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Abstract 
 
 
The concept ‘political religion’ has become the epitome of the ‘ideological turn’ in Holocaust 
research: the idea of the Nazi regime’s aim to replace Christianity and let its ideology function as a 
‘political religion’. But the heretical nature of National Socialism that has increasingly found its way 
into contemporary research remains untheorised in this context. This study seeks to address this gap 
by introducing the concept of ‘ideological incorrectness’ – a first step towards a re-theorisation of 
‘political religion’ that acknowledges the ideological divergence and the transgressive mindset so 
characteristic of the Nazis. 
With ideological divergence in mind, this thesis approaches Nazi ideology not from its ‘generic’ 
centre in Nazi Germany, but from its political peripheries. Combining analyses from archival material 
with text based research it examines a selected group of Danish and Norwegian National Socialists 
who went from being leaders of small, sectarian and pan-Germanic movements in their respective 
home countries throughout the 1930s, to becoming high-ranked SS men following the Nazi 
occupation of Denmark and Norway on 9 April 1940. The study reveals that contrary to the notion 
that National Socialism functioned as a substitute religion for Christianity, their hostility towards 
Christian confessionalism made them reject the idea of a ‘political religion’. The study further 
demonstrates how these individuals even used this religious critique in attacks against aspects of the 
Nazi regime that they deemed dogmatic. 
The contributions of this study revolve around conceptualising an alternative angle to ‘political 
religion’ that assumes that contrary to ‘correctness’, individuals were often incorrect towards official 
ideological doctrines. This incorrectness, in turn, does not equate with a lack of Nazi conviction. Far 
from it, the Scandinavian Nazis in this study regarded their ‘ideological incorrectness’ as a core value 
of National Socialism. The study thus contributes to the understanding of National Socialism in 
Scandinavia 1933-1945, while at the same time suggesting broader patterns that will advance research 
on National Socialism more generally. 
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Introduction 
 
 
There is no doubt about the interpretative importance of racial ideology to understanding the Third Reich. But this 
view has now turned into a catechism, depreciated by surplus use and acquiring a metaphysical explanatory status.
1
 
Alon Confino 
 
 
Ironically, the force of Nazi racial propaganda seems to have directed not only the Third Reich but 
also the academic practice of those who study the regime. Alon Confino’s analogy between the 
scholarly hype around the ideology concept and a religious catechism is not only a very compelling 
one, but it is also an implicit critique of the concept that has become the epitome of this ‘ideological 
turn’ in Holocaust research: the idea of the Nazi regime’s aim to replace Christianity and let its 
ideology function as a ‘political religion’. Like Confino’s point, the present study finds that the 
concept of ‘political religion’ has turned into a religion of its own, driven by a rigid notion of Nazi 
ideology based on a set of racist doctrines. The heretical nature of National Socialism that has 
increasingly found its way into contemporary research remains untheorised in this context. This study 
introduces the concept of ‘ideological incorrectness’ to explain that if National Socialism was ever to 
apply as a ‘religion’, it would require analytical room for ideological divergence and the transgressive 
mindset so characteristic of the Nazis’ ‘uncompromising generation’.2 
 
With ideological divergence in mind, this thesis approaches Nazi ideology not from its ‘generic’ 
centre in Nazi Germany, but from its political peripheries. At the same time, its peripheral position is 
a debatable label as Nazi propaganda regarded Scandinavia as the epicentre of Aryan supremacy. 
Precisely the Scandinavian ideological proximity to National Socialism combined with its 
geopolitical distance creates an ideal setting for discussing both the limitations and potential of 
‘political religion’. In other words, how did the peripheral yet in Nazi rhetoric ‘pure-blooded Aryans’ 
relate to the Nazi ‘political religion’? This thesis explores the way a selected group of Scandinavian 
National Socialists envisioned the relationship between Christianity and National Socialism, and 
between their nation-specific National Socialism and the Third Reich. They believed in an 
                                                          
1 Alon Confino ‘Why did the Nazis Burn the Hebrew Bible? Nazi Germany, Representations of the Past, and the 
Holocaust’, The Journal of Modern History, 84 (2012), p. 372. 
2 Michael Wildt’s notion of how the Nazi leadership was comprised of an ‘uncompromising generation’ will be 
discussed extensively throughout this thesis. 
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undogmatic, heretic National Socialism to the extent that they rejected dichotomies between ideology 
and religion in the first place.  
 
Within the timeframe of 1930 to 1945, I examine the intellectual life of a few Danish and Norwegian 
National Socialists who went from being leaders of small, sectarian and pan-Germanic movements 
in their respective home countries throughout the 1930s, to becoming high-ranked SS men and 
Waffen-SS soldiers following the Nazi occupation of Denmark and Norway on 9 April 1940. Beyond 
stereotypes of ‘Aryan warriors’, these individuals rejected the catechism of a particularly German 
racial ideology. They were incorrect with respect to the idea central to the theory of ‘political 
religion’: they objected to the assumption that Christianity and National Socialism were ideologically 
incompatible. Contrary to the notion that National Socialism functioned as a substitute religion for 
Christianity, the histories of the individuals presented in my study reveal how their hostility towards 
Christian confessionalism made them reject the idea of a ‘political religion’. The thesis goes on to 
describe how these individuals even used this religious critique in attacks against aspects of the Nazi 
regime that they deemed dogmatic. In other words, these Scandinavian Nazis ascribed features of 
‘political religion’ theory to Nazi Germany, but they did so in order to separate true National 
Socialism from the ‘political religion’ of a totalitarian regime. 
 
With the Scandinavian histories in mind, I offer an alternative angle to ‘political religion’ that 
assumes that contrary to ‘correctness’, individuals were often incorrect towards official ideological 
doctrines. The thesis introduces the concept of ‘ideological incorrectness’ to illustrate that the 
incorrectness does not equate with a lack of Nazi conviction. Far from it, the Nazis in this study 
regarded their ‘ideological incorrectness’ as a core value of National Socialism. 
 
 
I 
Scandinavian Heretics 
 
When the notion of ‘incorrectess’ plays such a major role in a thesis devoted to the study of what it 
is that defines Nazi ideology, one needs to address the question of relativism. When does a history of 
Nazi pluralism turn into a practice of historiographical relativism?  Indeed, the thoughts on National 
Socialism among this group of Scandinavian intellectuals as they are presented in this thesis will 
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come across as wishful thinking, naivety and perhaps even extraordinary sophistry, considering our 
knowledge today about the Nazi crimes and its violent ideology. So naïve that one could raise the 
question of whether these intellectuals count as ‘real Nazis’ or just delusional political idealists.  
 
In philosophical terms, intellectuals like Martin Heidegger would embrace the idea of relativism 
against dogmatic absolutism: ‘Philosophy is the opposite to all comfort and assurance. It is 
turbulence, the turbulence into which a man is spun’.3 These are words not dissimilar to how historian 
Peter Fritzsche described the Nazi modernist revolt against the morals and principles of truth of the 
‘old world’: ‘With every step, the political adventurer as much as the modernist poet or painter 
revealed ground that was tremulous, breaking apart, unclear. Liberal certainties that proposed to 
reveal the coherence of the world appeared completely inadequate.’4 The Scandinavian National 
Socialists analysed in the present study found in National Socialism a world-view that corresponded 
to this revolt against dogmas and the simultaneous acceptance of uncertainty. The line between a 
fanatical and perhaps just a naïve dream of Volksgemeinschaft and the active participation in genocide 
is as blurry for historians today as it was for many contemporary National Socialists. Julian Young 
raises this issue in his work on Heidegger’s presumed sympathy with Nazism. As a first step, just as 
Young sought to ‘establish what National Socialism really meant to Heidegger’5, the present thesis 
focuses primarily on the same point. For the individuals in this study, their National Socialist ideas, 
albeit both historically and theoretically flawed, nevertheless worked to define National Socialism 
for them. What Heidegger identified as the ‘inner truth’ of Nazism (thoughts that his defender Hannah 
Arendt wrote off as nothing but naïvety) – how Nazism challenged dogmas and encouraged genuine 
thinking – is a thought the reader of the thesis will recognise in statements made by the Scandinavian 
intellectuals chosen for this study. Young’s question of whether Heidegger’s ‘private National 
Socialism’ makes Heidegger count as a Nazi, equally applies to the Scandinavians: 
 
Did Heidegger, in 1933, embrace this century’s paradigm of evil? Did he […] subscribe to views on race [as] the 
logical outcome of which was the Holocaust? Or did he, on the other hand, subscribe to a ‘private National 
Socialism’ so private as to be something which, when properly understood, no right-thinking person would wish 
to take exception to? If the latter is the case, then the worst Heidegger can be convicted of is the political naivety 
                                                          
3 Martin Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude [1929-30] (trans. William 
McNeill and Nicholas Walker (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1995), p. 19. 
4 Peter Fritzsche, ‘Nazi Modern’ Modernism/Modernity, 3:1 (1996), p 12.  
5 Julian Young, Heidegger, philosophy, Nazism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 6. 
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of supposing that the Nazi movement could even become the embodiment of his conception of its ‘inner truth and 
greatness.6 
 
Heidegger’s ‘private National Socialism’ indicates a Nazi world-view with roots much broader and 
deeper than what any ‘political religion’ could achieve in terms of indoctrination. In Michael Wildt’s 
view, the Nazis were part of a much broader ‘uncompromising generation’ to which we can trace a 
part of the explanation behind the Holocaust. But it also tells us about the expressions of this 
transgressive mentality beyond the symbolic killing fields, gas chambers and Nuremberg parades that 
works to create distance between “us” and “them”. Fritzsche acknowledges this elusive task of finding 
Nazism behind its ‘end-result’ – the Holocaust – to see the more ‘humane’ aspects of Nazism that 
attracted individuals to the ideology in the first place: 
 
It requires that we focus less on unintended consequences, more on underemphasized premises, and that we view 
National Socialism as a distinctive, horrifying, but nonetheless plausible version of social renovation. That is not 
easy, for it makes the Nazis much more familiar, much more like us; it undermines cherished notions of how 
different “they” are from “us” or "we" are from “them.”7  
 
The Scandinavians in this study raised sharp critique of the regime. A critique that could compete 
with the most perceptive commentaries from contemporary Nazi opponents. Yet, they ascribed 
humanism and social responsibility to the ‘true’ core of National Socialism.  Many readers of the 
intellectual outputs of the Scandinavians might be struck by the absurdity of this combination. One 
might also come to raise the question of ‘how much of a Nazi’ these individuals really were as they 
frequently relativized Nazi ideology to fit their needs. The answer this thesis seeks to give is that the 
development in research on Nazi ideology, driven by the works of Fritzsche and Wildt, has come to 
a point where we can situate this absurdness into an analytical framework. ‘Ideological incorrectness’ 
is this thesis’ way to address the plurality of Nazi identities and conflicting views. Heidegger’s 
‘private’ Nazism did not make him less of a National Socialist. Indeed, compared to Heidegger, the 
Scandinavians in this study satisfy more of the standard criteria; they were SS-men and their political 
activism in National Socialist circles was high. Despite how different their ideas on the meaning of 
Nazism might appear to the images of the Nazi totalitarian dogmas and the Holocaust, these ideas 
nevertheless document the nature of National Socialism in Scandinavia. By drawing links between 
                                                          
6 Ibid, p. 11. 
7 Fritzsche, ‘Nazi modern’, pp. 3-4. 
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these ideas and the new historiographical research on Nazism in Europe, moreover, the thesis points 
to areas in international historiography where the fear of the Nazis being more like ‘us’ than ‘them’ 
persists to demonise the image of the ‘real Nazi’. 
 
Beyond the fruitfulness of comparison per se, these case studies thus complement each other and 
provide an argument that reaches beyond Scandinavia and towards the wider historiography of Nazi 
ideology.  The thesis follows a relatively small group of individuals and their subsequent entries in 
SS-led organisations during Nazi occupation. The Norwegian Ragnarok movement has a central role, 
but only 10 out of its approximately 100 members feature in this study. The same goes for the Danish 
case study, where the focus on the milieu around the intellectual Ejnar Vaaben includes fewer than 
10 close individual studies. Despite its narrow focus, the individuals and movements figuring in this 
thesis will throw light on historiographical issues relevant for contemporary historical research on 
both Scandinavia and other areas that once were parts of Nazi-occupied Europe. Through their radical 
outlooks, their contacts with the DNSAP leadership in Nazi Germany and their wealth of intellectual 
output between 1930 and 1945, these empirical case studies confirm and validate the analytical and 
less geographically-defined arguments that are made in chapters 1 and 2 of the thesis regarding the 
development of ‘political religion’-theory. Effectively, the thesis does not offer an extensive account 
of the political development of Nazi splinter parties in Scandinavia, as one might assume the standard 
geo-political comparative framework to be. Instead, its focus lies in analysing the National Socialist 
discourse among Nazi intellectuals in Scandinavia – both nationally and from a transnational 
perspective, to make a wider point about how we can understand National Socialism in Nazi Germany 
and the rest of Europe in the years 1930-1945. From that point of view, the selected case studies 
respond not only to the lack of Scandinavian studies in this particular field, but to a much wider gap 
in research dealing with the history of Nazi occupation and the intellectual discourses on National 
Socialism that arise from this political situation. In that sense, this intellectual discourse did not 
develop in a vaccum isolated from the political reality. Thus it is also important to stress that while 
this thesis is not operating within perpetrator studies in a strict way (i.e. this thesis does not seek to 
document the direct involvement of these Scandinavians in mass shootings or deportations) there are 
of course grey areas as most individuals in this study were active collaborators through SS 
involvement. Certainly, historical records do prove that the Ragnarok member Per Imerslund served 
in Division Wiking during a time when the division was involved in active participation in the 
Holocaust. In the timeframe of Imerslund’s voluntary service from July to October 1941, Wiking 
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passed through areas that were marked by the systematic slaughter of Jewish civilians.8 That being 
said, this is not a study about perpetrators’ motivations, but the research into perpetrator motivations 
and its linkage to the wider field of studies on Nazi ideology makes it a relevant area for the present 
study. 
 
This thesis is not the first to group these individuals together in an overall analysis. In fact, in the 
early 1930s the NSDAP found the National Socialist profiles of these individuals to be of particular 
interest to the Aryan visions of Nazi Germany. To the Nazi regime, the small Danish circle of 
individuals including Ejnar Vaaben and Wilfred Petersen and the group of Norwegians who were 
later to form the Ragnarok movement represented particularly promising National Socialist forces in 
Scandinavia. They were promising to the Nazi regime because they were, according to historians 
Terje Emberland and Matthew Kott, heretics.9 Himmler had a particular focus on those Scandinavian 
activists who stood in opposition to the major indigenous Nazi parties in Denmark and Norway, 
namely Frits Clausen’s Danmarks Nationalsocialistiske Arbejderparti (DNSAP) and Vidkun 
Quisling’s Nasjonal Samling (NS).10 The image of Clausen’s DNSAP and Quisling’s NS that appears 
in this thesis reflects the image provided by its opponents. Ragnarok and men like Vaaben often 
exaggerated the ideological gap between the pan-Germanic splinter movements on the one hand and 
DNSAP and NS on the other. This gap was used as a rhetorical device in proclaiming ideological 
originality at the time.11 
 
Therefore, by virtue of their radicalism, this group of individuals were on several occasions during 
the 1930s invited to Germany by the German Nazi party to attend ceremonies and receive ideological 
                                                          
8 Ibid., p.371. Emberland and Rougthvedt refer to F.H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol. 2 
(London: HMSO, 1981): ‘Radiotelegraphic messages, sent from Einsatzgruppen to Berlin were caught by British 
Intelligence and reported that “Norwegian battalions” participated in the final solution, in Galicia, early July 1941. At 
the time, the only Norwegians in south Russia belonged to Division Wiking.’ Emberland and Rougthvedt, Det Ariske 
Idol, p. 319. 
9 Ibid., pp. 81–83. 
10 Øystein Sørensen, Hitler eller Quisling: Ideologiske Brytninger i Nasjonal Samling 1940–45 (Oslo: J.W. Cappelens 
Forlag, 1989), p. 71. 
11 Indeed, the image of DNSAP as simply the German NSDAP’s ‘puppet party’ is questionable, considering DNSAP’s 
various attempts to distance itself from the German Nazi party, for example by propagating the relationship between 
National Socialism and the Nordic heritage and thus implying the necessity to consider the race principle from a Danish 
perspective too. Frits Clausen’s article from April 1933 was re-published in 1942 where Clausen continuously 
emphasise the racial bond between the Danes and the Germans; see Clausen, ‘Forholdet Dansk-Tysk’, Dansk Udsyn, 
2:2 (1942), pp. 72–73. For more insight on Quisling’s ideological profile and its divergences from Nazi Germany, see 
Hans Olaf Brevig and Ivo Figueiredo, Den norske fascismen. Nasjonal Samling 1933–1940 (Oslo: Pax, 2002). 
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education.12 Emberland describes the ‘heretical’ Ragnarok as the true representative of Nazism in 
Norway in its ongoing attempts to convince Quisling’s NS of its racially ideological philosophy.13 
The risk of viewing Ragnarok as a pure political pro-Nazi organ obscures the fact that the gods 
Ragnarok were to conquer were as much metaphysical as political.14 In a similar manner, and in the 
limited research on the subject, Danish historians describe Vaaben as a significant Danish Nazi in 
terms of his intellectual position, but less so in terms of political influence.15 
 
As we shall see in this thesis, shared experiences also shaped the internal relations between the 
Norwegian and Danish individuals. It is not surprising to note that their identities and future relations 
with Nazi Germany gradually became hard to separate from each other, and the thesis thus speaks of 
an emerging shared identity of ‘ideological incorrectness’ among these Scandinavians. If we assume, 
as Confino argues that contemporary research often tends to do, that National Socialist ideology 
emerged from the doctrines from a political centre, then the individuals of the present study were 
indeed ‘ideologically incorrect’. Their ‘ideological incorrectness’ and thus their strength to resist the 
doctrines of any establishment was in their view a demonstration of their true National Socialist 
identities. This particular point is discussed throughout the thesis, but from different angles: The first 
two analytical chapters describe how scholarship both today and through the works of Hannah Arendt 
and Eric Voegelin, stresses the Nazi revolt against dogmatism and conventional political ideologies. 
The empirical chapters then work to illustrate this point historically through the Scandinavian case 
study. Considering that the Nazi regime early on praised their heretical nature, the thesis discusses 
the potential for viewing ‘ideological incorrectness’ as a central feature of National Socialist ideology 
more generally. Emberland concluded by observing a paradox in how the Ragnarok editor and leader 
Hans S. Jacobsen ‘could adhere to a totalitarian ideology, but yet be emotionally against dictatorships 
and totalitarian tendencies’.16 It is, however, only a paradox when assuming a doctrinal rigidity in 
National Socialist ideology. The notion of ‘ideological incorrectness’ will be used throughout this 
thesis as a tool to demystify precisely these kinds of ‘paradoxes’. 
                                                          
12 Emberland and Kott, Himmlers Norge, pp. 81–83. 
13 Terje Emberland, Religion og Rase: Nyhedenskap og Nazisme i Norge 1933–45 (Oslo: Humanist Forlag, 2003), pp. 
15–16. 
14 Emberland, Rase, p. 263. 
15 Andreas Monrad Pedersen, ‘“Den nordiske tanke” – bidrag til en politisk biografi af Ejnar Vaaben’ in Fra 
Mellemkrigstid til Efterkrigstid, Henrik Dethlefsen and Henrik Lundbak (eds.) (Copenhagen: Københavns Universitet, 
1998), pp. 117–134; John T. Lauridsen ‘“Den forste graenseredder” – Ejnar Vaaben og den berlinske linie’, Fund og 
Forsking, 50 (2011), pp. 411–419. See more on this historiographical discussion in chapter 3. 
16 Emberland, Rase, p. 294. 
 
 
 
16 
 
II 
Sources 
 
The point this thesis seeks to make about ‘ideological incorrectness’ is not made with the aim of 
separating these organisations and individuals from the wider Nazi milieus in Scandinavia and 
Germany. In contrast, the thesis deliberately draws from external sources outside the isolated case 
studies to prove broader ideological patterns. Therefore, the thesis refers to various contributors in 
the Ragnarok pamphlet, the cooperation between Ragnarok and Eugen Nielsen’s Fronten, as well as 
the activities of men like Wilfred Petersen, Carl Frants Popp-Madsen and Jørgen Skeby, all of whom 
featured in the circles close to Vaaben and Andersen. 
 
Scandinavian historiography has compiled a wealth of historical studies on the political development 
of indigenous Nazism before and during the Nazi occupation. The present comparative study has thus 
taken a different direction in focusing firstly on the ideological exchange between Norwegian and 
Danish splinter parties, and secondly on the way a shared experience in facing the ‘official’ ideology 
of Nazi Germany informed this exchange. The approach therefore requires a broader base of sources 
than, for example, the archival material from Danish state institutions before, during and after the 
war, and German wartime records. The thesis combines these sources with the wealth of information 
left behind by those organisations and individuals examined. Findings from post-war trial records as 
well as the documented correspondence between the German occupation offices in Denmark and 
Norway and Berlin proved critical in framing the political context in which these actors found 
themselves. But these frameworks are not novel, and the thesis does not seek originality in its account 
of the political and organisational context. 
 
It is in the less explored personal archives of Ejnar Vaaben and Anders Malling where this thesis has 
departed and found a way to connect the intellectual works of these individuals to the intellectual 
outputs of their Norwegian and Danish colleagues. In combination with an extensive reading of 
individual contributions to papers and pamphlets, the works of Vaaben and Malling have thrown new 
light on the material produced by both Ragnarok and Aage H. Andersen’s Dansk Antijødisk Liga. 
While studies on the two already exist, the thesis offers an original comparative approach to their 
ideological profiles as well as illuminating unexplored areas of their works. 
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III 
Willing Scandinavians as Ordinary Europeans 
 
Confino’s notion of ‘the metaphysical explanatory status’ of ideology is not confined to studies on 
Nazi Germany. The ideological warrior, with his sadism, brutality and willingness, has become a 
dominating feature in representations of those Europeans who collaborated with Nazi Germany. 
Scandinavia, the Germanic ‘highlands’ in Nazi rhetoric, is a case study that more effectively than 
many others puts the finger on the issues at stake in the ‘ideological turn’. A division between Nazi 
policymakers and ‘ordinary men’ marked post-war historiography on perpetrators and it manifested 
in debates between the interpretive schools of intentionalism and functionalism. On the level of 
individual perpetrators, Dirk Moses has clarified the debate as one between structuralist explanations 
– such as contextual constraints of the inherent modernity of Nazi bureaucracy, and socio-
psychological theories on obedience17 – and emphasis on the role of Nazi ideology as its own logic 
to radicalisation.18 In general terms, as the so-called ‘new perpetrator research’ emerged in the 1990s, 
the functionalist–intentionalist debate increasingly lost its analytical value.19 The notion of ‘ideology’ 
as a driving force to the Holocaust was transferred from being a factor confined to the Nazi leadership 
to include the agency of the masses as studies on Holocaust collaboration increased. 
 
The dimension of collaboration also put the image of the ideologically ‘willing’ perpetrator into a 
wider geographical perspective. Parallel to the ideological turn was a tendency towards Europeanising 
the Holocaust perpetrator, and thus creating a framework that positioned the explanatory terms 
‘ideology’ and ‘context’ in opposition to each other. This framework grew from Daniel Goldhagen’s 
and Christopher Browning’s divergent interpretations of the Nazi Police Battalion 101, stationed in 
Lublin, Poland from the summer of 1942. The battalion is described by Goldhagen and Browning as 
being comprised of either ‘ordinary Germans’ or ‘ordinary men’. This labelling of either ‘men’ or 
                                                          
17 The social psychologist Stanley Milgram developed an experiment to investigate the human instinct of obedience 
towards authorities in his aim to explain Nazi killing, Obedience to Authority (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 
1974). Milgram’s framework was adopted to account for anonymous bureaucratic processes in Zygmunt Bauman’s later 
critique of Western modernity and rationalisation; see Modernity and the Holocaust (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1989). 
18 A. Dirk Moses, ‘Structure and Agency in the Holocaust: Daniel J. Goldhagen and His Critics’, History and Theory, 
37:2 (1998), p. 199. 
19 The term ‘New Perpetrator Research’ encompasses research since the 1990s, and the term figures in Gerhard Paul’s 
survey of perpetrator historiography in ‘Von Psychopaten, Technokraten des Terrors und “ganz gewöhnlichen” 
Deutschen: Die Täter der Shoah im Spiegel der Forschung’ in Die Täter der Shoah: Fanatische Nationalsozialisten 
oder ganz normale Deutsche?, ed. Paul (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2002), pp. 13–90. 
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‘Germans’ forwarded two rigid perpetrator types: Goldhagen presented ‘ordinary Germans’ from a 
‘cognitive-anthropological model’ who acted on behalf of nation-specific German culture ‘pregnant 
with murder’.20 Browning, in turn, followed socio-psychological lines of argument in his statement 
that these ‘ordinary men’ demonstrated the universal human disposition to evil that ultimately 
rendered cultural and ideological factors of secondary importance.21 
 
On the face of it then, the two ‘turns’ appear oxymoronic and the scope of research in the last two 
decades has surely shown that no primacy can be given to either the pan-European ‘context’ or the 
Nazi ‘ideology’ when discussing the mechanisms behind the Holocaust. In considering that these two 
terms of ‘context’ and ‘ideology’ effectively counted as two isolated explanatory concepts in post-
war historiography between 1960 and 1990, contemporary research is said to have moved beyond 
this dichotomy, a move manifested in attempts to capture the dynamic between the two terms, rather 
than mapping their positions in an explanatory hierarchy. 
 
The Scandinavian ‘context’ was indeed highly ‘ideological’. The occupation of Denmark and Norway 
in April 1940 also created the possibility of recruitment of ‘Aryan fighters’ in a transnational racial 
struggle. Seen from the Scandinavian perspective, the fact that Nazi race theory positioned 
Norwegians and Danes at the top of the racial hierarchy adds to the number of reasons why scholars 
increasingly investigate Scandinavian collaboration as a mirror of Nazi faith. Although Danish 
research put weight on the country’s own development of race hygiene as part of a broader 
international community, and thus not Nazi-specific,22 the Norwegian case has most persistently 
focused on the way race theory drove Scandinavian collaboration. Apart from giving evidence for 
how the Nazis and particularly Himmler’s SS fundamentally perceived Norway through the lens of 
racist ideology,23 there is also a growing emphasis on the direct connections between Nazi policy in 
the East and the Norwegian occupation. The latter’s police system, according to Matthew Kott and 
Bernt Rougthvedt, went through an ‘education for genocide’ which could be directly put into practice 
                                                          
20 Daniel J. Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1997). 
21 Christopher Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland (New York: 
HarperPerennial, 1993). 
22 Lene Koch, Racehygiejne i Danmark 1920–56 (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1996). 
23 Terje Emberland, ‘Å Stjele Godt Bondeblod: Heinrich Himmler, Walther Darré, SS og den Norske Bonde’, Fortid, 2 
(2009), pp. 19–34 and Emberland and Jorunn Sem Fure (eds.), Jakten på Germania: Fra Nordensvermeri til SS-
Arkeologi (Oslo: Humanist Forlag, 2009). 
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in Eastern Europe, and thus the thesis’ conclusion moves beyond the case of Norway in order to 
demonstrate the deep ideological core of Nazi occupational policies from east to west.24 
 
Yet, scholars increasingly point to how the ‘ideological turn’ has tended to consolidate the notion of 
‘ideological collaboration’ as a one-dimensional reflection of a Nazi policy. By example, Antero 
Holmila’s research on the Nazi occupation of Finland identifies a retreat to a rigid intentionalist–
functionalist dichotomy. According to Holmila, these binary structures fail to encompass more 
complicated aspects such as the fact that the seemingly ‘intentionalist’ unfolding of Finnish 
collaboration nevertheless revealed an absence of overwhelmingly pro-Nazi convictions, such as 
widespread anti-Semitism.25 Holmila thus detects a wider phenomenon where Western peripheral 
events were increasingly integrated within the framework of the Nazis’ master plans for racially 
reorganising Europe. 
 
Similarly, Anton Weiss-Wendt’s study on Estonian collaboration, which according to Nazi sources 
revealed one of the higher levels of collaboration and lower degrees of resistance,26 also questions a 
literal reading of Nazi aims when approaching collaboration. Weiss-Wendt illustrates the complexity 
behind the concept of ‘ideological collaboration’ by giving evidence for how Estonian nationalism 
rather than fierce anti-Semitism drove the Estonian persecution of the Jews.27 Ultimately, what could 
appear as an ideological blueprint was in fact a collaboration built around Estonian nationalist 
sentiments which did not necessarily contradict elements in Nazi ideology, but neither were they a 
mere replication. Confino’s notion of the ‘catechism of ideology’ is replicated in several scholarly 
observations of how approaches to National Socialism seem to lack analytical flexibility in the light 
of studies on collaboration. 
 
There is indeed little doubt about the level of brutality that informed genocidal actions among not 
only Germans but also among Europeans more generally. But arguably, this focus on a ‘European 
                                                          
24 Matthew Kott and Bernt Rougthvedt, ‘Kongsvinger: Politiutdannelse eller Opplæring i Folkemord?’, Fortid, 2 
(2009), pp. 6–14. See also Dirk A. Riedel, ‘Die SS-Inspektion z.b. Vin Norwegen. Nationalsozialistische Täter in den 
Gefangenen-lagern für jugoslawische Partisanen’, in Timm C. Richter (ed.) Krieg und Verbrechen. Situation und 
Intention: Fallbeispiele (Munich: Martin Meidenbauer, 2006), pp. 119–122. 
25 Antero Holmila, ‘Finland and the Holocaust: A Reassessment’, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 23:3 (2009), pp. 
414–416. 
26 Anton Weiss-Wendt, Murder without Hatred: Estonians and the Holocaust (New York: Syracuse University Press, 
2009), p. 336. 
27 Ibid., p. 333, See also Weiss-Wendt’s concluding discussion on pp. 344–45. 
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willingness’ to collaborate with Nazi Germany also comes with a political agenda. It is fair to say 
that the scholarly development also responds to present demands on confessional contributions to the 
construction of a ‘humanitarian Europe’ – founded upon the dark memory of the Holocaust. When 
the left-liberal intellectual Jürgen Habermas traced the relevance of Goldhagen’s work, it was to be 
found ‘in the connection between political self-understanding and historical awareness’ when facing 
continuous crimes against humanity.28 Other scholars add that ‘countries can no longer simply declare 
themselves neutral or claim that they were enemies of Nazism; now everyone is guilty’.29 
Alternatively, in Tony Judt’s compelling formulation: ‘Holocaust recognition is our contemporary 
European entry ticket.’30 
 
The representation of the Holocaust in European identity politics is an expression of Jeffrey 
Alexander’s notion of the ‘widening of the circle of perpetrators’.31 The Holocaust perpetrator was 
‘reconstructed’ through a process of ‘simultaneous historical detachment and deepening emotional 
identification’. This personification of the universal perpetrator figure made the Holocaust into a 
‘symbolic extension’ of defining inhumanity while serving as the antithesis of Human Rights-projects 
in the new Europe.32 Consequently, with a paradoxical universalisation of the image of a particular 
sadistic perpetrator, the ordinary perpetrator was attributed personal motivation and willingness. 
What Geoff Eley called the ‘Goldhagen effect’33 is arguably an expression of how the 
historiographical ‘ideological turn’ extended to the political realm, and brought with it its reductionist 
tendencies. 
 
A closer look at Norwegian and Danish publications on Scandinavian Nazi collaboration clearly 
shows the analytical influence of Goldhagen’s work – and the tendency of public media to enhance 
its sensationalism. Furthermore, Goldhagen’s main argument that evidence of the perpetrators’ 
sadism was a confirmation of ideological conviction is also absorbed in this context. Between 2012 
and 2014, the Norwegian journalist Eirik Veum published a trilogy on Norwegian wartime Nazi 
                                                          
28 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Goldhagen and the Public Use of History: Why a Democracy Prize for Daniel Goldhagen?’, in 
Shandley (ed.), Unwilling, p. 265. 
29 Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider, The Holocaust and Memory in the Global Age (Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 2006), p. 202. 
30 Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945 (New York: Penguin Press, 2005), p. 803. 
31 Jeffrey Alexander, ‘On the Social Construction of Moral Universals: The Holocaust from War Crime to Trauma 
Drama’, European Journal of Social Theory, 5:1 (2002), pp. 37–38. 
32 Ibid., p. 43–44. 
33 Geoff Eley, ed., The ‘Goldhagen Effect’: History, Memory, Nazism—Facing the German Past (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 2000). 
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activities with the collective title: ‘The Ruthless Norwegians’. Followed by a massive debate, Veum 
revealed the names of those Norwegian citizens who served the agenda of Nazi occupation, including 
members of Quisling’s paramilitary force Hirden, the state police and the Gestapo.34 A review of the 
books in the tabloid newspaper Verdens Gang described Veum’s work as ‘a catalogue of horror’. 
This register of Norwegian citizens furthermore clarifies a horror ‘made in Norway’ and not a product 
of the traditionally demonised German Nazism. The reviewer thus stresses that ‘the willing 
Norwegian helpers enabled the German occupational machinery to assert domination to the extent 
that the German presence would not have lasted without it’.35 In Denmark, Dennis Larsen’s book 
Suppressed Gruesomeness tells a similar story: a review of the book in the leading Danish newspaper 
Berlingske Tidene was headed ‘Danish Gruesomeness’.36 Similar to Hitler’s Willing Executioners, 
Larsen’s work attracted attention for its extensive usage of horrific witness accounts of the bestial 
violence and murder perpetrated by the SS guards. However, the detailed presentation of this ‘Danish 
sadism’, the review argued, was entirely necessary in order to bring Denmark into the reality of the 
Holocaust. That is, through the insight of how the Danes ‘went just as far as the Nazis in their extreme 
acts of violence’.37 
 
The works of Veum and Larsen show willingness and sadism on behalf of the Scandinavian Nazi 
collaborators. The irony of this quest for Scandinavian particularism is that it reveals its debt to 
Goldhagen’s highly problematic linkage between ideological motivation and genocidal actions. 
While the scholarly practice of demonisation seemed confined to the early post-war years, it 
resurfaced in a different shape through the ‘Goldhagen effect’: Browning’s ordinary men with profane 
motives stood in analytical opposition to Goldhagen’s methodologically problematic yet to many 
scholars appealing thesis on the ideological sacralisation of genocidal violence. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
34 Eirik Veum, Nådeløse nordmenn: Statspolitiet 1941–1945 (Oslo: Kagge Forlag, 2012); Nådeløse nordmenn: Hirden 
1933–1945 (Oslo; Kagge Forlag, 2013); Nådeløse nordmenn: Gestapo 1940–1945 (Oslo: Kagge Forlag, 2014). 
35 See review in Verdens Gang, 13 November 2014: http://www.vg.no/rampelys/bok/bokanmeldelser/bokanmeldelse-
eirik-veum-naadeloese-nordmenn-gestapo/a/23334774/ [accessed 15 May 2015]. 
36 Dennis Larsen, Fortrængt grusomhed – danske SS-vagter 1941–45 (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2010). For the review, 
see Bent Blüdnikow, ‘Dansk Grusomhed’, Berlingske Tidene, November 17, 2010:  http://www.b.dk/boeger/dansk-
grusomhed  [accessed 18 May 2011] (my emphasis). 
37 Blüdnikow, ‘Dansk Grusomhed’. 
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IV 
Between Sacred and the Profane 
 
The division of the ‘sacred vs profane’ will be discussed from diverse angles in the two analytical 
chapters. The thesis argues that the ‘sacred’ and ‘profane’ schools continue to structure approaches 
to ideology in general and theories on ‘political religion’ in particular. The focus of this thesis is 
primarily on the ‘sacred’ approaches, which in scholarly terminology refers to the phenomenologist 
school of ‘political religion’ theory. Indeed, my empirical research does not concern a regime with 
an aim to construct a ‘political religion’ with the force of state machinery. Those types of questions 
are traditionally confined to functionalist approaches, while the phenomenologist school focuses on 
the individual experience of a religious belief. In other words, the phenomenologist school promises 
a breadth that makes it applicable to research on National Socialist conviction beyond state 
propaganda and coercion. On the face of it then, this is the approach to ‘political religion’-theory most 
relevant to examining this concept in the context of Nazi-occupied areas where there was no 
experience of state-initiated rituals, ceremonies and propaganda like those played out in Nazi 
Germany during the 1930s and 1940s. 
 
The complexity of examining the Nazi ‘political religion’ outside of Nazi Germany increases when 
considering the interpretive dichotomies that mark the contemporary use of the concept. The thesis 
finds that the use of ‘political religion’ and its analytical limitations has its roots in the scholarly 
poliarisation of the works of Hannah Arendt and Eric Voegelin. They have polarised as 
representatives of ‘profane’ and ‘sacred’ approaches to Nazism and its explanatory role in the 
Holocaust.Voegelin’s phenomenological theory on ‘political religion’ is described as a turning point 
– towards a greater focus on ideological motivation, and away from Arendt’s alleged focus on the 
banal and profane factors behind the Holocaust. The two analytical chapters depart from this putative 
polarisation and offer two ways of looking at how the phenomenological approach as an analytical 
tool has continued to demonise Holocaust perpetrators. Both chapters conclude that the concept of 
‘ideological incorrectness’ is a move beyond this false dichotomy of the ‘sacred’ and the ‘banal’. The 
concept of ‘ideological incorrectness’ is reflected in the works of Voegelin and Arendt where their 
emphasis on the transgressive dimension of Nazi ideology has tended to be ignored and shows that 
works of Arendt and Voegelin were pioneering in ascribing ‘ideological incorrectness’ to Nazism. 
Their binary position in academia is a historiographical construct that contributes to Confino’s notion 
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of ‘the catchesism of racial ideology’ rather than an adequate description of Arendt’s and Voegelin’s 
approaches to National Socialism. 
 
Chapter 1 examines the use of ‘political religion’ among scholars today. The chapter focuses 
primarily on the issues with the ‘sacred’ phenomenologist understanding of ‘political religion’ where 
it firstly explains a divide between two schools of ‘political religion’ theory. This divide has worked 
to create a gulf between studies on Nazism, where the ‘political religion’ has taken a ‘sacred’ 
phenomenological dimension, and studies on fascism where ‘political religion’ reads as more of a 
‘profane’ and historically measurable tool in comparing totalitarian regimes. Considering the 
peripheral focus on the empirical case study, a section on transnational studies on Nazism further 
clarifies why this fusion would benefit contemporary research, stressing that this field of study lacks 
a flexible framework for studying National Socialist expressions across Europe. The boom in research 
on Holocaust collaboration has worked to bridge the gap between ‘sacred’ and ‘profane’ approaches, 
but a re-theorisation of ‘political religion’ beyond these stereotypes remains necessary. The chapter 
concludes that the phenomenological school with its emphasis on a sacralisation of violence and 
ideological passion struggles, despite its promises, with its tendencies to demonise National 
Socialism. 
 
Considering the analytical weakness of the phenomenologist school, chapter 2 examines the roots to 
this approach to ‘political religion’. It is a deeper examination of the discussion on how ‘political 
religion’ connotes dogma and indoctrination. The chapter reveals that, ironically, this type of criticism 
of the phenomenologist school was present already in the works of Hannah Arendt and Eric Voegelin 
– two of the most influential intellectuals in the historiography of Nazism. Contemporary research 
points to Voegelin as the ‘founding father’ of the phenomenologist school. What is less known, 
however, is his rejection of ‘political religion’ following several decades of critique of structuralist 
Holocaust historiography. Ironically, Voegelin’s rejection of his own concept was motivated not only 
by a revolt against the homogenising impulse of Nazi ideology, but also by his observation that 
contemporary scholarly interpretations of Nazism echoed the ideological rationale of a quest for 
singularity. In this vein, the chapter argues that the tendency to consolidate both Arendt and Voegelin 
in their oppositional historiographical positions is ironically a reminder of the quest for singularity, 
which these two intellectuals sought to overcome. Ironically, as we shall see in the following 
empirical chapters, Voegelin described the totalitarian Nazi state in terms not dissimilar to the 
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Scandinavians’ attitudes to the Nazi authorities following the occupation. What is more, Voegelin 
and Arendt found the most forceful (or in their view, most lethal) aspect of National Socialism to be 
its transgressive nature – the same transgressive nature as the ‘ideological inccorrectness’ that the 
Scandinavians emphasised as the true core of their belief. The breadth of National Socialism beyond 
totalitarian dogmas and quests for singularity and towards its capacity to encapsulate diverse political 
movements and attitudes across Europe, was Nazism’s dangerous novelty. This ‘ideological 
incorrectness’ was Voegelin’s biggest reason to reject his own concept ‘political religion’ as too 
narrow in analyses of Nazism. The same ‘ideological incorrectness’ encouraged the Scandinavian 
intellectuals to reject the dogmas of the Nazi regime while maintaining a firm belief in ‘true’ National 
Socialism beyond coercive singularisation. 
 
There are also striking parallels between Voegelin’s rejection of ‘political religion’ as an analytical 
concept and those made by scholars today. He shared with Hannah Arendt the understanding of 
National Socialist ideology as being conceptually transgressive.They agreed that no conventional 
concepts of ‘ideology’ could encompass National Socialism and its crimes. This way of thinking 
about Nazism has been overshadowed by simplistic and structuralist adaptations of Arendt’s banality 
thesis. The thesis traces a continuous tendency of demonisation in the scholarly applications of 
Voegelin’s phenomenological understanding of ‘political religion’. His concept emphasised the 
sacred dimension of National Socialism, an emphasis on the primacy of ideology that by the 1990s 
had fully replaced Hannah Arendt’s much-debated notion of the banality of the Nazi Adolf Eichmann 
in particular, and the implementation of the Holocaust in general. 
 
 
V 
Scandinavian research 
 
There is an already established consensus that this type of ‘ideological incorrectness’ makes sense in 
a German context. The aim of this thesis is to bring ‘ideological incorrectness’ into the framework of 
Nazi collaboration in Europe. Politically, this is a straightforward argument: there was naturally an 
aspect of incorrectness in the landscape of different nation states and Nazi groups heading for a 
continent-wide war. The empirical research is thus less devoted to analyses of the ‘religious’ 
dimensions of the state propaganda in the Third Reich. Rather, it focuses on Scandinavian 
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intellectuals who indeed proclaimed a radical National Socialist identity but did so within national 
contexts – Norwegian and Danish – that separated them from the German Nazis. The doctrine of 
‘Aryan supremacy’ became less rigid and entailed multiple meanings among the Scandinavians as 
they faced German occupation of their home countries. The Nazi ‘political religion’ appeared rather 
different from the viewpoint of those National Socialists, radical in their convictions but politically 
tied, who faced Nazi Germany from the ‘outside’. The Scandinavian study clarifies Nazi plurality in 
the clearest sense: the conflictual relationship between peripheral Nazi organisations and the National 
Socialist mothership, Nazi Germany. 
 
Choosing this particular non-German case study throws light on what the analytical chapter identifies 
as one of the key issues with ‘political religion’: the concept lacks broadness, and rather than being 
able to address the heterogeneity of Nazism, ‘political religion’ appears as dogmatic in its application 
as the ideology it is supposed to illustrate. In an increasingly ‘Europeanised’ historiography on 
Nazism and the Holocaust, any framework for studying ideological collaboration ought to work with 
a concept of ‘ideology’ as such that accommodates divergent National Socialist practices and policies. 
The individuals of this study attached an undogmatic and essentially heterogenic meaning to National 
Socialism that moreover separated it from confessional Christianity and even Italian fascism. This 
identification of Nazism as unorthodox and undogmatic compared to the beliefs of ‘the old world’ is 
not confined to the Scandinavian context, but works to confirm this aspect of National Socialism as 
something shared among Nazis across national borders. 
 
Social-psychological accounts of both Norwegian and Danish volunteers did take place in the 1950s; 
they demonstrated that these men were far more civilised than any ordinary criminal was.38 But as 
the rather one-dimensional post-war narrative of heroic resistance flourished in Scandinavia, the 
‘traitors’ were presented as alcoholics, opportunists and even victims of weak character – but rarely 
as thinking individuals.39 It is clear that the aim of challenging post-war demonisation is central in 
                                                          
38 On Norwegian volunteers, see Ørnulv Ødegård, ‘The Incidence of Mental Disorder among the Norwegian 
Quislings’, Acta Psychiatrica Nevrologica (1947), pp. 568–73 and later Harald Frøshaug, ‘A Social-Psychiatric 
Examination of Young Front-combatants’, Acta Psychiatrica Neurologica, 30 (1955), pp. 443–465. On Denmark, 
Thomas Sigsgaard, Psykologisk Undersøkelse av Mandlige Landssvigere under Besættelsen (Copenhagen: Direkotratet 
for Fængselvæsenet, 1954). 
39 This is especially evident in the first historical representation of the war years in Denmark, edited by the former 
resistance member, Wilhelm LaCour, in the three-volume, Danmark Under Besættelsen, 1945–47 (Copenhagen, 
Westermann, 1945–47). See also the essays in Arnd Bauerkämper, Odd-Bjørn Fure, Øystein Hetland and Robert 
Zimmermann (eds.), From Patriotic Memory to a Universalistic Narrative? Shifts in Norwegian Memory Culture after 
1945 in Comparative Perspective (Essen: Klartext, 2014). 
 
 
 
26 
 
the current state of research. Henrik Lundtofte’s research on Danes in the Gestapo during the 
occupation is an example of the move away from demonisation, as Lundtofte stresses that ‘you were 
not a Gestapo man – that was something one became’.40 
 
Post-war demonisation aside, we have already established that there is evidence of a later and much 
more complex tendency of demonising the Nazis in the rhetoric of Goldhagen’s ‘willing warrior’ that 
now has a transnational European charge. The appeals of Nazi racial ideology are, however, integral 
to any analysis of Scandinavian collaboration. Contemporary research thus increasingly focuses on 
the particular Scandinavian perceptions and expectations of this ‘ideological occupation’. For 
example, a growing number of Norwegian historians argue that the ideological collaboration with 
Nazi Germany stemmed from a particular Norwegian ideological strand of ‘Aryan supremacy’.41 
Other historians have approached the race question in a manner that downplays its relevance among 
those Scandinavians who called themselves National Socialists. Danish historian Steffen Werther 
presents a dilemma among Danish National Socialists of choosing between ‘race’ and ‘people’ – a 
dilemma conceptually translated as a conflict between supranational, pan-Germanic visions on the 
one hand and nationalist sentiments on the other.42 Werther thus depicts an essential conflict between 
the race idea and national implementation of National Socialism. That being said, the emphasis on 
Scandinavian particularity and ideological independence from Nazi Germany is as present in 
Werther’s work as it is among those scholars arguing for a particular Scandinavian race idea. Terje 
Emberland’s study of Ragnarok illustrates this consensus among scholars to emphasise an indigenous 
drive behind the Nazi landscape in Scandinavia. Emberland balances the evidence for Ragnarok’s 
German sources of inspiration with an emphasis on an idiosyncratic mix of pagan religion, Nazi race 
thinking and Norwegian nationalism.43 
 
                                                          
40 Henrik Lundtofte, Gestapo! Tysk Politi og Terror i Danmark 1940–45 (Copenhagen: Gads Forlag, 2003), p. 102, and 
Dennis Larsen, Fotrængt Grusomhed: Danske SS-vagter 1941–45 (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2010). 
41Jon Røyne Kyllingstad, Kortskaller og langskaller. Fysisk antropologi i Norge og striden om det nordiske 
herremennesket (Oslo: Scandinavian Academic Press/Spartacus, 2004). 
42 Steffen Werther, ‘SS-Vision und Grenzland-Realität. Vom Umgang dänischer und “volksdeutscher” 
Nationalsozialisten in Sønderjylland mit der “großgermanischen” Ideologie der SS’, Ph.D. Thesis, Stockholm Studies in 
History 95 (Stockholm University 2012), p. 329. Accessed online http://su.diva-
portal.org/smash/get/diva2:475516/FULLTEXT01.pdf [accessed 20 February 2014]. 
43 Emberland, Religion og Rase. On the particular establishment of Nordischer Ring and the idealisation of ‘The Nordic 
Race’, see Nicola Karcher, ‘Den Nordiske Bevegelses “Generalstab”: Nordischer Ring og Samarbeidet med Norske 
Raseforskere’, Fortid, 2 (2009), pp. 43–52. 
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Emberland’s study of Ragnarok effectively nuanced Øystein Sørensen’s classic divide between 
nationalism and racism that traditionally marked Norwegian historiography. Sørensen described 
Quisling’s Nasjonal Samling (NS) as divided between Norwegian nationalists and followers of a 
racist pan-Germanism.44 Apart from Emberland’s study, Ivo de Figueiredo’s and Hans Olaf Brevig’s 
publication on Norwegian fascism remains one of the few comprehensive studies in the last decades 
on the content of Nazi belief in Norway. Another example of how Scandinavian emphases on 
particularity have related to the ‘German factor’ in historiography is the attempt to adapt analytical 
concepts used on German National Socialism to fit the Scandinavian context. Stein Ugelvik Larsen 
applied his concept of ‘charisma from below’ to Quisling’s leadership. This is a notion with reference 
to Max Weber’s term ‘charismatic leadership’ that often function as a sub-category in discussion on 
the Nazi construction of a ‘political religion’. Ugelvik argued that Quisling’s leadership, albeit 
different from Hitler’s type of charisma, generated its own form of loyalty. The point is that Quisling 
was far from a political opportunist, but instead a reflection of his movement, in which ‘many people 
wanted the same things that Quisling did’.45 In other words, there is clear evidence of how scholars 
have transnational ambitions with analytical concepts such as ‘political religion’.46 
 
The grass-roots perspective on Scandinavian fascism aside, the pattern of studying ‘ideological 
collaboration’ from the perspective of its relative failure has dominated Norwegian and Danish post-
war historiography. The last decade of Danish research, however, indicates a development beyond 
theories on ‘why not’, and towards the question of ‘why did the Danish Nazis have followers at all?’47 
John Lauridsen describes this academic tendency as a way to show the limitations of generic theory 
in research on comparative fascism. While acknowledging the importance of the comparative 
perspective, Lauridsen advocates analytical frameworks that enhance individual, national cases and 
their divergences from ‘high theory’.48 He presents Frits Clausen’s DNSAP as a political sect and 
revolutionary party that borrowed influence from Germany but gradually gained a specific Danish 
character.49 A part of the explanation behind Lauridsen’s call for a more complex analytical 
framework stems from the incorporation of the individual stories of Danish Waffen-SS volunteers in 
                                                          
44 Øystein Sørensen, Hitler eller Quisling: Ideologiske Brytninger i Nasjonal Samling 1940–45 (Oslo: J.W. Cappelens 
Forlag, 1989), p. 27. On Emberland’s comments, see Religion og Rase, p. 17. 
45 Stein Ugelvik Larsen, ‘Charisma from below? The Quisling Case in Norway’, Totalitarian Movements and Political 
Religions, 7:2 (2006), pp. 243–244. 
46 See also Terje Emberland’s analysis of Ragnarok’s ‘political religion’ in Chapter 4. 
47 John T Lauridsen, Dansk Nazisme: 1030–45 – og derefter (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2002), pp. 50–51. 
48 Ibid., pp. 45–47. 
49 Ibid., pp. 60–61. 
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his argument. As Lauridsen continues, the significance of these volunteers for historical research is 
not the fact that 75% of them were members of the DNSAP, but that 25% were not. Yet, his interest 
does not lie within the defined category of the 25%; instead, Lauridsen argues that measurements of 
Nazism according to political membership have become far too simplistic. This categorisation further 
ignores a historical-sociological dimension of ‘political conviction’.50 For Lauridsen, the individual 
cases of the volunteering soldiers are symbols of the agency behind political membership records, 
and beyond demonisation stemming from Nazi ideal-types.51 
 
Despite Lauridsen’s criticism of the categorical juxtaposition of the ‘political’ with the ‘ideological’, 
he is dependent on the pioneering research on Danish Waffen-SS volunteers conducted by three 
historians representing the young generation of Danish scholars. In their study published in 1998, 
Peter S. Smith, Niels B. Poulsen and Claus B. Christensen were motivated by the aim of moving 
beyond the stereotyping and demonisation of the Waffen-SS men that had traditionally characterised 
previous literature.52 The Norwegian post-1990s scholarship on Waffen-SS volunteers was more of 
a slow starter. Earlier post-war studies from Ole Andreas Dahl and Svein Blindheim on the 
Norwegian Legion are conventional military-political approaches from the 1970s and thus outdated 
in terms of both documentary evidence and analytical precision.53 The past eight years, however, have 
witnessed a boom in research on Norwegian volunteers in the Waffen-SS. In the Danish case, an 
emphasis on both national and individual particularities implies a move beyond Hans Werner 
Neulen’s argument that the Waffen-SS represented a Eurofaschismus quite distinct from Nazism.54 It 
also departs from the more conventional line introduced by George Stein and later modified by Bernd 
Wegner of viewing the organisation as the vital core of the SS’ and Himmler’s ideological 
intentions.55 Both interpretations suggest not an ordinary soldier, but a political and ideological 
warrior. In contrast, the study by Christensen et al represents the current Scandinavian historiography 
as they conclude that ‘the service of the Danish volunteers is thus the story of Nazi ideology 
                                                          
50 Ibid., p. 27. 
51 Ibid., p. 112. 
52 Claus Bundgård Christensen, Niels Bo Poulsen and Peter Scharff Smith, Under Hagekors og Dannebrog: Danskene i 
Waffen SS 1940–45 (Emkjær: Aschehoug Viborg, 1998), p. 15. 
53 Ole Andreas Dahl, Frontkjemperbevegelsen i Norge, Unpublished Master Thesis (Universitetet i Oslo, 1972) and 
Svein Blindheim, Nordmenn under Hitlers Fane: Dei Norske Frontkjemparane (Oslo: Noregs Boklag, 1977). 
54 Hans Werner Neulen, An deutscher Seite. Internationale Freiwilligen von Wehrmacht und Waffen-SS (Munich: 
Universitas, 1985). 
55 George H. Stein, The Waffen-SS: Hitler’s Elite Guard at War 1939–1945 (New York: Cornell University Press, 
1966), p. 122 and Bernd Wegner (Trans. Ronald Webster), The Waffen-SS: Organization, Ideology and Function 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), p. 22. 
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implemented in real life’.56 For the purpose of this thesis, ‘ideological incorrectness’ is thus not a 
dividing line between what ideology is and what it is not; rather, it describes National Socialism as a 
borderland where the cerebral term ‘ideology’ meets reality – not for the sake of reducing the 
explanatory power of ideology, but to rethink the assumed ‘correctness’ of the term. 
 
VI 
The Empirical Case Study 
 
The first chapter of the empirical case study is chapter 3 in the thesis. It begins with the simple 
question of why there were several Nazi groups in Denmark, as well as in Norway, during the 1930s. 
It is an introduction to those individuals and organisations present throughout the thesis, and therefore 
it takes the shape of a prosopography, a collection of brief biographies. The focus throughout the 
chapter is the relationship between Nazi radicalism and political structures, which becomes so 
obvious in studying expressions of Nazism outside Nazi Germany. Chapter 3 uses the example of 
Otto Ohlendorf, a man who in many ways stands as an archetypical Nazi through his fusion of intellect 
and radicalism. I compare his profile to that of the Scandinavian intellectuals present in this study. 
What they lacked in terms of political significance they gained in their radical profiles, where the 
meaning they ascribed to National Socialism resonates clearly with the ideological outlooks of 
‘generic’ Nazis like Ohlendorf. By the end of the chapter, I discuss the limits and benefits of using 
Michael Wildt’s notion of the ‘unbound generation’ on those men who called themselves real 
National Socialists – in Scandinavia. 
 
Chapter 4 examines the connection between Nazi groups and theological circles in Scandinavia on 
the relationship between National Socialism and the term ‘political religion’. It compares Voegelin’s 
‘phenomenological’ school with the thoughts on religion present in this theological milieu. The 
chapter departs from Klaus Vondung’s distinction between the mysticism associated with a ‘volkish 
religion’ contrary to a ‘political religion’ understood as Hitler’s socially dominant (sozialdominante) 
religion in the Third Reich. The critique of Christianity among National Socialists such as Anders 
Malling, Jørgen Skeby and members of Ragnarok often resembled the criticism of the politics of Nazi 
Germany – at the same time as they praised the ‘religious qualities’ of National Socialism. It became 
                                                          
56 Christensen et al., Under Hagekors, p. 96. 
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a matter of distinguishing between a functionalist and constructed religion on the one hand, and an 
organic, phenomenological understanding of religiosity on the other. Neither of them saw National 
Socialism as a ‘political religion’ – a substitute for Christianity – but as a worldview that encompassed 
conceptual contradictions such as those between ‘religion’ and ‘politics’ and ‘Christianity’ and 
‘National Socialism’. In that sense, these movements were ‘theologically incorrect’. First, they were 
consciously incorrect towards a rigid Christian evangelicalism, as they proposed the Christian 
interaction with National Socialism, thus the Christian interaction with worldly matters, as the source 
for Christian liberalist reform. Second, from an ideological angle, it is very interesting to note that 
the discourse on religion and politics underlined the sources of conflict between these movements 
and the power politics of the Nazi regime. This chapter thus indicates the first step of ‘theological 
incorrectness’ in the movement’s discourse on religion, while the next chapter discusses more directly 
their ‘ideological incorrectness’ as a natural consequence of the first. As will be discussed extensively 
in both chapters, the opposition to the dogmatic structures of the Nazi doctrine of the superiority of 
racial laws did not merely have a structural resemblance to the critique of Christian dogmatism, but 
it was also a comparison made explicit by several members of these Danish and Norwegian 
movements. For them, the future of Christianity as well as National Socialism lay in the incorrectness 
towards their respective dogmas, because only in that way was a true interaction between these two 
worldviews possible. 
 
Chapter 5 moves beyond the isolated study on ‘political religion’ and towards Nazi ‘pluralism’ more 
generally. It moves from the point on ‘theological incorrectness’ and shows how the historical context 
drove this idea towards a manifestation of ‘ideological incorrectness’ as the Scandinavians faced the 
dilemma of competing Nazi visions. It focuses on this power-political imbalance between the 
Scandinavian individuals and Nazi Germany and examines how this imbalance shaped the discourse 
on transnational Nazism among Ragnarok members and Ejnar Vaaben’s circles. While 
‘transnationalism’ was not part of their explicit vocabulary, these individuals theorised National 
Socialism as a fundamentally transnational ideology because of this imbalance. In mapping out this 
complex relationship between national particularity and the transnational framework, these 
Scandinavians acted ‘ideologically incorrectly’ in the sense that their National Socialist perceptions 
deviated from the officially sanctioned ‘doctrines’ from Berlin. They also embraced ideological 
incorrectness as a symbol of deviation from the constraints of a Nazi ‘political religion’, and as the 
only true principle to follow in order to fruitfully implement National Socialism on Scandinavian soil. 
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In this sense, ‘ideological incorrectness’ is a conceptual illustration of the attempt these 
Scandinavians made to merge theory with practice in order to explore the boundaries of transnational 
Nazism. As this introductory chapter shows, ‘ideological incorrectness’ is not only useful in exploring 
the historical events in which Nazi pluralism expressed itself through transnational Nazi 
collaboration, but it is equally important in order to understand how these movements made sense of 
this collaboration in the first place. 
 
While the previous chapter focuses on the ideological dilemmas that awaited these Scandinavian 
intellectuals as Nazi Germany occupied their home countries, chapter 6 gives a more detailed account 
of the organisational and political mechanisms that underpinned these dilemmas. The majority of 
individuals examined in the thesis entered the SS-led organisations Schalburgkorpset and Germanske 
SS Norge, where they took leading positions within the areas of propaganda and ideological education 
within the organisations. Previous chapters stress the emphasis that Vaaben and Ragnarok members 
put on the pivotal position of pluralism in National Socialist ideology. This final chapter explains 
how this embrace of pluralism became for them a political necessity. It returns to the comparison 
between the Scandinavians and Ohlendorf. While all of them praised the violence of the National 
Socialist ‘fighting worldview’ (kämpferische Weltanschauung), geopolitical borders and institutional 
boundaries lent the Scandinavians’ understanding of it a different meaning from the Germans’. Their 
version of the Nazi ‘fighting worldview’ not only engaged in idealist battles against liberalism, the 
confessional church and fascism, but also against precisely the imperialism and ‘fanaticism’ of the 
Third Reich as it occupied Denmark and Norway on 9 April 1940. This final chapter thus focuses on 
the situations following the German occupations where ‘ideological incorrectness’ took its most 
political and tangible form. 
 
The stories in the four empirical chapters disrupt the homogeneous narrative of the archetypal SS 
man who succumbs to the rites and dogmas of the SS ‘political religion’. These movements and 
individuals operated in the grey zone between being de facto collaborators and being the strong voices 
of Nazi critique in their respective countries. Consequently, far from providing coherence, the 
histories of the ordinary Scandinavian men who described themselves in far from ordinary terms, as 
‘ideological prophets’, ‘action idealists’ or simply ‘the true believers of National Socialism’, fused 
the ‘sacred’ and the ‘profane’ up to a point where they can no longer be viewed separately
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 Chapter 1: Between the Sacred and the Profane: 
 
‘Political Religion’ and Nazi Collaboration in Europe 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In a lecture on the potentials and limitations of the concept of Volksgemeinschaft (People’s 
Community) in Nazi historiography, Ian Kershaw raised one particular concern: ‘How do you turn a 
propaganda slogan into a tool for analytical explanation?’1 For Kershaw, the concept represented a 
striving for explanatory coherence. The obsession with the ‘Nazi Success Story’ bordered on 
reductionism, which in turn was an awkward fit within an academic paradigm driven by the 
imperative of challenging the ‘orthodoxy’ of structuralism. 
 
Kershaw’s question illuminates a historiographical phenomenon not confined to debates on the 
Volksgemeinschaft. The passage could also have been an excellent introduction to the notion that 
National Socialism was a ‘political religion’. The Nazi Volksgemeinschaft and ‘political religion’ are 
products of a much broader academic phenomenon that increasingly stresses the explanatory strength 
of ‘ideology’ in Holocaust research. This chapter examines how the theory on ‘political religion’ has 
sought to redefine National Socialist ‘ideology’, and finds that despite its culturally inclusive label, 
‘political religion’ has a consensual emphasis that leaves little room for theorising the heterogenic 
nature of National Socialist ideology. The growing evidence of the transgressive nature of the Nazi 
genocide also transgresses the boundaries of ‘political religion’s’ previous distinctions. Ultimately, 
‘political religion’ assumes a far too correct reading of ideological dogmas when instead the room for 
‘ideological incorrectness’ was the true factor that can explain the extent of National Socialist 
collaboration in Europe. 
 
                                                          
1 Ian Kershaw, Volksgemeinschaft: Potential and Limitations of the Concept. Keynote Lecture at the international 
conference ‘German Society in the Nazi Era. “Volksgemeinschaft” between Ideological Projection and Social Practice’, 
co-organised by the German Historical Institute London and the Institut für Zeitgeschichte München-Berlin, 25 to 27 
March, 2010: http://www.ghil.ac.uk/podcast.html [accessed 26 August 2014]. 
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The chapter begins by mapping out the deeper structures of ‘political religion’, illustrating how for a 
long time ‘sacred’ and ‘profane’ approaches marked a divide in historiography. This divide has 
become increasingly more difficult to separate in light of recent research into fascist Holocaust 
collaboration. That breadth of violence that integrated fascist and National Socialist agencies across 
Europe is one further argument for the need to rethink the way ‘political religion’ is theorised. A 
section on transnational studies on Nazism and European fascism further clarifies why a fusion of 
‘sacred’ and ‘profane’ approaches to ‘political religion’ benefits contemporary research, stressing that 
a flexible framework for studying National Socialist expressions across Europe is needed. The 
Scandinavian case illustrates the limitations with ‘political religion’ as it situates the concept within 
a transnational context with its heterogenic Nazi expressions. When Holocaust research points to the 
gospel of transgression rather than blind confession, an ‘integrated’ theory of ‘political religion’ is 
missing. 
 
That said, an integrated theory of ‘political religion’ requires a closer look at the current assumptions 
surrounding the concept today. The second part of this chapter tackles the two classic schools of 
‘political religion’: the phenomenologist and the functionalist. The divide between the 
phenomenologist and the functionalist school addresses in more historiographical terms the divide 
between sacred and profane approaches to ‘political religion’. Since this present thesis is a study 
devoted to National Socialist organisations, the chapter focuses primarily on the issues with the 
‘sacred’ phenomenologist understanding of ‘political religion’. Ironically, the anti-structuralist turn 
in historiography has safeguarded the phenomenologist’s sacred approach to ‘political religion’ from 
methodological scrutiny to a much higher degree than analyses of the functionalist school. Despite 
its culturally inclusive label, ‘political religion’ persists in connoting dogma and indoctrination. 
Drawing from current research that identifies a transgressive principle at the heart of National 
Socialism, the chapter finally introduces the term ‘ideological incorrectness’ as a response to this 
issue. 
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I 
Holocaust between Apocalypse and Normality 
 
‘The total dissonance between the apocalypse that was and the normality that is makes adequate 
representation elusive, because the human imagination stumbles when faced with the fundamental 
contradiction of apocalypse within normality.’2 Holocaust historian Saul Friedländer’s words 
describe the Holocaust and the uniqueness of the scope of violence that for Friedländer was not only 
unprecedented in history, but posed a unique problem to the writing and representation of history. In 
this vein, Friedländer illustrated what he saw as the impossibility of historicising the Holocaust: the 
impossibility of integrating the event within the conventional framework of modern European history. 
This historicisation as such was, according to Friedländer, stumbling upon the clash between 
apocalypse and normality; between, on the one hand, the unique and ‘sacred’ that was National 
Socialism and its crimes, and the uncanny normality and profaneness of traditional history writing on 
the other. The Nazis, in Friedländer’s view, crossed a ‘theoretical outer limit’ that unhinged their 
crimes from the ‘normality’ of conventional historical methodology.3 The question of whether 
National Socialism should be seen as an integral part of a ‘normal’ European historical framework or 
separated from it due to its uniqueness formed the core to the German Historikerstreit in 1986, in 
which Friedländer participated as a spokesperson for the uniqueness argument.4 This divide, not freed 
from political considerations regarding Germany’s future in a united Europe, had carved the contours 
for differentiating the ‘sacred’ National Socialism from the ‘profane’ European fascism. 
 
To tackle this pattern of dichotomies in Holocaust studies, Friedländer embarked upon the project of 
writing an ‘integrated history of the Holocaust’. In Years of Extermination, he presented a different 
account of the event, and the perpetrators.5 It followed the methodological imperative of ‘not 
eliminating or domesticating that initial sense of disbelief’.6 Friedländer unconventionally gave the 
centre stage to the victims’ experiences found in diaries from the Holocaust period rather than 
                                                          
2 Saul Friedländer, ‘The Shoah in Present Historical Consciousness’, in Memory, 
 History and the Extermination of the Jews in Europe (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), p. 51. 
3 Ibid., pp. 82–83. 
4 Dirk Moses, German Intellectuals and the Nazi Past (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 219–229. 
5 Saul Friedländer, Years of Extermination: Nazi Germany and the Jews, 1939–1945 (New York: HarperCollins, 2007). 
6 Wulf Kansteiner, ‘Success, Truth and Modernism in Holocaust Historiography: Reading Saul Friedländer Thirty-Five 
Years After the Publication of Metahistory’. History and Theory, 48:2 (2009), p. 48. Friedländer in Stone, ed., The 
Holocaust and Historical Methodology. 
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documents from the perpetrators’ archives in order to illustrate precisely that ‘human imagination’ 
which stumbled against the apocalyptic drive of the perpetrators. Years of Extermination marked a 
historiographical paradigm in this sense, but scholars raised concerns: What about the perpetrators? 
Was there a clash of ‘human imagination’ and apocalypse in the worlds of the perpetrators?7 
Friedländer was certainly aware of the risk of simultaneously demonising the perpetrators in the 
process of humanising the victims. He thus sought to maintain a sense of disbelief by describing a 
clash between a ‘redemptive anti-Semitism’ – a peculiarly German, and sacred, drive of the Nazi 
leadership – and the complicity of Western European societies that formed a web of collaboration 
across the continent.8 While Nazi policies were defined as a fusion of mystical racism and a 
‘decidedly religious vision’ of Aryan Christianity that shaped this German redemptive anti-Semitism, 
Friedländer devotes less space to the rationale behind European collaboration. Rather, he presents 
European collaboration soberly as an empirically measurable entity freed from metaphysical 
motivational forces. This divide implicitly underscores Friedländer’s argument that National 
Socialism transgressed the conventional and comparative framework of European history. Its 
compelling methodological novelty aside, the dichotomy created between National Socialism and its 
fascist collaborative agents persisted. 
 
Friedländer’s portrayal of the Nazi ‘political religion’ broadened the spectre of Holocaust perpetrators 
in the way it fused the worlds of the profane collaborators with sacred fantasies of a Nazi apocalyptic 
mission. But it did not tackle the issue of demonisation: to avoid presenting the Nazi perpetrators as 
supernatural zealots, a theorisation of the human and profane mechanisms behind the project of 
collaboration only becomes fruitful in the light of a closer look at what exactly it was that made up 
the sacred ‘political religion’ of the Nazi project itself. Considering that the concept of ‘political 
religion’ has been used in analyses of both fascist movements and National Socialism, the divide in 
‘profane’ and ‘sacred’ understandings of the concept has worked to consolidate them as two opposing 
camps in the understanding of not only religion but, as it turns out, also the nature of Nazi ideology. 
‘Political religion’ has tended to be drawn either towards the mystification that comes with the sacred 
and incomprehensible labels, or the simplification of the concept when used as a comparative, profane 
                                                          
7 Alon Confino, ‘Narrative Form and Historical Sensation: on Saul Friedländer’s The Years of Extermination’, History 
and Theory, 48:3 (2009), p. 203 and Doris L Bergen. ‘No End in Sight? The Ongoing Challenge of Producing an 
Integrated History of the Holocaust’, in Christian Wiese and Paul Betts (eds.), Years of Persecution, Years of 
Extermination: Saul Friedländer and the Future of Holocaust Studies (London: Continuum, 2010), p. 297. 
8 Saul Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews: The Years of Persecution, 1933–1939 (New York: HarperCollins, 
1997), pp. 73–11. 
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tool in describing the external similarities between traditional religion and ‘political religion’. In this 
sense ‘political religion’, to use Friedländer’s terminology, inhabits both ‘apocalypse’ and 
‘normality’ and the concept thus stands at a theoretical crossroads between the sacred National 
Socialism and the profane phenomenon of fascist collaboration. Translated into the field of Holocaust 
studies, this chapter argues that we are speaking of a concept that on the one hand aims deep into the 
minds of single individual perpetrators and their sacred fantasies, which are impossible to represent 
historically. On the other hand, to follow a more ‘profane’ path, ‘political religion’ through its 
increased application in fascist movements also represents a scientific, comparative scholarly 
tradition with a sense of normality that is bound to clash with the sacred dimensions often attributed 
to the Holocaust. 
 
 
II 
The Europeanisation of the Holocaust Perpetrator 
 
The deep division between ‘profane’ and ‘sacred’ representations of the Holocaust was consolidated 
with the Historikerstreit in the mid-1980s, but crumbled in the face of a series of events in the 1990s. 
Beyond the killing fields in the ‘Wild East’, the opening of former Soviet archives revealed a 
continent-wide scale of Holocaust collaboration, reaching from Oslo in the west to Kiev in the east. 
The evidence of continent-wide collaboration prompted the ‘reworking of the past’ also within 
Western European nation states.9 This historiographical development of ‘Europeanising’ the 
Holocaust perpetrator is reflected in the contrasts between two works on Holocaust perpetrators 
published between 1996 and 2011. The latter is Christopher Hale’s Hitler’s Willing Foreign 
Executioners: Europe’s Dirty Secret with a title that explicitly worked to challenge the main argument 
in the former, Goldhagen’s debated publication from 1996 on the willing German executioners.10 
Goldhagen’s history of the ‘ordinary Germans’ implied a sacred dimension to German National 
Socialism where ordinary Germans were infected by a uniquely German brand of ‘eliminationist 
antisemitism’ that nurtured a particularly barbaric and German Holocaust perpetrator.11 In contrast, 
                                                          
9 Roni Stauber (ed.), Collaboration with the Nazis: Public Discourse after the Holocaust (London: Routledge, 2011). 
10 Christopher Hale, Hitler’s Foreign Executioners: Europe’s Dirty Secret (Stroud: The History Press, 2011). 
11Daniel J. Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (New York: 
 Knopf, 1996); A. Dirk Moses ‘Structure and Agency in the Holocaust: Daniel J. Goldhagen and His Critics’, History 
and Theory, 37:2 (1998), pp. 194–219. 
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Hale’s emphasis on ‘willing’ collaborators revealed a barbarism and fanaticism that crossed cultural 
and geopolitical borders beyond Nazi state power – but within Europe. The collaborators were indeed 
Hitler’s helpers, but their help was not the result of blind bureaucratic practice or totalitarian coercion, 
but of their own beliefs. The zealous Nazi perpetrator had company in the no less willing or convinced 
European collaborator. 
 
The binary positions between the European collaborator and the Nazi perpetrator follow the same 
dichotomous logic as that of the traditional divide between European fascism and German National 
Socialism. In an integrationist spirit similar to that of Friedländer, Aristotle Kallis’ work on fascist 
collaboration in the Holocaust is a European story of the ‘eliminationist mindset’ behind the murder 
of the European Jews that united the fascists and National Socialists. In his notion of a ‘fascist 
agency’, Kallis aims to illustrate ‘an emerging sense of an international fascist loyalty centred on the 
idea of a NS-led crusade for the regeneration of Europe’.12 Moreover, he describes an ‘almost 
metaphysical allegiance’ that ‘integrated a plethora of parallel eliminationist agencies and projects 
from across the continent into a single history-making crusade of pan-European regeneration.’13 
Described as an almost sacred and supernatural fusion of National Socialist and fascist agency, Kallis’ 
work moves a step closer towards the integration of the sacred and the profane approaches to the 
perpetrators’ motivations. With words like ‘allegiance’, ‘integration’ and ‘fusion’, Kallis’ argument 
represents a growing focus on the transnational dimensions of fascist and National Socialist ideology. 
 
 
III 
Holocaust and Transnational Studies 
 
The transnational turn in wider European historiography finds its expression in the scholarly 
directions of histoire croisée, entangled histories, and the concept of ‘transfer’ history 
(Transfergeschichte), all of which are approaches that in Hartmut Kaelble’s words have become 
                                                          
12 Aristotle Kallis, Genocide and Fascism: The Eliminationist Drive in Fascist Europe (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 
209. 
13 Ibid., p. 13. 
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‘comprehensible’ through the very experience of transnational wars.14 The transnational dimension 
of the field has past and present roots when considering both the implementation of the genocide in 
the midst of a transnational war and the central positioning of the Holocaust in European history 
writing of the past two decades. The transnational character shows in how scholarly trends have been 
quickly absorbed from other fields such as social and cultural history.15 Indeed, the history of the 
event itself has proven such an interpretative challenge to the conventional scholarly framework that 
the analytical tools developed for these contexts have transferred to areas related, but not confined, 
to the Holocaust. 
 
The transfer that stands out in this latter case is the one between Holocaust research and the field of 
fascist studies. Naturally, considering the geographical, temporal and thematic proximity, this 
scholarly exchange has indeed been a constant in post-war historiography. The link between fascism 
and the Holocaust was pioneered – albeit not explicitly – by Hannah Arendt’s thesis on totalitarianism 
from the 1950s. Her aim to develop a concept for comparative studies on the extreme politics of 
interwar Europe was in turn adopted – and modified extensively – by scholars of fascism in the 1990s 
through the concept of ‘political religion’.16 Adding to this, however, the transnational turn held a 
pan-European dimension, a result of European integration since the 1990s and the vast influx of 
empirical documentation on Nazi collaboration, which further highlighted the intersections of the two 
fields. Dan Stone clarifies this triangular relationship between fascism, the Holocaust and the 
European continent with precisely the term ‘transnational’: 
 
                                                          
14 Hartmut Kaelble, ‘Between Comparison and Transfers – and What Now?: A French-German Debate’ in Comparative 
and Transnational History: Central European Approaches and New Perspectives, eds. Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and 
Jürgen Kocka (New York: Berghahn Books, 2009), p. 36. 
15 The most recent example is arguments for the use of cultural history as methodology only on ‘softer’ stories of the 
victims of the Holocaust, but also as an anthropological approach to the motivations and mindsets of the Nazi 
perpetrators. See Alon Confino’s contributions: ‘Fantasies about the Jews: Cultural Reflections on the Holocaust’, 
History and Memory, 17: 1–2 (2005); ‘A World Without Jews: Interpreting the Holocaust’, German History, 27:4 
(2009); ‘Why did the Nazis Burn the Hebrew Bible? Nazi Germany, Representations of the Past, and the Holocaust’, 
The Journal of Modern History, 84:2 (2012), pp. 369–400; and Dan Stone, ‘Holocaust Historiography and Cultural 
History’, Dapim: Studies on the Shoah, 23 (2009), pp. 52–68. 
16 The relationship between fascism and totalitarianism under the umbrella term ‘political religion’ was pioneered by 
Emilio Gentile in ‘Fascism, Totalitarianism and Political Religion’, Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, 5:3 
(2004), pp. 326–375, especially pp. 337–346. See also the works of the fascist studies scholar Roger Griffin, Modernism 
and Fascism: A Sense of Belonging under Mussolini and Hitler (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). The 
totalitarianism thesis dates back to Hannah Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism (1952), produced the same decade 
as she interestingly enough criticised the ‘political religion’ concept, a term that appeared among contemporary 
intellectuals in the interwar period. See Arendt, ‘[The Origins of Totalitarianism]: A Reply’, The Review of Politics, 
15:1 (1953), pp. 76–84. 
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The Holocaust was thus a transnational phenomenon, not because Jews lived everywhere in Europe but because 
the issue of collaboration had their roots in national cultures as well as the imposing transnationalism in the racial 
ideology of Nazism – in order to solve the Jewish Question.17 […] The events we call the Holocaust represent a 
totality defined by this very convergence of distinct elements.18 
 
 
Against the backdrop of this transnational lens through which we view the Holocaust, fascist studies 
faced a scholarly turn that significantly challenged previous traditions within their own narrow field. 
This challenge is illustrated well in what Federico Finchelstein describes as an interpretative divide 
on the meaning of fascism: while the field of Holocaust studies on the one hand generally has an 
experiential emphasis in its approach to fascism, the field of fascist studies on the other hand tends to 
lean towards an intellectualist framework. Intellectualist in the sense that the search for a generic or 
an ‘ideal type’ of fascism that naturally draws from ideological reading guides the scholarly work, 
rather than an emphasis on the more mundane and violent expressions of fascism in historical 
reality.19 Also Kallis finds this methodological and interpretative divide to be a distorting dichotomy 
in contemporary fascist studies, and similarly to Finchelstein, he identifies the dichotomy as one 
between intellectual, ideological approaches and those approaches that are experiential.20 For 
transnational studies, ‘the ideological “minima” offers only limited insight into the various country-
specific permutations of fascism’.21 
 
That said, in order to capture the pan-European dimension and a sense of entanglement between the 
various instances of fascist violence across the continent, both Finchelstein and Kallis use the term 
‘transnationalism’ to maintain a sense of coherence within the mosaic of fascist stories they present. 
Yet, the step from transnational fascism understood as a set of entangled but diverse and country-
specific histories of fascism, and an underlying quest for an ‘ideological minima’ is small. The 
question is of course to what extent ‘transnational’ fascism does what it promises, if it does serve as 
an analytical bulwark against simplistic and totalising pan-European concepts, which overlook the 
                                                          
17 Dan Stone, Histories of the Holocaust (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 18. 
18 Ibid., p. 15. 
19 Federico Finchelstein, ‘Fascism and the Holocaust’, in Dan Stone (ed.), The Holocaust and Historical Methodology 
(Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2012), pp. 256–58. The ‘generic school’ of fascist studies is most commonly associated with 
Roger Griffin’s claim in 2002 that a consensus had been reached among fascist scholars on the main factors constituting 
generic fascism; see Griffin, ‘The Primacy of Culture: The Current Growth (Or Manufacture) of Consensus within 
Fascist Studies’, Journal of Contemporary History, 37:1 (2002), pp. 21–43. 
20 Aristotle Kallis, ‘Studying Inter-war Fascism in Epochal and Diachronic Terms: Ideological Production, 
Political Experience and the Quest for “Consensus”’, European History Quarterly, 34:1 (2004), p. 11. 
21 Ibid., p. 15. 
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important mechanisms of competing fascist intentions. Alternatively, is ‘transnationalism’ just 
another voguish expression of the historians’ quest for consensus among themselves – a consensus 
which, ironically, might not be mirrored in the actual histories of the fascist movements? 
 
Indeed, those scholars focusing on only one specific geographical area or movement within Europe 
during the time of Nazi occupation and the Holocaust would agree with Kallis’ argument on the 
fascists’ sense of a shared identity across national borders. Nevertheless, regional scholars downplay 
the international dimension in favour of an emphasis on conflict and nation-specific divergences from 
this ‘NS-led crusade’. Regardless of whether we turn east or west, Holocaust historians with a specific 
emphasis on fascism and Holocaust collaboration thus distinguish themselves from fascist studies 
scholars working on the same theme. By downplaying a transnational fascist loyalty and instead 
focusing on national borders as symbolic disruptions of the scholarly – or the generic historians’ – 
approaches to an international fascist coherence, Holocaust studies have had a significant effect on 
contemporary fascist scholarship.22 While the divide between scholars of fascism and the Holocaust 
in dealing with fascism on a transnational basis is smaller today, the difference between regional and 
generic approaches indicates that the divide persists. 
 
By way of synthesis, recent years have witnessed how scholars from fascist studies increasingly 
employ the term ‘transnational fascism’ as a symbol of challenge, rather than a breeding ground for 
the making of an international fascist loyalty. In Arnd Bauerkämper’s words, ‘fascist cooperation was 
continuously hampered by mutual antagonism’.23 Samuel H. Goodfellow, in his study of the diverse 
nature of interwar fascist expressions in the Alsace region, goes so far in his emphasis on the role of 
conflict to argue that the idea of a cooperative fascist international is the very oxymoron of fascist 
transnationalism. Moreover, the crux of the concept’s oppositional relationship lies in the way we 
approach the ‘ideological minima’. As transnationalism in his view assumes less coherence and rather 
emphasises ‘cumulative processes over time’, Goodfellow argues that the actual failure among 
various groups across Europe to create a consensual ideological framework for fascism ‘also points 
                                                          
22 Recent regional approaches that emphasise the idiosyncratic nature of regional fascism vis-à-vis the Nazi 
occupational project range from Eastern peripheries to Western Europe. For example, on Croatia, see Alexander Korb, 
Im Schatten des Weltkriegs: Massengewalt der Ustasa gegen Serben, Juden und Roma in Kroatien 1941–1945 
(Hamburger Edition HIS, 2013). In Western Europe and the SS occupation visions for Norway and the Nordic 
countries, see Terje Emberland and Matthew Kott, Himmlers Norge. 
23 Arnd Bauerkämper, ‘Transnational Fascism: Cross-Border Relations between Regimes and Movements in Europe, 
1922–1939’, East Central Europe, 37: 2–3 (2010), p. 214. 
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to the central features of transnational fascism’.24 Contrary to the quest for definitional consensus and 
ideological minima then, to understand fascism from a transnational point of view ultimately ‘means 
embracing a degree of definitional fluidity’.25 
 
That is not to say that a quest for a universal fascism, effectively transnational in its nation-
transgressing sense, did not exist among these various movements at the time. Goodfellow stresses 
that the fascists created and re-created an essentially different type of universality. He comments on 
the way research has presented ‘universal fascism’ as an ideology that mysteriously was already 
‘there’ when the fascists themselves embarked upon their political projects towards reductionist 
scholarly practice. Goodfellow’s point is that fascist movements across Europe appropriated 
‘universal’ doctrines selectively to match their idiosyncratic agendas, which in turn depended upon 
regional and socio-economic contexts. Goodfellow illustrates this relationship between transnational 
and universal fascism compellingly as he writes that ‘in the focuses of affirming universality, fascists 
created differences’.26 Transnational fascism thus demands definitional fluidity not because it adheres 
to the ideals of our contemporary scholarly practice, but because this fluidity was a historical reality. 
 
It is against this backdrop of the ‘transnational’ turn in studies on National Socialism that we must 
situate the theoretical crux of ‘political religion’. The double application of ‘political religion’ to both 
fascist and Nazi agencies does indicate a possible way of integrating the Holocaust into the framework 
of European political violence. The breadth inherent in the term’s connotations of a religious belief 
system corresponds to the loose framework required when examining the phenomenon of a European-
wide collaboration. However, it would also mean incorporating a mundane and comparative approach 
to the relationship between Nazi and collaborationist agencies. In other words, precisely the approach 
that Friedländer objected to in his striving to maintain the sense of uniqueness in which National 
Socialism transcends the realm of ‘normal’ history. In the following section, however, a closer look 
at the ‘sacred’ application of ‘political religion’ also reveals a rigid structuralist tendency that would 
benefit from a more historicised application that comes with the use of the term in fascist studies. 
 
 
                                                          
24 Samuel H. Goodfellow, ‘Fascism as a Transnational Movement: The Case of Interwar Alsace’, Contemporary 
European History, 22:1(2013), pp. 88–89. 
25 Ibid., p. 88. 
26 Ibid., p. 102. 
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IV 
‘Political Religion’  
 
‘Political religion’ is a concept that heavily depends on the user’s particular understanding of religion 
as such. In 1917, the theologian and historian Rudolf Otto published Das Heilige (The Sacred) which 
sought to illustrate the varieties of religious experience in the realm of the irrational. Otto meant that 
for the believer, God ‘was not an idea, an abstract notion, a mere moral allegory. It was a terrible 
power manifested in the divine wrath […] It is like nothing human or cosmic.’27 One finds this 
description of Otto’s piece in Mircea Eliade’s The Sacred and the Profane, written 40 years later. 
Eliade’s work departed from Otto’s point on how traditional religions comprise, and were thus the 
result of, the beliefs that arose from individual experiences. Otto’s claim that these religious 
individual experiences were fundamentally different from the ‘natural realities’ and beyond human 
comprehensiveness was central yet modified in Eliade’s subsequent argument; for Eliade, this 
distinction had quasi-universality, and thus he came to signify the proper rationalisation of the divide 
between the sacred and the profane. 
 
With this traditional distinction of religious theory in mind, we can begin to see how it shaped the 
concept of ‘political religion’. Originally, it developed as an intellectual response to the rise of fanatic 
mass politics across the political spectrum in interwar Europe including fascism, National Socialism 
and communism.28 In 1952, Waldemar Gurian reflected upon three decades of unprecedented 
political violence arguing that ‘we observe today an astonishing spectacle […] the totalitarian 
movements which have arisen since World War I are fundamentally religious movements’.29 Because 
of the broad platform for comparison that ‘political religion’ assumed, the individual approaches 
among contemporary intellectuals varied widely. Some resisted the rise of National Socialism on 
more conventional ‘political’ grounds, such as the theories on totalitarianism put forward by 
Frederick Voigt, Franz Borkenau and Sigmund Neumann,30 while others argued from the point of 
‘religion’, such as Gurian and Adolf Keller who more explicitly pointed to the movements as secular, 
                                                          
27 Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1959), pp. 9–10. 
28 Dan Stone, Responses to Nazism in Britain, 1933–1939: Before War and Holocaust (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2012). 
29 Waldemar Gurian, ‘Totalitarian Religions’, Review of Politics, 14:1 (1952), p. 3.  
30 Frederick Voigt, Unto Caesar (London: Constable & Co, 1938); Franz Borkenau, The Totalitarian Enemy (London: 
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non-Christian by-products of modernity.31 Their approaches nevertheless merged in a shared 
emphasis on the relationship between uncompromising state power and the rise of pseudo-religious 
belief systems in an era of mass politics. 
 
Common for these elaborations on ‘political religion’ were also the intellectual references to Emile 
Durkheim’s understanding of religion. For the sociologist Durkheim, religion was a social 
phenomenon, ‘a set of shared beliefs’, and in that sense different from Otto’s individual and existential 
approach. Because Durkheim understood religion as a product of society, it was not sacred or 
supernaturally inspired. Instead, its mundane character allowed for the study of religion to be 
comparative.32 From this Durkheimian perspective, concepts of ‘sacred religion’, ‘civil religion’ and 
‘political religion’ flourished in interwar Europe, because when one interprets religion as a social 
phenomenon, this view on religion signals a phenomenon that also transgresses outside its divine 
realm. For observers, the messianic leadership of the new political movements, their apocalyptic 
rhetoric and the fanatical crowds surrounding them became sources of comparison under the 
symbolically accessible umbrella term ‘political religion’. 
 
The Durkheimian analysis of religion laid the theoretical foundations for the functionalist school 
within political religion theory. It is most prominently associated with the French sociologist and 
philosopher Raymond Aron who based his notion of a ‘secular religion’ on his wider analysis of the 
reasons behind the success of totalitarian regimes.33 Similar to the contemporary intellectuals listed 
above, Aron primarily approached the sacred aura of Nazism from the angle of its function for the 
regime and thus took a bird’s-eye view of the mechanisms behind the leaders and their followers in 
totalitarian regimes. Hence, Aron saw ‘political religion’ in a functionalist sense: it was a political 
construction and a direct imitation of Christianity for purposes of domination. 
 
The collective emphasis at the core of the functionalist understandings of ‘political religion’ gives it 
a ‘profane’ character when compared to the second strand of thinkers on ‘political religion’ – the 
phenomenologist school. Emerging from the German-born political theorist Eric Voegelin’s work on 
‘political religion’ in the late 1930s, phenomenological approaches to ‘political religion’ are different 
                                                          
31 Waldemar Gurian, ‘Totalitarian Religions’, Review of Politics, 14:1 (1952), pp. 3–14; Adolf Keller, Religion and 
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from the functionalist in the sense that their underlying philosophy is the absolute opposite to 
Durkheim’s religious philosophy.34 Voegelin’s work adopted a theory on religion similar to Otto, and 
he regarded William James as his main intellectual inspiration.35 James’ psychological approach to 
religion distinguished radically between the individual ‘religious experience’ and ‘external’ religion, 
and was in this sense radically different from the ‘profane’ and external focus of the functionalist 
school. Moreover, James was – as we shall see later in the case study in this thesis – a great influence 
on the interwar liberal theological milieu that had a profound impact on the Scandinavian National 
Socialists’ approaches to religion. Voegelin’s distinctively phenomenologist take on ‘political 
religion’ thus stemmed from his focus on the individual experience of Nazi extremism: 
 
The state of the deed is not the victory, but the deed itself; the pain inflicted upon the enemy is to be resumed to 
the soul of the perpetrator […]The inner experience of being an active element in breaking down resistance […] 
of mythical self-dissolution and communion with the world up to the point of relaxation in bloodlust.36 
 
Voegelin’s approach is similar to Friedländer’s aim of maintaining a sense of disbelief, as he 
described a National Socialist ‘political religion’ that eluded definition. His understanding of religion 
prompted a definition of ‘political religion’ as a sacred, individual and thus intrinsically unique 
religious experience of National Socialism in each perpetrator. 
 
 
V 
The ‘Phenomenologist’ School 
 
The ideological turn in perpetrator research in the 1990s was, if understood through the isolated 
micro-history of ‘political religion’ theory, also a phenomenological turn. The subsequent demise of 
structuralist theory manifests through the rise of a new explanatory paradigm that challenged Hannah 
                                                          
34 Eric Voegelin, ‘The Political Religions’ [1939], in Manfred Henningsen (ed.), Modernity without Restraint: The 
Political Religion, the New Science of Politics and Science, Politics, and Gnosticism, The Collected Works of Eric 
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Arendt’s ‘banality’ figure of Adolf Eichmann being stuck in the totalitarian machinery.37 The 
ideological turn presented an image of the new Holocaust perpetrator that was closer to Goldhagen’s 
willing warrior, a unique individual with agency and belief. In this vein, ‘political religion’ came to 
symbolise the agency of the masses – a grass-roots perspective and a ‘humanised’ alternative to Cold 
War theories on totalitarianism.38 The focus on the identity of the perpetrators also revealed the 
complexity at a new level. In Neil Gregor’s words, the turn to micro-history also meant that these 
small stories were to challenge the hegemony of historical metanarratives. With the assumption that 
‘it was all much more complicated than that’,39 the field of new perpetrator studies is situated in the 
intersection of the ‘big history’ of the Holocaust with its well-documented chronology, the 
deportations, the racial laws, the propaganda and the epistemological abyss of tracing individual 
motivation. 
 
The phenomenological approach to ‘political religion’ fits very well in the academic imperative. 
Complex and elusive to grasp, scholars like Michael Burleigh who applied ‘political religion’ directly 
to the question of perpetrators’ motivations emphasise the ‘the deeper metaphysical context which 
shaped these appalling actions at the highest level’.40 Michael Ley furthermore describes the Nazi 
project of extermination as a manifestation of homogeneous acts of killing where Nazism understood 
as a political religion portrays the Holocaust not as an event of ‘social, economic or mass 
psychological nature, but one with a religious theoretical background’.41 To stress that hundreds of 
thousands of individuals actively implemented the Holocaust and that their actions entailed a plethora 
of factors that transgress an abstract notion of a ‘political religion’, Ley focused on the perpetrators’ 
motivations. With reference to Voegelin’s phenomenology, he argued that Hitler’s supporters saw 
annihilation and the fantasy of destruction as the road to redemption; the murder of the Jews was a 
‘holy deed’.42 
 
                                                          
37 Hannah Arendt, Report on the Banality of Evil [1962] (New York: Penguin, 1992); Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and 
the Holocaust (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1989). 
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40 Michael Burleigh, ‘National Socialism as a Political Religion’, Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, 1:2 
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Indeed, the debate around ‘political religion’ in Holocaust studies has been one of the most extensive 
in the last decade of research on Nazi perpetrators, all related to the methodological issue of 
maintaining the disbelief that surrounds the Holocaust and avoiding a simplification of the enquiry 
into the motivations of the perpetrators. On the one hand, Burleigh stressed the way ‘political religion’ 
stood in stark contrast to old images of the perpetrator as ‘less than fully human […] degraded into 
instruments of ideology and radically divorced from the plenitude of human spiritual destiny’.43 On 
the other hand, Gregor argues that the concept ‘shoehorns into a crude single mould a social, political 
and ideological movement whose essential characteristic was in its incredible heterogeneity’.44 
Similarly, Holocaust historian Hans Mommsen objects to the theory since it ‘attributes an ideological 
stringency and coherence to it [National Socialism] that it – a merely simulative movement in every 
way – did not possess’.45 
 
The arguments for and against ‘political religion’ are thus all linked to a scholarly resistance to 
explanatory coherence. Those who use ‘political religion’ with respect to the Holocaust find the 
phenomenological approach to be less rigid and less prone to explanatory reductionism when 
compared to the functionalist school. In this vein, the phenomenologist direction was an improvement 
on structuralist ‘political religion’ theories that in a Durkheimian spirit engaged in more immanent 
and profane types of external comparisons. By way of contrast, Voegelin’s phenomenological legacy 
is clear as Klaus Vondung – a former student of Voegelin – acknowledged the risk of making causal 
simplifications by providing ‘a linkage between Hitler’s apocalyptic worldview and the beliefs of 
Eichmann and other organizers of the Holocaust down to the perpetrators in the concentration camps’. 
46 Nevertheless, Vondung maintained that it was to a ‘high degree plausible’ that Hitler’s ‘article of 
faith’ motivated the perpetrators and further claimed the National Socialist political religion to be ‘the 
only plausible explanation of the Holocaust’.47 He attempted, however, to nuance the rather rigid 
explanatory link he had made between ‘Hitler’s article of faith’ and the execution of the Holocaust. 
A latter piece by Vondung reveals a less rigid approach to political religion where Vondung argues 
that the establishment of a ‘political religion’ was indeed a matter of contention within the Nazi party 
                                                          
43 Burleigh, ‘National Socialism as a Political Religion’, p. 21. 
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itself. He draws a useful distinction between the mysticism associated with a ‘volkish religion’ 
contrary to a ‘political religion’ understood as Hitler’s socially dominant (sozialdominante) religion 
in the Third Reich.48 This distinction is a reflection of the one between the ‘sacred’ phenomenologist 
religion and the ‘profane’ functionalist theory. In the latter case, National Socialism reads as a 
‘political religion’ for its instrumentalist and coercive character in being primarily a belief system 
constructed to consolidate the power of a totalitarian regime. As we shall see in chapter 4, the attitudes 
to traditional religion among the Scandinavian Nazis of this present study would clearly fall under 
the second, ‘volkish’ category. Moreover, it will clarify how Vondung’s ‘volkish’ category of 
‘political religion’ clearly corresponds to the characteristics of the ‘phenomenological’ school. 
 
The attractiveness of the phenomenologist school is visible also in studies that are more empirical. 
Michael Wildt’s research on the leading members of the RSHA (Reichssicherheitshauptsamt) –
described as the ‘genocidal core’ of the Nazi regime – also incorporates Voegelin’s ‘political religion’ 
into the analysis of the perpetrators’ motivations as he finds ‘political religion’ to be heuristically 
fruitful in order to approach Nazi belief. This approach, however, depends on acknowledging the 
aspect of belief, rather than focusing on religious exteriors, such as rituals and symbols.49 What Wildt 
and more theoretically Vondung and Ley arrive at is an argument that the phenomenological 
dimension of ‘political religion’ alone is necessary when applied to Nazi perpetrators. Vondung’s 
argument that ‘behind the form there was faith’ further illuminates the wider trend in which it is the 
‘sacred’ core rather than the ‘profane’ exteriors of the Nazi ‘political religion’ that attracted Holocaust 
scholars to ‘political religion’.50 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
48 Vondung, ‘Von der völkischen Religiosität zur politischen Religion’ in Uwe Puschner and Clemens Vollnhals (eds.), 
Die völkisch-religiöse Bewegung im Nationalsozialismus. Eine Beziehungs- und Konfliktgeschichte (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2012), p. 33. 
49 Michael Wildt, ‘The Spirit of the Reich Security Main Office (RSHA)’, Totalitarian Movements and Political 
 Religions’, 6:3 (2005), p. 334. 
50 Vondung, ‘National Socialism as a Political Religion’, p. 89. 
 
 
 
48 
 
VI 
Fascism and ‘Political Religion’ 
 
Since the 1990s, the use of ‘political religion’ in theories on fascism has moved from dominating 
functionalist approaches to arriving close to Holocaust historians’ phenomenologist view of ‘political 
religion’. The work of the pioneering scholar on fascism and ‘political religion’ Emilio Gentile is an 
example of how the fascist-Nazi dichotomy dissolves through the very concept of ‘political religion’. 
Originally, Gentile took a rather functionalist stand in 1990 as he described how ‘fascist religion 
placed itself alongside traditional religion, and tried to syncretize it within its own sphere of values 
as an ally in the subjection of the masses to the state’.51 His words display, on the one hand, a focus 
on the external, ‘profane’ characteristics of ‘political religion’. On the other hand, and in more 
phenomenological terms, Gentile maintains that ‘what unified fascists was not a doctrine but an 
attitude, an experience of faith’.52 Gentile later modified his functionalist approach by further 
emphasising the linkage between ‘political religion’ and ‘fascist culture’ to be ‘not at all metaphoric 
[…] political religion is certainly an ideology, but, we could say, an ideology with an extra ingredient, 
which makes it qualitatively different from other political ideologies’.53 Gentile’s two takes on 
‘political religion’ thus illustrate a wider historiographical development from 1990 to the 21st century 
where the phenomenologist ‘political religion’ also made inroads into research on fascism. 
 
Gentile’s own clarification of his concept of ‘political religion’ corresponds to Roger Griffin’s 
definition of the religious dimensions of fascism. In promoting a distinctively phenomenologist 
understanding of ‘political religion’, Griffin’s emphasis on the ‘experience of faith’ takes a central 
position as Griffin relates the concept to his wider call for a more ‘humanized’ field of fascist 
studies.54 By introducing the term ‘palingenetic ultranationalism’, Griffin finds the value of ‘political 
religion’ in its capacity to stand as a conceptual expression of the existential myth of national re-birth 
that drove the fascist regimes. In that sense, ‘political religion’ is not a metaphor, nor is it an ideal-
typical abstraction, but an umbrella term for the heterogeneity of expressions that encompass a 
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primordial human need for a sense of belonging.55 For Griffin, his concept was a heuristic device that 
illuminated the 
 
dynamics of collective belief systems, new religions and the psychology of crowds under modern social conditions. 
[Therefore] ‘political religion’ is a concept that symbolizes the kind of academic openness which is necessary as 
one approaches the worldview of an individual movement or even a single fascist activist.56 
 
Beyond the hegemony of structuralist theory, the emphasis on voluntarism and personal motivation 
has thus brought forward ‘political religion’ as an illustration of the increasing overlap between 
fascism and National Socialism in the historiography. This overlap stemmed from precisely those 
academic paradigms that arose in the wake of new perpetrator research in the 1990s: the focus on 
agency, micro-histories and above all the abundance of empirical evidence that portrayed the ‘ideal- 
type’ Holocaust perpetrator with a heterogeneous and essentially unorthodox ideological checklist. 
 
 
VII 
Nazism as Transgression 
 
Recent research increasingly portrays the Holocaust with a transgressive dimension that stems from 
a new understanding of Nazi ideology. Beyond sacred and profane, Eric Kurlander stresses in his 
work on Nazi relations with Wilhelmine occultism that Nazi ideology ‘incorporated an eclectic array 
of popular mythologies and contradictory attitudes’ and thus avoided the constraints of occult 
sectarian doctrines. In this vein, National Socialism was successfully justified within the broader 
social sphere precisely because of ‘this fungibility, this lack of a clear “political religion”’.57 
Kurlander thus objects to the use of ‘political religion’ for its failure to acknowledge the ideological 
inconsistency in National Socialist ideology. The ‘sacred’ aura of its worldview was thus enforced 
and sustained through intrinsically populist and profane symbols. Therefore, as Kurlander stresses 
the need to rethink the coherence conventionally assumed in the term ‘sacred’, his argument further 
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illustrates that perhaps also the ‘sacred’ understandings of National Socialism must be questioned for 
its structuralist dimension. 
 
In a similar manner, Finchelstein argues that by virtue of its heterogenic character, it is precisely the 
broadening of Holocaust research and the ‘Europeanisation’ of the perpetrator that has forced 
traditional understandings of Nazism to question the coherence assumed in the term ‘ideology’. 
Moreover, Finchelstein explicitly links these cerebral readings of ideology to the conventional use of 
‘political religion’. In pointing to a gap between ‘high theory’ and the historical realities, in 
accordance with contemporary research on Nazi ideology, he stresses that Nazism shared with 
fascism an experiential ideology, where no doctrines or dogmas but pure ‘violence became the 
ultimate form of theory’.58 Different from the traditional divide between ‘sacred’ and ‘profane’, 
Finchelstein further invokes the work of Dominick LaCapra whose arguments on the sacred nature 
of Nazism incorporate Finchelstein’s emphasis on pure violence beyond high theory and sacred 
preaching. In LaCapra’s words: ‘to the extent fascism and especially Nazism arguably have a 
significant relation to the religious and the sacred, it is, I think, more to a specific form of the 
immanent sacred’.59 For LaCapra, the way one can speak of sacred transcendence from a Nazi point 
of view is the perpetrators’ move beyond normative limits. Only in this form of earthly, experiential 
transcendence can one apply the notion of a Nazi ‘sacred’. 
 
LaCapra’s take on ‘political religion’ is in fact not very different from one of the more perceptive 
contemporary criticisms of ‘political religion’. David D. Roberts argues similarly to LaCapra that it 
is time to ‘historicize’ ‘political religion’ as the conception we currently have of ‘religion’ is one of 
idealism; believing we know so well what religion is (either ‘sacred’ or ‘profane’), ‘political religion’ 
is the ideal-typical construction that saves us from digging deeper into the real nature of these 
movements. As Roberts clarifies, ‘because it seems credible, “political religion” truncates the inquiry 
into the content of belief’60 and to historicise it would mean to bring ‘political religion’ down to the 
dirty, much less romantic and more ‘profane’ factors that counterbalance the sacred image of a 
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National Socialist ‘political religion’.61 The need to historicise ‘political religion’ away from religious 
blueprints of ‘holy worships’ and quick-fix images of Hitler’s messianic leadership as a mere 
replacement of Christian structures is an argument that also comes through in the work of the theorist 
of religion Stanley Stowers. Just as there are idealist conceptions of theological doctrines, Stowers 
points out an under-theorised factor in the context of ‘political religion’ theory as he argues that the 
‘sacred’ phenomenologist school tends to carry a pre-fixed and essentially romantic understanding of 
religion: 
 
The concept of political religion trades on expressive-symbolist theory with its romantic roots […] the content of 
religion is said to be an ineffable experience or an incomprehensible pre-rational something or social structure that 
is then expressed in a uniquely self-referential symbolic form. The result is pure meaning that scholars and 
specialists are able to detect beneath the external form of language and symbol.62 
 
A rethinking of the sacred label on ‘political religion’ would effectively mean to theorise ‘political 
religion’ according to National Socialism’s transgressive dimension. This re-theorisation thus 
challenges the notion of a belief system’s ‘pure meaning’ by pointing to the iconoclastic violence of 
the ideology as such. It further allows for the historical diversity that avoids demonising the 
perpetrators with a sacred blueprint. Stowers identifies this phenomenologist idea that individual 
religious belief inhibits a ‘pure meaning’– in Burleigh’s words ‘existential core’, or for Griffin a 
‘palingenetic myth’ – as a scholarly practice of maintaining hard boundaries which ultimately enable 
and preserve both mystifications and simplifications. In order to move away from the romanticism 
that Roberts and Stowers identified in the use of ‘political religion’, both suggest comparative and 
profane interpretations to supply the glorification of the phenomenologist ‘existential core’. As 
Stowers points out, historians and ‘writers do not seem to realize that theories of religion based on 
the idea of […] phenomenology and on religious experience are almost always religious theories 
rather than theories of religion’.63 Therefore, the phenomenologist school of ‘political religion’ runs 
the risk of mystifying the concept into a semi-religious vision in its own right. 
 
Kallis, Finchelstein and more theoretically LaCapra, Roberts and Stowers have thus shown in 
consideration of the growing field of research into fascist collaboration that the religious dimension 
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did not lie in the functionalist exteriors of ‘political religion’, where functionalist exteriors are, for 
example, mass parades and ideological indoctrination. It was neither ‘sacred’ in terms of Ley’s 
grandiose claim that ‘Auschwitz was National Socialism’s holy worship’ as a symbol of a set of 
shared religious fantasies, or, in Goldhagen’s view, that a Nazi gospel of ‘eliminationist’ anti-
Semitism moved the perpetrators unanimously.64 The sacralisation of pure violence that preceded the 
Holocaust apocalypse appears strikingly profane and thus the sacred and the phenomenological 
‘political religion’ seems to regain strength only by referring to its conceptual sibling: its banal and 
profane antithesis. Indeed, as Friedländer argued, Nazism crosses the outer limit of conventional 
historical methodology, and the argument put forward here is that it is precisely for this reason that 
the Nazi sacred cannot be contained within a traditional understanding of supernatural religious 
theory. In consideration of the growing research on the spirit of transgression in Nazi ideology, 
Friedländer’s call for maintaining disbelief needs to finally uncover the unorthodoxy and thus the 
profane ‘paganism’ of the Nazi ‘sacred’. 
 
 
VIII 
Ideology and Culture 
 
This second section proposes a new understanding of ‘political religion’ that turns away from 
previous emphases on repression or confession. ‘Nazi belief’ is here examined with an emphasis on 
individual expressions of ‘ideological borderlands’ vis-à-vis the high theory of official doctrines. 
These ideological borderlands at a grass-roots level are later described as an illustration of the 
‘ideological incorrectness’ in National Socialism. Considering the broad scope of the ‘political 
religion’ concept, its potential to cover analytically both the policies of the Nazi state and sentiments 
of the German people, ‘political religion’ positions closer to conceptions of ‘culture’ rather than 
‘ideology’. Despite the fact that the aim of the ‘political religion’ theory is to challenge static ideology 
concepts, it nevertheless comes with an inherent structuralism. As we have seen, recent research gives 
evidence of an intrinsically unorthodox Nazi ideology. This heterodoxy, moreover, challenges the 
validity and explanatory coherence of traditional approaches to ‘political religion’.65 This 
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documented deviation of theological doctrines which ultimately enabled co-mingling Christian and 
Nazi identities signals a need to abandon the ‘confessional’ turn of the ‘political religion’ paradigm. 
 
Ironically, ‘political religion’ gained popularity at a time when research on Nazism was moving away 
from the ‘primacy of ideology’ consensus, as the 1990s witnessed a boom in micro-historical studies 
which emphasised heterogeneity and diversity. Yet, it nevertheless brought a subsequent 
strengthening of the argument that Nazi ideology stretched beyond state propaganda, into the hearts 
and the minds of the German people. How could one otherwise explain the uncanny insight that this 
vast number of heterogenic stories amounted to something as terrifyingly coherent as the Nazi project 
of genocide? In the geopolitical context of the early 1990s, racist stereotypes and myths of national 
rejuvenation legitimised ethnic wars in Rwanda and Yugoslavia. These political events worked to 
translate the Foucauldian ‘cultural turn’ into the ‘racial/ideological turn’ in Holocaust Studies.66 But 
more than 20 years later, scholars today argue that perhaps the pendulum has swung too far, and that 
it is necessary to move beyond the paradigm of the ‘racial state’ in order to avoid new 
metanarratives.67 For instance, Alon Confino concludes that the concept of ideology borders on 
essentialism and simply does not add up, since ‘people’s tendency to think outside, against, 
underneath and above it is left historically unrecorded […] In short, ideology is part of culture, not 
culture itself; it is too cerebral to embrace culture.’68 The problem, in other words, was not that one 
overestimated the explanatory strength of ideological components such as anti-Semitism and racism, 
but that the ‘ideology’ concept was too narrow to encompass these often conflicting and at times 
idiosyncratic mentalities, even among Nazi decision-makers. ‘Ideology’ demanded reconfiguration – 
where the answer has often been to invoke the term ‘culture’.69 
 
In order to separate ‘Nazi culture’ from its structuralist forerunner, ‘ideology’, one must clarify their 
actual differences. For the anthropologist Sherry Ortner, a study of culture is ultimately ‘a story of 
struggle and change’.70 With a focus on ‘the clash of meanings in borderlands’, Ortner interprets 
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culture as an area of study that might not generate its most penetrating insights through the search for 
a central core, but indeed from the conflicting areas of its borderlands. This is an approach to ‘culture’ 
similar to Confino’s point that our understanding of National Socialism must be broad enough to 
include ideological divergences – ‘people’s tendency to think outside, against, underneath and above’ 
– as integral parts of our perception of Nazism as such. Although the cultural turn became the 
‘ideological turn’ in Holocaust research, historiography persists in regarding culture and ideology as 
two conflicting terminologies. 
 
This tendency is visible in the intellectual history of anti-Semitism, which has gradually turned 
‘cultural’ with the simultaneous definition of being ‘non-ideological’. For instance, Shulamit 
Volkov’s notion of anti-Semitism as a ‘cultural code’ during the Wilhelmine period is an explicit 
rejection of anti-Semitism understood as a consensual ‘ideology’. Rejecting cultural cohesion, 
Volkov’s study incorporates conflicting sub-cultures to explain that if one speaks of anti-Semitism as 
the cultural framework from which the German Nazi party, the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche 
Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP), later drew its popular support, then one ‘can properly define this 
phenomenon [anti-Semitism] only when it is understood in the broadest possible sense’.71 By virtue 
of their lack of coherence, the anti-Semitic symbols functioned as a cultural ‘glue’ in the German 
society that united traditionally divergent ideologies of the new and old Right, where anti-Semitism 
was thus given cognitive meaning by individuals in widely different settings and experiences: 
 
It was clearly operating, in society as well as in individuals, both on the intellectual-rational level and on that of 
implicit values, norms, lifestyle and thought, common ambitions and emotions. The cluster of ideas, sentiments 
and public behaviour patterns that characterize this syndrome cannot be subsumed under the title ‘ideology’ as this 
term is commonly understood.72 
 
This perceived gap between ‘ideology’ and ‘culture’ has introduced a third component to account for 
a broader understanding of the Nazi Weltanschauung – the notion of faith. Thomas Rohkrämer’s 
study of the German Right portrays a journey from conservatism to Nazism. In this piece, Rohkrämer 
advances the idea that striving for a ‘single communal faith’ – a ‘sacred homeland’ –functioned as 
precisely a ‘cultural code’ that glued together the agendas of the new and old German Right. Despite 
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previous ideological barriers and despite the traditional tension between religious and worldly 
authorities, Rohkrämer argues that the striving for a single communal faith tolerated a ‘variety of 
personal convictions […] in a single communal political mission or a civic religion’.73 In a similar 
way, the social historian Claudia Koonz (to whom Rohkrämer frequently refers) explicitly employs 
the term ‘Nazi culture’ in arguing that this culture offered a ‘secular faith’. Based on an ‘ethnic 
fundamentalism’, this faith was equipped with new conceptions of life and morality that were 
fundamentally different from those traditionally assigned to religion. For Koonz, the ‘Nazi 
conscience’ was not simply an ideology, because ‘what outsiders saw as ideology, the Nazis 
experienced as truth’.74 
 
Previous studies have either discussed the genealogy of ‘political religion’ in historiography75 or they 
have more generally debated empirically whether National Socialism was in fact a ‘political 
religion’.76 These studies pay less attention to the interpretative position of ‘political religion’ 
between ‘ideology’ or ‘culture’. In fact, one has to look to the use of ‘political religion’ in fascist 
theory studies where ‘political religion’ has undergone a more thorough theorisation and thus 
systematic comparison to the term ‘ideology’. 
 
Emilio Gentile’s work towards developing a generic understanding of the concept and its integration 
in fascist studies argued that ‘political religion is certainly an ideology, but, we could say, an ideology 
with an extra ingredient’.77 Roger Griffin seconded this approach by ‘clustering’ the concepts of 
‘totalitarianism’, ‘fascism’ and ‘political religion’, claiming that this methodological move would 
contribute to developing a concept of an attempted fascist ‘cultural revolution’.78 Griffin’s earlier 
contribution was to introduce the term ‘palingenetic ultranationalism’, where ‘political religion’ 
increasingly contributed as the conceptual expression of an existential myth of national re-birth which 
drove the fascist regimes towards the ‘cultural revolution’.79 The palingenetic myth itself drew 
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together aspects of Christian millennialism, charismatic politics and, most importantly, the 
perspective of a national ‘revitalisation moment’. Methodologically, Griffin has described this 
theoretical development as parts of the scholarly aim to maintain ‘the primacy of culture’, whereby 
‘theories on generic fascism can retain a healthy empirical sense of the extraordinary heterogeneity 
of the genus, while empirical studies of it can be informed by a sophisticated concept of cultural 
revolution’.80 This ‘primacy of culture’ school of fascist studies thus framed ‘political religion’ as a 
methodological advance beyond the utopian quest for definitive explanations and total 
understandings. 
 
 
IX 
Defining Religion 
 
By virtue of its explanatory heterogeneity, the advocates of a cultural-historical approach to fascist 
and Holocaust studies have therefore found in ‘political religion’ a useful supplement to ‘ideology’. 
Scholars approaching National Socialism from the field of religious studies, however, have raised 
concerns: the assumed difference between ‘political religion’ and ‘ideology’ was one thing, but it was 
another thing to address the relationship between ‘political religion’ and Christianity.81 Richard 
Steigmann-Gall therefore argued that the main problem with ‘political religion’ is that it ‘presumes a 
static “zero sum” model of identity formation’. This is because the concept reads as a supplement – 
an ‘ersatz-religion’ – to that of traditional religions.82 With such a substitution comes the presumption 
that totalitarian politics in an era of secularisation and through the persecution of alternative belief 
systems (i.e. the Churches) was essentially anti-religious. This interpretative divide has led to a 
perceived incompatibility between traditional views of the Christian religion and the Nazi ‘political 
religion’ that Steigmann-Gall finds so problematic: 
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What exactly constitutes ‘religion’ such that both Christianity and Nazism can be considered two equally valid 
examples of it? By what means can we demonstrate that one form of identity – being nationalistic – must 
necessarily impinge upon and usurp another form of identity – being Christian?83 
 
Steigmann-Gall’s research on the theme describes how Christian structures underpinned the Nazi 
conceptions of Volksgemeinschaft and argues that Christianity thus co-mingled with race-biological 
terminologies and militant ethno-nationalism.84 In other words, ‘Christianity did not constitute a 
barrier to Nazism. The battles waged against Germany’s enemies constituted a war in the name of 
Christianity.’85 To follow this argument, the use of ‘political religion’ has encouraged an 
essentialisation of both Christianity and Nazi ‘ideology’ that ultimately has served to create a false 
dichotomy between these two belief systems. Overlaps could and indeed did coexist for Nazi 
‘believers’. To this end, Rohkrämer also expressed ambivalence about the concept, claiming on the 
one hand that ‘political religion’ in no way carried theoretical assumptions that would challenge his 
own argument, and on the other, considering the Nazi ideological heterogeneity, admitting that the 
concept ‘seems to imply too much of a terminological heterogeneity for it to be methodologically 
useful’.86 
 
Now, the argument that Christian belief and Nazi convictions were mutually exclusive remains 
widely accepted among researchers in the field. Moreover, as scholars diverge in their perceptions 
about precisely which aspects of Christian religion actually influenced Nazism, their treatment of the 
relationship between ‘a traditional religion’ and a ‘political religion’ has also questioned the 
coherence of Christianity. In examining the Catholic roots of Nazism in Munich in the 1920s, Derek 
Hastings has recently stressed that there were indeed possibilities of religious identities not being 
exactly what we expect from them. He argues that viewing Nazism through its self-representation 
revealed its ideology to be ‘intricately intertwined with Catholic identity’.87 Susannah Heschel 
compellingly re-formulates this argument from the angle of Protestant theology; she finds that a 
mutual interdependence developed between the ‘German Christian Movement’ (Glaubensbewegung 
Deutsche Christen) – a pro-Nazi faction within the German Protestant Church – and the Nazi 
leadership. When the Institute for the Study and Eradication of Jewish Influence on German Church 
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Life (Institut zur Erforschung und Beiseitigung des jüdischen Einflusses auf das deutsche kirchliche 
Leben) was established in May 1939, it adopted a racist rhetoric to bolster and redefine its take on the 
Christian message. With respect to Nazism, its 
 
relationship to Christianity was not one of rejection, nor was it an effort to displace Christianity and become a 
form of ‘political religion’ […] Nazism was a form of supersessionism, as usurpation and colonization of Christian 
theology, especially antisemitism for its own purposes.88 
 
This tendency to use the argument that Nazism was not a ‘political religion’ in order to strengthen 
the main point that it was compatible with Christianity is a common phenomenon when scholars 
present their research as an explicit challenge to the idea that the NSDAP was ‘anti-religious’. For 
instance, Steigmann-Gall finds that, since Christianity infused the Nazi worldview, it is therefore 
‘clear that, by their own account, most Nazis did not believe their movement was a political 
religion’.89 For Hastings, the ‘reconfiguration’ of Nazism from its Catholic roots did promise a Nazi 
‘political religion’ as soon as the Christian influences had been outsourced: after its re-founding in 
the early 1920s, it ‘embarked on a vastly different trajectory that ultimately culminated in the highly 
stylized form of political religion’.90 Steigmann-Gall formulates his initial question of whether the 
concept of ‘religion’ allows for the coexistence of competing identities because most scholars 
consensually perceived ‘political religion’ as a conceptual rejection of such coexistence. A triangular 
relationship of three isolated entities – religion, ‘political religion’ and Nazism – thus emerges. The 
either/or rationale of the relationship works to re-enforce this structure of coherence. 
 
 
X 
Theological Incorrectness 
 
‘Political religion’ has proved to be of limited use when accounting for the Christian influences upon 
Nazism. The problem, however, is that the same homogeneity ascribed to ‘political religion’ is 
automatically transferred to the idea of religion. This either/or rationale thus forces a choice between 
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whether Nazism was the product of ‘pure’ Christianity, or an ersatz (in)version of it. For instance, 
Steigmann-Gall stresses that ‘Nazism cannot represent but a “destructive mimesis of Christianity” 
and simultaneously derive its ideology from Christian convictions […] which was it?’91 That Nazism 
could simultaneously contain both ‘true’ Christian and anti-religious elements means that they are 
both possibilities that become automatically rejected in perceptions of what ‘political religion’ is able 
to encompass. This is not to argue that scholars themselves question the fact that both religious and 
anti-religious sentiments existed among the top Nazi leadership. The point is rather that ‘political 
religion’ has traditionally functioned as the conceptual weapon for those preferring to emphasise the 
anti-religious character of the regime, such as Wolfgang Dierker’s extensive research on the anti-
religious policies of the German Security Police (Sicherheitsdienst – SD).92 
 
Connections between ‘political religion’ and ‘anti-religion’ have worked to further establish an 
interpretative distance between ‘political religion’ understood as ‘pseudo-religion’ on the one hand, 
and ‘real’, i.e. traditional religion, on the other. Claus-Ekkehard Bärsch, who argues that one cannot 
draw a straight line between the Nazi leadership’s rejections of Judeo-Christian monotheism and then 
simply label them as pagans, further elaborates on this point.93 Bärsch’s conclusion that ‘political 
religion’ must be studied in a way that makes room for Christian and anti-Christian sentiments to 
mingle indicates that it is perhaps not ‘political religion’ as such that constitutes the greatest obstacle 
to studying ideological pluralities within Nazism. Instead, it might be in the way the concept is used 
and in which analytical frameworks it is placed. Ultimately, if ‘political religion’, by virtue of having 
the broader, more ‘cultural’ connotations that come with the term ‘religion’, nevertheless assumes an 
overly narrow and coherent definition of both ‘religion’ and Nazism, then its separation from early 
discussions of ideology is rendered superfluous. 
 
Doris Bergen’s study on the German Christian Movement breaks with this consensual image of 
religion while it simultaneously engages with the ‘political religion’ debate.94 Bergen brings the 
question of belief down to the level of individual actors analytically and empirically as she argues 
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that ‘the German Christians did not fit most standard theological criteria for Christians […] 
nevertheless, they remained consciously Christian’.95 Despite acknowledging the importance of 
Steigmann-Gall’s ambition to illuminate the Christian presence in the Nazi movement, Bergen 
criticises his view that Christians who engaged in Nazi – that is, ‘un-Christian’ – activities, such as 
genocide and murder, were led by a ‘false consciousness’. Although it is clear that individuals acted 
incorrectly from a theological point of view, the question is whether an enquiry into religious 
conviction should necessarily end there. Bergen stresses, for example, that there is a crucial difference 
between what she labels as ‘ideal/theological definitions’ and ‘historical/institutional categories’. It 
is the interaction, rather than their differences, that best reveals the relationship between Nazism and 
Christianity, let alone the nature of ideological and religious conviction: 
 
the ironic and often violent contradictions between ideals (love of neighbour; liberty, equality and fraternity; from 
each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs) and realities (slavery, racism, terror, ethnocide) is 
the everyday stuff of human history.96 
 
The claim is that because of idealist conceptions of Christianity, its sometimes brutal past is 
overshadowed. The conceptual understanding of Christianity thus undermines a proper enquiry into 
the ways Christianity informed individuals’ actions and motivations. Instead, focus lies on the 
conceptual conflict between ‘Christianity’ and ‘Nazi political religion’ – a distinctively cerebral 
scholarly enterprise, one far from the culturalist methodology advocated by, for example, Confino. 
David D. Roberts has further depicted a number of shortcomings with the concept, pointing to the 
‘familiarity’ factor as the main issue: Roberts’ notion of ‘familiarity’ resembles Bergen’s point on 
‘idealist’ approaches to Christianity. Roberts’ main issue with ‘familiarity’, then, is that the idealist 
assumption about the nature of belief systems fundamentally excludes the factor of human agency. 
In believing we are so sure of what religion is, ‘political religion’ becomes an ideal-typical 
construction when the familiarity we know in the term ‘religion’ juxtaposes with the unknown ‘as if 
the agents, thanks to a religious blueprint actually knew what they were doing’.97 This ‘religious 
blueprint’ is thus a composition of doctrines that shape the idealist conceptions of religion that Bergen 
and Roberts depict in ‘political religion’ theory. When ‘political religion’ derives its theoretical 
foundations from this dogmatic understanding of ‘religion’, the concept is bound to transfer the same 
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essentialism to its analyses of Nazism. If conviction equates to confession, there are aspects of a belief 
system that arguably remain untouched. Furthermore, from a theoretical perspective, those ‘forgotten’ 
aspects are those of conflict and divergence from theological teachings that should be emphasised, 
not ignored. 
 
 
XI 
Cognitive Studies on Religion 
 
Philosopher of religion Sami Pihlström has helpfully analysed the ‘elusive boundary’ between 
religion and so-called ‘pseudo-religion’. To illuminate this, Pihlström turned traditional assumptions 
of religious purity on its head by asking whether a belief that heavily relies upon a theological system 
is ultimately only an indication of ‘a non-religious life’.98 Essential to this reasoning is the argument 
that anyone solely dependent upon an officially sanctioned system of thought suggests a lack of 
personal attachment to this belief in the first place. The debate on ‘political religion’ faces its strongest 
challenge in the similar argument that if individuals believed they were Christians but functioned in 
their daily lives as dedicated Nazis, is that theological deviation, or false consciousness, enough to 
write them off as Nazis who could not possibly be Christians? Bergen argued that this was not the 
case; these individuals were indeed ‘theologically incorrect’, but at the same time they believed they 
were acting wholeheartedly in the name of their faith. In a similar vein, Stanley Stowers has also 
criticised the use of ‘political religion’ through his claim that a ‘rational-cognitive’ category of 
religious belief had to be introduced right next to the ‘romantic’ and idealist view of ‘religion’. 
Contrary to an idealist tendency to assume theological coherence, this theory ‘agrees with what most 
people who practice religion think that their religion is about’.99 Often overshadowed by scholarly 
disagreements over whether National Socialism was Christian or anti-Christian, Bergen and Stowers 
usefully emphasise confessional ‘incorrectness’ as counterweights to the hegemony of the 
idealist/theological category. 
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The separation of ‘people’s conceptions of religion’ on the one hand, and the official dogmas of a 
religion on the other has dominated cognitive studies of religion since the 1990s.100 Although Stowers 
does not refer to it explicitly when proposing the ‘rational-cognitive’ theory, the actual concept of 
‘theological incorrectness’ was coined in 2004 as ‘the idea that what one learns in one’s given culture, 
such as theological ideas, plays only a partial role in what people actually think and do’.101 While 
acknowledging the overlapping nature of religion, the proponents of cognitive studies above all argue 
that doctrinal modes of religiosity are insufficient when viewed in isolation from people’s conceptions 
and daily lives. In fact, ‘theologically incorrect’ versions among ordinary people often override 
theological doctrines.102 It is therefore highly relevant to note that cognitive theory captures a 
dimension of religion that goes beyond ideal-typical understandings of religious concepts, since 
‘people’s actual practices and concepts generally deviate from officially sanctioned ones’.103 For this 
reason, the cognitivist interpretation provides two insights that are surely fruitful in studies on 
National Socialism. Firstly, from a naturalist approach, religion and ideology are conceptually 
inseparable. Secondly, even more significantly, religion and ideology can be similarly 
‘deconstructed’ in order to detect individual agency in the praxis of a belief system. This 
deconstruction, in turn, requires an emphasis on deviation and even conflict between individual belief 
and doctrinal teachings. The conflict is the premise underpinning ‘theological incorrectness’. 
Ultimately, such a concept of ‘theological incorrectness’ thus indicates the possibility of developing 
a similar conceptual notion of ‘ideological incorrectness’ when applied in this interdisciplinary way. 
 
Historiography on Nazism has not explicitly dealt with the scholarly potential of ‘theological 
incorrectness’. All the same, the transgressive nature of National Socialist ideology is increasingly 
emphasised vis-à-vis both traditional conceptions of political ideologies and institutional Christianity. 
Indeed, scholars often portray National Socialism as transgressive in the sense that its worldview 
rested upon principles of violence and action that naturally challenged the idea of dogmatic 
constraints. In other words, increasingly central to studies of Nazism is a still loosely defined principle 
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of transgression, or a worldview that, according to Michael Wildt, rested upon the principle of the 
‘unbound’ (Unbedingten).104 Recent work by Boaz Neumann emphasises how the Nazis 
differentiated between the terms ‘ideology’ and ‘worldview’ as part of an all-encompassing Nazi 
battle with materialistic liberalism associated with the term ‘ideology’. Neumann further describes an 
iconoclastic construction of a Nazi worldview that ‘was conceived as articulated through the 
intellectual faculty and associated with ideas concerning life. Weltanschauung was coupled with life 
experience and the senses […] The “idea” of ideology based on reason was identified with the 
detested liberal tradition.’105 The distance between ‘theological incorrectness’ and ‘ideological 
incorrectness’ is further minimised when Kurlander explains the absence of a ‘political religion’ in 
National Socialist ideology. He points not merely to the overlaps of theological and Nazi doctrines 
as such, but frames their interaction as a deliberate Nazi revolt against both ideological and 
theological consistency: 
 
The haphazard introduction of numerous pagan and National Socialist holidays indicates less the desire to create 
a political religion or ‘sacralization of politics’ and more a pragmatic attempt to exploit existing supernatural tropes 
without worrying about the internal theological consistency of the proceedings.106 
 
 
The transgressive principle has thus begun to make its way into the analytical frameworks of today’s 
research. Scholars increasingly position ‘political religion’ within the framework of transgression 
rather than confession. One example is LaCapra’s alternative understanding of ‘political religion’: if 
there ever was a sacred aura to National Socialism, it should not be sought in a comparison with 
Christian theology, but in the ‘real’ limit-shattering experience of murder. Stemming from the urge 
to break out from theoretical and moral limits, Nazi violence thus became a sacralised act of 
transcendence – one that to them was worthy of glorification.107 LaCapra’s ‘activist’ approach to Nazi 
sacralisation resonates with his earlier writings on ideology and culture, which called for ‘a concept 
of ideology that is not simply conflated with a homogenised idea of a cultural system’.108 Indeed, his 
divergent image of the Nazi as sacred presents the concept of ‘political religion’ as precisely the kind 
of theological construct so commonly transgressed by the Nazis. This culturalist emphasis on conflict 
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is thus not only informed by broader methodological developments in the field of cultural studies, but 
also empirically and theoretically supported by contemporary research on Nazism. It is thus 
increasingly clear that ‘political religion’, as it reads today, fails its original purpose of 
conceptualising a heterogenic approach to Nazism. 
 
The second point separates this thesis from previous critical examinations of the concept. The aim of 
this literature survey, then, has been to use the genealogy of ‘political religion’ in order to trace what 
really has been missing in today’s research: a positive link between the ‘incorrectness’ often found in 
individual conceptions of their belief vis-à-vis official doctrines, and ex post facto theories on Nazi 
ideology. Indeed, this chapter began with an analytical separation between the more inclusive 
‘culture’ and ‘religion’ on the one hand, and the more narrow ‘ideology’ on the other. Yet, this 
discussion has shown that the difference in the historiographical use of these concepts is not that 
significant after all. Regardless of whether we use the term ‘religion’ or ‘ideology’ in approaches to 
Nazism, what remains absent is the inclusion of ‘incorrectness’. This emphasis on the importance of 
illustrating the dynamic between the official nature of Nazi propaganda and its ideological aims, and 
its actual adaption in the daily lives of the NSDAP’s ‘ordinary men’ is indeed already integral to 
contemporary scholarship. Just because definitions of Nazism have new conceptual exteriors, such 
as religion in place of ideology, there is little room for heuristic headway unless it challenges the 
assumed coherence of Nazism in the first place. What the ‘political religion’ debate has offered 
contemporary research are insights that, ironically, derived from its shortcomings. As a response to 
the failures of the concept, scholars have since proposed a more thorough systematisation of 
intermingling convictions. Importantly, these are propositions necessitated by a turning away from 
the categories of doctrine and confession, where ‘ideological incorrectness’ must be viewed as both 
a principle and an agent in the making of a transnational ‘Nazi culture’. 
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 Chapter 2: Beyond the Banality of ‘Political Religion’ 
 
‘Ideological Incorrectness’ in the Works of Hannah Arendt and Eric Voegelin 
 
 
Introduction 
  
In 1973, Eric Voegelin argued that his own conception of National Socialism as a ‘political religion’ 
was ‘too vague and already deforms the real problem of experiences by mixing them with the further 
problem of dogma or doctrine’.1 While Voegelin never fully engaged in discussions with postmodern 
thinkers, his words echo their argument on the affinitive relationship between philosophical 
essentialism and the totalitarian ideologies of homogenisation.2 With the Holocaust in hindsight, 
Voegelin saw a ‘spiritual disease’ right at the core of the Western intellectual tradition; the dominance 
(Herrschaft) of so-called objective science had degraded historiography into historicism, and the 
subjective individual was transformed into an ‘illiterate idiote’ – a mere puppet of public life and 
‘essentialist truths’.3 But for Voegelin, the idiote was still a politically willing person, and not merely 
driven by a metaphysical force such as a ‘political religion’. The Nazi crimes committed in acts of 
both compliance and direct persecutions were, in Voegelin’s view, beyond the reach of collectivist 
classifications. Scholars tended to ascribe a banality to the actions of the Nazi idiote in post-war 
historiography, and this became a trigger towards the formation of Voegelin’s theory of 
consciousness – and his ultimate rejection of ‘political religion’. 
 
                                                          
1 Eric Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, Ellis Sandoz ed. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1989), 
p. 50. 
2 See Peter A. Petrakis and Cecil L. Eubanks (eds.), Eric Voegelin’s Dialogue with the Postmoderns: Searching for 
Foundations (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2004). The similarities between Voegelin and Emmanuel 
Levinas have been particularly highlighted in their respective works on ethics and transcendence: Levinas’s 
phenomenology of the ‘Other’ and Voegelin’s appropriation of Plato’s Metaxy. The latter will be discussed further in 
this text. For further reading on the parallels between Voegelin and Levinas, see William Paul Simmons, ‘Voegelin and 
Levinas on the “Foundations” of Ethics and Politics’, Petrakis and Eubanks (eds.), Eric Voegelin’s Dialogue, pp. 121–
144., and Marie L. Baird, ‘Eric Voegelin’s Vision of Personalism and Emmanuel Levinas’s Ethics of Responsibility: 
Toward a Post-Holocaust Spiritual Theology?’, Journal of Religion, 79:2 (1999), pp. 385–403. 
3Voegelin, ‘The German University and the Order of German Society: A Reconsideration of the Nazi Era’ [1966] in 
Published Essays 1966–1985. The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin Volume 12, Ellis Sandoz (ed.) (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1990), p. 25. 
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While the previous chapter described the contemporary use, potentials and limitations of ‘political 
religion’ today, this chapter describes the historiographical development of the concept from the 
interwar years until today. It is the argument of the chapter that the concept’s trajectory is marked by 
essentialisation and, ironically, a dogmatic approach both to the meaning of the term ‘religion’ and 
to National Socialism. Today’s use of the concept is marked by binary structures – the sacred and the 
profane; the phenomenologist and the functionalist; the National Socialist and the fascist – and with 
this observation comes the subsequent scholarly critique of the concept’s reductionist tendencies. 
Chapter 1 thus argued that the use of ‘political religion’ needs to move away from its either/or 
assumptions and rather focus on how heterogeneity and pluralism infused National Socialist ideology. 
There is certainly no novelty in this type of conclusion. Indeed, it has become standard 
historiographical practice to point to the fact that since the 1990s, scholars have increasingly called 
for explanatory heterogeneity in studies on Nazism and the Holocaust. 
 
What is less explored, however, is the role of theories on Nazi pluralism before the 1990s – a 
historiographical period so often written off as dominated by rigid structuralism in the way Nazism 
was interpreted. The present chapter transgresses the commonly used periodisation by arguing that 
the notion of National Socialist ideological pluralism, in this thesis ‘ideological incorrectness’, 
formed the core of the ideas of two of the most influential intellectuals on Nazism since the late 1930s: 
Eric Voegelin and Hannah Arendt. Similar to Arendt’s firm positioning within Holocaust 
historiography in the early post-war years, Voegelin’s concept of ‘political religion’ (1938) has 
reached canonical status since the 1990s. ‘Political religion’ is thus largely applied by scholars who 
emphasise explicitly that contrary to Arendt’s banality thesis, the force of ‘ideology’ took such 
dimensions during the Holocaust that one should speak, as Voegelin did, of a Nazi religion. This yet 
another form of historiographical dichotomy has created a distorting image of the works of both 
Arendt and Voegelin. This chapter describes how historiography not only before but also after the 
ideological turn in the 1990s has failed to acknowledge two uniting aspects in the works of Arendt 
and Voegelin: firstly, their rejection of the explanatory hegemony of concepts, and secondly, their 
subsequently shared argument that National Socialism displayed an ‘ideological incorrectness’. This 
form of ‘incorrectness’ that Arendt and Voegelin depicted at the heart of National Socialism 
transgressed not only conventional approaches to ‘ideology’, but eventually, in Voegelin’s own view, 
it transgressed also the dogmas assumed in ‘political religion’. 
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‘Ideological incorrectness’ not only describes Nazi pluralism, but it is an anti-concept that seeks to 
highlight the almost dogmatic striving for ‘correctness’ in research on National Socialist ideology. 
Contrary to the bipolar historiographical positions of Arendt’s banality thesis vis-à-vis Voegelin’s 
image of the Nazi religion, both scholars rejected the term ‘ideology’ in explanations of perpetrators’ 
motivations. In 1953, Hannah Arendt wrote to Voegelin: ‘I hate ideologies as much as you do.’4 
Voegelin’s later rejection of ‘political religion’ has been largely overlooked by contemporary users 
of the concept. Moreover, his post-Holocaust theory of consciousness, published in parts from 1966 
up to his death in 1985 – and which Voegelin later stated to be the core to all his work5 – was 
intimately related to the events of the Holocaust and its aftermath. These dates significantly parallel 
the post-war hegemony of structuralist interpretations in perpetrator historiography. There is thus a 
need to examine more closely whether Voegelin’s post-structuralist rejection of ‘political religion’ 
was in fact a philosophical response to this particular historiographical development that still seems 
to have taken a hold on the way the concept is used today. This type of examination seeks to draw a 
link between Voegelin’s and Arendt’s critique of the historiographical development, and the 
theorisation of a less dogmatic way of understanding ‘political religion’. The link is the ‘ideological 
incorrectness’ that both Arendt and Voegelin depicted in National Socialism and which later made 
Voegelin rethink his own concept. This ideological incorrectness was a clear ideal also among the 
Scandinavian National Socialists present in this study, and with this broadness in mind, ‘ideological 
incorrectness’ is not necessarily a negation of ‘political religion’ theory but an adaption of the concept 
to a more complex historical scenery. In that sense, one can understand Voegelin’s rejection of his 
own concept as a sign that he should not be regarded as the founding father of ‘political religion’, but 
rather more pioneering in the way he depicted its dogmatic assumptions. 
  
  
  
  
  
                                                          
4 Cited in Peter Baehr, ‘Debating Totalitarianism: An Exchange of Letters between Eric Voegelin and Hannah Arendt’ 
(with Gordon C. Wells), History and Theory, 51: 3 (2012), pp. 364–380 
http://peterbaehr.99scholars.net/uploads/9/0/5/3/9053324/peter_baehr_-
_debating_totalitarianism_an_exchange_of_letters_between_eric_voegelin_and_hannah_arendt.pdf, p. 5. 
5 See Ellis Sandoz, The Voegelinian Revolution: A Biographical Introduction, 2nd edn (New Brunswick: Transaction 
Publishers, 2000), p. 22, and Lissy Voegelin ‘Foreword’ in Eric Voegelin, Order and History Volume V: In Search of 
Order (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1987). 
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I 
Hannah Arendt 
 
‘He was not stupid. It was sheer thoughtlessness – something by no means identical with stupidity – 
that predisposed him to become one of the greatest criminals of that period.’6 Just as the totalitarian 
system rendered humans superfluous, Hannah Arendt saw in Eichmann a high-ranking Nazi with an 
inability to think outside the singularity of the Nazi worldview.7 Yet, in her later publication The Life 
of the Mind, she also added that ‘there were no signs in him [Eichmann] of firm ideological conviction 
or of specific evil motives’.8 According to Michael Mack, this passage, seemingly confined to 
Eichmann’s own thoughtlessness, does in fact highlight the difficulty of separating the account of 
Eichmann’s personal features from Arendt’s description of the wider nature of Nazi ideology. First, 
Eichmann was a true Nazi because he fully absorbed the ‘absoluteness’ of the Nazis’ take on a 
‘reversed’ Kantian morality in ‘thou shalt kill’.9 Second, Arendt’s portrayal of Nazism as the 
antithesis of human plurality was nurtured by Eichmann through his own thoughtlessness. Eichmann 
was an incarnation of Nazi ideology since his profile fully corresponded to the violent logic of non-
thinking that was ‘completely removed from the inconsistency and plurality that characterizes 
humanity’.10 Following on from that, Mack further agrees with Richard J. Bernstein that Arendt’s 
banality thesis rested upon her use of Eichmann’s case to illustrate how the Nazi system and ideology 
challenged moral and philosophical ideas by refusing to reject moral thought and logics, but 
nevertheless was founded upon an ethic of mass murder.11 Because on the one hand, Arendt saw the 
banality of evil as 
 
                                                          
6 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem – A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: Penguin, 1992 [1963]), pp. 
287–288. 
7 Ibid., p. 49. 
8 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, Mary McCarthy ed. (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1981 [1978]), p. 3. 
9 Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, p. 150. 
10 Michael Mack, ‘The Holocaust and Hannah Arendt’s Philosophical Critique of Philosophy: Eichmann in Jerusalem’, 
New German Critique, 36:1 (2009), p. 60. 
11 Although important for a comprehensive analysis of Arendt’s thesis, I will not engage in the discussion of whether 
Eichmann’s moral was in fact a reversal of Kantian laws, or whether it represented its extreme version. For a more 
recent overview with an emphasis on the former, see Carsten Bagge Laustsen and Rasmus Ugilt, ‘Eichmann’s Kant’, 
Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 21:3 (2007), pp. 166–180. 
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no theory or doctrine but something quite factual, the phenomenon of evil deeds, committed on a gigantic scale, 
which could not be traced to any particularity of wickedness, pathology, or ideological conviction in the doer, 
whose only personal distinction was a perhaps extraordinary shallowness.12 
 
On the other hand, if one accepts the argument that Eichmann encompassed the nature of Nazism as 
Arendt described, as much as Nazism encompassed the figure of Eichmann, one can turn the question 
of superfluousness on its head; by emphasising the uncanniness in his banality, the agency is 
enhanced rather than trivialised. It brings us to the relationship between Arendt’s terminology of 
radical and banal evil. In contrast to viewing Arendt’s ‘two evils’ in conceptual opposition, Mack and 
Bernstein both argue that in the light of Arendt’s earlier work on The Origins of Totalitarianism, ‘the 
concept of the banality of evil is compatible with her earlier thoughts about radical evil’.13 For 
Bernstein, the conception of banal evil depends on the understanding of an existing radical evil,14 a 
contention followed by Mack when he interprets Arendt’s message to suggest that the ‘greatest evil 
is not radical, it has no roots, and because it has no roots, it has no limitations’.15 
 
As Arendt realised the boundless nature of the Nazi crimes, she also faced the insufficiencies with 
her own use of the term ‘radical’. As Bernstein clarifies in his interpretation of Arendt, ‘the so-called 
Nazi crimes and radical evil breaks the boundaries of our traditional concepts or standards’ where the 
human-made conception of something ‘radical’ is a term rendered banal in the face of the 
unprecedented nature of the Nazi crime.16 In that sense, the conception of ‘radical’ evil was on the 
one hand indicating a banality since it was unable to encompass Nazism as such, but on the other 
hand, it also meant that the ‘banal’ Nazi evil was a kind of ‘banality’ that radically altered any 
previously held conceptions of its meaning. 
 
So, what does the equivalence between radical and banal evil imply for the interpretation of 
Eichmann? Ultimately, it becomes a question of how to interpret Arendt’s already mentioned notion 
of the ‘factual extraordinary shallowness of Eichmann’. I follow Mack’s analysis of Arendt’s 
liturgical strategy in the report on Eichmann to argue that there are two ways to approach this 
equivalence. First, her text could simply be understood literally: that Eichmann’s banal and obedient 
                                                          
12 Hannah Arendt, ‘Thinking and Moral Consideration’, Social Research, 38:3 (1971), p. 417. 
13 Richard J. Bernstein, Hannah Arendt and the Jewish Question (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), p. 184. 
14 Bernstein, Radical Evil: A Philosophical Interrogation (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002), p. 218. 
15 Mack, ‘Philosophical Critique’, p. 45. 
16 Bernstein, Hannah Arendt and the Jewish Question, p. 150. 
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figure was a cog in a radical machine where the equivalence of evils was shown in the totality of 
genocide; in Mark Roseman’s description of this interpretation, he was ‘a modern man in his 
vulnerability to totalitarianism’.17 Holocaust historiography until the 1990s gives evidence for the 
attractiveness of this reading of Arendt: as the post-war debate between intentionalists and 
functionalists from the 1960s to the end of the Cold War was based on two divergent holistic 
frameworks to account for the Holocaust, ‘the banality of evil’ was absorbed in this dichotomy. In 
contrast to the early historiographical demonisations of Hitler and ‘hardcore-Nazis’ in the 1950s, 
Stanley Milgram’s social-psychological experiments followed in the wake of Arendt’s thesis and 
underlined the ordinariness of obedient men like Eichmann.18 In other words, as the focus among 
Holocaust historians lay primarily on the macro-structures of decision-making processes and Nazi 
policy, ‘the banality of evil’ could confirm the intentionalists’ focus on Hitler’s grand project as well 
as the functionalists’ emphasis on a ‘cumulative radicalisation’ beyond the reach of individual 
agencies.19 When Roseman states that ‘it is striking how slow post-war historians have been to see 
its perpetrators as motivated by ideas or convictions’, he also comments on the period in which 
Eichmann in his thoughtlessness became the archetypal Holocaust perpetrator.20 Because according 
to this image, thoughtlessness was not reflected upon as a fundamental part of National Socialism, 
and therefore Eichmann’s ‘inability to think’ implied his detachment from ideological conviction. 
 
There is also a second possibility emphasised by Mack that Arendt, by juxtaposing the particularity 
in the individual figure of Eichmann with the metaphysical terms of ‘banality’ and ‘evil’, already in 
her title aimed to challenge her interpreters with inconsistency – an inconsistency that she was later 
criticised for.21 Therefore, scholars have engaged in the seemingly elusive task of differentiating the 
‘radical’ from the ‘banal’ – based on the fundamental premise that the two are contradictory and that 
the latter excludes ideology. But, in fact, it was the realisation of how the radical and the banal 
conflated in Nazi ideology that prompted Arendt’s reconsideration of using the term ‘radical’. She 
wrote to Karl Jaspers in 1946: ‘the way I’ve expressed this [‘what the Nazis did’] up to now I come 
                                                          
17 Mark Roseman, ‘Beyond Conviction? Perpetrators, Ideas and Action in the Holocaust in Historiographical 
Perspective’, Roseman, Frank Biess and Hanna Schissler (eds.), Essays on Modern German History: Conflict, 
Catastrophe and Continuity (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), p. 86. 
18 Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1974). 
19 There are numerous analyses available on the impact of the banality thesis on perpetrator research; for a concise 
overview of its position in perpetrator historiography, see Roseman, ‘Beyond Conviction’, pp. 83–90. 
20 Roseman, ‘Beyond Conviction’, p. 83. 
21 Mack, ‘Philosophical Critique’, p. 46. 
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dangerously close to that “satanic greatness” that I, like you, totally reject’.22 With a deliberate 
linguistic instability, Arendt thus critiques logic as part of both philosophy and ideology when she 
attempts to ‘develop a political philosophy in response to the Nazi genocide while undermining 
“philosophy” as a discipline hostile toward diversity and the plural realm of politics’.23 Because, just 
as Arendt expressed in her 1953 essay ‘Terror and Mankind’, ‘all our political concepts and 
definitions […] seem to explode in our hands the instant we try to apply them’.24 In other words, the 
way that Arendt’s critique of scientific reason and Nazi totalitarian dogmas had also posed penetrating 
questions for her own intellectualist practice comes through as she describes her use of the term ‘the 
banality of evil’ in The Life of the Mind: ‘Behind the phrase, I held not thesis or doctrine. I was dimly 
aware of the fact that it went against our tradition of thought.’25 The dogmatic lenses derived, in 
Arendt’s view, from conventional perceptions of what a political ideology looked like. Arendt’s 
observation not only attacked the dogmatism of Western scholarly tradition, but it was also a 
comment on its failure to grasp the ‘ideological incorrectness’ of Nazism. 
 
Arendt seems to imply that Eichmann lived out Nazism beyond historiographical conceptions of 
‘conviction’, to the extent that it was the interpretative term ‘ideological’ that was rendered 
superfluous by the Nazi crimes, rather than the individual conviction as such. As Peter Baehr’s study 
on Arendt emphasises, although she became increasingly more occupied with the term ‘ideology’ 
over the years, Arendt’s works from the 1950s also show evidence for an early link between Arendt’s 
principle of plurality and her academic style of inconsistency and irony. In 1951, in a first draft of a 
letter to Voegelin, Arendt defined totalitarian ‘ideology’ through her characteristic juxtaposition of 
two seemingly contradictory concepts. Just as Eichmann came to represent the blurred distinction 
between the ‘radical’ and the ‘banal’, Arendt’s notion of ‘ideology’ left her with nothing but the 
observation of a conceptual inconsistency, that ‘there is something truly crazy about this logicality’.26 
                                                          
22 Hannah Arendt and Karl Jaspers, Correspondence, 1926–1969, Lotte Kohler and Hans Saner (eds.) (New York: 
Harcourt Brace & Co., 1992), p. 69. 
23 Mack, ‘Philosophical Critique’, p. 36. For an alternative view, Dan Diner has departed from an acknowledgment of 
Arendt’s inconsistency, but argues contrary to Mack that Arendt’s liturgical inconsistency was caused not by a deliberate 
philosophical critique but by Arendt’s personal ambivalence in her own Jewish self-conception, being torn between 
extreme universalism (the emphasis on the banality of the perpetrators) and radical nationalism (the emphasis on the 
monstrous Nazi barbarity and the Jewish suffering); see Dan Diner, ‘Hannah Arendt Reconsidered: On the Banal and the 
Evil in her Holocaust Narrative’, New German Critique, 71 (1997), pp. 177–190. This approach to Arendt, and its impact 
on perpetrator research, is further discussed by Richard Wolin, ‘The Ambivalences of German-Jewish Identity: Hannah 
Arendt in Jerusalem’, History and Memory, 8:2 (1996), pp. 9–34.  
24 Arendt, ‘Mankind and Terror’, in Jerome Kohn, ed., Essays In Understanding, 1930–1954: Formation, Exile and 
Totalitarianism [1953] (New York: Schocken Books, 1994), p. 302. 
25 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, p. 3. 
26 Cited in Baehr, ‘Debating Totalitarianism’, p. 5. 
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Arendt therefore did not reject Nazi ideology as a motivating factor for Eichmann, but she did reject 
its assumed consistency. 
 
As much as the post-war structuralist interpretation of Arendt turned her banality thesis into a slogan 
for the secondary importance of ideological conviction, her name also takes a centre position in a 
more recent paradigmatic debate in Holocaust discourse. By virtue of its very existence, the growing 
field of genocide studies is often interpreted as a logical refutation of the uniqueness claim to the 
Holocaust. Arendt’s ‘boomerang thesis’, a thesis in which Arendt draws continuities of exclusionary 
ideas and politics between colonialism and the drive of National Socialism (i.e. genocide), has, as 
Dan Stone observes, become an intellectual justification the continuity thesis. It har further 
consolidated a polarised scholarly climate of pros and cons for Arendt’s thought – and therefore for 
genocide studies as such.27 In giving evidence for Arendt’s simultaneous emphasis on continuities as 
well as radical breaks between the Holocaust and colonial atrocities, Stone argues similarly to Mack 
that Arendt’s ‘causal pluralism goes hand in hand with her defense of human plurality’.28 When not 
interpreted in accordance with her principle of pluralism, her analytical inconsistency leads to the 
scenario where ‘somewhat ironically, those who argue against this suggestion [the ‘boomerang’ 
thesis] might be closer to Arendt’s thinking than they suppose’.29 To recall Arendt’s critique of the 
logics in philosophy then, she would have opposed the label of being a ‘prophet’ of the ‘boomerang’ 
thesis, not because she might have had second thoughts about her argument but primarily because 
that would have been a thoughtless position to be in – and a rejection of the historical complexity that 
plurality brings. 
 
 
II 
Voegelin’s ‘Political Religion’ 
  
It was against this essentialism that Arendt based her critique of Voegelin’s analysis of Nazism as a 
‘political religion’. In a response to his critical review of Origins of Totalitarianism in 1953,30 Arendt 
detected ‘semi-teleological’ features in Voegelin’s concept that seemed to homogenise the plurality 
                                                          
27 Dan Stone, ‘Defending the Plural: Hannah Arendt and Genocide Studies’, New Formations, 71 (2011), p. 54. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., p. 49. 
30 Eric Voegelin, ‘The Origins of Totalitarianism’, The Review of Politics, 15:1 (1953), pp. 68–86. 
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of historical elements that could explain the emergence of totalitarianism. In Voegelin’s own words, 
as he recalled the main points of her criticism, the problem lay in the fact that according to Arendt, 
he had given Nazism the status of a ‘Weltanschauung-movement without any particular historical 
factors’.31 Interestingly throughout the post-war years, Voegelin’s comments on Nazism were 
increasingly moving towards Arendt’s argument that ‘political religion’ indeed implied a 
‘functionalisation’ of religion.32 
 
As Voegelin began to formulate his critique of ‘political religion’, scholars were busy praising its 
analytical potential. While the critique of Arendt’s banality thesis gained momentum in the 1990s, 
this decade also marked the point of departure for the resurgence of ‘political religion’ in research on 
Nazi perpetrators. A few factors contributing to this academic development must be highlighted. First, 
the scholarly turn to cultural history furthered a preoccupation with the ‘small histories’ of individual 
actors and their beliefs and agency so that portrayals of Eichmann gradually took the shape of a 
dynamic ideologue. Second, in the post-Cold War context of a growing focus on religious 
fundamentalism, theories on totalitarian movements experienced a renaissance with a specific focus 
on the phenomenon of mass participation in political extremism.33 These factors taken together meant 
that ‘political religion’ came to symbolise the agency of the masses – a grass-roots perspective in 
contrast to structuralist Cold War theories of totalitarianism – and its application to Nazism led to the 
concept’s inevitable connection with Holocaust perpetrators.34 
 
Voegelin was certainly not the only theorist of Nazism as a ‘political religion’. In the 1930s, one did 
not have to be a political scientist to observe a National Socialist politics that seemed out of this 
world. Victor Klemperer’s essay ‘I Believe in Him’ described a ‘Hitler religion’ where political 
support across the conventional boundaries of class, gender and religious confessions had entered 
                                                          
31 Voegelin, ‘Autobiographical Statement at the Age of Eighty-Two’, Ed Lawrence ed., The Beginning and The 
Beyond: Papers from the Gadamer and Voegelin Conference (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1984), p. 122. 
32 Hannah Arendt, ‘[The Origins of Totalitarianism]: A Reply’, The Review of Politics, 15:1 (1953), pp. 81–82. Arendt’s 
most elaborative critique of the application of the term ‘religion’ in Nazism is, however, found in her article ‘Religion 
and Politics’, published in Confluence (1954), also available in Jerome Kohn ed., Essays in Understanding 1930–1954: 
Formation Exile and Totalitarianism (New York: Schocken Books, 1994), pp. 368–390. 
33 The link between Voegelin’s analytical perspective and the study of terrorism is explicitly drawn by Barry Cooper in 
his study on ‘the spiritual disorder’ (Voegelin’s term applied) of modern terrorism, in New Political Religions, or An 
Analysis of Modern Terrorism (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2004). 
34 Neil Gregor offers a comprehensive contextualisation of the resurgence of the ‘political religion’ concept in the light 
of the voluntarist turn in the wider social sciences and humanities; see Gregor, ‘Nazism – A Political Religion? 
Rethinking the Voluntarist Turn’, in Neil Gregor ed., Nazism, War and Genocide: Essays in Honour of Jeremy Noakes 
(Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 2005). 
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into the realm of a collective religious faith: ‘Thus I have heard this profession of faith in Hitler from 
two different social strata […] and I unfortunately never had any reason to doubt that as well as 
coming from the lips, it also came from the heart.’35 Klemperer’s words could have been mistaken 
for being Voegelin’s because it was the roots to the formation of National Socialism as sacred 
collective that both sought to unmask. At the centre of Voegelin’s attention stood the individual’s 
experience of the religious: 
 
Wherever a reality discloses itself in the religious experience as sacred, it becomes the most real, a realissimum. 
The basic transformation from the natural to the divine results in a sacral and value-oriented recrystallization of 
reality around that aspect that has been recognized as being divine.36 
 
Voegelin’s Die politischen Religionen was the culmination of a decade’s elaboration on the nature of 
totalitarian ideologies and politics. Living in Austria at the time, the German-born Voegelin predicted 
early the unbound reach of the Nazis’ false claim to science. On racism, Rasse und Staat (1933) and 
Die Rassenidee in der Geistesgeschichte (1933) were published at the time of the Nazi seizure of 
power in Germany. The striving to penetrate the core of exclusionary ideologies had early on given 
Voegelin the insight that the line between a religious experience and the exclusionary quest for 
scientific certainty easily overlapped. Later in his life, he explained how 
 
this reality of murdering through inspired idiocy […] is not simply an academic problem, or a problem in the 
history of opinion and so on that evokes my interest in this or that issue in the theory of consciousness, but the 
very practical problem of mass murder which is manifest in the twentieth century.37 
 
Ernst Nolte’s idea of meta-political fascism sees the fascist experience as non-transcendent beyond 
the individual experience 38 and similarly did Voegelin’s ‘phenomenological’ approach to a National 
Socialist ‘political religion’ emphasise the inner experience of Nazism within political structures. The 
argument that the religious aura of National Socialism was itself an uncanny explanation of the violent 
nature of the regime is evident as Voegelin describes the formation of ‘inner-worldly religions’ 
                                                          
35 Victor Klemperer, The Language of the Third Reich: LTI: Lingua Tertii Imperii: A Philologist’s Notebook [1947], 
Martin Brady tr. (London: Athlone Press, 2000), p. 109. 
36 Voegelin, ‘The Political Religions’ [1939], Manfred Henningsen ed., Modernity Without Restraint: The Political 
Religion, the New Science of Politics and Science, Politics, and Gnosticism. The Collected Works of 
Eric Voegelin, Volume 5 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2000), p. 32. 
37 Voegelin, ‘Autobiographical Statement at the Age of Eighty-Two’, pp. 116–117. 
38 Ernst Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism: Action Française, Italian Fascism, National Socialism (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, 1966). 
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(innerweltliche Religionen); as opposed to ‘trans-worldly religions’ (überweltliche Religionen), the 
‘inner-worldly’ religious movements found the real and divine (realissimum) in earthly phenomenon. 
In this vein, Voegelin presented National Socialism as such an ‘inner-worldly’ religion where its 
realissimum was built around the racist idea of an Aryan community, or Volk. A belonging to the 
Nazi community meant that each individual was being in a state of action. As a result, Voegelin 
sought to balance the individual and the supra-individual dimensions of ‘political religion’ by 
emphasising that the religious experience of a racial community itself became a suprahuman reality.39 
To explain the willingness of the individual to gain such an experience while simultaneously letting 
himself sink ‘down into the impersonal nothingness of instrumentality’, Voegelin saw how 
‘individuals experience themselves as actors in the course of world history’.40 In short, the banality 
in the individual’s active aim to master his worldly existence was for Voegelin the very essence that 
formed the pillars of the Nazi ideology of racial exclusion and its manifestation in violence. 
 
 
III 
Arendt, Voegelin and Historiography 
 
There is, however, an irony in how the growing focus on the Nazi Weltanschauung marked the end 
of the polarising power of the use of Arendt’s banality thesis, only to be replaced by the image of 
Eric Voegelin as the founding father of ‘political religion’.41 In fact, both Voegelin and Arendt hold 
a canonical place in perpetrator historiography and represent important milestones in its development. 
As scholars have described an ‘ideological turn’ in perpetrator research since the 1990s, this 
‘ideological turn’ coincided with what one could see as the turn away from Arendt’s Eichmann to 
Voegelin’s ‘ideological believer’ in the representation of the archetypal Holocaust perpetrator. In the 
context of Arendt, Dana Villa perceptively identifies the irony which motivated Goldhagen’s 
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reductionist thesis on German ideological ‘executioners’, namely by proclaiming it as a response to 
one-dimensional Eichmann figures – where the one to blame was ‘of course, Hannah Arendt’.42 
 
Similarly, Gilbert Weiss has remarked that Voegelin’s sudden popularity says more about the limited 
interpretative ability among contemporary scholars than the actual content of Voegelin’s work. What 
these comments on Arendt and Voegelin indicate is an appropriation of their work into the perpetrator 
historiography, driven largely by historiographical meta-structures, such as post-war structuralism as 
well as the ‘ideological turn’. In this vein, Villa concludes that when scholars have strived to detect 
the ‘representative perpetrator’ in Arendt’s writing, they have paradoxically ‘diminished the plurality’ 
that signified not only Arendt’s intellectual works but also her very principle of thinking.43 Just as 
Dan Diner has described how in the academic disciplines and beyond, the ‘banality of evil’ now 
constitutes a career in itself, Weiss notes that besides the ‘inadequate and unoriginal’ use of 
Voegelin’s concept as applied to National Socialism, ‘political religion’ seems to have taken on ‘a 
life of its own’.44 In this context, Jürgen Gebhardt has further observed that Voegelin rather 
paradoxically tends to be read as a prophet, offering ‘a vision of the true order’, which is a 
historiographical position scarcely different from the mentioned place of Arendt in genocide 
research.45 As I move on to discuss ‘political religion’ in current perpetrator research against 
Voegelin’s theory of consciousness, it will become clearer how these two parts of his philosophy 
came to clash through the very notion of logical ‘ideal-types’. I will begin with an overview of the 
use of ‘political religion’. 
 
Remembering how Vondung and Ley both stressed the explanatory power of political religion, the 
ambition to crack the code and solve the mystery of Nazism paradoxically transforms the obscurity 
of ‘political religion’ into a tool in the quest for certainty. Precisely because it appears as the closest 
possible articulation, ‘political religion’ is thus used in order to overcome the mystery rather than to 
‘live with’ the uncertainty it entails. Besides the analytical shortcomings of the concept, the ethical 
dimension in Roberts’s critique mirrors Friedländer’s aim to maintain a disbelief, for the 
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representation of the Holocaust not to ‘be assimilated by the known’ and not to ‘be transformed into 
new understanding; the imaginative leap has only partly succeeded; the mind is not at rest’.46 
 
What Roberts describes is thus the banality of interpretation, or in Arendt’s terms, thoughtlessness, 
when the familiarity we know in the term ‘religion’ is juxtaposed with the unknown, ‘as if the agents, 
thanks to a religious blueprint actually knew what they were doing’.47 Hence, apart from the fact that 
the study of perpetrators’ motivations – not to mention the content of their ideological beliefs – in its 
own right leads into an epistemological abyss, the closure to causal particularity that the concept 
brings simultaneously symbolises a functionalist mode of thinking about the perpetrators. In a letter 
to the Austrian philosopher Alfred Schütz in September 1943 – in the midst of the Nazi project that 
involved bureaucrats and intellectuals indistinguishable from the barbarity of their tasks – Voegelin 
elaborated with sarcasm on the elusive nature of the functionary: 
 
I do not distinguish sufficiently between functionaries of the National Socialist party and functionaries of mankind; 
or that the functionaries of the party slaughter mankind, while the functionaries of mankind do not see deep enough 
into the nature of evil, to see at least one of its roots in the nature of the functionary.48 
 
Certainly, the aim here is not to imply that either Roberts or Voegelin attribute totalitarian aspirations 
to scholars of ‘political religion’. Rather, the above lines serve to illuminate the way Voegelin’s 
commentary on scholarly functionalism mirrors the functionalism of his concept and its applications, 
which both Arendt and Roberts detected, albeit in their separate ways. In his discussion, Roberts 
significantly included Voegelin’s own hesitant remarks on ‘political religion’. Consequently, it 
indicates that what Weiss saw as Voegelin’s concept ‘living its own life’ is a part of Roberts’s 
fundamental critique of the contemporary usage of political religion.49 In other words, the process of 
the concept’s canonisation involves a non-critical dimension. The clash between the familiarity of the 
concept and the inconsistency of historical realities is also a reflection of historians’ non-familiarity 
with Voegelin. As we shall see, Voegelin’s post-Holocaust discussion of symbolism elaborates 
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48 Cited in David J. Levy, ‘Europe, Truth and History: Husserl and Voegelin on Philosophy and the Identity of Europe’, 
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precisely on Roberts’ concern with the problem of ‘familiarity’ in ‘political religion’ as an analytical 
concept. 
 
 
IV 
Voegelin’s Critique of Postwar Historiography 
  
In Munich in 1964, Voegelin’s lectures on ‘Hitler and the Germans’ roughly coincided with Arendt’s 
commentary on Eichmann in 1963. By then, Arendt had already discussed her early interpretations 
of the trial in one of Voegelin’s graduate seminars in 1961. As a student at that time, Manfred 
Henningsen underlines the similarities in Voegelin’s and Arendt’s approaches by stating that 
Voegelin’s lectures could have been ‘subtitled reflections on the evil banality of the Third Reich’.50 
On the individual level, Arendt had previously argued that Eichmann ‘was incapable of uttering a 
single sentence that was not a cliché’.51 In a similar vein, rather than engaging his students in theories 
on Nazism, Voegelin encouraged a revolt against scholarly functionalism as he stated that ‘nothing 
can be explained by the cliché of National Socialism’.52 Hence, the study of the Nazi phenomena 
would mean an exercise in its own form of doctrinalisation if it followed a literal reading of its 
ideological clichés. 
 
In a response to the wider phenomenon of demonisation of the perpetrators in the context of the 
Federal Republic’s slogan of ‘mastering the past’ (Vergangenheitsbewältigung), Voegelin explicitly 
criticised Percy Ernst Schramm’s Hitler’s Table Talk, where Schramm gives Hitler demonic features. 
Instead, Henningsen describes how Voegelin portrayed Hitler as a man where the only depth could 
be found in his ignorance.53 The links between Arendt’s thoughtless Eichmann and Voegelin’s image 
of Hitler thus clearly reveal the banality Voegelin ascribed to the leading figure of Nazism, and 
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possibly Nazism as such. As Henningsen further clarifies, it was a departure from ‘the “satanic” 
seducers Voegelin tried to understand in 1938’ and by 1964, ‘the “satanic” aspect of the Nazis had 
obviously changed’.54 
 
Although Voegelin never revised his pre-Holocaust writings on Nazism, ‘political religion’ as a 
concept reflected the methodological challenges in studying totalitarian phenomena. The attribution 
of the symbol of ‘religion’ to account for Nazism revealed homogenising impulses and crude 
simplifications which for Voegelin could not be completely detached from the single-mindedness of 
totalitarian ideologies. This linkage is particularly clear in an essay from 1967 where he argues that 
the upheaval in the use of symbols such as ‘religion’ turned into a ‘doctrinal deformation’ similar to 
a ‘too doctrinal reading of the [National Socialist] ideology’.55 Instead, Voegelin concluded his letter 
to Schütz in 1943 with the message that the study of totalitarian regimes had to be centred on a theory 
of individual consciousness.56 
 
Voegelin tried to come to terms with the phenomenon of the ‘inspired idiot’.57 Ultimately, his 
message was that in the nature of all kinds of functionaries was an inability to live with the 
inconsistency and the complexity of existence, manifested in their readiness to uncritically receive 
given symbols. Whether concerned with movements or individual experiences, Voegelin’s approach 
to symbols, such as ‘religion’ and ‘ideology’, was formed around the idea that symbols arise from the 
forces of imagination and language in ‘man’s experiential response to the reality of which he is a 
part’.58 In this experience, symbols are created to express this reality, but since man participates in a 
world of constant change beyond his own intentionality, ‘the concrete situation in which man has to 
find the images and symbols of his existential order change with the course of history’.59 Yet, for the 
‘inspired idiot’, symbols replace the existential quest for reality, a process of symbolisation described 
by Voegelin as a process of deformation. 
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In the event in which symbols or images are taken as ultimate expressions of reality and truth, the 
‘imaginative response can issue onto the untruth of a Second Reality’.60 Voegelin refers to Heimito 
von Doderer’s novel Daemonen (1956), where the term ‘Second Reality’ was introduced. The 
inspiration drawn from his theory is clear as Voegelin commented that Doderer’s ‘analysis of 
National Socialism in the post-war novels is extremely acute, and results in the conception of second 
realities which replaced the first realities’.61 The ‘Second Reality’ is interpreted as ‘a realm of 
spiritlike nonspirit […] which finds its representation of the plane of politics in the ideological mass 
movements’.62 With an aim to ‘eclipse the reality of existential consciousness’,63 these movements 
constructed an image of reality through a process of ‘doctrinalization and literalization’64 of symbols. 
This construction of reality represented ‘a deliberate act of imaginative oblivion’.65 What Voegelin 
described as a form of ‘selective conscience’ in the emergence of collective ideologies also applied 
to his interpretation of the microcosm of individual Nazi followers; by accepting a static symbol of 
reality, for example the doctrine of the race idea, the ‘inspired idiot’ actively refused to perceive the 
complexity and contradictions in their own surroundings.66 Voegelin describes the ‘inspired idiot’ as 
one who ‘gets an inspiration that one is on the just side, one feels no concern about consequences of 
nonsensical, even murderous actions: it is as if one no longer really effects the murders one will be 
committing’.67 
 
In this vein, Roberts’s ‘familiarity’ thesis as a critique of ‘political religion’ reflects Voegelin’s 
objection to the uncritical acceptance of literal symbols. For Voegelin, the need to refuse symbols as 
equivalences of reality went beyond the ethical dimension of countering totalitarian non-thinking. 
Evident from his lectures in Munich was also a message directed to the academic field on the need to 
move beyond concepts and classifications and towards a study of differences in historical realities. 
As Voegelin argued, ‘the aim is to gain a genuine understanding of the truth of the language symbols 
in their historical variants – not brought under the heading of “history of ideas” or “comparative 
religion”’.68 Instead, one should approach ‘the “ideas” as objects of a history and to establish the 
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experience of reality […] as the reality to be explored historically’.69 For Roberts, the familiarity with 
‘political religion’ obscures the fact that our reading of ‘the historical specificity is not rich or deep 
enough’.70 Moreover, similar to Voegelin, on the static nature of conceptual symbolism, Roberts 
argues that 
 
The point is not so much to play down the elements featured by proponents of ‘political religion’ but to find a 
more convincing way of accounting for them and the roles they played, in interface with others. At the same time, 
we must recognize, as proponents of ‘political religion’ tend not to, that roles, proportions, and relationships 
change as practice proceeded.71 
 
What Voegelin saw as a problem of ‘high theory’ vis-à-vis the reality of historical experience thus 
remains a methodological puzzle in Holocaust research. 
 
 
 
 
V 
Eichmann: Thinking and Consciousness 
  
So far I have attempted to establish that Voegelin rejected the concept of ‘political religion’ based on 
similar criteria to those that characterise contemporary objections to the concept. This leads to the 
question of whether Voegelin’s post-Holocaust analysis of National Socialism provides the 
complexity sought, both by Voegelin himself as well as the contemporary field of perpetrator research 
in their consensual rejection of the notion of an ‘ideal-type’ Nazi.72 
 
Since Arendt’s and Voegelin’s works have been presented here from the angle of the 
‘thoughtlessness’ and ‘stupidity’ they ascribed to the perpetrators, Zoë Waxman’s following critique 
of Arendt’s banality thesis will take this discussion a step further in that respect. Waxman identifies 
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a paradox in that Arendt’s image of the thoughtless perpetrator Eichmann functions as the antithesis 
to Arendt’s call for individual critical thinking. By constructing a bipolar relationship between the 
notion of the perpetrator and that of critical thinking, described by Waxman as an ‘inviolable, 
immediate morality’, she argues that Arendt is in fact formulating her own take on ‘pure ethics’ 
against her principle of plurality.73 In failing to fully emphasise the meditative act between thinking 
and doing which Eichmann displays, for example, in Arendt’s own description of him as an ‘idealist’ 
obeying orders,74 Waxman concludes that Arendt ultimately fails to 
 
forward a mediated account which avoids the categories of simple opposition: rationality/irrationality; 
legality/morality; human/divine; innocence/guilt. The failure to acknowledge the inter-dependence of these 
categories influences the way that the events of the Holocaust are represented: aesthetically, philosophically and 
verbally, and subsequently means that a fuller understanding of modern existence continues to elude modes of 
representation.75 
 
Thus, Waxman seems to imply that if Eichmann indeed was thinking (something Arendt might 
necessarily not have objected to, as Waxman also notes),76 there is yet to be established an account 
of Nazi perpetrators which acknowledges the tension between them as thinking individuals and their 
relationship to a Nazi doctrine of ‘non-thinking’. Reading from this argument, Eichmann’s thinking 
did not necessarily contradict his Nazi worldview, but it most definitely contradicted the Nazi project 
of establishing singularity. Eichmann thus gained control over the Nazi totalitarian ideology through 
his own thinking. Therefore, he not only represented Nazism – just as the banal represented the radical 
in Arendt’s terms – instead his actions imply that the National Socialist ideology surely proclaimed 
a doctrine of non-thinking, but nevertheless functioned upon a plurality of thinking individuals. In 
other words, to reconcile Eichmann’s thinking with that of his exemplary career within the Nazi 
regime forces us not only to re-visit Eichmann as an individual as so many scholars already have 
done. Assuming that the Nazis indeed were ‘thinking’, it also highlights the relationship between the 
individual ‘ideological incorrectness’ and the ‘correctness’ of the Nazi doctrine as two integral parts 
of National Socialism.  
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The theoretical possibility to address Nazism beyond stupidity and towards individual thinking is a 
crucial aspect that is implicit in Voegelin’s theory of consciousness. Voegelin argued that individuals 
resisting truth share the same grounds of consciousness as those resisting untruth.77 You could be a 
Nazi or you could be a humanitarian peacekeeper, but your levels of consciousness were measured 
the same way. They were measured through your ability to form your own perception of reality and 
thus resist a blind acceptance of the ideas provided to you, regardless of whether they came from 
totalitarian propaganda or more ‘truthful’ sources. This idea of consciousness is significant to note in 
relation to Voegelin’s commentary on Holocaust historiography regarding Eichmann. The 
relativisation he makes between ‘truth’ and ‘untruth’ should be seen as an attempt to move beyond 
the demonisation of the Nazis: Voegelin effectively ‘humanised’ the Nazis by arguing that there was 
room for consciousness even within the most inhumane contexts. In that sense, Voegelin’s notion of 
consciousness plays on the relationship between the incorrectness of the individual vis-à-vis the 
information and ideas projected onto him from the outside world. 
 
What measured the individual’s consciousness was his ability to resist this type of inspiration from 
the outside. The ‘inspiration’, in Voegelin’s words, was thus the ideas that the individual faced from 
its surrounding world. Voegelin therefore stressed that these ideas were regarded as inspiration 
regardless of their nature, i.e. they could be both humanitarian and totalitarian inspirations. In fact, 
the nature of the messages mattered less than the individual attitude to them. By resisting given 
symbols and messages of reality, a conscious individual was defined by the resistance to inspiration 
from this received symbolism. The uncritical acceptance of images (or propaganda) as such signalled 
a lack of consciousness. In Arendt’s words, the state of being ‘unthinking’ defined the lack of 
consciousness more than the nature of the images as such. Voegelin clarified this point as he stated 
that ‘nor should there be forgotten the contemporary enmity between certain representatives of 
“positivism” and ideological activists’.78 Like Arendt, Voegelin drew parallels between the 
homogenising tendency present in Western scholarly tradition and those totalitarian ideologies 
subject to this scholarly scrutiny. 
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Particularly important for this thesis is Voegelin’s argument that a man who succumbed to the 
deformed ‘truth’ was thus a man who ‘can well be conscious of his deformation’.79 Here, in the last 
stage of his career, Voegelin seems to argue that ideological conviction was an individual choice and 
that there was room for consciousness as the individual dedicated his actions to a collective idea. This 
is a significant nuance of Voegelin’s approach to National Socialism, because it implicitly reveals 
that Voegelin saw no clear contradictions between human consciousness and ideological conviction. 
Instead, the process of being conscious of one’s own deformation of reality – i.e. the acceptance of 
the Nazi Weltanschauung – is in Voegelin’s theory of consciousness also marked by an emphasis on 
individual agency. In other words, since Voegelin draws similarities between ‘truth’ and ‘untruth’, 
he also offers an interpretation of Nazis with conscience, which contradicts a perception of Nazis as 
a collective group of ‘inspired idiots’. This interpretation is given further evidence in one of 
Voegelin’s late writings: ‘he [man] is not afflicted with blindness for the open cosmos, but deforms 
its reality while being conscious of deforming it’.80 Voegelin thus acknowledges the possibility that 
a believer in ‘non-truth’ (i.e. Nazism) might not necessarily have a blind trust in ideological symbols 
but that ’non-truth’ also meant the conscious individual reformation of these symbols. 
 
 
VI 
Agency 
 
This depicted emphasis on agency in thinking connects with Voegelin’s emphasis on agency in doing, 
which is clearly essential in the study of perpetrators. In fact, his theory of consciousness is also 
relevant to the contemporary critique of the assumed ‘divine transcendence’ in ‘political religion’ 
theory. In Voegelin’s view, mundane factors were always present in divine transcendence, i.e. he 
rejected the idea that the perpetrator would act in the name of a ‘political religion’ entirely detached 
from mundane reality. This conflation of the sacred and the profane is, as we have seen, frequently 
called for among scholars today. In this vein, and against doctrinal or ‘fanatical certainty’, Roberts’ 
second objection to ‘political religion’ points to a feeling of fragility so present among men in times 
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of upheaval and destruction, but is given no space in ‘political religion’ theory. This feeling, Roberts 
argues, accompanied the sense of historical openness and space for action among the totalitarian 
movements, where a ‘fanatical certainty’ also came with uncertainty: 
 
It entailed among other things, a sense of the need to improvise – but also a sense of the human capacity to do so. 
Still, the uncertainty inevitably shadowed the confidence. So mixed characteristically with hubris in all three cases 
was a certain shrillness, reflecting the lack of any suprahistorical assurance, the feeling that it was all up to them, 
acting within an unforeseeable history.81 
 
Ultimately, Roberts questions the notion of a ‘divine transcendence’ for its reductionist tendency to 
ignore the historical realities of interwar Europe. As we have seen in chapter 1, this emphasis on 
‘historical realities’ is a critique of the sacralisation of National Socialism implied in ‘political 
religion’ theory, and one which Roberts shares with many other scholars today. He compellingly 
argues that ‘the fragility at issue could have been experienced only when even the possibility of 
religious assurance had been left behind’.82 A similar hesitation towards the notion of ‘divine 
transcendence’ can be found in Dominick LaCapra’s arguments on the sacred nature of Nazism, 
which is rather different from most scholars on ‘political religion’. For LaCapra, the way one can 
speak of transcendence from a Nazi point of view was in the exaltation and willingness of the 
perpetrators, which became dependent on the aspect of victimisation. LaCapra puts forward a view 
of Nazism deriving from his focus on the perpetrators’ move beyond normative limits. Only in this 
form of earthly, experiential, transcendence beyond norms can one invoke the notion of a Nazi 
‘sacred’.83 
 
In essence, LaCapra demonstrates an ideology that becomes on the one hand dependent on 
transcendental acts in their ritualistic forms, but that on the other hand remains centred on the non-
transcendental; the ritual of violence itself depends on an acknowledgement of boundaries in order to 
maintain the possibility of exceeding them. To clarify, since the sacred is found ‘beyond good and 
evil’ and is in constant need of repeated acts of transgression, it remains in the uncertain, rather than 
certain, position of being in-between.84 
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At the centre of the perpetrators’ ideological motivation, LaCapra argues that there is a need to 
emphasise more clearly the plausible awareness that the perpetrators had over their own violation of 
moral norms. Berel Lang has further clarified the implication of this kind of moral knowledge for the 
discussion on thinking. Lang argues that from the process of dehumanisation follows the assumption 
that the perpetrators actually knew of their immorality, since the act of dehumanisation ‘required a 
conscious affirmation of the wrong involved in it’.85 Consequently, while Roberts and LaCapra 
describe the nature of Nazism on different levels, they both base their opposition to ‘political religion’ 
on the connection to the conventional symbolism of ‘religion’ as linked with ‘divine transcendence’. 
Both also emphasise the notion of a ‘worldly transcendence’, where the assurance that comes from 
divinisation was replaced by a form of transcendence that sacralised the traumatic and the mundane. 
This transcendence comprises both a feeling of uncertainty at the root of the Nazi world order as well 
as a seemingly conscious maintenance of this instability through the repeated acts of breaking moral 
norms. 
 
Voegelin’s understanding of transcendence is intimately connected with his discussions of symbolism 
and of consciousness. First, the relationship between Voegelin’s theory of consciousness and 
transcendence can be summed up as follows. In Heideggerian terms, Voegelin’s notions of 
‘authenticity’ and ‘being’ in the world were not separated, and ‘consciousness is an experience of 
participation in the ground of being’.86 The experience of participation could either be deformed by 
the individual through the act of a refusal to apperceive the complexities of reality, or it could be 
reflected upon through an awareness of what Voegelin simply calls ‘the complexity’. To account for 
this complexity, Voegelin borrowed the term Metaxy from Plato to illuminate the human existence in 
tension, the status of being ‘in-between’. Visually, Voegelin’s ‘complexity’ represents the idea that 
human reality is comprised of poles in tension between the questing human and the ‘divine reality’ 
which moved the individual.87 
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Voegelin rejected the notion of the ‘divine’ to fully encompass an act of transcendence; instead, he 
emphasised the actual position of ‘in-between’.88 Against Hegelian dialectics, Voegelin saw the 
tension of the poles in relation to the so-called ‘thing-reality’ which in the individual consciousness 
is perceived to exist outside the ‘self’, but according to Voegelin nevertheless lies within 
consciousness.89 The thing-reality can in simple terms be described as the world we live in and the 
external objects to which we refer. With an insight that a ‘subject-reality’ (i.e. the tension between 
the ‘divine’ and the inner quest of the individual) and a ‘thing-reality’ (i.e. the external world) exist, 
Voegelin draws from Nietzsche to argue that the coexistence of these realities make up the ‘it-reality’. 
This reality is beyond pure subjective intentionality since it is bound to an awareness of the human 
existence in tension. Ultimately, the knowledge of this ‘in-between’ status of the human in relation 
to the beyond and unknown, as well as to the ‘thing-reality’, is for Voegelin the structure of 
consciousness.90 
 
Parallels can be drawn from the Voegelinian theory of transcendence to LaCapra’s and Roberts’ 
linkage between uncertainty and conscience within Nazism, and how it was expressed among its 
individual followers. Voegelin refers to the platonic usage of transcendence as ‘meditative’, opposed 
to conventional usage, which is stated to go beyond the worldly reality of the ‘de-divinized’ world.91 
For Voegelin, an act of transcendence and the move ‘beyond’ tends to be objectified and read 
doctrinally to indicate a divine ‘destination’ of transcendence. Similar to the way LaCapra puts 
emphasis on the perpetrators’ experiential transcendence, Voegelin calls the experience of 
transcendence a ‘cognitive event’.92 He further argues that one cannot separate the act of 
transcendence, which he calls ‘the rise’, from an understanding of the collective consequences of this 
transcendence as such: ‘there is not a “transcendent reality” other than the Beyond experience in the 
“rise”. If it is torn out of the experiential context, it suffers the intentionalist reduction to an object.’93 
 
                                                          
88 Michael P. Morrissey discusses in detail Voegelin’s conception of ‘transcendence’ and its challenge to Christian 
theology, as well as Western philosophy. By so doing, Morrissey rejects the commonly held assumption that Voegelin’s 
‘political religion’ by necessity represents a traditional theological response to the phenomenon of Nazi ideology, but 
that it rather should be seen as a move beyond the false dichotomy of philosophy and theology. See Morrissey, 
Consciousness and Transcendence: The Theology of Eric Voegelin (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1994). 
89 Voegelin, ‘The Meditative Origin’, p. 49. 
90 Ibid., pp. 49–50. 
91 Voegelin, ‘The Beginning and the Beyond’, in Thomas A. Hollweck and Paul Caringella (eds.), What is History? and 
Other Late Unpublished Writings, The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, Volume 28, p. 218. 
92 Ibid., p. 219. 
93 Ibid., p. 218. 
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Voegelin’s linkage between the experiential ‘rise’ and notions of sacred transcendence in the context 
of the perpetrator is in line with LaCapra’s alternative understanding of ‘political religion’. It is seen 
not as a static conception of a doctrine of divinity where individuals across time and space acted 
unanimously as believing puppets, but where the experience of individually divergent acts themselves 
amounted to the sacralisation of Nazi violence. Voegelin further explains the relationship between 
the mundane, historical acts and the transcendence as an intrinsically ‘sacred’ phenomenon where 
one must not separate the 
 
participle transcendent from the act of transcendence and transform it into a fideistic attribute of the reality that 
becomes visible in the act […] it furthermore obscures the historical process in which the modes of the ‘rise’ 
change.94 
 
The ‘ideological incorrectness’ in individual actions thus amounted to the homogenising ‘correctness’ 
that scholars have ascribed to National Socialism and its genocidal project. 
  
  
 
VII 
Perpetrator Motivations 
  
Claus-Ekkehard Bärsch has invoked Voegelin’s rejection of divine transcendence in his critique of 
current theorisations of ‘political religion’. To an extent, his argument follows Voegelin’s theory of 
consciousness as well as the early thesis on ‘political religion’ in that the divinisation took ‘inner-
worldly’ expressions in the sacralisation of ideological symbols such as Hitler’s leadership and the 
Aryan Volksgemeinschaft. Nevertheless, Bärsch’s analysis stops short of providing significant insight 
as to how this ‘inner-worldly’ notion of ‘political religion’ is analytically useful in the particular study 
of ‘ordinary perpetrators’ and their relationship to Nazism.95 In line with scholars such as Boaz 
Neumann, I would argue that it is in fact the move away from a programmatic reading of ideological 
                                                          
94 Ibid. 
95 Claus-Ekkehard Bärsch, ‘Der Topos der Politischen Religion aus der Perspektive der Religionspolitologie’ in 
Politische Religion? Politik, Religion und Anthropologie im Werk von Eric Voegelin (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 
2003), p. 195. For a comprehensive account of Bärsch’s approach to the concept, see Bärsch, Die politische Religion 
des Nationalsozialismus: Die religiöse Dimension der NS-Ideologie in den Schriften von Dietrich Eckart, Joseph 
Goebbels, Alfred Rosenberg und Adolf Hitler (Munich: Fink Verlag, 1998). 
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doctrines that somewhat ironically might direct us towards the ‘existential’, yet perhaps also banal, 
core of the National Socialist ideology,96 a ‘core’ indicated by LaCapra to encompass the 
‘secularization of the sacred, and of the desire for radical transcendence of ordinary conditions and 
banality, including ordinary moral limits’.97 
 
In fact, when faced with instances of individual excessive violence proclaimed to be motivated by 
metaphysical political ideologies, even the most eager defenders of ‘political religion’ have displayed 
hesitations towards its analytical value. Michael Franz has depicted an interesting development of 
Michael Burleigh’s scholarship on the motivations of perpetrators, ranging from National Socialist to 
21st-century terrorists. Franz directs attention to the fact that Burleigh’s previously mentioned 
preference for ‘political religion’ as applied to Nazi perpetrators was abandoned completely in his 
later work Blood and Rage – focusing on the agency of individual terrorists. Within the latter work, 
Franz finds it striking how often Burleigh 
 
finds merely mundane personal motivations underlying terrorist violence […] Burleigh’s book seems to suggest 
that many, many more terrorists acted as they did – and became who they were – not because of spiritual agitation 
or any sort of ‘second reality’ apocalypticism, but rather because of ‘first reality’ processes involving motivations 
and attractions that were thoroughly prosaic.98 
 
Although I concur with Franz’s general warrant that a too one-sided emphasis on mundane 
motivational factors might distort us from the wider ideological patterns and cultural contexts in 
which these individuals acted, I choose to disagree with Franz as he further makes a rather rigid 
separation between intrinsically personal motivations and ideological consciousness. Yet again, 
‘political religion’ is placed in opposition to personal motivation, as Franz concludes in a questionable 
manner that it is in the absence of the concept that Burleigh fails to account for ideological 
conviction.99 
 
                                                          
96 See Boaz Neumann, ‘The National Socialist Politics of Life’, New German Critique, 85 (2007), p. 109. In a later 
article, Neumann further emphasises that Nazism was about experience rather than ideas, since ‘ideology’ as such was 
an integral part of the liberal tradition that Nazism aimed to break out of; ‘in the case of Nazism, there was no gap 
between the idea/ideology and practice’. See Neumann, ‘The Phenomenology of the German People’s Body 
(Volkskörper) and the Extermination of the Jewish Body’, New German Critique, 36 (2009), p. 152. 
97 LaCapra, Writing History – Writing Trauma, p. 136. 
98 Michael Franz, ‘Moral Insanity and Spiritual Disorder: Conceptualizing the Terrorist Mind’, Paper presented 
at the Eric Voegelin Society Annual International Meeting 2010, American Political Science Association 
(Washington D.C., 2–5 September, 2010). 
99 Ibid. 
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When Dirk Moses critiques the ‘quick-fix’ scholarly concepts of racial hatred, ‘eliminiationist’ 
ideologies and ‘political religion’ in studies of contemporary mass violence, the crux he identifies is 
the absence of approaches that actually consider the study of ‘ideology’ to contain ‘an analysis of 
how and why these eliminationist ideologies develop at all’.100 In other words, the absence of 
‘mundane’ aspects of ideology, such as broader geopolitical contexts as well as more narrow and 
immediate personal dispositions, renders concepts such as ‘political religion’ de facto detached from 
the actual historical events under study. This detachment is an ironic contradiction to what proponents 
of ‘political religion’ aimed for, namely to capture the ‘existential’ individual experience in a supra-
individual political project which had taken a metaphysical meaning – hence, to study individuals’ 
realities as they appeared on the ground rather than from a concept moving across time and space. 
Instead, there is room to argue that precisely by highlighting Burleigh’s avoidance of applying 
‘political religion’ to terrorist activities – thus acts of violence fundamentally connected with agency 
and personal transgression – we can also trace the limits of the concept as applied to Nazi perpetrators. 
In this context, the theoretical works of both Voegelin and LaCapra share the contention that there 
should be no analytical separation between the act of transcendence and the fact that it was 
accompanied by its often mundane reasons. 
VIII 
Chapter Conclusion 
  
The chapter began by arguing that despite their intellectual quarrels, Eric Voegelin and Hannah 
Arendt formed their respective philosophies around a battle against the term ‘ideology’ and the 
correctness assumed with the term. The chapter has clarified how and why it was that ‘ideology’ 
formed the core of both Arendt’s and Voegelin’s work. In different ways, Arendt and Voegelin fought 
the violent logic they detected not only in totalitarian ideologies, but also in the interpretative 
responses to it. Arendt’s and Voegelin’s approaches to the Nazi perpetrators were fundamentally 
connected to their apprehension of the conceptually unbound structure of National Socialism as such. 
This transgressive nature of National Socialism also worked to contextualise Voegelin’s theory of 
consciousness in the wake of Arendt’s portrayal of Eichmann and the subsequent emergence of 
perpetrator research in the mid-1960s. Voegelin thus developed his post-Holocaust philosophy from 
a growing awareness of the intellectual homogenisation that resulted in the construction of ideal-type 
                                                          
100 A. Dirk Moses, ‘Paranoia and Partisanship: Genocide Studies, Holocaust Historiography, and the Apocalyptic 
Conjuncture’, The Historical Journal, 54:2 (2011), p. 582. 
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Nazi perpetrators. In that sense, the bipolar position of Arendt’s and Voegelin’s concepts in 
perpetrator research is an ironic reflection of the homogenising impulses they themselves sought to 
transgress by intellectual means. In the face of the historical plurality of chaos, conflict and 
divergences that the Nazis created, Voegelin’s critique of ‘political religion’ was a historically 
informed revolt against a broader development in Holocaust historiography of imposing 
metanarratives on the actions and motivations of Nazi perpetrators. 
 
Voegelin’s post-Holocaust works thus reveal greater similarities to contemporary critiques of 
‘political religion’ than they do to its defenders. Contrary to the contention of many of Arendt’s and 
Voegelin’s interpreters, the underlying principle in their work was not to define Nazi ideology, but to 
unmask it. As Voegelin and Arendt both expressed clearly, the only way to do so was to approach 
Nazism with the kind of plurality that the totalitarian ideologies ultimately had sought to destroy and 
this involved a rejection of rigid collective classifications. In that sense, the little attention paid by 
scholars to the ways in which Arendt’s and Voegelin’s trajectories in historiography bear striking 
similarities is itself an uncanny reminder of the homogenising impulse that lies in the very notion of 
‘ideology’ as such, or in Confino’s words, the ‘catechism of ideology’. It is clear that Arendt and 
Voegelin disagreed on several aspects of the nature of Nazi totalitarianism, but the underlying 
structures they both sought to use to overcome the impulse of demonisation in the face of Nazism are 
clear. As I have attempted to show, just as Voegelin came to acknowledge how an act of sacralisation 
could emerge from something intrinsically banal and mundane, so too does Arendt’s Eichmann 
represent a banality that radically challenges our conception of ‘banal’ as such. Voegelin and Arendt 
strived for inconsistency, not only in the structures of their own philosophy, but also in order to grasp 
the inconsistency in which Nazism transgressed its own conceptual limits for what constitutes an 
‘ideology’. This linkage between plurality and inconsistency was ultimately Voegelin’s and Arendt’s 
intellectual common ground where they both responded to Nazism by refusing to let their own work 
provide conceptual closure to the study of Nazism. 
 
Ultimately, Arendt and Voegelin were pioneering not so much regarding Nazism’s banality or its 
‘political religion’, but in the way these two intellectuals pointed to the ‘ideological incorrectness’ in 
National Socialism. It was incorrectness in the sense of being an ideology fundamentally detached 
from the assumptions of a conventional political ideology. But that is not to say that the ideology was 
out of this world, or a divine ‘political religion’; Voegelin’s theory of consciousness pointed to 
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another form of ‘ideological incorrectness’: thinking about Nazis as conscious individuals meant 
accepting the space for incorrectness vis-à-vis the Nazi dogmas. It did not render National Socialism 
less lethal, but rather enabled its adaptability in highly diverse contexts across the European continent, 
such as Scandinavia.
 
 
 
93 
 
 Chapter 3: ‘Why Are There Several “Nazi” Groups?’ 
 
A Biographical Introduction to the Nazi Sub-Cultures in Norway and Denmark 
 
 
Introduction 
 
‘Why are there several “Nazi” groups?’1 The situation in the 1930s when Danish politics faced a 
growing anti-parliamentary wave prompted this rather simple question. The article was published in 
the pamphlet Stormen, edited by ‘one of Danish National Socialism’s most dynamic and controversial 
personalities’ as one historian describes Wilfred Petersen.2 The pamphlet itself was banned by the 
Danish justice ministry, with its final publication on 10 October 1940.3 Several Danish ‘“Nazi” 
splinter-parties deliberately work to destroy the true National Socialist idea’, read the verdict from 
the article. It continued to describe party leaders who despite their self-acclaimed identity as fuehrers 
were nothing but ‘false prophets’, in the author’s words.4 While the Stormen article seemed to attack 
this situation in which splinter parties competed with one another, the commentary was published in 
autumn 1940 when nearly a decade of rivalry had entered a new phase; now, ‘true’ National Socialism 
had to be debated among not only various Danish movements but also an occupation regime. The 
timing of this call for Danish unity, in a pamphlet edited by probably the most notorious rebel in the 
history of Danish National Socialism, thus goes some way to explain what otherwise appears a 
paradox: throughout the 1930s, Petersen had contributed to the creation of several Nazi groups rather 
than working for unity. But now, the criticised ‘false prophets’ were no longer just Danish National 
Socialist ‘wannabes’; they also included actors within the Nazi occupation regime who, in the eyes 
of these splinter parties, perpetuated a false National Socialism. 
 
Danish unity aside, paradoxes did surround Wilfred Petersen’s name throughout his political career. 
With anti-Semitic actions, political sabotage through break-ins and blackmailing and, later, bomb 
attacks among his repertoire, the verdict from Dr August Wimmer regarding Petersen’s mental health 
                                                          
1 ‘Why are there several “Nazi” groups?’ Journal article located in Rigsarkivet, nr. 10192, box 47. ‘1932-1944: Diverse 
Avisudklip’. 
2 Ole Ravn, Dansk Nationalsocialitisk Litteratur 1930–1945 (Copenhagen: Berlingske Forlag, 1979), p. 131. 
3 ‘DNSAP, visse politiske smaapartier og lignende’, dated 10 June 1945, Rigsarkivet, P-Journalsager nr. 24. 
4 ‘Why are there several “Nazi” groups?’ Rigsarkivet nr. 10192, box 47. 
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on 25 August 1934 probably surprised many. Wimmer described a man with ‘sound ethical values’ 
who gives a ‘cultivated impression, intrinsically idealist’ and without a doubt ‘a well-oriented human 
being’.5 Petersen’s notorious quest to challenge the established political parliamentary system and 
the established norms and customs surrounding it does not provide him with a revolutionary profile 
in the historiography of Danish National Socialism. In fact, he appears rather mainstream when placed 
in a comparative framework. Petersen’s figure illustrated the political pattern so characteristic of the 
milieu of Danish and Norwegian Nazis in the 1930s; they all represent the splinter groups outside of 
Vidkun Quisling’s NS and Frits Clausen’s DNSAP, a peripheral position for these splinter groups 
that implicitly debated the nature of their radicalism through swiftly changing alliances. The 
exclamation mark on ‘Nazi’ in the Stormen article gives us a clue to understand the rivalry and the 
very coexistence of multiple Nazi groups. The conflict with the major Nazi parties in their respective 
home countries profiled these intellectuals as proponents of the more radical SS vision – in their own 
view, also a more pure vision – of an Aryan pan-Germanic community. Their pan-Germanic 
propaganda was noticed and encouraged by the German NSDAP leadership early on, most 
prominently by Himmler.6 These pan-Germanic groups in Scandinavia were often guided primarily 
by their self-perception as radical outcasts – an outcast identity which simultaneously confirmed their 
own imagery of what it meant to be a real National Socialist. This chapter starts with the same 
question of why there were several Nazi groups in Denmark, as well as in Norway, during the 1930s. 
It introduces those individuals and organisations discussed throughout the thesis and therefore takes 
the shape of a prosopography, a collection of brief biographies. At the end of the chapter, I discuss 
the limits and benefits of using Michael Wildt’s notion of the ‘unbound generation’ in understanding 
those men who called themselves real National Socialists – in Scandinavia. 
 
This chapter focuses on those individuals who stayed close to Petersen at the radical end of the 
Scandinavian National Socialist spectrum. The focus on Petersen provides a form of introduction to 
the overlaps and ideological commonalities between a number of Danish and Norwegian National 
Socialist intellectuals; like Petersen, they all claimed originality, but in a comparative framework they 
appear rather more ordinary. The Danes Ejnar Vaaben and Aage H. Andersen collaborated frequently 
and at times closely with Petersen in conspiracies against not only the political establishment but also 
                                                          
5 Wilfred Petersen, Maal og Midler (Copenhagen: Dansk Socialistisk Forlag, 1940), unpaginated. This psychological 
analysis was published in the leading Danish newspaper Berlingske Tidene, 11 January 1935. 
6 The Norwegian Ragnarok member Adolf Egeberg Jr. and Vaaben’s personal acquaintance Poul Sommer were invited 
to Germany to attend an SS school in National Socialist education. Straffeakt, nr 20, Rigsarkivet Copenhagen. 
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Clausen’s DNSAP. Similarly, one of the major characteristics of the Norwegian splinter group 
Ragnarok was its anti-Quisling rhetoric, and another was its significant connections with influential 
individuals in Nazi Germany. A third was the significant attention given to debating religion through 
Ragnarok’s links to Eugen Nielsen who in turn was deeply influenced by Eric Ludendorff. This type 
of attack on religious dogmas also prompted Andersen’s and Vaaben’s connections with priest Anders 
Malling. What they lacked in terms of political significance they gained in their intellectual profile, 
where they – again somewhat paradoxically – propagated anti-intellectualism in the name of the Nazi 
glorification of action. Furthermore, their outcast positions in their national contexts proved attractive 
for the Nazi regime as it sought mediating links in Scandinavia as a means of controlling the 
development of indigenous National Socialism. Entering the 1940s, Andersen and Vaaben led the 
ideological realm of the SS project Schalburgkorpset. Ragnarok members Ola Furuseth and Hans S. 
Jacobsen held equally significant roles and were responsible for the ideological indoctrination of 
aspiring members of the Norwegian Germanske SS and in Jacobsen’s case, being the editor of its 
propaganda organ Germaneren. The perceived closeness to Nazi Germany was a feeling shared by 
Jacobsen and Vaaben who published their independent works with almost identical German titles: 
Jacobsen’s Ein Norweger Spricht and Vaaben’s Ein Däne spricht zu Deutschland.7 These two pieces 
show two Scandinavians who in 1930 believed they had an important voice within Nazi Germany. 
 
 
I 
Ejnar Vaaben 
 
There are several factors that give substance to Ejnar Vaaben’s label as ‘Denmark’s first National 
Socialist’.8 His contact with leading individuals in Nazi Germany combined with his pioneering role 
on the Danish National Socialist scene prompted a question that many Danish Nazis would later ask 
themselves: ‘how could a young man from Southern Denmark ever be such a thing as German-
                                                          
7 Hans S. Jacobsen, Ein Norweger Spricht. Die deutsch-tschechische Frage (Berlin: Widukind Verlag, 1938) and Ejnar 
Vaaben, Ein Da ̈ne spricht zu Deutschland. Deutschlands Kampf – eine europäische Angelegenheit (Leipzig: Hesse & 
Becker, 1940). Note also the echo of Mein Kampf in Vaaben’s title. 
8 Andreas Monrad Pedersen, ‘“Den nordiske tanke” – bidrag til en politisk biografi af Ejnar Vaaben’, in Fra 
Mellemkrigstid til Efterkrigstid (eds.) Henrik Dethlefsen and Henrik Lundbak (Copenhagen: Københavns Universitet, 
1998), pp. 117–134. John T. Lauridsen aims to nuance this image; see John T. Lauridsen, ‘“Den forste graenseredder” – 
Ejnar Vaaben og den berlinske linie’, Fund og Forsking, 50 (2011), pp. 411–419. 
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friendly?’9 Vaaben, born in 1902 and with a university degree in History and German, displayed pan-
Germanic ideas as early as the late 1920s. According to his own statement in police records, he 
regarded himself as a National Socialist in 1924 and his political activities throughout the 1930s were 
commonly considered ‘German-friendly’. His awareness of the importance, and indeed difficulty, of 
balancing Danish national interests with the pan-Germanic idea was formulated very early in 
Vaaben’s career, and became a signature feature of his intellectual works on National Socialism 
throughout his career. Vaaben’s memoirs describe a meeting in October 1930 where he interviewed 
Hitler for the Danish newspaper Venstrepressen and where Hitler had claimed that Danes must realise 
that National Socialism was not a product for exportation. In response, Vaaben answered that 
‘National Socialism comes from within every healthy nation and by knowing that, the question of 
importation becomes irrelevant.’10 In 1928, so before the time of the interview, Vaaben had already 
established Denmark’s first National Socialist party, or rather a small intellectual circle. Four years 
later, Frits Clausen’s predecessor Cay Lembcke founded Denmark’s largest National Socialist party, 
Dansk Nationalsocialistisk Arbejderparti (DNSAP). In this context, Vaaben’s movement, which on 
9 November 1930 had taken the name Dansk Nationalsocialistisk Parti (DNP), was incorporated into 
the new organisation, where Vaaben functioned as the leader of the county Fyn, while Clausen held 
the same position regarding DNSAP’s reach in Southern Jutland bordering with Germany. Vaaben 
left DNSAP 1934 as a result of growing tensions between him and Clausen. 
 
A more detailed account of the ideological underpinnings of Vaaben’s split with the DNSAP will be 
provided in chapters 4 and 5. On the most fundamental level, however, it suffices to refer to Vaaben’s 
own words in his memoirs which state that ‘up until the 1930s it was not so much the worldly-political 
matter, but the world-view, the “Voelkisch” moment in the National Socialist freedom-movement, its 
“Grundtvigianism”’ that attracted him.11 Vaaben’s DNP cooperated with several National Socialist 
splinter groups without gaining any significant political influence. Meanwhile, he profiled himself as 
the leading Danish pan-German expert through several individual publications and contributions to 
the Danish National Socialist milieu. His main publication was Hagekorset over Danmark (‘The 
Swastika over Denmark’) from 1939. It followed from his piece Hagekorset over Tyskland (‘The 
Swastika over Germany’), published in 1931, which stands as one of the earliest Danish introductions 
                                                          
9 Vaaben, ‘Det var det hele værdt’, p.10. Rigsarkivet, nr. 06540, box 4. 
10 Ibid., p. 17. 
11 Ibid., p. 12. Grundtvigianism was a religious movement based on the Lutheran religious philosophy of Nikolaj 
Grundtvig who sought greater religious freedom for both laity and clergy and propagated the authority of the living 
Christ over formal religious doctrines. Grundtvigianism will be further discussed in chapter 5. 
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to German National Socialism.12 The 1939 publication indicates how the split from the DNSAP was 
one factor that clearly nurtured Vaaben’s position on the extreme wing of Danish National Socialist 
groups, particularly his radical racist outlook. The book further displays continuities with Vaaben’s 
article in Dansk Udsyn that dealt with the notion of ‘Nordic thought’ which ultimately called for a 
united Scandinavian movement along the lines of the race idea.13 His emphasis on race science 
deepened and had its pre-war culmination in Hagekorset over Danmark – one year preceding the 
German invasion. Although more concrete geopolitical factors were added to this ‘völkisch’ 
foundation of Vaaben’s attraction to National Socialism, he maintained his profile as a National 
Socialist intellectual, in opposition to more conventionally political Nazi supporters in Denmark, 
throughout the 1930s. 
 
These sentiments can partly be explained by his hostility and distance to rival National Socialist 
parties on the Danish scene. Despite brief cooperation with other Nazi groups, DNP remained 
independent until 1939 when it was incorporated into Wilfred Petersen’s Dansk Socialistisk Parti 
(DSP). Besides a shared emphasis on the centrality of the race principle in National Socialist politics, 
Vaaben and Petersen agreed on one thing in particular: the limitations of Frits Clausen’s ideological 
insights and thus his unsuitability as a leader of the DNSAP. Following a couple of years in Munich 
in the early 1930s, where he not only familiarised himself with German academia but also with the 
top leadership of the German NSDAP at the time, Vaaben returned to Denmark and joined a brief 
alliance with Clausen and the DNSAP from late 1932. He recalled his subsequent exit in 1934 as the 
result of two factors: ‘the absence of a Danish line and the rejection of my demands for morally 
qualified individuals within the higher ranks of the party’.14 One additional reason, according to 
Vaaben, was the fact that ‘Frits Clausen’s circle did not approve of my [Vaaben’s] significant German 
network’.15 And while the DNP continued its activities independently after 1934–35, economic 
hardship and political isolation marked the 1930s. These experiences made Vaaben recall the period 
as ‘a political interregnum’.16 Despite his impressive Nazi connections then, Vaaben spent the years 
from 1935 to 1939 in a political vacuum, where, instead of fighting in political constellations or 
‘sectarian movements’, as he called them, he consolidated his image as first and foremost a National 
                                                          
12 Vaaben, Hagekorset over Tyskland (Copenhagen: Reitzel, 1931). 
13 Vaaben, ‘Den Nordiske Bevægelse’, Dansk Udsyn (December, 1935). 
14 Vaaben, ‘Ejnar Vaaben om den Danske Folkerejsning’, Dannebroge, nr. 5 (February 1941), p. 5. 
15 Vaaben, ‘Det var det hele vaerdt’, p. 35. Rigsarkivet, nr. 06540, box 4. 
16 Ibid., p. 38. 
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Socialist intellectual.17 The distinctively academic approach to National Socialism taken by Vaaben 
in the early 1930s is described in an article on him located in his personal archive. It claims that: 
 
Had it not been for his lofty intellectualism […] his position as Danish fuehrer would have been uncontested […] 
had he cooperated wholeheartedly with Clausen, Danish National Socialism would have been considerably more 
dangerous.18 
 
These early National Socialist initiatives peaked in Vaaben’s correspondence and subsequent 
cooperation with the University of Jena’s race biologist Hans F.K. Günther and the organisation 
Nordischer Ring (Nordic Ring) throughout the 1930s.19 Vaaben’s unpublished memoir from 1978 
emphasise on his connections to Günther. Describing his political life in the early 1930s, Vaaben 
further highlighted his personal connections with Himmler’s and Rosenberg’s admiration for 
‘anything Nordic’ – two central NSDAP proponents of this kind of pan-Nordic ideological 
cooperation.20 Nordischer Ring was founded in 1926 with the aim to unite all Nordic groups in a 
movement guided by the principles of Nordic thought as set out by Günther. These principles of 
‘Nordic thought’ will be discussed in detail later on. Vaaben’s intellectual exchange with Günther, 
beginning in 1928 and lasting until Günther’s death in 1968, portrays the early years of his National 
Socialist career as ones where Vaaben not only aimed to cross Nordic borders through Günther’s pan-
Nordic organisation, but also Vaaben’s ambitions of making a name for himself within the NSDAP 
leadership in Nazi Germany. Indeed, the entire practice of Nordische Ring was built upon this task of 
merging intellectual völkisch circles with the political leadership of the DNSAP.21 
 
Of course, these two hallmarks, the Nordic idea and the National Socialist idea, overlapped on a 
practical as well as ideological level through Vaaben’s activities; Vaaben’s connections with Günther 
introduced him to the close circle of Nordic pan-Germanic experts around Alfred Rosenberg. 
Rosenberg’s interest in Nordic race science, in turn, provided a direct link between the Nazi regime 
and pan-Germanic groups in Norway and Denmark such as Vaaben’s in the early 1930s. In 1932, 
Rosenberg participated at a lecture given by Günther in Jena attended by Danish and Norwegian 
                                                          
17 Ibid. 
18 Unknown author and publication located in Vaaben’s private archive, Rigsarkivet nr. 06540, box 1. 
19 Correspondence with Hans F. Günther. Rigsarkivet nr. 06540, box 3. 
20 Vaaben ‘Det var det hele værdt’, p. 17. Rigsarkivet nr. 06540, box 4. 
21 For more information on the Scandinavian focus of Nordische Ring, see Nicola Karcher, ‘Schirmorganisation der 
Nordischen Bewegung: Der Nordische Ring und seine Repräsentanten in Norwegen’, NORDEUROPAforum, 19:1 
(2009), pp. 7–35. 
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National Socialists.22 One indication of Vaaben’s prominent position in this context is his 
appointment together with the leading Norwegian race scientist Jon Alfred Mjøen to lead seminars 
specifically on the topic of Nordic race science. These seminars were arranged on Günther’s initiative 
between 1931 and 1933.23 
 
Vaaben’s political activities in the 1930s were thus both diffuse and to some extent politically 
insignificant – after all, he was not even the leader of the largest Nazi party in Denmark, the DNSAP, 
which nevertheless proved an electoral failure. In light of the larger ‘failure’ of Danish National 
Socialism,24 historians continue to debate the role of Ejnar Vaaben in this historiography. Departing 
from an analysis of his pan-Germanic visions, some scholars insist on Vaaben’s role as a significant 
intellectual in legitimising pan-Germanic voices in Denmark, while some denounce these visions as 
signs of an ‘insignificant political fanatic’.25 Indeed, despite early encouragement from the top 
leadership in Nazi Germany including Himmler and Göring, Vaaben’s hopes for a place in a future 
National Socialist government were crushed after two personal meetings with Himmler in May and 
August 1940 following German occupation where Himmler firmly declared the NSDAP’s faith in the 
cooperation policy of the Danish government.26 Yet, high-profile voices within the Nazi milieu in 
Denmark such as the writer and Nazi sympathiser Knud Nordentoft did to some extent confirm the 
image Vaaben himself liked to proclaim of a man who reached beyond the unsophisticated and 
relatively insignificant political scene of Danish National Socialism. Nordentoft noted in his journal 
on 18 September 1943 that Vaaben was the only ‘brave man left’ and after all ‘the only Dane who 
knows Himmler, Rosenberg, and Hitler in person’.27 
 
This reputation of Vaaben’s high Nazi connections, albeit exaggerated, cannot be interpreted as either 
an indication of a significant political position in Denmark or of Vaaben necessarily being a 
successful mediator of Danish interests in Germany. It can, however, give us an idea of Vaaben’s 
                                                          
22 Letter from Günther to Vaaben, dated March 1932, Rigsarkivet nr. 06540, box 3. 
23 Vaaben’s correspondence with Hans F. Günther 1931–1933, Rigsarkivet nr. 06540, box 3. 
24 For the Danish historiographical debate on the ‘failure’ of Nazism in Denmark, see the thesis introduction. 
25 John T. Lauridsen, ‘Den forste graenseredder’. Lauridsen maintains that from a political perspective, the central 
position of Vaaben in historiography is uncalled for and to an extent even ahistorical. Lauridsen positions his argument 
against Anders M. Pedersen’s, whose image of Vaaben is as a pioneering National Socialist and an ‘ideological 
original’; see Pedersen, ‘“Den nordiske tanke” – bidrag til en politisk biografi af Ejnar Vaaben’, in Henrik Dethlefsen 
and Henrik Lundbak (eds.), Fra Mellemkrigstid til Efterkrigstid (Copenhagen: Københavns Universitet, 1998), pp. 117–
134. 
26 Poul C. Rasmussen’s witness testimony, Rigsarkivet, Straffeakt, nr. 8624. 
27 Two entries in Knud Nordentoft’s journal, dated 8 October and 18 September 1943. Rigsarkivet, Straffeakt, nr. 313. 
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uncontested image within Nazi circles as an intellectually pioneering National Socialist, perhaps by 
virtue of his political failure. Vaaben’s post-war trial records for instance end with the judicial 
statement that ‘Vaaben’s activities were predominantly on “a spiritual level” which is beyond the 
reach of criminal law’.28 Since the post-war years, however, one of the main breakthroughs in 
contemporary historiography of Nazism is indeed the notion that activities on a ‘spiritual level’ cannot 
be detached completely from the scene of ‘political’ life, which in the Danish case from 1940 was 
increasingly dictated by an ideologically infused project of Nazi imperialism.29 Vaaben travelled 
twice to Germany immediately following the Nazi takeover of Denmark in 1940. During two visits 
in June and August that year, Vaaben functioned as spokesperson for the small movement 
Danmarkskredsen. The ambition was to secure cooperation between Danmarkskredsen30 and the 
German government regarding future occupation plans in Denmark. During his first trip, Vaaben 
allegedly had a promising meeting with Rudolf Hess, but Vaaben’s later meeting with Himmler 
proved a disappointment. Himmler made it brutally clear that Nazi Germany, following the 
declaration of the Danish government in the summer of 1940, would remain loyal to the promise of 
cooperation with the existing government. Vaaben returned to Denmark disillusioned with the Nazi 
regime and Himmler in particular, who effectively advised him to leave his ideological fantasies aside 
for the meantime.31 Yet, it was precisely Vaaben’s peripheral position in Danish National Socialist 
politics that would provide him with an entry ticket to Himmler’s pan-Germanic plans for Denmark 
as the Nazi regime had begun to discuss the limited potential of Clausen’s DNSAP. 
 
 
 
                                                          
28 Court statement, 16 January 1946, Rigsarkivet, P-journal, nr. 9509. 
29 The fusion of intellectual ideological concepts and realpolitik in Nazi occupational practice is an approach to the 
Holocaust which in recent years has turned into a scholarly paradigm. See for example Peter Longerich’s notion of 
Judenpolitik to illustrate the driving force of anti-Semitism as both policy and politics in Longerich, Holocaust (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 4–7 and Isabel Heinemann’s emphasis on the fusion of science and mysticism 
among the Third Reich’s ‘race-experts’ in occupied Eastern Europe, Heinemann, ‘Rasse, Siedlung, deutsches Blut’: Das 
Rasse- & Siedlungshauptamt der SS und die rassenpolitische Neuordnung Europas (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2003). 
30 Danmarkskredsen comprised former core members of Anders Malling’s Dansk Folkefællesskab who in 1940 sought 
to establish an alternative government outside of the established political parties. Being part of a wider anti-
parliamentary wave in 1940, the organisation was soon dissolved and the membership was divided between either 
seeking new forms of alliances with a goal similar to that of Danmarkskredsen or aligning with right-wing parties. 
Danmarkskredsen formally ceased to exist on 15 October 1940. See especially Henning Tjørnehøj, Rigets bedste Mænd. 
Da det store erhvervsliv ville tage magten i 1940. Om Højgaardkredsen og Haustrupkredsen (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 
1990). 
31 Rigsarkivet, P-journal nr. 1851. 
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II 
Aage H. Andersen 
 
Few other Danish National Socialists were able to challenge Vaaben on the position as leading Danish 
Nazi intellectual, but the one man closest to achieving that was arguably Andersen and his circle 
around the pamphlet Kamptegnet. As we shall see in chapter 4, Andersen was an initiator of 
incompatible, and even paradoxical, interactions; deeply Christian and anti-Semitic, he spent the 
second half of the 1930s juggling Christian messages with the advocacy of race science across the 
Danish National Socialist spectrum. If Malling’s anti-Semitism had been elusive and contradictory 
throughout his time in the DNSAP in 1935, Andersen’s anti-Semitic attitudes were so fierce it forced 
his exit from Clausen’s party. His radicalism regarding anti-Semitic propaganda would form a pattern 
in his political career until the end of the war. 
 
Andersen’s active involvement with National Socialism started a couple of years later than Vaaben. 
In 1933, at the age of 41 and thus considerably older than Vaaben, Andersen embarked on political 
cooperation with the young and radical National Socialist, Wilfred Petersen. The cooperation 
involved Andersen’s entry into Petersen’s political party National Socialistisk Parti (NSP), which 
was one year later renamed the Dansk Socialistisk Parti (DSP). The nature of Petersen’s 16-point 
party programme from 1933 early on established the centrality of the race idea alongside the aim of 
dissolving the state church as two principles that dominated the ideological rationale in the politics 
of both Vaaben and Andersen.32 The initial connections between Andersen and Petersen are among 
the early indicators of the radicalism that marked Andersen’s entire National Socialist career. It would 
not be an exaggeration to describe Wilfred Petersen, born in 1905, as the partisan among the Danish 
Nazis before and during the occupation. He was one of the early DNSAP members to leave the party 
and thus initiated the trend that both Vaaben and Andersen were to follow through their own exits 
and subsequent creations of more extreme National Socialist groups.  
 
                                                          
32 The party programme of NSP, ‘Dansk National-Socialistisk Parti’, dated 9 November 1933, pp. 1–12.in Rigsarkivet, 
nr. 10192, box 49. ‘1932-1944: Diverse Materiale’. 
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Petersen did not leave Clausen’s DNSAP alone but was accompanied by a circle of loyal men that 
came to constitute his own SA group.33 Petersen’s initiation of a Danish equivalent of the National 
Socialist SA and SS milieu also provides some insight into why Andersen continued to label Petersen 
as a comrade in their united struggle against the corrupt Danish parliamentary system, as late as 
1939.34 When Andersen abandoned formal political cooperation with Petersen in late October 1935 
and, following the brief encounter with the DNSAP, he finally established his own independent party, 
National Socialistisk Parti (NSAP), Petersen’s influence was clear throughout the NSP’s 
organisational design. From 1936, the major organisational task for Andersen’s NSAP was the 
creation of a similar SA division within the party, where the notion of ‘SA’ reflected the idea of the 
concentration of ‘particularly active’ (særligt active) party members into an elite formation.35 In fact, 
the plans for a particular SS organisation in 1937 indicate even more strongly the far-reaching plans 
of Andersen’s political project. In practical terms, the establishment of an SS organisation was 
accompanied by the establishment of party political schools (Førerskole) which under the strongest 
disciplinary rules would stand at Andersen’s disposal and function as his personal military unit.36 The 
programmes for these schools indicate the primacy of an ideological homogenisation within the 
movement, where lectures on the theme of ‘ideological education’ were designed to function as the 
introductory and foundational component of each meeting within Andersen’s SS formation.37 
 
Despite the grand designs, however, the history of the NSAP was one of financial struggle. The 
sectarian outlook that emerged from the strict adherence to the race principle effectively narrowed 
the circle of potential members. While actual membership records are lacking, the post-war trial 
records back up later scholarly estimates that Andersen’s movement never reached beyond 1,000 
                                                          
33 For a brief but comprehensive overview of Petersen’s activities from 1930 to 1945, see Lauridsen, Dansk Nazisme, p. 
531. For the SA groups, see Rigsarkivet, nr. 10192,‘Organisationsplan og Vedtægter for Danmark’s National 
Socialistiske Parti’ dated 9 November 1933, Rigsarkivet, nr. 10192, box 49. ’1932-1944: Diverse Materiale’. The 
archive of NSP (re-named Dansk anti Jødisk Liga in 1941) hosts a large number of Danish newspaper articles covering 
the life and crimes of Wilfred Petersen as Petersen’s loyal circle embarked on a number of attacks on the Danish Social 
Democratic party throughout the 1930s. The attention given to Petersen’s activities demonstrates the central role that 
Andersen gave to Petersen in his mapping of the National Socialist milieu in Denmark at the time. See Rigsarkivet, nr. 
10192, box 42-49. ’1932-1944: Diverse Avisudklip’. 
34 Unknown author, ‘Det 20. Aarhundredes Kættere’, Kamptegnet in Rigsarkivet, nr. 10192, box 45. ’1932-1944 
Diverse Avidudklip’. 
35 A document listing the current SA members in November1936 shows how the SA project was an early priority and 
identity marker for the NSAP as it was already running in the second year of the party’s history, see ‘Til Medlemmar af 
den særligt active arbejdende Gruppe (S.A.)’, dated November 1936, Rigsarkivet, nr. 10192., box 1. ‘1934-1937: 
Vedtægter og Organisationsplaner’. 
36 ‘Forslag til Dannelse af S.S.’, Rigsarkivet, nr. 10192, Ibid box 1. 
37 ‘Forslag til Oprettelse af de Partipolitiske skoler’, Rigsarkivet, nr. 10192, Ibid box 1. 
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members.38 These estimates also include the years after the German occupation, when it is likely that 
the membership numbers increased. It is therefore safe to conclude that the NSAP remained a 
marginal political party throughout the 1930s. But the notion of ‘marginal’ is of course measured in 
comparative terms. There are several factors indicating that Andersen as much as Petersen revolted 
against the idea of conventional politics to the degree that they found nothing less than a revolutionary 
greatness in the marginal and sectarian. Estimates by two leading newspapers at the time certainly 
add to this sectarian image, finding that the core membership of the NSAP originally comprised up 
to 100 excluded members of the DNSAP.39 But the main example of how elite aspirations were not 
only reflected in the NSAP’s plans for an SS division but more concretely in what should be viewed 
as Andersen’s trademark in this decade can be seen in the party organ Kamptegnet. While Sofie Lene 
Bak’s pioneering study on Danish anti-Semitism presents a comprehensive overview of the nature of 
this particular pamphlet and its far-reaching ambitions, the present study is less concerned with its 
rabid anti-Semitic outlook and vulgar anti-Semitic language in which Kamptegnet took the role of a 
Danish version of Julius Streicher’s Der Stürmer.40 Beyond anti-Semitic caricatures, chapter 2 
focuses on Andersen’s vision of a revolutionary interaction between the two pillars of his own 
National Socialism: Christianity and the race principle. The envisioned interaction of Christianity and 
National Socialism is an indicator of how Andersen’s political outlook challenged the very concept 
of ‘politics’ as such. In that sense, the non-political identity that is usually ascribed to both Andersen 
and Vaaben is indeed valid, but it was infused with a fierce political critique. 
 
In the Norwegian National Socialist milieu during the 1930s, the opposition to the political 
establishment was more outspokenly antagonistic. The National Socialist attack on the political 
establishment in Norway was concentrated less around a few individuals leading separate political 
circles, as in Denmark, and more as a collective effort centred on a few organisations. What really 
sharpened the rhetoric, both in Norway and Denmark, was the growing internal antagonism that 
developed between Quisling’s NS and Frits Clausen’s DNSAP on the one hand, and the remaining 
National Socialist splinter parties on the other. This divide is clearly illustrated by the cooperation 
                                                          
38 Sofie Lene Bak, Dansk Antisemitisme 1930–1945 (Copenhagen: Aschehoug, 2004), pp. 59–60.  
39 Estimations from Dagens Nyheder (13 November 1935) and Arbejderbladet (11 June 1937), see Bak, Dansk 
Antisemitisme 1930–1945, p. 52. 
40 Before the launch of Kamptegnet, an article in the Danish newspaper Arbejderbladet from 1937 describes these links 
between Andersen and Streicher as an already established truth: ‘Andersen is thus well known as the Danish Streicher’, 
Rigsarkivet, nr. 10192. Box 43. ‘1932-1944 Diverse Avisudklip’. 
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between the editorial staff of the two pamphlets Ragnarok and Fronten, and their subsequent 
opposition to Quisling. 
 
 
III 
The Ragnarok Circle 
 
Ragnarok’s establishment in 1935 was a consequence of the development of a radical National 
Socialist sub-culture in opposition to Vidkun Quisling’s political party Nasjonal Samling (NS). In 
this environment, Terje Emberland identifies the Fronten editor Eugen Nielsen, an architect, publicist 
and pioneering National Socialist, as a leading figure among reactionary National Socialist activists 
in Norway during the 1930s.41 The interaction between Ragnarok and Fronten was most clearly 
evident in the political trajectories of a few individuals who were actively engaged in activities for 
both pamphlets. Fronten’s official declaration from 1938 states the purpose of the pamphlet: 
 
Fronten is a pamphlet that propagates a holistic view on life, where the spiritual, biological, material and political 
areas are being compensated accordingly for the lack of attention they are given in the conventional press. We 
guard those areas that others neglect.42 
 
The official declaration to ‘guard those that others neglect’ eventually became visible in Nielsen’s 
later determination to go against Hitler’s power politics in order to support the völkisch ideas that had 
become increasingly distanced from Hitler’s realpolitik. This attitude, that Petersen’s psychiatrist had 
called ‘an altruistic approach to the small people in society’, resonated particularly well with a 
movement such as Ragnarok. Whether it considered small people, or small and isolated ideas in 
society, Ragnarok editor Hans S. Jacobsen would in a similar manner highlight Ragnarok’s 
independent outlook: ‘It has always been independent of others and never received financial backing 
[…] the fact that it was generally German friendly did not however keep it from criticising German 
violations.’43 
 
                                                          
41 Emberland, Religion og Rase, pp. 114–115. 
42 ‘Frontens Program’, Fronten, 15 February 1938 (original emphasis), p. 1. 
43 Riksarkivet Oslo, L-sak Moss politikammer nr. 488. 
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Taking into account the fact that Ragnarok figured in grey zones both politically and intellectually, it 
should not come as a surprise that its approach to religion was unorthodox – although others might 
have preferred to use the word ambivalent. It may be questioned to what extent Ragnarok’s editor 
Hans S. Jacobsen and its leading members deliberately crafted this unorthodox profile as a principle 
in its own right, or whether the mix of religious attitudes that we find in its publications was a result 
of a more conflicted position caused by a chaotic political climate. This thesis will emphasise the 
former assumption and illustrate how Ragnarok’s connections with the liberal theologian Kristian 
Schjelderup and Fronten were marked by the aim of actively striving for the kind of heterogeneity 
visible in the Ragnarok pamphlet. Indeed, Jacobsen’s outlook reflected a more general pattern of his 
personal aversion towards dogmatism. This ‘dogmatism’ appeared in several guises, reflecting 
Jacobsen’s experience of different contexts throughout the 1920s. Raised in a conventional Christian 
home, early on Jacobsen retreated from the state church, but it was his time in North America in the 
1920s that more fundamentally shaped the political beliefs that came out of his early preoccupation 
with Christian dogmatism. Emberland argues that the combined experience of religious 
fundamentalism in the Midwest and Jacobsen’s critique of American liberal society was crucial; 
Jacobsen meant that the detachment of the individual from the collective actually undermined rather 
than encouraged true individual freedom and it fostered a political standpoint against dogmatism 
rather than a critique of religiosity.44 
 
Beyond the ideological similarities of the two men’s general outlook, several other leading 
contributors to Ragnarok and Fronten met within the same political organisation; the radical political 
party Norges Nasjonal-Socialistiske Arbeiderparti (NNSAP) that was established by Nielsen in 1932 
had Fronten as its propaganda organ. The NNSAP was a political formation with a young profile, 
where for example Ragnarok’s future member Stein Barth-Heyerdahl started his National Socialist 
career. Among the leadership of both Fronten and the NNSAP was Adolf Egeberg Jr. who together 
with Ejnar Vaaben’s brother-in-law Poul Sommer had been invited in 1932 by the NSDAP to take 
part in SS educational activities in Munich.45 Egeberg Jr. would also briefly operate as the editor of 
Ragnarok in 1940.46 By 1934, it was precisely this group of young Norwegians with experience of 
SA activism in Germany who pushed Nielsen out of the NNSAP due to divergent ideas of the kind 
                                                          
44 Emberland, Religion og Rase, pp. 232–233. 
45 Witness testimony Knud Nordentoft in Rigsarkivet Straffeakt, nr. 20. Sommer’s work on Christianity and National 
Socialism, Under Hagekorset (Danmarks National-Socialistiske Arbejder Parti, 1932) was advertised in Fronten, 2:2, 
(February 1933), p. 3. 
46 Editorial note, Ragnarok, 7:1, (May 1941), p. 43. 
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of ideological profile Fronten represented. While Nielsen remained preoccupied with völkisch ideas, 
the younger members led by the future Ragnarok ideologues, Barth-Heyerdahl and Per Imerslund, 
sought to direct the party away from Nielsen’s fierce anti-Semitism and towards a more explicit 
struggle against Bolshevism.47 
 
Nielsen’s ideological trajectory throughout the 1930s was a reflection of his aim ‘to guard those who 
others neglect’ as he came to support views that were gradually being isolated in Nazi Germany. 
Besides his early fascist activities in Norway dating back to the 1920s through the party Den 
Nasjonale Legion, Nielsen had personal connections to Eric Ludendorff who greatly influenced 
Nielsen’s attitudes to the relationship between Christianity and National Socialism. After serving in 
the First World War, Ludendorff had become an active spokesperson for the völkisch movement in 
the Weimar Republic, and rather than seeking to ‘germanise’ Christianity, Ludendorff propagated an 
anti-religious and essentially pagan profile for the NSDAP. This profile eventually led to a conflict 
with Hitler, which would result in Ludendorff being expelled from the party in 1927.48 As a reflection 
of this development, the following years witnessed Fronten’s increased anti-religious attitude. For 
instance, one article from 1938 stated in Nietzschean terms that ‘Christianity is nothing but a 
Jewishness in disguise’.49 Nielsen’s pamphlet had existed for less than one year in 1933 when the 
swastika was removed from the front page in response to Hitler’s takeover and as a mark of Nielsen’s 
sympathy with Ludendorff.50 
 
This emphasis on having the courage to confront the establishment was central to the contributors to 
both pamphlets. In 1939, Fronten clearly indicated its intention to side with Ragnarok when it 
published a list of Norwegian Nazi or Nazi-sympathising pamphlets with accompanying comments 
from the Fronten editors. In the article, Quisling’s NS organ Fritt Folk was described as anti-Marxist, 
anti-Jewish, pro-Norwegian and pro-Nordic but a pamphlet which nevertheless does ‘not dare to 
attack freemasonry in Norway and the Jewish Christianity’.51 The NS pamphlet was thus criticised 
                                                          
47 The anti-Bolshevism of these early activists had momentum in 1936 when Per Imerslund and Ola Furuseth were part 
of the group of young radicals that broke into Leo Trotsky’s home in exile in Norway to seek evidence for Trotsky’s 
revolutionary activities in Norway. The action was hardly successful but led eventually to Trotsky’s expulsion to 
Mexico. 
48 For more on Ludendorff and the wider discourse on religion within the NSDAP, see Richard Steigmann-Gall, The 
Holy Reich: Nazi Conceptions of Christianity, 1919–1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
49 ‘Frontens Program’, Fronten (February 1938), p. 1. 
50 Emberland, Religion og Rase, p. 116. 
51 ‘Nasjonale aviser i Norge’, Fronten (June 1939), p.3. 
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for its hypocrisy in only fighting the Nazi doctrines (i.e. in this case, the battle against Jewishness) 
when it suited them, and avoiding a confrontation with those areas that more subtly expressed its 
Jewishness. Contrary to this accusation of hypocrisy, Ragnarok was described as ‘the largest national 
pamphlet in the Nordic countries and most importantly a pamphlet that struggles for Norwegianness 
in spirit and action and attacks all forms of Jewishness present in the Nordic countries’.52 
 
A prominent Ragnarok activist with a similar aim in his editorial role was Ola Furuseth who edited 
the pamphlet Baunevakt before taking the position as ideological leader of Germanske SS Norge. 
Furuseth’s aim in Baunevakt was to reveal cases ‘that never have been published in other newspapers, 
everything that the newspapers are banned from publishing’.53 The men behind Baunevakt as well as 
Fronten and Ragnarok thus sought to give the Norwegian people another perspective, to move beyond 
conventional truths and customs, whether with respect to politics or religion. In Furuseth’s words, 
true faith ‘needs no dogmas, no thick books’.54 Stein Barth-Heyerdahl summed up this goal in a letter 
to Hans Jacobsen in 1942 in which he had urged the Ragnarok editor to continue his important 
mission: 
 
As long as it [Ragnarok] is published to the same standard as before, so that it touches the spirit of our times and 
remains brave, everything is alright. If it is difficult to find interesting things to write about back home, look out 
and write about foreign lands, preferably in a utopian manner and about ideal conditions in Illyria or Utopia. Write 
theoretically about human values and dignity. Be confusing, urge the people to once more ponder over these 
idealist thoughts.55 
 
This statement by Barth-Heyerdahl is indicative of his general perception of the Ragnarok mission 
on the Norwegian intellectual and political scene which was, similarly to Fronten, marked by the 
striving to illustrate contradictions in its many forms. Indeed, Ragnarok’s idealist position often 
resulted in precisely stressing the contradiction between political practice and the original ideas that 
underpinned them. As we shall see later in this thesis, the criticism directed against those ‘great men’, 
such as Hitler and Quisling, who claimed to represent these authentic ideas, were thus often fierce 
and involved accusations that these leading politicians had corrupted the entire National Socialist 
ideology for imperialist reasons. 
 
                                                          
52 Ibid. 
53 ‘Baunevakt’, Baunevakt (February 1940), p. 1. 
54 Ola Furuseth, ‘Troens makt’, Østlendingen (22 May 1943), p. 2. 
55 Stein Barth-Heyerdahl to Hans S. Jacobsen, 22 June 1942. Riksarkivet L-sak Oslo politikammer nr. 6331. 
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IV 
Anders Malling 
 
The priest and previous DNSAP member Anders Malling spent the latter half of the 1930s eagerly 
trying to convince Vaaben to enter Dansk Folkefællesskab. Like Vaaben, Malling found it difficult 
to accommodate his personal views on National Socialism within the DNSAP framework. Historian 
Martin Schwarz Lausten writes about Malling’s past and subsequent exit from the DNSAP as a result 
of his ‘attitudes to Christianity, Nazism and the Jews [that] were often elusive and contradictory’.56 
A letter from party comrade Johannes Sørensen dated as late as October 1939 reveals that it was their 
Grundtvigian colleague Ejerslev who functioned as the link to Vaaben. Sørensen concludes that ‘He 
[Vaaben] might be persuaded to join us as long as we take one step at a time.’57 Vaaben, however, 
remained sceptical about Malling’s radicalism, and regarded Dansk Folkefællesskab as too moderate. 
Despite their shared Grundtvigian intellectual heritage, an issue that will be discussed further below, 
Vaaben was more radical in his nationalist approach and was also more attracted to the idea of 
political cooperation with Nazi Germany than the conservative Malling. Their different levels of 
political radicalism aside, what they had in common was the conviction that no one could claim 
ownership of National Socialism. 
 
Similarly to Vaaben, Malling’s political profile in the late 1930s was characterised by his gradual 
distancing from the idea that National Socialism could be translated into political imperialism. The 
fact that the letter to Sørensen was written in 1939 is interesting when taking into account that Malling 
left the Danish political scene less than a year later. Following the German occupation of Denmark 
in April 1940, Malling explained his disillusionment with what National Socialism had effectively 
become. He reveals that the affinitive relationship between National Socialism and a Grundtvigian 
philosophy appeared clearer than ever following the invasion; it was the resistance to Nazi Germany’s 
imperialistic politics that had brought the spiritual revival sought for among dedicated National 
Socialists. 58 What Malling describes is less an exit from National Socialism than a break of political 
connections with Nazi Germany. In this context, it is fruitful to compare Malling’s break with Clausen 
                                                          
56 Martin Schwarz Lausten, Jødesympati og jødehad i Folkekirken (Copenhagen: Forlaget Ania, 2007) p. 182. 
57 Johannes Sørensen to Anders Malling, Dated 10 October 1939, Rigsarkivet nr. 07187, box 14 ‘1936-1949: Breve 
Politisk liv’. 
58 Malling, ‘Den Danske rejsning etter Brandes’, p. 12., Rigsarkivet nr. 07187, box 40 ‘1916-1976: Foredrag, Møder og 
Taler’. 
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and the DNSAP in 1936 to his exit from politics following the occupation. The break in 1936 was 
followed by an article in his newly established party Dansk Folkefællesskab stating that 
 
We have struggled for the implementation of the Fuehrer-principle, but never for the kind of conditional despotism 
that DNSAP represents today […] but although we see it as necessary to break with our old party, we are still 
deeply bound to the National Socialist idea and will not stop fighting for it in the future.59 
 
The ‘two exits’, Malling’s separation from Clausen in 1936 and from Nazi Germany in 1940, 
converge in the face of Malling’s preoccupation with safeguarding the Danish southern border. In 
fact, similarly to Vaaben’s early focus on these issues, Malling’s entry into the DNSAP in the first 
place was related to Clausen’s promises of active engagement in the border question.60 Just as Malling 
saw Clausen’s leadership as an outright abuse of the Fuehrer-principle, his article from February 
1940 discusses the German quest for Lebensraum as a political slogan that in no way met the promises 
of National Socialism, but rather resembled an ‘ideology’ no different from the old imperialism.61 In 
a letter from 1937, Malling’s breaks with Clausen’s DNSAP and with Nazi Germany appear even 
more ideologically close as he describes the exit from the DNSAP as one where ‘we broke with the 
principle that we always had to look south and try to translate all Hitler’s good ideas. We saw that 
this kind of strategy would ultimately result in something foreign to the spirit of our Danish people.’62 
 
Malling’s writings thus reveal the same pattern that is visible in Vaaben’s separation between 
‘Nazism’ and ‘National Socialism’, that is, the divide between an imperialist and constrained 
‘German’ or ‘Danish’ ideology and that of a holistic National Socialist worldview. This separation is 
one way to approach the difficulties that Malling’s party colleagues had when defining the ‘level’ of 
his National Socialist dedication. In the correspondence between the party member Arne Sørensen 
and Malling during the years 1937 and 1938, Sørensen accused Malling of representing such a rabid 
anti-Semitism that labelling him a ‘Nazi’ was well deserved.63 These accusations, in turn, prompted 
                                                          
59 Untitled article in Dansk Folkefællesskab, 1:1 (27 May 1936), unpaginated in Rigsarkivet, nr. 10192, box 43. ‘1932-
1944: Diverse Avisudklip’. 
60 Correspondence Malling and DNSAP, May-June 1933, Rigsarkivet nr. 07187, box 4 ‘1931-1935: Breve i alm.’. 
61 Malling, ‘Geopolitik. En ny ideologisk maske. Skal de nationale stater oppslukes av imperialistiske “livsrum”?’, 
Dansk Folkefællesskab, 5:5 (February 1940), pp. 4–5. 
62 Letter from Malling to Axel Clausen, dated 15 December 1937, Rigsarkivet nr. 07187, box 13 ‘1936-37: Breve 
Politisk liv’. 
63 Correspondence Arne Sørensen to Anders Malling, 1937–38, Rigsarkivet nr. 07187, box 13 ‘1936-37: Breve Politisk 
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an improvised meeting where Malling, on behalf of Dansk Folkefællesskab, declared that ‘we refrain 
from all German forms, symbols and methods. There is thus no reason to speak of any “Nazism”.’64 
 
That Malling, despite his official rejection of ‘Nazism’, continued to search for cooperation with a 
political figure such as Vaaben, whose pan-Germanic profile positioned him closer to the image of 
the ‘hard-core’ Nazi, is not necessarily a contradiction. For both Malling and Vaaben, ‘Nazism’ was 
not the same as ‘National Socialism’, and the difference often took the form of a comparison between 
a ‘German’ approach and a true ‘Danish’ belief. One article by Ernst Christensen, the editor of 
Southern Jutland paper Flensborg Avis and Vaaben’s ally in questions regarding the German–Danish 
border in Southern Jutland, stressed this distincyion: ‘the real truth about Ejnar Vaaben is however – 
whether he agrees or not – quite simply that, despite all his race science and race theories, he will 
never qualify as a National Socialist in the German sense of the word’.65 Vaaben formulated this 
criticism within the argument that Clausen – with his party political and thus inherently parliamentary 
mindset – had failed to see the essential values of National Socialism. It was one thing to maintain 
friendly relations with Germany in order to safeguard Danish national interests in Southern Jutland 
but quite another to import German National Socialist propaganda. In Vaaben’s view, Clausen had 
 
viewed my [Vaaben’s] and the DNP’s hard work of creating a dialogue with the new leaders of Germany as 
‘competition’ […] and our friendly relations with Germany have been overturned by Clausen through his 
abandonment of the border question and his ‘Danish–German’-Volksgemeinschaft humbug.66 
 
Wilfred Petersen, who worked closely with Vaaben outside the DNSAP and also contributed articles 
to Ragnarok,67 reflected on the crisis within the DNSAP in the 1930s: 
 
The movement [DNSAP] was soon divided where the majority sought to adopt National Socialism in its German 
form without considering our specific national conditions and Danish mentality, and others who showed a true 
understanding of National Socialism […] in striving to create a politics that reflected our cultural heritage and 
spiritual life.68 
                                                          
64 ‘Inbydelse til Samling. Aabent Brev til Generaldirektör Pürschel and Arne Særensen’, Dansk Folkefællesskab, 19:4, 
(11 May 1939), p. 1. 
65 Article in Flensborg Avis, 10 August (1939) located in Rigsarkivet nr. 10192, box 43. ’1932-1944: Diverse 
Avisudklip’. 
66 Vaaben in correspondence with Christensen, p. 3, Rigsarkivet nr. 06540, box 3. 
67 Wilfred Petersen, ‘Nordisk Politik’, Ragnarok, 2–3 (1943), p. 99. 
68 Wilfred Petersen, Rene Folk med Rene Haender: Blade af Frits Clausens Blå Bog (Copenhagen: Dansk Socialistisk 
Forlag, 1941), p. 3. 
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This idea also comes through in Vaaben’s letter of defence which was read in court in 1939. Vaaben 
had received access to top-secret documents regarding the German Social Democratic Party that had 
been sent in strict confidence to the Danish Social Democrats, documents which Vaaben had made 
public. His defence, unsurprisingly in the judicial context, contained some criticism expressed 
towards the Nazi regime; yet it maintained that 
 
I [Vaaben] openly admit that I sympathise with the New German National Socialist movement, but I am not a 
National Socialist in the sense it is understood in this country. I do not praise foreign political systems or support 
foreign power politics at the expense of Danish interests and Danish dignity. True to this conviction, I have tried 
my best to teach my fellow Danes the values that lie in the idea of the nation, but these ideas and comparisons are 
indeed taken from Germany.69 
 
 
V 
 ‘Anarchy-Nazis’ 
 
Their outcast positions as opponents to these two dominant Nazi formations alone justify studying 
the positions of Ragnarok, Andersen’s NSAP and Vaaben’s DNP in a comparative framework. But 
it is even more interesting to note that their respective breaks with NS and the DNSAP both occurred 
between 1935–37 as a result of a divide between moderate and more ‘reactionary’ forces. This break 
is described by Ragnarok as the exit of the ‘best men of the movement and the most convinced 
idealists’.70 As we have seen in Denmark, the split with Clausen’s DNSAP in the mid-1930s also 
centred upon a conflict understood by the splinter movements. It was a conflict between the idealism 
of creating a specifically Danish and thus organic form of National Socialism, rather than a 
materialistic copy of the German version. 
 
Most members of Ragnarok had begun their National Socialist careers in NS. Their personal 
trajectories in the Norwegian Nazi milieu were, however, more shaped by their exit from rather than 
their time in NS. Several Ragnarok activists played important roles in the crisis in 1936–37, which 
marked the end of their careers in NS and the beginning of what one Norwegian author claims was 
                                                          
69 Vaaben, ‘Forsvar’ dated September 1939, p. 1 (my emphasis), Rigsarkivet nr. 06540, box 2. 
70 Hans S. Jacobsen, ‘Vidkun Quisling og NS’, Ragnarok, 3:3 (1937), pp. 62. 
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NS’s journey from ‘mass party to a revolutionary group waiting for a moment to strike’.71 This break 
and simultaneous reconfiguration of the NS outlook is examined in various Norwegian scholarly 
works, and there is a clear consensus that both NS and its opponents (including Ragnarok) came out 
of the conflict with a sharpened ideological rhetoric.72 The image of NS that was propagated among 
Quisling’s opponents was that of an NS party torn between ‘the national and social forces’, the 
freemason circle and one which – once again – likened Quisling’s leadership to an absolute monarchy: 
 
Vidkun Quisling is an immovable absolute dictator […] In a fighting idealist movement, the pure leadership must 
prevail encouraging the best men to become fuehrers after proving their qualities. If this organic principle had 
been established within NS, things would have looked much different today.73 
 
The conflict within NS had its roots in the events of 1933–34 that involved the Ragnarok activists 
Barth-Heyerdahl and Walter Fürst. They had drafted a law to establish a board of leading NS members 
close to Quisling in order to avoid an absolutist Führer-cult. While Quisling took part in meetings 
regarding these plans for reorganisation, the end result was disappointing. Quisling chose to appoint 
the regional leaders (fylkesfører), whose positions he had the sole authority to remove. This action 
effectively rendered the draft insignificant and resulted in Quisling’s dictatorial position being further 
consolidated.74 The reaction in Fronten and Ragnarok was clear: Fürst described the events as an 
indication of an NS dictatorship that ruled the Norwegian National Socialist members by ‘oriental’ 
strategies that characterised a dictatorship.75 
 
The accounts of this event were used in Ragnarok as somewhat of a founding myth and the rhetoric 
is also present in the movement’s later years where Jacobsen for example re-cites Quisling’s words 
from Fritt Folk stating that they, the SS, do not need the radical kind of Nazism that is propagated by 
the splinter movements like Ragnarok.76 Indeed, Quisling’s label of Ragnarok as a radical movement 
was welcomed and defined their revolutionary ambition. At the same time, the relations with NS were 
complex and became even more so after the occupation, where strategic concerns grew among 
                                                          
71 Hans Fredrik Dahl, Vidkun Quisling. En fører blir til (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1991), p. 431. 
72 See for example Ivo de Figueiredo’s claim that NS’s ideological orientation was much stronger after 1937, in De 
Figueiredo, ‘Ideologiens Primat: Nasjonal Samling 1937–40’, Historisk Tidsskrift, 74:3 (1995), pp. 370–390. 
73 ‘Nasjonal Samlings skjebne’, Fronten, 6:2 (15 February 1937), p. 1. 
74 Jacobsen, ‘Vidkun Quisling og NS’, p. 63. 
75 Walter Fürst, ‘Årsakene til og følgene av N.S.’ sammenbrudd’, Ragnarok, 3:3 (1937), pp. 66–70. Walter Fürst was 
more personally involved in these events than other Ragnarok contributors, considering that he as chief of propaganda 
in NS was accused of being the cause of the NS’s financial problems. See ‘Kringsjå’, Ragnarok, 3:4 (1937), pp. 84–85. 
76 Cited by Jacobsen in ‘Vidkun Quisling og NS’, p. 64. 
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Ragnarok relating to whether a re-entrance into the NS was necessary in order to realise their National 
Socialist political aspirations. Ragnarok members attacked Quisling’s supposedly dictatorial politics 
while simultaneously consolidating their heretical identity. Stein Barth-Heyerdahl opposed Hitler’s 
and Quisling’s politics and presented himself as an ‘anarchy-Nazi’. The anarchist label referred to 
Barth-Heyerdahl’s critique of the leadership behaviour of both NS and the German NSDAP. This 
critique prompted his anarchist call for a revolt against the ‘false’ prophets of National Socialism.77 
 
Barth-Heyerdahl had been an eager member of NS in its founding years. In a letter dated 30 June 
1933, Barth-Heyerdahl wrote to the NS propaganda office and offered his assistance as a 
spokesperson for the party in the summer months preceding the election campaign in autumn the 
same year.78 He quickly became an important individual within the party. When NS announced its 
party programme between 30 May and 2 June 1933, Barth-Heyerdahl held one of three lectures. His 
topic of race and spiritual revival was followed by Quisling’s lecture on the ‘revival of politics’.79 In 
this party programme as well as following proclamations made by Quisling, the different emphasis 
placed by Quisling and Barth-Heyerdahl on the NS’s aims become clear. With no mention of spiritual 
revival, Quisling’s pragmatic tone comes through in a clarifying declaration in the following days 
after the lectures, on 5 June 1933: ‘To avoid any misunderstandings: NS builds upon the Führer 
principle.’80 Just like the article in Wilfred Petersen’s Stormen, Barth-Heyerdahl hinted at the 
emerging sense of corruption among all those ‘false National Socialist prophets’. What is more, 
Barth-Heyerdahl hinted at the fact that these false prophets were not to be found among the ‘small 
people’ of the splinter groups, but among those, like Quisling and Clausen, who dared to claim 
ownership over an essentially unbound ideology; being an ‘anarchy-Nazi’ was for Barth-Heyerdahl 
equivalent to being a real Nazi. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
77 Emberland, Rase, p. 193. 
78 Stein Barth-Heyerdahl, ‘Forslag: Om organisasjon og propaganda i Helgeland’, dated 30 June, 1933, Riksarkivet NS 
Hovedkontor 1933, Oppfordring til Nasjonal Samling 0758/F/Fh/Box 0002. 
79 Preparations for Barth-Heyerdahl’s lecture on ‘Rase’, Dated 1 June 1933, Riksarkivet, RA/PA-0758/F/Fh/Box 0002. 
80 Vidkun Quisling, ‘Organisasjon og Disiplin’, dated 5 July 1933, Riksarkivet, 0758/F/Fh/Box 0002. 
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VI 
Chapter Conclusion 
 
The present chapter has illuminated the ways in which the question of what defined a real National 
Socialist occupied the contemporary discourses as much as it dominates current historiography today. 
Michael Wildt’s research on the generational cohort of men born between 1900 and 1910 – men who 
were spared the first-hand experience of the First World War and who came to lead the genocidal 
machinery of the SS main office (RSHA) – has provided, in scholarly circles, a widely accepted 
profile of the archetypal Nazi. In Wildt’s words, these individuals shared ‘a concept of a new world, 
which based both its appeal and its absoluteness on the collapse of the old world’.81 They were 
completely uncompromising in their attitudes and breaking the old world’s rules became their motto. 
 
Wildt sees this ideal type personified in Otto Ohlendorf, born in 1907. The post-war trial records of 
Ohlendorf’s case echoes the psychologist’s confusion about Wilfred Petersen’s cultivated personality 
and his completely outrageous actions. It is, to an extent, indeed possible to draw parallels between 
Ohlendorf and these Scandinavian intellectuals. That is, if one follows the framework of Wildt’s 
‘uncompromising’ mentality as key to tracing the ‘real’ National Socialist, more so than focusing on 
the murderous consequences of this mentality. Compared to Wildt’s stencil of the uncompromising 
National Socialist, Petersen and his colleagues were hardly as revolutionary in their ideologies as 
they might have thought. Demographically speaking, Petersen was born in 1905 and Ejnar Vaaben a 
couple of years earlier, in 1902. Aage H. Andersen, however, was considerably older. Born in 1892, 
he entered Schalburgkorpset in 1944 when he was over 50 years of age. Like Petersen and Vaaben, 
and unlike Andersen and his colleague Arendt Lemwigh-Müller born in 1899, the individuals covered 
in this study were all born within the years 1900–1910 or later:82 the Kamptegnet contributor Jørgen 
Skeby in 1905, the Fronten editor Adolf Egeberg Jr. in 1909 and Ragnarok editor Hans S. Jacobsen 
in 1901. The Ragnarok ideologues Per Imerslund (1912), Ola Furuseth (1908), Tor Strand (1912) and 
Stein Barth-Heyerdahl (1909) are no exceptions. Even when we look beyond the immediate circles 
around Ragnarok, Kamptegnet and Vaaben’s closest allies, among noteworthy members of 
                                                          
81 Michael Wildt, ‘Generational Experience and Genocide: A Biographical Approach to Nazi Perpetrators’ in Volker 
Rolf and Simone Lässig (eds.), Biography Between Structure and Agency: Central European Lives in International 
Historiography (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008) p. 149. 
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Schalburgkorpset and Germanske SS Norge, which will be discussed later in this thesis, we find the 
Germaneren editor Egil Holst Thorkildsen (1916), the GSSN staff-chief Leif Schjøren (1906) and 
leader of Schalburgkorpset Carl Popp-Madsen (1900) all within this age group. 
 
However, only limited conclusions can be reached based on these generational factors alone. Apart 
from considering the obvious particularity of the German Kriegsjugend in contrast with the 
Scandinavian context, it is enough to take a look at the time of death of these individuals. Ohlendorf 
was executed by hanging on 7 June 1951 following the Einsatzgruppen trial. Ejnar Vaaben, by 
contrast, lived a peaceful post-war life until his death in 1997. The same can be said about Hans S. 
Jacobsen who lived until 1980 and Aage H. Andersen who died at the age of 76, in 1968. Indeed, 
neither Furuseth and Barth-Heyerdahl nor Imerslund and Skeby met Ohlendorf’s fate. Furuseth died 
in 1983 and Barth-Heyerdahl in 1972. Imerslund and Skeby, however, did not live to see the post-
war period: Imerslund died accidentally in the midst of his plan to assassinate Quisling in late 1943, 
and Skeby committed suicide on 10 April 1940, the day after the German occupation of Denmark. 
Considering that the judicial punishment for these Scandinavians was rather mild even within their 
national contexts,83 if men like Vaaben and Jacobsen are ever to be regarded as uncompromising 
National Socialists, one needs to look beyond gas chambers, Einsatzgruppen and the murderous 
ambitions of the SD. 
 
Dr August Wimmer describes Petersen’s ideological convictions as ‘controlled yet deeply 
passionate’, a description very much in line with post-war psychiatrists’ impressions of Ohlendorf. 
As we shall see later in this thesis, the paradoxically dogmatic quest for breaking the hegemony of 
the confessional church, liberalism and all forms of intellectualism stemming from ‘the old world’ 
was as widespread among fascists and National Socialists in Scandinavia as it was in Germany. 
Compared to Quisling and Clausen and their respective parties, it was however expressed in its most 
radical Scandinavian form by the individuals examined in this thesis. Needless to say, these aspects 
are all different forms of expressing one particular ideal and, moreover, a very central ideal to the 
ideology of the German SS: the glorification of agency – in particular, the glorification of violence. 
The question of why violence ceased to become an aspect associated with these Scandinavian men 
leads us to Wildt’s own argument about the explanatory limitations of a biographical approach with 
                                                          
83 Vidkun Quisling, Frits Clausen and Schalburgkorpset leader K.B. Martinsen were among those 91 (46 in Denmark 
and 45 in Norway) individuals sentenced to death in post-war trials. 
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its generational emphasis. The transformation from a radical National Socialist to an actual 
perpetrator must ‘also take into consideration an analysis of the society, the structure of the power 
apparatus, in particular the new specifically National Socialist institutions’,84 and these were all 
aspects of radicalisation where Petersen’s and Ohlendorf’s trajectories diverge from one another. In 
what follows, a number of Scandinavian National Socialist intellectuals will be presented, being 
singled out for this thesis because of their connections with Nazi Germany and their self-acclaimed 
radicalism. They do not constitute ideal-types of the Nazi perpetrator, but in their own context and 
the subsequent absence of a National Socialist institutional framework, they never ceased to call 
themselves ‘true National Socialists’.
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Chapter 4: ‘There are a Number of Gods to be Crushed’ 
  
Nazi Germany as a Political Religion 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In 1933, the Danish theologian Halfdan Høgsbro described National Socialism as ‘undoubtedly 
highly religious’, but yet a movement ‘of falsification which meets the Church with a kiss’.1 National 
Socialism was thus a sophisticated imitation of a religious system, where the act of falsifying 
traditional religion had fostered a new kind of faith. In Norway, Kristian Schjelderup admitted in a 
lecture on the ‘conflict in German religious life and our contemporary religious crisis’ from 1935 that 
‘many of the founding principles of modern liberal theology experienced a religious revival when it 
became separated from Christianity and instead linked to “Blut und Boden [Blood and Soil]”’.2 
Schjelderup was, however, not hesitant in raising criticism, stating that the faith in a sacred Germany 
had ‘religious clothing but with an inner core indicating nothing but a nationalist movement striving 
for power’.3 These Danish and Norwegian voices expressed a dilemma they shared not only with 
other liberal theologians but also with radical Nazi individuals in their respective countries, vis-à-vis 
the religious politics of Nazi Germany: if National Socialism indeed was a form of religiosity, what 
safeguarded it from meeting the same fate as the (in their view) corrupt and degraded confessional 
Christianity? The first edition of the Norwegian Ragnarok pamphlet from 1935 stated that ‘there are 
a number of Gods to be crushed and it demands a struggle’.4 Indeed, their critique of Christianity 
eventually was bound to clash with aspects of the Nazi regime. 
 
This chapter examines the conjunction between Nazi groups and theological circles in Scandinavia 
regarding the relationship between National Socialism and the term ‘political religion’. Just like many 
other Christian writers across Europe in the 1930s, Schjelderup and Høgsbro formulated their early 
                                                          
1 Halfdan Høgsbro, De Nye Religione: Kommunisme, Nationalsocialisme som Livsanskuelser (Århus: De Unges Forlag, 
1933), pp. 44–46. 
2 Kristian Schjelderup, Den tyske religionskamp og nutidens religiøse krise, Foredrag holdt den 14. Mars 1935, Chr. 
Michelsens Institut for Videnskap og Åndsfrihet (Bergen: John Griegs Boktrykkeri, 1935), p. 14. 
3 Schjelderup, ‘Krisen i det tyske hedenskap’, Fronten, (May 1936), p. 1. 
4 Hans Jacobsen, Ragnarok, 1:1 (March 1935), p. 1. 
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theories of Nazism as an inner-worldly ‘political religion’ – a secular alternative to Christian religion. 
Another Danish theologian, Eduard Geismar, clarified that this Nazi ‘political religion’ symbolised 
the resolution of Christian polemics: as blood and race formed the pillars of a new worldview, the 
tension between the divine and the worldly had been reduced and conquered by man.5 This is a 
clarification no different from Eric Voegelin – the founding father of political religion theory – and 
his definition of the phenomenological approach to inner-worldly religiosity.6 At the same time, these 
Christian intellectuals were nonetheless also inspired by the functionalist approach to ‘political 
religion’ that – less from an individual and more from a Durkheimian socio-political angle – saw the 
Nazi religion as a power-political construction with the aim of seducing its population into obedience. 
It is the contention of this chapter that the tension between a functionalist and phenomenologist 
understanding of ‘political religion’ that figures in today’s historiography was therefore also present 
in the Nazi writings in Scandinavia at the time. 
 
The establishment of a ‘political religion’ was certainly a matter of contention within the Nazi party 
itself. As discussed in the historiographical chapter, Klaus Vondung distinguishes fruitfully between 
the mysticism associated with a ‘volkish religion’ contrary to a ‘political religion’ understood as 
‘Hitler’s socially dominant (sozialdominante) religion in the Third Reich’.7 The sozialdominante 
approach assumes that National Socialism is understood as a ‘political religion’ in a functionalist 
sense. That means, National Socialism was defined a religion based on its instrumentalist and 
coercive character, being primarily a belief system constructed to consolidate the power of a 
totalitarian regime. To follow Vondung’s distinction in this Scandinavian context, the attitudes to 
traditional religion among the Ragnarok members and most of their Danish colleagues would clearly 
fall under the other, ‘volkish’ category. This observation is significant because it will be able to tell 
us more about how and why the critique of Christianity among National Socialists such as Anders 
Malling, Jørgen Skeby and members of Ragnarok often resembled the criticism of the politics of Nazi 
Germany – while they at the same time praised the ‘religious qualities’ of National Socialism. It 
became a matter of distinguishing between a functionalist and constructed religion on the one hand, 
and an organic, phenomenologist understanding of religiosity on the other. The chapter further argues 
that the Nazis determined this distinction by stressing the importance of the principle of ‘theological 
                                                          
5 Eduard Geismar, Religiøse Brydninger i det Nuværende Tyskland (Copenhagen: G.E.C. Forlag, 1934), pp. 87–110. 
6 See chapter 1 in this thesis. 
7 Klaus Vondung, ‘Von der völkischen Religiosität zur politischen Religion’ in Uwe Puschner and Clemens Vollnhals 
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incorrectness’ and thereby favouring what we now call the phenomenologist school of ‘political 
religion’ theory. 
 
‘Theological incorrectness’ is thus introduced in the particular context of Nazi theory as a clarifying 
tool when mapping the divide between functionalist and phenomenologist understanding of the term 
‘political religion’. The term works to clarify why many Nazis combined an outspoken aversion to 
the term ‘religion’ while at the same time calling for a religious move beyond Christianity. Without 
exaggerating the proximity of liberal theology and National Socialism, the chapter does assume 
significant ideological overlaps between liberal theologians and the Scandinavian Nazis of this study.8 
These overlaps are structured into three main themes. 
 
First, the chapter describes how the emerging field on the psychology of religion informed 
contemporary liberal theologians. Through the calls for a more loosely defined understanding of 
religiosity that came with a phenomenological – and essentially individual – emphasis on religiosity, 
this opposition to concretisation also made way for ambivalent attitudes among liberal theologians 
vis-à-vis pagan movements. The broad approach to divergent forms of religiosity, in turn, prompted 
the question of whether it was possible to be ‘theologically incorrect’ and nevertheless claim a 
religious identity. Scholars have, as we have seen in recent research on the Nazi Kirchenkampf, 
stressed that Nazi historiography should incorporate a greater openness to a less dogmatic 
understanding of religiosity.9 This chapter not only argues for the use of ‘theological incorrectness’ 
from an analytical/historiographical point of view, but it also stresses that it was a principle the Nazis 
themselves used to measure the quality of emerging religious systems. 
 
Second, because of the basic opposition to ‘religious mediators’ like priests, dogmas and institutions, 
Scandinavian theologians and National Socialists alike shared an aversion to any notions of 
constructed, man-made and thus rigidly defined religions. From a theological point of view, this 
opposition fostered an ambivalent attitude towards National Socialism. The ambivalence was shown 
in how theologians on the one hand saw National Socialism as a spiritual movement and to an extent 
sympathised with some of its aspects. On the other hand, theologians still objected to the way the 
once pure Nazi ideals were consolidated and constrained within a power-seeking political regime led 
                                                          
8 For a fairly recent commentary, see Arne Rasmusson, ‘Historiography and Theology: Theology in the Weimar 
Republic and the Beginning of the Third Reich’, Kirchliche Zeitgeschichte, 20:1 (2007), pp. 155–180. 
9 See my discussion of Doris Bergen’s argument with regards to Deutsche Christen in chapter 1. 
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by Hitler. Thus, their critique of the ‘Nazi religion’ was structurally similar to their revolt against the 
constraints of orthodox Christianity. This ambivalence in attitudes to National Socialism was also 
present in the writings of Anders Malling, Ragnarok members and individuals and movements close 
to these circles. 
 
Finally, however, the principle of ‘theological incorrectness’ that had paved the way for the 
acknowledgement of National Socialism as a religious movement also informed the critique of Nazi 
politics that was raised from both theological and Nazi circles in Scandinavia. Central to this critique 
were those voices who objected to the so-called religious chauvinism that they identified in Nazi calls 
for an ethnicised religion, or more particularly a ‘Germanised Christianity’. The chapter gives 
examples of the works of individual contributions in Fronten and Ragnarok pamphlets as well as 
prominent Nazi intellectuals on religious matters where they stress the inauthentic and even dogmatic 
dimensions of National Socialist principles. The pamphlet contributors objected to an overtly rigid 
subordination to the race principle’s supremacy, i.e. the dogmatisation of race. Ultimately, it was an 
objection, which again indicates how a pre-conceived framework of the ideal religious system that 
stemmed from their critique of Christianity guided their judgement of the Nazi worldview. 
 
 
I 
Wilhelm Hauer and Deutsche Glaubensbewegung 
 
Although this chapter focuses on the religious attitudes of relatively small and distinctively radical 
Nazi circles in the region, this has to be set within a much broader spectrum of opinions on Christian 
religion in Norway and Denmark at the time. Chapter 3 of this thesis has established Ragnarok’s 
relations to Fronten more thoroughly, where the latter pamphlet included contributions of several 
profiled Ragnarok members including Ola Furuseth and Barth-Heyerdahl. Editor Eugen Nielsen 
described the young Barth-Heyerdahl as a ‘true National Socialist’ and ‘probably the only one that 
can provide the Norwegians with honest and authentic reports [on National Socialism]’ in his position 
as lecturer at the University of Greifswald in 1933.10 There were indeed overlaps in terms of 
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individual contributors and shared opinions between Ragnarok and Fronten. These conjunctures 
serve to provide a broader framework of the attitudes to religion that shaped both pamphlets. 
 
Moreover, these discourses did not take place in isolation from religious or political developments in 
Nazi Germany, where a Kirchenkampf played out between the mainstream evangelical Christian 
church and its NSDAP-supporting wing, the Deutsche Christen (DC) from 1933 to 1939. DC, with 
its racially infused rhetoric of an Aryan Christianity, sought to reform the Christian Church in the 
direction of Nazi dominance.11 Of the German movements, however, it was Jacob W. Hauer’s 
Deutsche Glaubensbewegung (DGB) rather than DC that attracted most attention from Scandinavian 
Nazi groups. The private correspondence and friendship that Hauer had with both Vaaben and 
Jacobsen from the late 1920s until the after the war is just one example of the interest DGB received 
in Scandinavia.12 Another is Jacobsen’s claim that he, following Hauer’s exit from the DGB and the 
movement’s marginalisation in 1936, proved his loyalty to Hauer in a meeting with the NSDAP 
leadership the following year: 
 
I have personally explained to Alfred Rosenberg […] (and in oral conversation also to Himmler) [that we] have 
the greatest respect for Wilhelm Hauer and that we regard them [DGB] as one of the leading, or rather the leading, 
spirit in the revival of the Third and Nordic Reich.13 
 
The emphasis on the Nordic and in turn the link between the Nordic idea and the race principle was 
fundamental to Jacobsen’s and Vaaben’s admiration for Hauer. Indeed, Terje Emberland points to 
the great influences that Hauer had on Ragnarok’s outlook by identifying a shared goal in the creation 
of a ‘reality religion’.14 Ivar Aker’s article in the pamphlet from 1943 advocated a ‘real-religion’ by 
citing Henrik Ibsen that ‘there will come a time when art, religion and science synthesise in a higher 
unity’.15 Aker described ‘Nordicness’ (Nordendom) as ‘a real-religious race-politics or a race-
political real-religion but both versions derive from the same principle: to manage without the rule of 
                                                          
11 On the Deutsche Christen, see Susannah Heschel, The Aryan Jesus: Christian Theologians and the Bible in Nazi 
Germany (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); Christopher J. Probst, Demonizing the Jews: Luther and the 
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foreign systems’.16 This understanding of a religious and scientific synthesis emphasised the primary 
position of race theory in shaping a new Nordic faith. 
 
The frames for Aker’s article and the premise of this ‘reality-religion’ derived from the volkish fusion 
with occultism. The fusion, termed Ariosophy, had gained momentum in early 20th-century Europe.17 
The opposition to scientific rationalism had thus found its spiritual, yet ‘scientific’, substitute in the 
culturally specific Aryan race. In pessimism, one of Hauer’s main sources of inspiration, Walter de 
Lapouge had stressed that the only way to move beyond old Christian promises was to relate to human 
existence in terms of fostering biological continuity and the struggle of the Aryan ‘master race’.18 
Lapouge thus offered a ‘respectable racial science’ where spirit and morale were the results of a given 
racial heritage, which easily merged with volkish spiritualism. Ragnarok’s Lapougian heritage comes 
through in their common opposition to the dogmas of both science and religion, and it was an 
opposition shared with Hauer. Historian Jennifer Michael Hecht stresses the striking ‘religiosity of 
his anti-religion’ when referring to Lapouge’s critique of both liberal politics and Christianity.19 Just 
like chapter 3 of this thesis has sketched an image of the Danish and Norwegian Nazi sub-milieus as 
deliberately heterogenic and unorthodox, the scholars Karla Poewe and Irving Hexham apply the 
same characteristics to Hauer. They maintain that Hauer sought to establish a ‘new religion’, but they 
also stress that the DGB’s pagan label was not written in stone, referring to Hauer’s statement in 1936 
that he had forbidden ‘anyone [to] say that National Socialism and Christianity are irreconcilable’.20 
 
True to its volkish Lapougian heritage, the leading figures of the Norwegian Ragnarok movement 
shared with Hauer a curious attitude to religion where their at times fierce anti-religious rhetoric took 
on religious dimensions, while simultaneous calls for the creation of a ‘new’ religion were toned 
down since it implied an unsought association with traditional religious systems. As Tor Strand put 
it in an edition of Ragnarok, ‘we should not think that we have now created a new religion’ since that 
would only lead to ‘national conflicts and misunderstandings’.21 Strand saw a danger in the process 
                                                          
16 Ibid., p. 20. 
17 Nicholas Goodrick-Clarke, The Occult Roots of Nazism: The Ariosophists of Austria and Germany, 1890–1935 
(Wellingborough: The Aquarian Press, 1985), p. 33. 
18 Jennifer Michael Hecht, ‘Vacher de Lapouge and the Rise of Nazi Science’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 61:2 
(2000), p. 290. 
19 Ibid., p. 289. 
20 Re-cited from Karla Poewe and Irving Hexham, ‘Jakob Wilhelm Hauer’s New Religion and National Socialism’, 
Journal of Contemporary Religion, 20:2 (2005), p. 201. 
21 Tor Strand, ‘Flere momenter i det nasjonale ordskifte’, Ragnarok, 4:1 (February 1938), pp. 42–43. 
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of dogmatising the new faith, and Emberland thus draws a link between Ragnarok here represented 
by Strand’s ideas and other liberal theological voices in Norway. Poewe and Hexham similarly 
explain Hauer’s objection to a clear-cut paganist outlook by emphasising Hauer’s intellectual debt to 
liberal theology.22 The triangular relationship between liberal theology, Hauer and Ragnarok is most 
visible in their shared preoccupation with the individual experience of religiosity which they saw as 
a determining factor for future religious studies. For example, Hauer’s article in Ragnarok from June 
1935 criticised conventional theology for ‘humanising the divine and enclosing God as the symbol 
of eternal being […] trying to win over the outer reality which we cannot grasp with abstract phrases 
[…] the divine is the inner soul of the person’.23 While he stressed the connection between religious 
faith and the collective ideal of the Aryan race, the philosophical foundation for DGB was the 
phenomenologist emphasis on divergent modes of religiosity. Theoretically speaking, the primacy 
they assigned to individual religiosity naturally prompted Hauer’s DGB and Ragnarok’s (as well as 
liberal theologians’) hostile attitudes to the thought of subordinating individual religiosity to religious 
dogmas. 
 
Heterogeneity was more than an abstract ideological principle in the Danish Nazi discourse on 
religion. More so than in the Norwegian context, heterogeneity defined the entire landscape of 
opinions and the relations between the various Nazi intellectuals. There was no equivalent movement 
to Ragnarok in Denmark in the sense of one specific organisational platform for radical discourse on 
National Socialism and ‘political religions’. Rather, these discussions spread across various party 
political forums and they were discussions primarily shaped by the personal attitudes held by the 
party leaders. While a worldly consolidation of divine teachings was seen by many Danish 
theologians – like Høgsbro and Geismar – as a deadly threat to the Christian Church, for others it 
symbolised the birth of Christianity as such. Different from Hauer’s DGB and Ragnarok, the religious 
discourse among Danish Nazis outside of Clausen’s DNSAP had a greater emphasis on a particular 
fusion of Christianity and National Socialism. According to several leading Danish National 
Socialists in the 1930s, the Nazi sacralisation of politics went hand in hand with a Christian religious 
revival in Denmark. Moreover, these individuals argued that the intertwined relationship between 
Christianity and National Socialism had its intellectual heritage in the religious philosophy of 
Denmark’s founding father of liberal theology, Nikolaj Grundtvig. 
                                                          
22 Poewe and Hexham, ‘Jakob Wilhelm Hauer’s New Religion’, pp. 204–205. 
23 Wilhelm Hauer, ‘Det Tyske Trosbevegelses tilblivelse, vesen og mål’, Ragnarok, 1:5 (1935), p. 113. 
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The main spokesperson for this kind of fusion was Malling, who expressed this vision most explicitly 
in his own work from 1935, ‘The Swastika paves the way for the Christian Cross’.24 In fact, Malling’s 
religious outlook was to some extent reflected in his preoccupation with religious fusions more 
generally. Historians have positioned Malling in the intersections of the two dominating religious 
forces of 19th-century Denmark: the biblical fundamentalist line of the Lutheran-evangelical Indre 
Mission into which he was born, and the Grundvigianist liberal theology that infused Malling’s 
writings in the 1930s.25 Although this positioning would indicate a less radical and more traditional 
Christian approach than, for example, his National Socialist colleagues in Ragnarok, a look at 
Malling’s allies on the Danish Nazi scene tells a different story.  
 
Kamptegnet’s Aage H. Andersen declared his intellectual debt to Malling on religious matters when 
he initiated an anti-Semitic study circle motivated by the fact that ‘only in this way can one grasp the 
deepest meaning of the words by the Danish National Socialist priest; the swastika paves the way for 
the Christian Cross’.26 Other noteworthy contributors to Kamptegnet on religious matters were Sofus 
Nervil and the future chief of propaganda in Schalburgkorpset, Arent Lemwigh-Müller. Overall, the 
chapter covers two circles in each country: Fronten and Ragnarok in Norway; and Malling’s 
interactions, both historically and ideologically, with Andersen’s Kamptegnet in Denmark. 
 
The relationship between Andersen and Malling had taken new light following Malling’s exit from 
the DNSAP in 1936. In a letter from that year, Andersen acknowledged that despite their differences, 
their Christian faith was their true source of agreement. Indeed, Malling was concerned about 
Andersen’s rabid anti-Semitism, an anti-Semitism that often bordered on a rejection of biblical 
Christianity. Malling’s distinctively evangelical approach comes through in his book from 1935 and 
he moreover expressed hesitation regarding Andersen’s fanaticism in his public rejection of 
Andersen’s piece ‘The Christian Church in Nordic Light’ (Kristen Kirke I Nordisk Belysning). 
                                                          
24 Anders Malling, Hagekorset baner Vej for Kristi Kors (Copenhagen: Landsoldaten, 1935). The title became a slogan 
for Malling’s religious profile and had been used by him even before his publication; see Malling ‘Den danske 
Nationalsocialisme og Kirken’, Kirkligt Centrum, 12:10 (1934), pp. 138–139. 
25 Indre Mission as such was not freed from ambivalence regarding modern liberal theology, where regional strands of 
the organisation leaned towards Grundtvigianism, the area of Copenhagen included. Sofie Lene Bak’s study on anti-
Semitism demonstrates how the organisation conditionally accepted the race principle in the ideas of a moral 
degeneration of the ‘white race’, but rejected the idea of race hierarchies on the basis of references to Christian 
principles of equality. One other factor contributing to the fact that Indre Mission took an official stance against the 
politics of the NSDAP relatively late (1937) is its early fascination with the leader principle in the representations of 
both Hitler and Mussolini. See Bak, Dansk Antisemitisme, pp. 121–166. 
26 Ibid. 
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Andersen published the book in 1935 and distributed it to 141 leading Danish intellectuals, the 
majority being theologians.27 Andersen in turn justified his radicalism by reassuring Malling in the 
same letter from 1936 that his own ‘uncompromising anti-Semitism’ was the necessary precondition 
for the preservation of his Christian faith.28 Despite these hesitations, the main indicator of Malling’s 
significance in the religious discourse among Danish Nazi circles is found in his ‘Guiding principles 
of NSAP’s propaganda’ from as late as January 1938. It revealed that Andersen had plans to recruit 
Malling together with NSAP’s Jørgen Skeby as co-editors of the section of ‘religion’ in the future 
party organ.29 
 
Against the backdrop of this brief introduction of the Nazi milieus under study in this chapter, it is 
clear that heterogeneity not only describes the two national discourses, but it also marks the entire 
nature of this comparative chapter. Considering that Malling formally ended his activities in Dansk 
Folkefællesskab by the time of German occupation, one could indeed question the purpose of 
comparing the religious outlook of Malling and the Ragnarok circle in the context of National 
Socialist political religion theory. If these individuals first of all diverged on the most fundamental 
level regarding their religious outlooks, and second of all, must be regarded as Scandinavian National 
Socialists with radically different political trajectories, then what is the point of comparison? On the 
face of it, Anders Malling’s supposed lack of radicalism (in contrast to Ragnarok’s distinctly radical 
profile) is the main issue. Yet, in addition to the authority that Andersen gave Malling in religious 
issues by envisioning him as co-editor, Malling’s central profile in these radical circles outside Frits 
Clausen’s DNSAP does indeed modify the conservative image of his outlook. When Andersen 
received a personal invitation to the NSDAP’s Nuremberg rally in September 1937, it was not only 
the archetypical rebel Wilfred Petersen who accompanied him as representatives of Danish National 
Socialism, but also Malling.30 
 
                                                          
27 Aage H. Andersen, Kristen Kirke i Nordisk Belysning (Copenhagen: NSAP, 1935). On the distribution, see ‘NSAP 
Forlaget’, dated 20 November 1935 in Rigsarkivet, nr. 10192., box 7. ‘Manuskribter til artikler, taler m.m.’ Malling’s 
public denouncement of the piece involved his signature on the list of formal complaints about the content of 
Andersen’s writings. Moreover, this initiative was issued by the DNSAP where Malling had a central role at the time. 
See Bak, Dansk Antisemitisme, p. 174. 
28 Letter from Andersen to Malling, 24 December 1936, Rigsarkivet nr. 07187, box 13 ‘Breve Politisk liv’.  
29 ‘Grundlinjer for NSAP’s Propaganda 1 Januar 1938’, Rigsarkivet nr. 10192, box 49. ‘1932-1044: Diverse Materiale’. 
30 ‘Danske Nazister til Nüremberg’, Arbejderbladet, 7 September 1937, Rigsarkivet nr. 10192, box 47. ‘1932-1944. 
Diverse Avisdudklip’. 
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While we can establish Malling’s position in this milieu and thus to an extent confirm his radicalism, 
it is however not the radicalism as such that makes a comparison between Ragnarok and Malling 
particularly fruitful with regards to Nazi attitudes to political religion theory. Instead, although 
commonalities should be stressed, the divergences between the two are equally as important since 
‘theological incorrectness’ after all is a concept that assumes interactions between ‘incompatibles’: 
between theology – albeit in its liberal form – and Nazi ‘pagan movements’; between dogmas and 
individual religiosity; and, of course, between the two distinct worldviews of Christianity and 
National Socialism. In that sense, the chapter actually benefits from working with such a broad 
spectrum of identities and incompatibilities in order to show more strongly how the principle of 
‘theological incorrectness’ cut across these divergences. By doing so, it works to illustrate that the 
debate between proponents of a functionalist ‘political religion’ and volkish understandings of 
religiosity was as much a historical conflict as it is a historiographical one. 
 
 
III 
Liberal Theology and the Psychology of Religion 
 
The theological influences on the discourses on religion within Malling’s and Ragnarok’s circles 
were naturally separated according to the national context and cultural heritage. This following part 
of the chapter therefore divides into two main sections: the influence that Schjelderup’s theological 
ideas had on Ragnarok’s attitudes to Christianity and religion, and similarly in Denmark, how Danish 
National Socialists borrowed from the religious philosophy of Nikolaj Grundtvig in their anti-
Christian attitudes. While the works of Schjelderup heavily influenced the Norwegian context and 
even Danes like Aage Andersen followed his work closely,31it was not a contemporary figure but 
instead the 19th-century theological writings by Nikolaj Grundtvig that influenced the Danish scene. 
As we shall see, and despite the fact that their writings originated in profoundly different periods, 
Schjelderup and Grundtvig were incorporated in the Nazi discourse in a very similar manner by virtue 
of their roles as national representatives of liberal theological ideas. More particularly, they 
propagated a distinctive phenomenologist understanding of religion that scholars like Vondung have 
attached to volkish approaches to religious systems. The obvious connection to the later volkish 
                                                          
31 A review of Schjelderup’s ’På vei mot hedenskapet’ in the Danish newspaper Politikken, dated 17 January 1936 is 
located in Aage Andersen’s political archive, Rigsarkivet, nr. 10192, box 45. ‘1932-1944: Diverse Avisudklip’. 
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ideology, and its central position in the propaganda of the main NSDAP ideologue Alfred Rosenberg, 
was noted among Nazis, just as it was among their evangelical Christian opponents. A contributor in 
the Danish pamphlet Gads Magasin – a leading forum on cultural matters at the time – put forward 
in November 1934 a very clear comparison between liberal theology and Rosenberg: 
 
Rosenberg is, regardless of his extremist standpoints, an echo of the period that he so outspokenly despises; the 
liberal age; yes, in fact he appears as its disciple. The weapons that Rosenberg uses against true Christianity are 
weapons he has gathered from the otherwise so despised liberals. The anxiety over dogmas (although he indeed is 
creating a new one: the racial soul, the dogma of the blood), the attempt to construct a Christianity free from 
dogmas [...] There are thus a number of factors pointing to a clear connection between a Nazi-infused religiosity 
and liberal outsourcing of Christianity.32 
 
The author Paul Holt was particularly wary of how Danish liberal theology had undermined so-called 
‘true Christianity’, and concluded that what ‘the protection against this Nazi falsification of 
Christianity needs is a dogmatic “old-fashioned” gospel about Jesus as our saviour’.33 The interesting 
aspect of statements like this is that it adds to the wide spectrum of voices on the relationship between 
Christianity and National Socialism that although they came from various political and spiritual 
camps, all raised the same point: the essential conflict was the conflict on the position of dogmas in 
a religious system. This part of the chapter will strengthen the point that one could be an evangelical 
Christian, a liberal theologian or a National Socialist but still agree that liberal theology had inspired 
Nazism to adopt the principle of ‘theological incorrectness’ in its critique of Christianity. 
 
The phenomenologist school 
The overlaps between the phenomenological school of ‘political religion’ theory and the notion of 
‘theological incorrectness’ has its starting point around the birth of psychological approaches to 
religion. When Eric Voegelin formulated his concept of ‘political religion’ in 1938, he particularly 
mentioned one source of inspiration in William James’s The Varieties of Religious Experience from 
1902. Voegelin described the piece as ‘a treasure trove for examples of the new mass religiosity’.34 
In that sense, Voegelin acknowledged that the psychology of religion was a driving force behind the 
birth of the kind of phenomenologist approaches to religion that he, in turn, saw as foundational for 
                                                          
32 Paul Holt, ‘Alfred Rosenberg og den tyske religion’, Gads Danske Magasin (1934), p. 588. 
33 Ibid., p. 590. 
34 Eric Voegelin, ‘The Political Religions’, p. 75. See also William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience: A 
Study in Human Nature. 
 
 
 
128 
 
the Nazi ‘political religion’. A background as a professor in psychology had informed James’s 
approach to religion, and his notion of ‘religious experience’ stands as the pioneering initiative to 
merge psychology with religious studies that informed liberal theologians at the time. From what we 
have learned about the trajectory of ‘political religion’ theory considering the way the experiential 
dimension (the focus on the individual experience of religiosity) informed the phenomenological 
school, the link between Voegelin and James is also an indication of the link between Voegelin’s 
concept of ‘political religion’ and liberal theology.35 Between 1902, when James published his piece, 
and Voegelin’s ‘political religion’ concept from 1938, however, liberal theologians in interwar 
Europe had already begun working towards a rationalisation of religion: of how to understand the 
various expressions of belief systems that extended beyond the realm of traditional religion. In the 
light of the emergence of ethno-nationalist and race-scientific propaganda in contemporary politics, 
the tensions between what was commonly perceived as confessional ‘faith’ and the logic of science 
seemed greater than ever before. 
 
‘Religion and Religions’: Kristian Schjelderup on the purity of inner religiosity 
The relationship between the terms ‘reality’ and ‘religion’ was not, however, a discussion limited to 
the contradictory principles of biological race science and Christian theology. The greatest challenge 
to confessional Christianity came from the entire spectrum of contemporary cultural relativist ideas, 
not confined to race-biology. As a move away from the ‘correctness’ of the theological systems that 
for modern theologians seemed outdated and anachronistic, the Norwegian Kristian Schjelderup 
made his point clear: ‘we have had enough of the kind of religion that seeks uniformity; that ranks 
theological adaption higher than personal religiosity’.36 
 
Schjelderup’s time at the University of Marburg in the autumn of 1920 shaped his theological profile, 
since it was in Marburg that he met Otto for the first time. In the decade that followed, Schjelderup’s 
work was characterised by its increased emphasis on the need to modernise Christianity so that it 
                                                          
35 Although one must not assume that Voegelin’s private religious preferences were a direct reflection of the ‘political 
religions’ he studied, scholars have consequently pointed to the tendency in Voegelin’s work to incorporate his own 
Christian critique of the outdated theology in his commentary on the nature of newly religious movements such as 
National Socialism. See for example Jardine Murray, ‘Eric Voegelin’s Interpretation(s) of Modernity: A 
Reconsideration of the Spiritual and Political Implications of Voegelin’s Therapeutic Analysis’, The Review of Politics, 
57:4 (1995), pp. 581–605. 
36 Schjelderup, Religion og religioner (Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1926), p. 6. 
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could meet the demands of contemporary society.37 One article in Fritt Ord – the liberal theological 
pamphlet edited by Schjelderup – summed up the driving force of liberal theology. It was the 
unbearable tension between Christianity and culture’ that called for future action: ‘It [liberal theology] 
is the first approach to the problem of shaping the form of religion that is adaptable to the specific 
chapter in history that we call modern times.’38 Although the failure of Christianity often was 
discussed as a social problem (i.e. as a problem relating to an entire culture, rather than solely on an 
individual level), the message was the same. The irrational element in religion that was influenced by 
psychology, and detected in individual religiosity, was symptomatic of the relationship between 
national cultures and religious systems. All people’s communities (or, in the Nazi racist configuration 
of the idea: the Volksgemeinschaft) had particularities that deserved to be highlighted, rather than 
flattened out, as had been the case during the reign of Christian confessionalism. There was thus a 
sense of disjunction between the Christian doctrines and the idiosyncratic development of religiosity 
both individually and communally. 
 
With the idea that the true nature of religion was preconditioned by a wider or smaller gap between 
theological doctrines and its believers, the ideas of liberal theologians bear structural resemblance to 
the premises of ‘theological incorrectness’ in today’s cognitive studies on religion. One example of 
this link is Schjelderup’s piece ‘Religion and Religions’ from 1926 which differentiated between the 
inner religiosity and its external forms. The book advocated a more systematic approach to 
comparative religious studies, and Schjelderup clearly drew on Otto’s work as he sought the sacred 
core that was common to all religious systems. He further argued that since ‘form is in fact 
secondary’,39 one could fail to notice the fact that different forms (i.e. different exteriors of religious 
systems) actually could express the same thing. ‘Everything that people see as religion: dogmas, 
transmissions, moral preaches, ceremonies, the Church and the sacraments – it is nothing but the slag 
released when the fire starts to burn.’40 
 
Schjelderup would later on in the mid-1930s sketch a relationship of conflict between the authentic 
and primitive religion (Urreligion) and the forms of religion. The primitive religion understood in 
                                                          
37 Hans S. Jacobsen, ‘Bokkronikk: Kristian Schjelderup og hedendommen’, Ragnarok, 1:8 (October 1935), p. 238. On 
Schjelderup’s theological development in the 1920s, see Pål Repstad, Mannen som ville åpne kirken: Kristian 
Schjelderups Liv (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget Oslo, 1989), p. 243. 
38 C.J. Bleeker, ‘Nogen av de frie teologis grunnprinsipper’, Fritt Ord (1932), p. 218. 
39 Schjelderup, Religion og religioner, p. 15. 
40 Ibid., p. 33. 
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singular form was the core of all religious systems, while the forms of religion referred to plural form 
as the cultivation of the religious core – a core that looked different across all religions.41 This image 
of conflict was a development of the original distinction between religion and religions that he had 
drawn in 1926. Moreover, Schjelderup’s distinction made it clear that different from individual 
religiosity, theological doctrines were parts of the external forms of religion that varied across 
religions and were not components of a sacred inner religiosity. 
 
 
IV 
Grundtvig’s Living Religiosity 
 
The Dane Nikolaj Grundtvig stated in a poem from 1837 that one was ‘first human, then Christian’. 
Although at that point there was no field of ‘psychology of religion’, Grundtvig’s emphasis on inner 
religiosity was, like Schjelderup’s approach, a way to distinguish this form of experiential religiosity 
from external synthetic forms. But this distinction was made partly with the intention of illustrating 
the actual interaction between these two forms of religious life. The Danish theologian Hans R. 
Iversen has described Grundtvig’s collected work as ‘a life-long battle of separating and uniting’ 
without ever letting the factors act independently of the other.42 Grundtvig was in that sense a witness 
and a commentator of the eventful 19th century. Similar to Eliade’s later divide between the sacred 
and the profane, Grundtvig’s theological writings focused on the tension between the sacred 
individual religiosity and aspects of mundane reality – like the dogmas of religious systems. In one 
of Grundtvig’s early writings from 1810, this tension had already begun to dominate his religious 
philosophy: 
 
We sense a duality inside of us, something that drives us towards the visible and something that pulls us away 
from it, but to where we do not know – to declare what we call the invisible in us as the highest and let it conquer 
our drive towards the visible, is only possible if we are fully aware of our connection to that invisible.43 
 
                                                          
41 Kristian Schjelderup, På vei mot hedenskapet (Oslo: Aschehoug & co, 1935), p. 100. 
42 Hans Raun Iversen, Grundtvig, Folkekirke og Mission: Praktisk Teologiske Vekselvirkninger (Copenhagen: Forlaget 
Anis, 2008), p. 11. 
43 Cited in ibid., p. 23. 
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The battle and the simultaneous embrace of the duality identified in the earthly and the divine that 
Grundtvig expressed was a reflection of his own historicity; his religious philosophy and theological 
reflections took place in a century divided by the forces of rationalism and romanticism. Grundtvig 
personally experienced this divide as a theologian pursuing his career while surrounded by the 
rationalism of the Copenhagen bourgeois elite. In response to the rationalists, Grundtvig made clear 
that fundamental to it all was God’s creation of man, a truth that transgressed the boundaries of reason. 
At the same time, as Grundtvig stressed Christianity’s historicity, he also challenged the romanticists 
in their separation of body and spirit. Grundtvig described this balance by stating that ‘as much as we 
cannot grasp God’s interference in this world and in man’s place in history, it is simultaneously 
clearly present and visible for us’.44 Grundtvig’s specific thoughts on God’s incarnation can explain 
why the sentence is more than merely paradoxical: God created man and left man to act and believe 
the presence of God in this world, by becoming God’s physical expressions on earth.45 This idea of 
God’s incarnation in man also relates to Grundtvig’s view on contemporary Christian practices. 
Iversen’s study compellingly describes this relationship in that the foundational structure behind 
Grundtvig’s notion of ‘human first, then Christian’ is the idea that the capacity to believe, the action 
of believing, is a human capacity that constitutes Christianity as much as the Christian content or its 
doctrines.46 In the Danish context of the 1930s, these lines represented one of the pioneering 
reflections between the earthly and divine powers that both Andersen and Malling later took up in 
their defence of National Socialism. Grundtvig himself described the human impact on the unfolding 
of Christianity in the following way: 
 
For Christianity to be a living religion, its teachings have to be reflected in real life, in the people and their specific 
historical development. This mirroring relationship between Christianity and life is the only way to fully 
understand Christianity […] the Christian message stands and falls with us, and we can understand the message 
only out of something that is familiar to us, where Christianity can be reflected in the same way as God since the 
creation has mirrored himself in the human that is created in his image.47 
 
                                                          
44 Ibid., p. 20. 
45 Iversen’s argument is a response to Kaj Thanning’s unpublished thesis Mennesket først. Grundvig’s Opgør med sig 
selv (‘The human first. Grundtvig’s self-reflections’) from 1963. Thanning sees this interaction as an expression of 
Grundvig’s ‘confusion’. Iversen thus situates the ‘confusion’ as such as the guiding principle for Grundvig’s entire 
Christian philosophy. In Iversen, Grundtvig, p. 32. Thanning’s later publication had the title changed to For 
menneskelivets skyld: Grundtvigs opgør med sig selv (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1971). 
46 Iversen., Grundtvig, p. 39. 
47 Cited in ibid., p. 21, (original emphasis). 
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Grundtvig formulated a close relationship between the birth of true ‘Danishness’ and the growth of 
Christian belief.48 The quest for a ‘national consciousness’ on Christian grounds was brought to the 
fore in the midst of the political upheaval of 1848–49. Grundtvig responded to these events by stating 
that a detachment from the Christian horizon would undermine any sense of a united people, or to 
use his term, Folkelighed. In the 1930s, the Grundtvigian movement struggled to distance itself from 
the Nazi regime, since Folkelighed is linguistically difficult to separate from the German word 
Völkisch, and its connotations in the Nazi era.49 Grundtvig himself discussed the term Folkelighed in 
1838 as both a purely Danish phenomenon but that equally applied to other countries in their specific 
contexts of defining their true national characteristics. Ultimately, Folkelighed meant ‘in line with 
the people’, as Grundtvig formulated the term from two parts: first, Folk, meaning the people, or the 
Volk, and second, the Danish word lighed, which translates into the English ‘equality’.50 Paul Holt 
has further identified the Nazi connotations in Grundvig’s concept of Folkelighed and its emphasis 
on the Nordic spirit, sarcastically stating that ‘if Alfred Rosenberg had known Danish, he would 
probably have made space for these [Grundvigian] quotations in his Mythus des XX Jahrhunderts’.51 
 
By the 1930s, liberal theologians like Schjelderup thus saw potential in National Socialism to break 
this unholy pact between the correctness towards fabricated dogmas and Christian universalism that 
Grundtvig had previously identified. Just like the premises of Grundtvig’s Folkelighed concept, 
Schjelderup called for a new type of faith, one anchored within the people, grown from their heritage 
and soil. The remaining parts of this chapter will compare these theological arguments to Nazi 
writings from the same period. It will discuss a number of conjunctions between the writings of liberal 
theologians and those of the Nazi intellectuals chosen for this study. Firstly, we have seen so far that 
the liberal theological emphasis on the personal experience of religiosity implicitly gave way for a 
more inclusive attitude to what it was that counted as a religion. This widened horizon for how to 
view religion ultimately led to a rejection of constraining dogmas and attempts to concretise religion. 
Schjelderup did not consider the wider process of secularisation in Western Europe as well as the 
                                                          
48 On the political dimensions of Grundtvig’s writings, see especially Ove Korsgaard, N.F.S. – as a Political Thinker 
(Copenhagen: DJØF Publishing, 2014). 
49 Henrik S. Nissen, ‘Folkelighed og Frihed 1933: Grundtvigianernes reaktion på modernisering, krise og nazisme’, in 
Dansk Identitetshistorie Vol. 3 (Copenhagen: C.A. Reitzels Forlag, 1992), pp. 588–89. For example, the Grundtvigianist 
M.P. Ejerslev stated somewhat ambivalently that ‘Grundtvig’s Folkelighed cannot be sidelined with Alfred Rosenberg’s 
Mythus although one cannot deny their intellectual overlaps.’ In Dansk Folkefællesskab (11 April 1940), p. 2. 
50 Flemming Lundgreen-Nielsen, ‘Grundtvig og danskhed’, in Ole Feldbæk (ed.), Dansk 
identitetshistorie, bind 3, Folkets Danmark 1848–1940 (Copenhagen: C.A. Reitzels Forlag, 1992), p. 56. 
51 Holt, ‘Alfred Rosenberg og den tyske religion’, p. 589. 
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particular crisis of the Christian institutions within Nazi Germany as church-political crises. Instead, 
he preferred to see the relations between National Socialism and Christianity from a more ideological 
viewpoint as ‘a struggle between two incompatible spiritual movements’.52 Secondly, and echoing 
the propaganda of so-called pagan movements like Hauer’s DGB, Schjelderup argued that 
‘Christianity is a form of religion that is foreign to our character as a people’.53 Statements like that 
expressed National Socialist calls for an ethnicisation of religion, an adaption of religiosity to the 
particular national context. Echoing Grundtvig’s synthesis of the people’s community and a Christian 
revival, Schjelderup wrote in a 1936 edition of Fronten that: 
 
when it is argued that National Socialism rejects the Christian worldview and that the religion is squeezed into the 
principles of National Socialism one must disagree – it is precisely a sign of intolerance to argue that the teachings 
of Christianity only resonate with one’s own perception of Christianity and its humanitarian ideals. […] Nothing 
can resonate better with the ethical demands of Christ than the people’s community.54 
 
The struggle to narrow the distance that had grown between Christian theology and ordinary people 
was a factor that – albeit for a brief period – perhaps more clearly than any other united liberal 
theologians and Nazi intellectuals. Although these opinions stemmed from critical theological 
approaches to biblical anachronism, the space for racist interpretations of this critique of Christianity 
was wide. Despite the standard theological standpoint that Christianity and National Socialism were 
indeed two opposing worldviews, Schjelderup nevertheless viewed this supposed incompatibility 
with less rigidity than one might have expected. National Socialism, in his view, was not a cheap 
copy of Christian religion but appeared as an alternative worldview that indeed offered a broader 
view of religiosity. That said, the effort to avoid a concretisation of religion and the striving for an 
ethnicisation of religion were primarily visions of a new religion that depended on these Nazis’ 
attitudes to the notion of dogmas. These attitudes, in turn, stemmed from more in-depth analyses of 
the relationship between individual belief and official doctrines. 
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V 
The Nazi ‘Theological Incorrectness’ 
 
The Nazis’ designation of liberal theology as ‘theologically incorrect’ explains the ambivalence that 
many contemporary (liberal) theologians felt towards National Socialist politics in Germany. 
Ragnarok’s and their Danish colleagues’ shared opposition to Christian orthodoxy stood at the 
crossroads between liberal theology and the Nazi attack on Christianity. Independent of whether we 
examine liberal theologians in Nazi Germany or in the Scandinavian countries at the time, they all 
emphasised the need to move away from the assumed correctness vis-à-vis theological dogmas. 
 
The personal trajectory of the German theologian Herbert Grabert illustrates these links. The re-
publication of Grabert’s articles in Ragnarok as well as Schjelderup’s Fritt Ord further indicates the 
internal Norwegian connections between liberal theology and National Socialist thoughts on religion. 
Most importantly, however, Grabert was a theologian and a National Socialist who explicitly stressed 
the importance of transgressing the correctness of confessionalism. Grabert edited the liberal 
theological pamphlet Die christliche Welt between 1928 and 1933, but increasingly turned towards 
the Nazi regime as in January 1934 he became the editor of the paganist monthly Deutsche Glaube 
(‘German Faith’). He had already written in Fritt Ord in 1931 that the religious revival of German 
youth ‘had something protestant about itself. Not something confessional, but a firm spiritual 
direction that is over-confessional.’55 As might be expected, the radical development of his National 
Socialist career influenced his thoughts on the future of religion. By using the term ‘over-
confessionalism’, Grabert had pointed to how the German youth through their anti-confessionalism 
actually transgressed into the realm of a deeper and more authentic religious life. In that sense, the 
terms ‘over’ and ‘anti’ came to mean the same thing as Grabert made his point on the dogmatic 
constraints that confessional Christianity had put on the idea of religiosity: ‘The church has gone so 
far that it rejects the authentic and strong religious life as heresy. What is missing is the 
acknowledgement of the holy spirit beyond the borders of the church.’56 With the term ‘over-
                                                          
55 Herbert Grabert, ‘Viljen til religiøs fornyelse hos Tysklands ungdom’, Fritt Ord (1931), p. 266. Grabert also had 
articles published in Ragnarok; see Grabert, ‘Germansk-tysk verdenanskuelse i kamp’, Ragnarok, 1:6–7 (September 
1935), pp. 146–148. A decade later, membership of the NSDAP and a position at Alfred Rosenberg’s Reich Ministry 
for the Occupied Eastern Territories from 1941 added to Grabert’s professional trajectory. 
56 Grabert, ‘Viljen til religiøs fornyelse’, p. 267. 
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confessionalism’, Grabert thus identified ‘incorrectness’ towards theological dogmas as an essential 
aspect of National Socialist ideology. 
 
Habitual Christianity: Scandinavian writings on ‘theological incorrectness’ 
Grabert’s term ‘over-confessionalism’ had in these Scandinavian Nazi circles its antidote in the term 
‘habitual Christianity’. It implicitly referred to the inability to learn from the developments of the 
psychology of religion; firstly, that inner religiosity was entirely different from theological dogmas, 
and secondly, that the tension between the two meant a tension between the cultural heritage of a 
particular people and an externally imposed religious system, like Christianity. 
 
That said, it is important to stress once more that the term ‘habitual Christianity’ was not hostile to 
Christianity per se, but more so towards its dogmatic development. In fact, by using the exact term 
‘habitual Christianity’ (Vanekristendom), Anders Malling searched for a belief beyond both the Bible 
and the race idea, a belief which left the incompatibility between Christianity and National Socialism 
as nothing more than a dogmatic construct. The notion of ‘habitual Christianity’ is the aspect of 
Malling’s religiosity that bears most resemblance to the religious philosophy of his National Socialist 
contemporaries. It also challenged Malling’s own evangelical position as such, and thus contributed 
to the kind of ambivalence that we find in his collected work of the 1930s. Not very different from 
Grabert’s praise of the German youth’s ‘anti-confessionalism’, Malling’s unpublished piece ‘The 
Hardships of Believing’ (Trosvanskeligheder) insisted that religious belief could – and perhaps 
should – be drawn from other sources than Christian dogmas in order to break out of ‘habitual 
Christianity’.57 In some of his writings, the notion of ‘habitual Christianity’ goes under the second 
name ‘the religious mask’ where Christian people under the ‘mask’ are said to insist that ‘I feel no 
hardships in believing, I do not doubt any of the dogmas. I believe in everything’. For Malling, this 
lack of questioning was the greatest threat to ‘true’ Christianity.58 His article ‘Are we Christian? [Er 
vi kristne?]’ also touches on the argument that what constitutes Christianity is indefinable, describing 
how  
 
a man once expressed that National Socialism is an un-Christian movement […] but can these people separate 
what is Christian from what is not? […] So what is Christianity, and what does it mean to be Christian? […] You 
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would want to participate in the struggle for the freedom of you and your people with your entire heart. This is 
Christianity, but it is also National Socialism.59 
 
In a similar manner, Ejnar Vaaben put a strong emphasis on what he called ‘the farmers’ habitual 
Christianity which in reality is pagan in its origin and entire spiritual structure’.60 Vaaben’s 
Grundtvigian references are largely confined to his writings on the geopolitical relationship between 
Germany and Denmark. In fact, his writings on religion more generally were also limited, and this 
thesis primarily deals with Vaaben as an early theorist on Nazi transnational relations in chapter 5. 
That being said, Vaaben maintained that his National Socialist conviction was born from its ‘volkish 
moment’, which for him also meant ‘its Grundtvigianism’.61 This inspirational source can partly be 
explained by his admiration for Hans F.K. Günther and the ideas of a Nordic spirit, but in his writings 
about Günther we can also trace Vaaben’s personal attitudes to the religious issues that were so 
frequently debated in his circles. Vaaben praised Günther for his religious philosophy, stating in a 
review article about Günther’s ‘sociological and biological study’ of the German farmer that the 
chapters on religion were particularly exceptional.62 In his review of Günther’s piece, Vaaben made 
his point clear that common people found it difficult to understand that although the farmer indeed 
believed in God, he was not necessarily a Christian. Vaaben explained this difficulty by stressing that: 
 
They [the common people] are incapable of differentiating between God and Christ, faith and Christianity. It is 
also unknown to most people that religion and faith can be two very different things. Faith comes from within and 
has its roots in the holy mystery of the blood, while religion means the doctrines or dogmas that are brought to 
people from outside themselves and often contradict the values and character of their heritage.63 
 
This statement shares Doris Bergen’s argument that ‘theological incorrectness’ was an integral part 
of many individuals’ Christian identity; whether they were called ‘pagans’, ‘National Socialists’ or 
‘Christians’ was irrelevant. What mattered was that beyond these artificial categorisations, human 
religiosity primarily comprised contradictions and incorrectness. One article in the Norwegian 
Fronten from 1937 stated in a similar manner that 
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when one speaks of the Christian image of God one must remember that there are few ‘Christians’ who know it. 
When the Christianity bound with dogmas is presented to those who believe they are Christian, they see it as 
blasphemy. That is after all good news. It shows that most Christians have created their own image of God that 
often bears little resonance with the Christian image […] they call themselves Christians because they have yet to 
engage with its theology and from there realise that they are in fact ‘pagans’.64 
 
More so than the correctness of dogmas, these writings show that ‘theological incorrectness’ was 
regarded as an integral part of a religious system since it grew from the idiosyncratic experiences of 
everyday life. The everyday life, in turn, was a matter of cultural differences, subjugated for ages to 
the dogmas of Christian universalism. In other words, leaving ‘habitual Christianity’ behind meant, 
for these Nazi intellectuals, rejecting Christian universalism by embracing mainly the idea that 
religiosity was not equal with theological correctness. 
 
The Norwegian priest Einar Edwin put forward the perception that orthodox confessionalism implied 
an uncritical and essentially unthinking form of religiosity. He introduced the term ‘hangover-
orthodoxy’ in Fritt Ord, based on an argument similar to what had fostered the notion of ‘habitual 
Christianity’. Edwin explained ‘hangover-orthodoxy’ as something he had ‘picked up in art circles’ 
and that was ‘of course highly unscientific’, but still he found that the term resonated well with the 
wider spiritual crisis of Christianity. Edwinin argued that weak individuals in the time of crisis turned 
to the toxic conformity: just like the day after ‘when the radicalism of the alcohol is lost […] we are 
facing what psychologists call the regression’.65 This psychological state was one of apathy and 
signalled a form of habitual Christianity that Edwin found to be ‘the cheapest form of religion. And 
it is just as inauthentic as it is cheap.’66 
 
 
VI 
The Discourse on ‘Paganism’  
 
Whether to call it ‘habitual Christianity’ or ‘hangover-orthodoxy’, the point for these theological and 
Nazi writers alike was that since Christian orthodoxy was a detested term, it also implied a challenge 
                                                          
64 Unknown author, ‘Den Nordiske Gudserkjennelse’, Fronten, 4:9 (November 1935), p. 3. 
65 Einar Edwin, ‘Bakrusortodoksi’, Fritt Ord (1932), p. 214. 
66 Ibid., p. 216. 
 
 
 
138 
 
to its antithesis, paganism. More precisely, if it indeed was categorisation, dogmas and confinements 
that characterised Christian orthodoxy, was paganism really to be understood as simply atheism? Or 
was that conception merely a construct of Christian dominance? An article in Fronten confirmed the 
difficulty of defining the term paganism, and even more so of defining its relationship to religiosity: 
 
We pagans are not atheists […] our image of God is only dependent on our own spiritual development; therefore 
we are not putting any constraint on our own development. We are thus not attaching dogmas to the image of God 
we have reached so far. We continue searching. The search itself is the praise to God.67 
 
Although it remained frequently used, the question was whether the notion of paganism assumed a 
sense of dogmatism in its own right. Schjelderup paid close attention to the ‘pagan’ movements within 
Nazi Germany, which at the time meant Hauer’s DGB: ‘The question is whether instead of calling it 
a pagan movement we should rather speak of a “newly religious” one, of individuals searching for a 
type of religious feeling that Christianity was unable to provide them.’68 Hauer’s movement, as 
Schjelderup continued, had a particular resemblance to liberal theology which 
 
after all is an attempt to create harmony between religion and contemporary cultural life – only with the difference 
that the arguments that have been used by liberal theology in its conflict with the orthodox wing of Christianity 
are now used by the pagan movement in their struggle against Christianity as such.69 
 
This argument resembled that of the Danish theologian Johs Bech, whose articles and other activities 
on the intellectual scene were followed closely by Andersen’s NSAP. An interview located in 
Andersen’s organisational archive concerns Bech’s conversation with Rosenberg and DC in Germany 
1935. Bech concluded that ‘the new paganism is a distorting concept’ as he described that 
Rosenberg’s worldview conformed neither to Hauer’s ‘pagan’ Deutsche Glaubensbewegung nor to 
the ideas propagated by the Deutsche Christen.70 Bech’s relatively early treatment of this 
phenomenon is found in the piece ‘Cross and Hammer’ (Kors og Hammer) from 1921. In this 
publication, he argued that the volkish spirit was situated in an in-between position, which ultimately 
rejected conventional religious divides.71 The title’s connotations of Nordic mythology, with the 
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hammer belonging to the warrior god Odin, reveals Bech’s embrace of the Grundtvigian tradition. He 
further defined this tradition as believing in God instead of the Christian dogmas.72 The aim was not 
to break with Christianity, but to break out of Christianity, ‘to help the Christians go beyond 
Christianity […] beyond Christianity we have transgressed the realm of bound religions’.73 On the 
day when reconciliation takes place between Odin’s hammer and the Christian Cross, ‘only then has 
a new day dawned over the Nordic countries’.74 The Grundtvigian connotations continue, as Bech’s 
following passage vividly illustrates the ongoing process of interaction between the Christian 
teachings and the historicity of this world: 
 
All its dogmas are in their own right contradicting our time […] it [Christianity] has become nothing more than a 
hard shell that has to be broken in order to bear fruit. A new tree is then born, that gives more fruit, whose shells 
again have to be crushed in order for its core to survive. The struggle is eternal and the orthodox idea of completion 
and eternal perfection with its accompanying salience is not only unthinkable, but also unworthy of the human 
spirit […] It was not until the day I realised that I was a seeking human being, that I finally broke with the traditions 
of dogmatic belief and the Church as such.75 
 
Indeed, this analysis of Christianity and its relationship with Nazi volkish ideology was not confined 
to theologians but formed an integral part of Nazi propaganda. Arent Lemwigh-Müller, a co-editor 
of Andersen’s Kamptegnet and, as mentioned before, the future propaganda leader of 
Schalburgkorpset, was a frequent contributor of opinions on issues regarding Christianity and 
religion. The point was, according to Lemwigh-Müller, that people simply did not understand that 
‘Rosenberg does not only reject the Christian dogmas, but all dogmas. He is not seeking new dogmas, 
or a new institution.’76 Lemwigh-Müller saw this inability to understand Rosenberg’s undogmatic 
position as a symptom of the many centuries of Christian theological rule, where ‘the abstract notion 
of God’ had supressed the ‘living religiosity’of pagan faith.77 Considering the writings of Schjelderup 
and Bech, Lemwigh-Müller might indeed have underestimated the liberal theologians’ abilities to 
move beyond the orthodox mindset when he argued that people 
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did not see his [Alfred Rosenberg’s] words as expressions of a faith, but as already made formulas, and instead of 
interpreting them as suggestions, they saw his words as dogmatic preaches. But when one, as indeed is the case 
among theologians, has got used to speaking dogmatically about religious matters, it is certainly difficult to 
recognise true faith when you see it.78 
 
This statement presents the dogmas as weapons of a process where Christianity and National 
Socialism were falsified in their characterisation as incompatible. Efforts of defining and closing the 
boundaries of each of the two worldviews ultimately led to a false perception of what constituted true 
National Socialism and equally Christianity. In the manuscripts in the NSAP’s archive, the piece ‘The 
Christian and the Others’ (De kristne og de andre) is particularly interesting in relation to these 
discussions on authentic belief. The text begins with the observation that National Socialists are not 
Christian and goes on to question if National Socialism is in fact un-Christian. The verdict is ‘yes!’ 
where Jewish-Christian intellectualism would indeed reject the notion of National Socialism as 
Christian. But this rejection was, for its authors, nothing more than a sign that Christianity itself has 
degraded into academic phrases and stiff doctrines. Instead, as the text concludes, and contrasting the 
preachers of a Jewish ‘fake Christianity’, the ‘real’ Christian is National Socialist partly by virtue of 
its label as ‘un-Christian’.79 True to the principles of individual religiosity, it was an argument about 
how the identity of being an incorrect Christian was in some cases the clearest sign of an authentic 
Christian belief. 
 
Lemwigh-Müller did not see Rosenberg’s National Socialist worldview as one where ‘the purpose 
was to replace one ideology with another’, but instead to find the way back to what he called ‘the 
living middle ground […] a middle ground which ultimately defines the term “world-view”’.80 
Lemwigh-Müller thus implied that being preoccupied with whether the National Socialist ideology 
was Christian or not was to miss the point. That way of thinking was nothing but a mimesis of the 
old world where dogmatism had ruled. National Socialism had transgressed these old categorisations 
was not measurable according to levels of correctness. The only way to grasp National Socialism was 
to acknowledge its consistent incorrectness towards these dogmatic categorisations. According to that 
reasoning, being ‘theologically incorrect’ actually meant having a sense of religious authenticity. The 
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efforts of defining and closing the boundaries of each of these worldviews had ultimately led to a 
false perception of what constituted true National Socialism and equally Christianity. In a similar 
manner, the speech from Malling’s political party Dansk Folkefællesskab’s meeting in July 1936 had 
clarified the meaning of the term Folkefællesskab. It further confirmed Malling’s inspiration from 
Grundtvig: ‘The ideas of the Folkefællesskab shall embrace our people […] so that our fellow Danes 
understand that we provide the message of truth; that National Socialism is in fact the practice of 
Christianity.’81 Another example of this emphasis on a fusion of worldviews is located among the 
manuscripts in Andersen’s NSAP’s archive. 
 
We have seen so far that Nazi sympathisers employed the terms ‘habitual Christianity’ and ‘hangover-
orthodoxy’ to illustrate what they saw as an alarming conformity among practitioners of traditional 
religion. This conformity, in turn, had given much more than any other factor to the Christian 
demonisation of the term ‘paganism’. One author in Fronten provocatively raised the question: 
‘When you Christians formed a mass movement, the glory was transformed into shame’ […] ‘are you 
[Christians] afraid of being called “outcasts”? Are you afraid of being called “pagans”?’82 Being an 
‘outcast’ or being ‘theologically incorrect’ had, through Christian hegemony, turned into a curse. A 
Danish review of Schjelderup’s work on German paganism, found in Andersen’s organisational 
archive, further concluded that the result of the dogmatic Christian theology was ‘that the distance 
between Jesus and German Paganism is less than the distance between Jesus and church theology.’83 
True to Otto and other liberal theologians who stressed the primacy of the individual religious 
experience, this form of authentic religiosity thus transgressed the hegemony of universalism. 
 
 
VII 
Ethnicisation of Religion 
 
With the opposition to Christian universalism and its dogmas came the search for a type of religious 
system that encouraged rather than extinguished the particularities of the people and their cultural 
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heritage. The question of nationalism, however, would make matters more complicated, as it is 
positioned somewhat in-between individual religiosity and Christian universalism. As we shall see 
later in the thesis, the question of to what extent nationalism itself had become a new dogma became 
the crux for these Nazi intellectuals as they realised that, ironically, their original criticism of 
Christianity became the stencil for their growing opposition to the imperial politics of Nazi Germany. 
At this point, it is important first to stress that with the emphasis on race came also statements on the 
foreignness of Christianity in the Nordic context, and how Christian ‘orientalism’ and 
internationalism went hand in hand. In clarifying this ‘orientalism’, Sandborg’s article in Ragnarok 
from 1943 pointed to what he identified as Christianity’s oriental features, such as the practice of 
dictatorship.84 Sandborg further depicted a fundamental opposition between the flattening 
‘internationalisation’ of the Christian religion and the embrace of natural particularities within the 
race idea.85 
 
What mattered was that beyond these artificial categorisations, human religiosity was primarily 
comprised of contradictions and incorrectness. More so than the correctness of dogmas, ‘theological 
incorrectness’ was important to note as an integral part of a religious system since it grew from the 
idiosyncratic experiences of everyday life. An article in Fronten stated that ‘the goal of Christianity, 
through various confessional systems, is to gather people from all nationalities to unite in an 
international mission’.86 What National Socialism and the Germans had done was to challenge this 
foreign and imposed universalism by finding 
 
a new faith which allows them to be true to the best parts of themselves. […] The new movement of faith is not 
searching for outer-worldly religious guarantees as heaven, hell and salvation, it has not the old superstition and 
the hypocrisy associated with habitual Christianity. It is safely resting in itself because it knows that is where the 
religious source is located.87 
 
The present chapter uses the term ‘ethnicisation’ of religion to describe the process whereby the 
liberal theological rhetoric on the failure of Christianity was attached to the race idea and ultimately 
served to legitimise attempts by National Socialist proponents to ‘Germanise Christianity’. Although 
inspiration from DC and Hauer’s DGB should not be underestimated, Nazi interpretations of 
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Scandinavian liberal theologians like Grundtvig and Schjelderup underpinned their calls for a 
‘Germanised Christianity’ among the individuals of this study. Movements like Ragnarok and their 
colleagues in Fronten expressed these notions in terms of a ‘reality religion’ or ‘race-religion’. In the 
case of Andersen’s Kamptegnet, the fierce racial propaganda was no less visible. Indeed, Anders 
Malling’s writings were more ambivalent regarding the primacy of the race principle over traditional 
Christian dogmas. Despite its variations, however, the entire spectrum of calls for an ethnicisation of 
religion among Nazi intellectuals and liberal theologians alike brings us closer to an understanding 
of how exactly they envisioned the relationship between National Socialism and Christianity. On a 
deeper level, however, this relationship not only assumed an abstract reconciliation between two 
worldviews, but what it all came down to, more precisely, was the question of how to approach the 
new dogma of National Socialist race propaganda. 
 
Ragnarok, Schjelderup and the ‘reality religion’ 
The historian Terje Emberland has situated Ragnarok in the ‘political religion’ debate by arguing that 
more than merely political, Ragnarok sought the establishment of a ‘reality religion’ 
(Wirklichtskeitreligion).88 The movement added ‘reality and authenticity’ to what Ragnarok 
perceived as old materialistic structures of traditional religion by seeking a synthesis between racial 
science and völkisch religion.89 Emberland’s concept is drawn from the terms explicitly used in 
Ragnarok publications in the 1940s, where the ideas of a ‘real-political race-religion’ or ‘real-
religious race-politics’ were used to explain ‘Nordic thought as a new religion’.90 In fact, the concept 
‘reality religion’ had already been introduced by Schjelderup in a lecture in 1935. At that point, he 
employed the term ‘reality religion’ as the type of religiosity of movements such as the DGB. Just as 
Schjelderup had admitted, this ethnicisation of religion was the kind of reasoning that welcomed the 
Nazi racist rhetoric of ‘Blut und Boden’. Schjelderup published an article by Wilhelm Hauer in Fritt 
Ord in 1935, where Hauer described the main principles of the Germanic religion that was propagated 
by the DGB: ‘The 19th century liberal theology is first and foremost nothing but an attempt to 
Germanise Christianity.’91 One could no longer rely on old theology but needed to find new platforms 
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that were more suitable to the Germanic people. By describing Christianity as the ‘foreign guest’ that 
had given way to a millennial religious conflict in the pre-Asian Semitic and indo-German worlds, 
Hauer wrote that ‘the Nordic world has been rediscovered’ as precisely an inner-worldly and more 
authentic faith.92 In an article in Ragnarok the same year 1935, Hauer clarified that the label ‘German’ 
in the DGB must not be taken literally as a rejection of indo-Germanic people outside of the German 
national borders, but should be seen as a ‘Nordic Germanic’ movement.93 Schjelderup defined the 
reality religion as different from Christianity’s focus on the transcendent. But it was entirely in line 
with Voegelin’s definition of ‘political religion’ as a practice of inner-worldly religiosity that sought 
to narrow the gap between peoples’ cultural realities and their religious belonging. Schjelderup 
further mentioned the term ‘reality religion’ in his piece ‘Towards Paganism’ (På vei mot 
hedenskapet) written in the same year, where he argued that ‘religion must not function as an escape 
from reality – neither theoretically nor practically. We need a reality religion, a religion that 
empirically resonates with our entire human self.’94 Unlike the Christian religion that in Schjelderup’s 
view ‘never managed to capture the German people’, the Germanisation of the religious life of the 
people ‘did not need to conflict with inner religiosity’.95 
 
Most writings on the topic of religion in Ragnarok in the pre-war years shared the argument that 
National Socialism represented a reformation of Christianity, which spoke to the authentic Norwegian 
heritage. Otto Sverdrup Engelschiøn, who was for a short while in 1940 the main editor of 
Ragnarok,96 stated in 1938 that ‘all national and social people-movements are contrary to 
Christianity’.97 One article in Ny Dag edited by Ola Furuseth would state that ‘for us, it seems that 
Hitler is fulfilling and continuing the major work that was initiated by the “farmerfuehrer” Münzer 
and the reformer Luther, 400 years ago. It is the completion of the struggle against the Catholic-
Jewish burden.’98 This ‘burden’ referred to the Christian dominance that for centuries had buried 
Nordic faith under its hegemonic rule. But as Stein Barth-Heyerdahl stressed, ‘even in the darkest 
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hours of Christianity, the flame of the Nordic spirit was still burning’.99 Like several other 
contributors to Ragnarok, Barth-Heyerdahl thus argued that despite the Christian universalist 
attempts to eradicate the old Nordic religion and impose its foreign system on the Nordic people, the 
Nordic faith had never ceased to exist. These arguments on the Nordic heritage, in turn, were often 
justified by references to the primacy of race drawn from race science. This statement, for example, 
was published in 1940: 
 
The concept of God is a product of volkish or racial fantasies, and this goes for all religions. The laws of the 
religious movements are shaped by the mentality of race. It is rare to hear about a Volk that replaced their old 
religion with a new one without there being obvious external reasons for it. More common, however, and especially 
during religious wars and wars of conquest, was that a people was forcibly subordinated to a foreign religion.100 
 
In a later article in Ragnarok from 1943, Tor Strand, who wrote frequently on these issues, would 
describe this relationship as ‘the clash between Norwegian religion and Christianity’,101 where 
Christianity nevertheless managed to take a specifically Nordic form and deviate from its pure 
programme in order to resonate with the Nordic people. In 1932, Fronten had already published an 
article that sought to make a distinct separation between the Nordic thought and confessional religious 
systems like Christianity: ‘against the pan-European inauthentic collectivism the Nordic people shall 
raise their banner of freedom and individualism’.102 That sensitivity towards Nordic particularities 
was thus the starting point for what Strand called the making of ‘Christianity in its Germanised 
form’.103 
 
Interactions: From Grundtvig’s ‘Folkelighed’ to the Nazi Volksgemeinschaft 
This interaction between the human inner religiosity and the divine beyond the single individual that 
Schjelderup had called for dominated Danish Nazi intellectuals’ writings on religion. Among Danish 
National Socialist voices, however, the interactive point held a more literal meaning than in the case 
of Ragnarok. There was indeed a shared emphasis across the Danish and Norwegian organisations 
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on the need to synthesise Christianity and National Socialism, but where Ragnarok proposed a 
‘Germanisation’, individuals like Malling, Andersen and Skeby stressed a more direct cooperation 
between the existing forms of Christianity and National Socialist politics. Andersen’s NSAP election 
speech from 1935 not only touched upon the divine and inner-worldly interaction, but it also 
illustrated the adoption of Grundtvig’s Folkelighed into racist National Socialist rhetoric: 
 
If one would summarise the question [‘What is National Socialism?’] in as few words as possible, the answer 
would be that National Socialism is the spirit of national unity in love for the people and its land […] the National 
Socialist world-view is also founded upon the principle of race, in our case the Nordic blood […] is the heritage 
that conditions not only our bodies but also our souls.104 
 
The interaction appears even more violently in Andersen’s anti-Semitic text ‘The Jewish Question’. 
The term ‘Nordic-Aryan Christianity’ was presented in opposition to Jewish religion, and with a clear 
millennial message: 
 
It is not only through National Socialism that antisemitism rose as a true source of power, as an idea – an idealistic 
and determined striving for the preservation of the race, a positive factor in the eternal struggle between light and 
darkness, between good and evil […] the struggle between idealism and materialism […] Christ will appear as the 
God of the struggle. Our God who separates the evil from the good and who uncompromisingly sides with the 
good.105 
 
The struggle between light and darkness that so often figured in race propaganda suggested that the 
Christian religion had spread darkness over the Nordic landscape for centuries, as the light of the old 
Nordic religion had faded. A lecture from May 1938 by Sofus Nervil, a frequent contributor to NSAP 
propaganda, was titled ‘Naivety and Race’ (Naivitet og Race). Nervil defined ‘naivety’ through its 
relation to ‘purity’ and more specifically racial purity. Like Schjelderup’s point on the primitive 
Urreligion, Nervil stressed that the intimate relationship between purity and authenticity was 
determined by the race principle. In this reasoning, naivety and purity not only characterised the 
‘Nordic’, but it also represented the depth and truth ‘which separated Christianity from Jewishness, 
Jesus from Jehovah, darkness from light’.106 The interaction between National Socialism and 
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Christianity was a necessity, and Nervil praised the thoughts of Luther and Grundtvig in being the 
founding fathers of the kind of theology which sought a pure and naive Christianity.107 In other words, 
the Nordic and racist rhetoric was given a label of being pure and authentic, in contrast to the 
flattening Christian universalism. 
 
Just as the race principle was indeed more contested in Jørgen Skeby’s and Anders Malling’s works, 
their pieces also offered a far more complex and interesting level of discussion on these matters 
compared to the more stereotypical tone in Andersen’s and Nervil’s works, which were difficult to 
separate from standard Nazi propaganda material. Contrary to the critique that was raised within more 
conservative Christian milieus, neither Malling nor Skeby regarded National Socialism as a ‘political 
religion’ if the meaning of the term implied that it functioned as a secular substitute for traditional 
religion. Instead, National Socialism expressed the natural unfolding of true Christianity in its 
historical context. The position of race was, however, more or less explicit in these authors’ works. 
 
The combination that Andersen had envisioned with Malling and Skeby as co-editors of Kamptegnet 
was hardly an incompatible alliance. It was, however, not necessarily a conventional one considering 
the very different approaches taken by Malling and Skeby. Indeed, both Andersen and Malling had 
praised Skeby’s publication from 1934, ‘The Christian Cross and the Swastika’ (Kristenkors og 
Hagekors). Skeby’s piece was one of the more radical Danish National Socialist arguments for a holy 
alliance between Christianity and Nazism, especially compared to Malling’s more moderate 
standpoint.108 Skeby’s writings were, in contrast to Malling’s evangelicalism, infused with an 
aggressive liberal critique of Christian dogmatism that resonates more clearly with the kind of 
material we find in Ragnarok and Fronten. Belief after 1914, Skeby argued, had now moved beyond 
the confines of priestly preaching and academic lectures; it was born out of ‘the bitter and bloody 
reality of life – in the unforgiving frontier of blood and steel that forced the participation of all men 
as the new ground laid for the unification of the people.’109 While he did not use the explicit term 
‘reality religion’, Skeby’s Jüngerian references to the trench experience tell a story of a new kind of 
belief, rooted in reality and consolidated through the Volksgemeinschaft. 
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Skeby objected to functionalist notions of a substitute religion in his argument that National Socialism 
stood not in opposition to Christianity, but at its best, as Christianity’s most fruitful ally. He wrote in 
Kristenkors og Hagekors that  
 
the idea of “Christ is our Fuehrer” does not imply a critique of Adolf Hitler’s extraordinary achievement, but a 
consolidation of the idea that National Socialism is in the eyes of the Christians not a world-view but a means 
towards the liberation of the people through racial cleansing.110  
 
In other words, National Socialism was in its ideal form an un-definable phenomenon in relation to 
Christianity, and thus not a worldview functionally comparable to it. It becomes clearer in the 
following passage: ‘there is the possibility that a continuous support for the Christian faith will stand 
as the spiritual companion to the rise of National Socialism, and therefore the ultimate world-view of 
the Third Reich’.111 The rise of National Socialism in turn depended on Christian faith. Skeby further 
illustrated this gradually intertwined relationship by arguing that ‘only through Christian faith […] 
will the evils of the materialistic age be buried’.112 In this vein, Skeby refers directly to Malling as he 
also points to how Christianity not only paves the way for National Socialist ideals, but also how ‘the 
swastika paves the way for the Christian Cross’ in that ‘behind the external struggle for national and 
social revival, burns the living Christian faith’.113 Contrary to the functional resemblance between 
Christian doctrines and race dogmas, which only points to the ‘false Christianity’, Skeby’s description 
of the connection between true Christianity and National Socialism indicates that it took place on a 
more phenomenological level where dogma had lost its value as a measurement of true belief. 
 
Skeby was not alone in rejecting neat and tidy categorisations of religiosity. Malling also emphasised 
that DGB confessional Christians as well as Deutsche Christen all reflected divergent religious 
directions, which nevertheless remained ultimately connected through their shared identities of being 
National Socialists.114 The interaction between National Socialism and Christianity culminated at the 
point where these so-called separate worldviews became indistinguishable from each other. In 
rejecting conventional religious boundaries, National Socialism thus nurtured an unprecedented 
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Christian union of perceived incompatibilities. In ‘The demands of our time’, Malling continued in 
this vein, arguing that 
 
National Socialism is the complete opposite of Communism, also religiously speaking. I choose to see National 
Socialism as more than a political party […] they see in Christianity the best way to strengthen the morale of the 
people.115 
 
Compared to Skeby and Ragnarok, Malling’s moderate image is to an extent a product of the 
radicalism that contemporary scholars have attributed to his Nazi contemporaries. Wilfred Petersen 
and Malling had come to a stalemate in the mid-1930s. Petersen had terminated any prospects of 
political cooperation with Malling’s party Dansk Folkefællesskab since Petersen saw a fundamental 
incompatibility between the National Socialist beliefs in race science and Malling’s Christianity. 
Despite Malling’s early efforts to initiate dialogue, Petersen stated in a personal letter to Malling in 
1936 that he saw it necessary to distance himself from any religious and ‘anti-Nordic’ communities 
in order to make his anti-Semitic attack as ‘forceful as possible’.116 But Malling’s mobility across 
organisational boundaries, which his contact with Andersen clearly indicates, also blurred the 
dichotomy-like borders between race and religion. He certainly did maintain that dogmas should not 
take authority over individual belief, and the fact that the majority of the Danish population had little 
or no knowledge of the dogmas as such also pointed to unfamiliarity with the Christian tradition as a 
whole.117 In practice, therefore, National Socialism ‘paved the way’ for Christianity, not by 
counteracting the Christian teaching through race science, but by incorporating state resources in the 
efforts of raising the knowledge of religious dogmas to an unprecedented level.118 
 
Despite the partial rejection of the race idea, however, the passage also demonstrates that it was not 
total. In the same publication, Malling nuanced his approach by making it clear that ‘Danish National 
Socialists also acknowledge the necessity of racial purity and active race hygiene […] Race is the 
material foundation for the people’s spirit.’119 A letter from 1938 confirms Malling’s 
acknowledgement of the race idea, albeit on what he would have stated as purely biological grounds, 
stating that ‘we only seek pure race […] the pure personality necessary to lead an entire Nordic 
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National Socialism’.120 The letter was part of a correspondence between Malling and the ad hoc 
organisation Nordisk Front, which comprised individuals within Andersen’s circle in the NSAP. The 
elusive attitudes to the race principle had deeper roots than mere opportunistic alliance building. It 
comes through in a letter of more private character to the Dansk Folkefællesskab colleague, the 
Grundtvigian Mikkel Ejerslev,121 where Malling wrote that ‘there is something more than just the 
cultural, but what? It seems to me that it is something to do with race.’122 In citing Grundtvig’s call 
for the necessary reconciliation between ‘high Odin and white Christ’,123 Malling’s envisioned 
synthesis of Christianity and National Socialism followed the pattern of his Nazi colleagues. Despite 
their divergent standpoints on religious issues, radical Ragnarok writers as well as ‘moderate’ voices 
like Malling all incorporated Nordic racist rhetoric in their envisioned fusion of Christianity and 
National Socialism. 
 
 
VIII 
Critique of Nazi Germany 
 
Whether one expressed the ethnicisation of religion in terms of an envisioned fusion or as a dogmatic 
substitution of Christian teachings with the race principle, these visions eventually had to face 
geopolitical realities. When the political situation in Norway and Denmark changed dramatically in 
April 1940, the question of national chauvinism turned its direction towards the so-called German 
imperialism. The Scandinavians presented in this study attacked the Nazi regime for its homogenising 
ambitions – just as Christian universalism had been throughout the previous decade. Like the message 
of ‘theological incorrectness’, these writers objected to the flattening impulse of the Nazi regime and 
the use of dogmas to mesmerise a population into obedience and uncritical thinking. Before 1940, 
however, these more nuanced lines of thinking regarding the paradoxes of National Socialist anti-
                                                          
120 Letter from Malling to Nordisk Front, dated 10 May 1938, Rigsarkivet nr. 07187, box 15 ‘1938-39: Breve Politisk 
liv’. 
121 Mikkel Ejerslev, a DNSAP member and later follower to Malling’s Dansk Folkefællesskab, held a position as a 
teacher in the Grundtvigian educational Højskole system. Due to Ejerslev’s National Socialist activities, an article in the 
internal pamphlet Højskolebladet from November 1934 declared that Ejerslev had been removed from his position. See 
Nissen, ‘Folkelighed og Frihed 1933’, pp. 647 and 667. 
122 Letter from Malling to Ejerslev, dated 3 January 1939, Rigsarkivet nr. 07187, box 15, ‘1938-39: Breve Politisk liv’. 
123 Ibid. 
 
 
 
151 
 
Christian rhetoric remained peripheral, and the critique of the constructing process of a worldview 
was mostly confined to Christianity. 
 
It is, however, possible to trace early tendencies where the ideals of a ‘theological incorrectness’ that 
had infused writings on religion were moving towards the realm of politics and the actions of the 
Nazi regime. Emberland refers to George Mosse’s point that Hitler’s policies ‘concretised and 
objectivized an ideology that originally had been too vague to fit a mass movement’.124 This journey 
from a phenomenological enthusiasm with the promises of National Socialism to disillusionment with 
its functionalist system is visible when taking a closer look at the development of Schjelderup’s 
writings on the topic. His critique of National Socialism was obviously more outspoken by 1945, and 
he justified his early support apologetically. He pointed to the difference between the Nazis’ idealism 
and the consequences of the politics of the Third Reich, the death camps, the terror and the 
genocide.125 Despite the fall of the Nazi regime, he stressed that National Socialism would remain a 
factor in contemporary society unless a revival of Christianity took place: ‘if National Socialism is to 
be fought from within, we need a stronger faith’.126 Schjelderup certainly did not avoid a 
condemnation of the Nazi crimes and the consequences of the National Socialist idealism. But those 
who were familiar with his earlier writings would find a striking continuity in his call for Christian 
reforms. For a moment, Schjelderup had thought that the ‘theological incorrectness’ of liberal 
theology had been reflected in the National Socialist faith. In 1945, it was clear for him that the Nazi 
faith and traditional Christianity had both failed to meet the needs of their people. Similarly to 
Heidegger’s thoughts on how in 1945 it was clear that Nazism lacked the ‘inner greatness’ it had 
appeared to possess back in the early 1930s, Schjelderup added Nazism to his list of inauthentic 
religious systems. 
 
One could certainly argue that it was easy for Schjelderup to say then. By 1945, the Nazi regime had 
broken down and National Socialist ideology was forever to be condemned. But Schjelderup’s 
opinions on Nazi Germany did not take a drastic turn by the mid-1940s in parallel with the failure of 
the German war effort. Rather, a growing sense of disillusionment with Hauer’s ‘new religion’ and 
with the entire National Socialist politics was visible in Schjelderup’s writings as early as the mid-
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1930s. The decline of the German Christians (Deutsche Christen) had paved the way for Hauer’s 
movement, but as the Nazi regime was increasingly consolidated, the lofty ideas propagated by Alfred 
Rosenberg of a Nordic religion had to give way to Hitler’s realpolitik. In 1936, Hauer had resigned 
as leader of the DGB. By then, Schjelderup had already lost his faith in this ‘religious movement, 
albeit religious in a primitive form’, as he had earlier characterised the DGB.127 Hauer’s movement 
was thus no longer the kind of authentic religion for which Schjelderup once had at least partially 
expressed his admiration. 
 
Between content and form: Ragnarok opposition on the concretisation of religion 
With the title ‘Religion and Politics’, Christian Benneche’s article in Ragnarok stressed the need to 
‘avoid dangerous overlaps between national and religious movements’.128 Schjelderup was not alone 
in seeing the rise of National Socialism as a potential dawn of a dangerous pseudo-religiosity based 
on nationalist chauvinism. When Schjelderup accused Hauer of constructing a religion, what he 
essentially did was to criticise Hauer for giving primacy to the process of forming and externalising 
the religion rather than being shaped by the spontaneity of people’s inner religiosity. The 
phenomenologist impulse was thus replaced by a calculating functionalist mind. The type of critique 
directed against both Christian internationalism and universalism turned against these National 
Socialist movements to make themselves question their own dogmas of ethnic exclusion and racial 
supremacy. Benneche’s warning of the making of a Führer-cult and his critique of Nazi propaganda’s 
indoctrinating power was an example of this ambivalence. 
 
For the Ragnarok activist Tor Strand, it was precisely the kind of ‘materialist direction within 
Nazism’129 and its dictatorial features that movements such as Ragnarok fought against. This 
materialist direction, moreover, was not confined to a critique of Christianity, but was increasingly 
applied to the ‘enlightened absolutism’ (aufgeklärten Absolutismus) and the ‘orthodoxy’ of both 
Quisling’s and Hitler’s leadership cults.130 But it was another Norwegian whose writings on religion 
came to signify the religious profile of the Ragnarok pamphlet. With several extensive articles 
published during the mid-1930s, the lawyer Albert Wiesener stressed that despite the greatness of the 
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Third Reich, no state could replace religion and God. Yet, the argument against a construction or 
concretisation of religion took a different turn from the standard theological version: for Wiesener, it 
was important not to concretise God, and by not doing so, he implied that it was possible to avoid 
defining God as such.131 He further pointed to the issue of definition as the crux of all religions, where 
the process of concretisation transports the religions ‘into a world of seminarism [being centred on 
the seminary] and propaganda’.132 Wiesener gave the example of Nazi Germany in his argument that 
the personality cult around Hitler and Quisling had constrained the movement and therefore 
compromised its spiritual depth: ‘that Hitler and Germany is one and the same is only propaganda 
and nothing else’.133 At the same time, the opposition to concretisation could also be interpreted from 
the opposite angle, as an argument for the fact that National Socialism could count as a religion as 
much as any other traditional religious system. Although Wiesener had concluded with reference to 
Nazi propaganda and the Hitler cult mentioned above, the tone of the article also revealed an author 
torn between two positions. On the one hand, it reflected the idealism of the kind of ‘theological 
incorrectness’ that opened up an acknowledgement of the Nazi movement as a modern form of 
religiosity, and on the other hand, it highlighted the evidence for how the Nazi regime had corrupted 
the original religious sentiments that had given rise to the NSDAP movement. 
 
The ambivalent attitudes to Christianity were in many ways reflected in the Ragnarok opinions of 
Nazi Germany. Certainly, liberal theology assumed a certain religious freedom that in principle would 
accommodate this new Germanic religion. Yet, Wiesener had indeed – and similarly to Schjelderup 
– raised a word of warning about the risk that the Nazi religion would fall into the same dogmatic 
trap as Christianity had done. Despite their general support for Rosenberg’s volkish line in Nazi 
Germany,134 the publications in Ragnarok continued to express opinions that challenged the volkish 
hegemony. Wiesener’s piece was a response to the article by a Norwegian priest who pointed to the 
dangers of ‘the promises of Rosenberg’s paganism’ and who argued that that contrary to ‘Rosenberg’s 
seminarism’, Christianity could not be replaced with anything deeper.135 
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The work of Christian Benneche was another example of Ragnarok voices on religion where an 
implicit criticism was directed against Nazi Germany. In a text published after his early death in 1936, 
Benneche had made it clear that the authenticity of the Nordic idea was entirely dependent on one not 
defining or dogmatising it: 
 
As soon as it [religion] becomes conscious, humans try to construct religion. Religion, however, is not human-
made but grows from our heritage and develops along with society […] Religious feelings are products of the 
unconscious, and the articulated religion is just a symbolism of these emotions and feelings […] The importance 
of religion is not in its shaping power but how it is shaped.136 
 
With this statement, Benneche not only summed up the main points of Schjelderup’s fascination for 
Nazi paganism and its resonance with liberal theology, but he also pointed to the dangers and its 
pitfalls. In accordance with Wiesener, Benneche emphasised the dangerous impulse for humans to 
construct a religion, while the truth was that, arguing in a manner clearly inspired by Otto and by 
extension Schjelderup, religiosity could not be concretised. Ragnarok had dedicated one of its 
publications to Benneche as a special edition in his memory. The edition included previously 
unpublished papers chosen personally by Ragnarok members. Considering that contributors like Per 
Imerslund and Barth-Heyerdahl, who have been labelled in current historiography as Ragnarok’s 
main ideologues with strong idealist profiles,137 praised Benneche’s work, Benneche must also be 
seen as representative of Ragnarok’s collective attitudes to religious issues. Imerslund described 
Benneche as ‘a nationalist intellectual of the best kind’,138 where he referred to the dilemma that many 
Ragnarok members had faced as part of a National Socialist intellectual circle while at the same time 
basing their ideological outlook on a collective rejection of the establishment and its intellectualism. 
But precisely the intellectualisation and effectively the construction of religion was one of 
Benneche’s main targets when it came to identifying the problems with Christianity. Having these 
opinions in mind, Wiesener’s critique of the constructive impulses in Nazi propaganda should not be 
viewed in isolation from the Ragnarok writings on religion. 
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Danish writers on the failure of the ‘race prophets’ 
The critique of a construction of religion that we find in Ragnarok implied an opposition to the 
making of dogmas. Andersen’s writings from this period touched on the argument that the 
dogmatisation of the race idea mirrored the critique the Nazis themselves raised against Christian 
evangelicalism: 
 
National Socialism has by virtue of being a political movement stated clearly that ‘our Reich is from this world’, 
not in a self-righteous Judeo-Christian sense, but as a humble acknowledgement of the blasphemy it would entail 
if a worldly movement would attempt to conquer God’s Reich.139 
 
The piece ‘National Socialism and the Church’ (Nationalsocialismen og Kirken, 1935) defines the 
‘un-Christian’ as the sacralisation of the race principle that threatened the teachings of Christianity 
on a functional level. That is, when Malling argued that the race principle is presented as ‘something 
mystically religious’ he also implied that the ‘un-Christian’ feature of the Nazi paganism was the 
functional replacement of Christian dogmas with that of race dogmas. In that sense, Malling therefore 
made an implicit structural comparison between the two worldviews by referring to a replacement of 
dogmas. A concluding passage clarifies the point that ‘we do not view the race theory religiously, but 
biologically. We have no mysticism in our movement, no myths, no Alfred Rosenberg, no Professor 
Hauer.’140 
 
Jørgen Skeby’s writings are particularly interesting in this respect as he elaborated further on the 
functional similarities between the racist and the Christian dogmas and the problematic phenomenon 
of dogmatism as such. Skeby described what he called the pagan ‘prophets of the “race-religion”’.141 
Just like Schjelderup’s initial fascination with the authentic impulses of the National Socialist spiritual 
search, Skeby similarly described his disillusionment as he also realised how ‘the primitivism in 
National Socialism that in so many areas expressed itself through instinctive searching into the depth 
of the people’s spiritual sources of power, seems to […] have failed catastrophically’.142 Skeby further 
defined the attempt to make the race idea the basis of the worldview that is evident ‘among certain 
                                                          
139 Andersen, ‘Verdensanskuelse: Race-anti-Race’, (1934), p. 7. Rigsarkivet, nr. 10192, box 49: ’1932-1944: Diverse 
Materiale’. 
140 Anders Malling, Nationalsocialismen og Kirken, pp. 7 and 14. 
141 Skeby, Kristenkors og Hagekors, p.13. 
142 Ibid., p. 13. 
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German thinkers and fuehrer’ as a ‘conscious race-belief’.143 Like the criticism of concretisation, the 
notion of consciousness was in this context not a compliment but a sign that the race-belief was a 
constructed system more than the kind of primitive instinct it was supposed to be. Skeby consequently 
argued that because of this construction of race-belief, the bipolar positioning of National Socialism 
and Christianity was ultimately the work of race-theoretical dogmatism. Significantly, he made it 
clear that ‘this bipolarity has no anchoring in reality, because in reality the world-views of most 
National Socialists are peculiar examples of a co-mingling of these two extremes, “the race-faith” 
and “the Christian faith”’.144 Schjelderup was therefore not alone in identifying a hidden nationalist 
chauvinism in the new ‘reality religion’: Skeby went so far as to argue that in fact, the ‘race-belief’ 
had taken the shape of a new form of ‘Jewishness’. He defined the race-belief as 
 
the belief in the chosen German people – [and] of them being greatest and strongest representatives of the Nordic 
master-race’s blood are statements to be found not only in the philosophies of front soldiers, but especially in the 
outrageous dogmas of the race-theoreticians.145 
 
 
IX 
Chapter Conclusion 
 
The argument that both politics and religion were terms that had taken on a new meaning and were 
no longer part of the ‘old world’ dominated the writings of the individuals discussed in this study. A 
political religion theorist today would therefore struggle to decide whether to interpret this semantic 
revolutionism as a defence of the term ‘political religion’ or a rejection of it. Indeed, on the one hand, 
the calls for synthesis seemed to imply the merging of politics [National Socialism] and religion 
[Christianity] into a ‘political religion’. The rejection of any attempt to construct a religion, on the 
other hand, also questions whether a ‘political religion’ was a welcome concept in these circles after 
all. As we have seen, the heavy critique of the functionalist tendencies of the Christian religious 
system that has been identified as a common factor in the writings of both liberal theologians and 
Nazi intellectuals indicates that the making of a Nazi ‘political religion’ was a process that too much 
resembled the evils of old Christian confessionalism. The term ‘political religion’ resonates more 
                                                          
143 Ibid., p. 14 (my emphasis). 
144 Ibid., p. 16. 
145 Ibid. 
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with these individuals’ writings on the ideal type of religion if the concept reads less in a functional 
and more in a phenomenologist sense. This chapter has drawn clear links between liberal theology, 
these radical Nazi circles and those attitudes to religion that informed the development of the 
phenomenological school of ‘political religion’ theory. These links have gone under the umbrella 
term ‘theological incorrectness’. The ‘theological incorrectness’ present among the individuals 
discussed in this study points to a way ahead for a re-theorisation of the phenomenologist school to 
include the heterodox dimensions of Nazi ideology. 
 
Although the works of Malling and the contributors to Kamptegnet and Ragnarok would thus 
frequently stress the danger of mixing religion and politics, their judgement of Christianity was 
infused by political commentaries; if its policies were to be translated politically, Christianity 
represented the intolerant dictatorship. Equally so, it worked the other way around in that Ragnarok’s 
attitudes to the political systems could not entirely be understood without taking into account their 
thoughts on religion. This present chapter has primarily established the premises behind the idea of 
‘theological incorrectness’ that informed these Nazi writers in their attitudes to religion. The 
following chapter will examine how ‘theological incorrectness’ was adopted in political 
commentaries on the geopolitical actions taken by Nazi Germany. ‘Theological incorrectness’ and 
the critique of Christianity thus informed ‘ideological incorrectness’ as both an ideal and political 
practice that developed among these Scandinavian Nazis as they faced Nazi occupation
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Chapter 5: ‘Both Frontier and Bridge’ 
  
Ideological Incorrectness and the Transnational Logic 
 
 
Introduction 
 
‘Among those “dogmatic fanatics” I have seen a wider horizon’, reads the conclusion of an article by 
a Norwegian National Socialist from 1943. The original Norwegian article had been re-published in 
the Danish Nazi pamphlet Akademisk Aktion. The pamphlet comprised of young and radical Danes 
who shared the Norwegian’s support for National Socialism.1 This rhetoric on the inclusiveness and 
broadness of National Socialism was, however, not the same as seeking the establishment of an 
international movement. The ‘wide horizon’, stretching from the political order of the Third Reich 
over the divergent national visions within the occupied Nordic countries, was indeed a political reality 
beyond ideological abstractions. Some even argued that National Socialism was nothing less than a 
‘pan-European ideology’.2 But among Danish and Norwegian pan-Germanists in the 1930s, the 
separation of ‘Danishness’ or ‘Norwegianness’ on the one hand from ‘Germanness’ on the other was 
seen as essential to successful implementation of National Socialism on Scandinavian soil. If one 
were to single out one issue that encompassed the wider nature of the Scandinavian National Socialist 
discourse until 1945, with its diverse movements, political conflicts and ideological controversies, it 
would be the continuous debates regarding nation-specific ‘ownership’ of National Socialism. 
 
This debate on ownership was essentially a discussion about establishing the premises for a 
transnational National Socialist ideology. In other words, to what extent could one speak of a generic 
form of National Socialism? And how did this generic form accommodate not only national 
divergences in terms of ideology, but also questions of national security in the midst of Nazi 
expansionism? These questions occupied groups and individuals who represented various and highly 
                                                          
1 ‘Nazismen dreper det frie menneske’, signed ‘A.S.B.’ and originally published in Hugin, the propaganda organ of 
NSU, the youth organisation of the Norwegian National Socialist party Nasjonal Samling. The article was re-published 
in Akademisk Aktion, 7–8 (April–May 1943), p. 12. 
2 Carl Frants Popp-Madsen, radio speech titled ‘Nationalsocialismen’, published in print by National Studenter Aktion 
(1 December 1942). 
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diverse national and political agendas on the National Socialist hierarchy – where for example 
Ragnarok’s Hans Jacobsen’s relative political insignificance stood in stark contrast to the aims and 
visions of the Nazi leadership in the Third Reich. 
 
The present chapter focuses on this power-political imbalance and examines how it shaped the 
discourse on transnational Nazism among Ragnarok members and Ejnar Vaaben’s circles. While 
‘transnationalism’ was not part of their explicit vocabulary, these individuals theorised National 
Socialism as a fundamentally transnational ideology because of this imbalance. That is, the very 
existence of various nation-specific National Socialist movements and their subsequent political 
negotiations was seen as the foundation for a transnational dialogue. It was a dialogue, moreover, 
through which they came to define ‘true’ National Socialist practice. Indeed, this type of thinking did 
not emerge in isolation from global political events, but the idea that National Socialism was an 
ideology emerging as the result of this transnational pattern, rather than being its prerequisite, created 
a legitimate space in Nazi theory for the Scandinavian underdogs.3 These ideological negotiations, 
conflicts and divergences challenged the premises of generic National Socialism. When applied in 
theory, as we shall see in this chapter, the ideological incorrectness that characterised this reality was 
incorporated into the way these Scandinavian Nazi intellectuals discussed ‘true National Socialism’. 
 
 
I 
 Transnational Ideas 
 
The concept of ‘true National Socialism’ leads us to the question of how notions of purity and 
incorrectness could be reconciled. The Norwegian article in Akademisk Aktion tells a story of 
something more than a ‘wide horizon’ geographically speaking. It positions the wide horizon of 
National Socialism as an ideological antithesis to the kind of dogmatism of which National Socialism 
was often, and in the view of many contemporary Nazis, wrongly accused. Transnational Nazism, i.e. 
a dialogue between Nazism’s classic form (Nazi Germany) and its various reformulations (here, the 
                                                          
3 The term ‘underdogs’ is used in a geopolitical sense. From a racially ideological perspective, however, the 
Scandinavians consequently pointed to their superior position vis-à-vis the Germans. See discussion on race theory and 
transnationalism later in this chapter. 
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Scandinavian countries),4 thus symbolised a form of unorthodoxy. It is only more recently that 
historians have begun to take an interest in this type of consciousness among National Socialist groups 
over their idiosyncratic ideology on the one hand, and their role as parts of a wider transnational web 
of organisations on the other. Walther Gutmann identifies a curious fusion of nationalism and 
internationalism in foreign SS volunteers’ ideology, including those from Sweden and Denmark. 
Gutmann is not attempting to illustrate their ideology as ‘a clearly defined dogma’,5 but he wants to 
make clear that the typical Waffen-SS volunteer had transnational visions and an intellectual 
awareness that stood in sharp contrast to the stereotype of the soldiers as barbaric beasts fighting for 
the sake of mere violence. Another example is Samuel Goodfellow’s previously mentioned study of 
the various fascist groups in the Alsace region. Goodfellow describes the interaction between these 
groups as one where ‘a sense of commonality and differentiation were simultaneously present. In the 
process of affirming universality, fascists created differences. Arguably the collapse of definitional 
clarity for fascism starts here.’6 The emphasis on divergence and ideological conflict has therefore 
increased the more historians have looked into the historical realities of fascism and simultaneously 
left behind their overly rigid preoccupations with the search for a ‘generic fascism’.7 
 
In the case studies of this chapter, we see more ambition among the men of Goodfellow’s case studies 
than among Ragnarok members and their Danish colleague Ejnar Vaaben to strive for a universal 
National Socialism. Among the Scandinavians in this study, ‘universalism’ was rejected as a liberalist 
construction, and thus they actively sought differentiation rather than ‘universalism’. This quest for 
differentiation was completely in line with the Nazi worldview. In order to illustrate the awareness 
among the Scandinavian National Socialists of the ‘definitional unclarity’ at the heart of their 
ideology, this chapter uses the term ‘ideological incorrectness’ to describe a process whereby – 
contrary to Goodfellow’s observation on Alsace – the striving for differentiation was driven by an 
outspoken ideal of unorthodoxy. This principle of ‘dogmatic incorrectness’, did more than just lay 
the foundation of thinking about National Socialism as a transnational phenomenon. At the end of 
                                                          
4 Federico Finchelstein formulates this loose definition of ‘transnational patterns’ in Finchelstein, Transatlantic 
Fascism: Ideology, Violence and the Sacred in Argentina and Italy, 1919–1945 (Durham & London: Duke University 
Press, 2010), p. 6. 
5 Martin Gutmann, ‘Debunking the Myth of the Volunteers: Transnational Volunteering in the Nazi Waffen-SS Officer 
Corps during the Second World War’, Contemporary European History, 22:4 (2013), p. 605. 
6 Goodfellow, ‘Fascism as a Transnational Movement’, p. 102. 
7 This argument is put forward by Federico Finchelstein who points to the Holocaust as a historical event that through 
its multitude of causes and ideological outlooks challenges the overtly intellectual outlook of fascist studies. See 
Finchelstein, ‘Fascism and the Holocaust’. 
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this chapter, ‘ideological incorrectness’ is also presented as a way of thinking about National 
Socialism that functioned not only theoretically, but also justified individual actions. The anti-
doctrine of ‘ideological incorrectness’ enabled these Scandinavian movements to embark on the 
simultaneous process of ambivalently supporting and actively opposing the occupational politics of 
Nazi Germany while firmly seeing themselves as ‘true’ National Socialists. 
 
 
II 
The ‘Correctness’ of Fascism 
 
Because attacks on Nazi Germany remained subtle and were kept hidden from the official discourse 
in Ragnarok publications and its Danish equivalents, a critique of fascism was even more dominant. 
This critique, moreover, was part of a process of re-defining National Socialism that extended beyond 
the Scandinavian context. At the SS-Junckerschule in Bad Tölz in May 1941, the Danish SS officer 
Poul Ranzow Engelhardt took notes during a class on National Socialist ideology. The contents of 
his notebook provide a clear illustration of what it was that German Nazi officials sought to teach the 
aspiring Scandinavian SS men about National Socialism. Engelhardt noted that worldviews could be 
sorted into different types with a main distinction between the so-called ‘confessional 
Weltanschauung’ and the ‘fighting [Kämpferische] Weltanschauung’. The first ideology – the 
confessional – was the Catholic Church and the ‘fighting’ worldview was of course National 
Socialism.8 Liberalism was also mentioned as a form of worldview but definitely not a ‘fighting’ 
one!9 
 
A Danish National Socialist publication further developed and presented this fighting worldview as 
standing in contrast to ‘all the movements of the old sort – conservatism, fascism, liberalism [that] 
are driven by the more or less rationalistic, but always materialistic world-view’.10 The separation 
between fascism and National Socialism on the basis of its fundamental ideological differences was 
thus shared among Danes, Norwegians and Germans alike. This bidirectional attack against doctrinal 
                                                          
8 See Michael Wildt’s argument about the bureaucracy of the RSHA being like no conventional bureaucracy, but 
instead a kämpferische Verwaltung (literally, a ‘fighting bureaucracy’). Wildt describes the ideological core of National 
Socialism through a similar emphasis on its ‘fighting characteristics’ in Wildt, Generation des Unbedingten. 
9 Notebook, entry 18 May, 1941 in Rigsarkivet, nr. 6926, ‘Poul Ranzow Engelhardt’, box 14. 
10 Wilfred Petersen, ‘Materialisme – Idealisme’, Nordiske Stemmer, 3 (1936), p. 6. 
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‘correctness’ from the angle of both politics (against fascism and liberalism) and religion 
(Christianity) ultimately points to the centrality of the kämpferische Weltanschauung in National 
Socialist ideology. 
 
‘Quisling’s fascism’ 
With an emphasis on fighting comes a preoccupation with transgression of boundaries – and dogmas. 
An article in Fronten argued that while fascism was an ideological system, National Socialism was 
an organic worldview: ‘while fascism is form seeking content, National Socialism is content seeking 
form’.11 Another piece stated that ‘the similarities between fascism and National Socialism are not 
greater than their respective similarities to Bolshevism’.12 This rejection of fascism was also a 
message about the National Socialist embrace of national divergences and principle of incorrectness 
vis-à-vis generic visions like that of a fascist international. In that sense, the rejection further defined 
National Socialist ideas. Jacobsen explained how the fascist system symbolised ‘the eternal 
opposition between the Mediterranean culture’s formalism, ideas of equality and demands for 
universality as opposed to Nordic, Germanic strivings for independence, [and] our emphasis on 
human diversity’.13 Echoing his own critique of Christianity, the doctrines of universality and 
internationalism were attributes of fascism that drove the process of creating what Jacobsen called a 
‘“world centre” for the fascist movements in all countries’.14 
 
Jacobsen referred to the international fascist conference in Montreaux, Switzerland on 16–17 
December 1934 that had sought to gather various European fascist movements to organise a fascist 
international. This effort was initiated by Mussolini’s CAUR network (Action Committee for the 
Universality of Rome), and it further prompted Jacobsen’s comment that ‘Mussolini is not exactly 
trying to hide his imperialism’.15 Internationalism and imperialism were seen as intimately connected. 
For those Ragnarok voices that criticised this fascist internationalism, arrangements like the one in 
Montreaux were first and foremost signs of the way fascist political visions ignored the principles of 
national heritage, race and, ultimately, national sovereignty: 
 
                                                          
11 ‘Fascismen kontra Nasjonalsocialismen’, Fronten, 4:9 (15 November 1935), p. 1. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Hans S. Jacobsen, ‘Nasjonalsocialisme og Fascisme’, Ragnarok, 1:6 (August 1935), p. 138. 
14 Ibid., p. 141. 
15 Ibid., p. 138. 
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The reason I have stressed the incompatibility between National Socialism and fascism so strongly is informed by 
the danger that threatens us. It is the danger of not going beneath the surface of the ideas of our time that possibly 
contains a foreign content. This danger is present among all parties and political movements in our country.16 
 
The actual split with Quisling in the mid-1930s was described as a fundamental conflict between 
National Socialism and fascism, where Quisling was associated with supporting the Montreaux 
arrangement. Fronten addressed the ‘problem and truth’ about Quisling’s leadership of NS where a 
number of particularly significant factors were singled out: 
 
[…] the engagement with the Montreaux fascist international, misunderstanding of the Fuehrer-principle, free-
mason alliance, a lack of psychological insight into how to utilise the strongest forces of the movement. […] 
Quisling has made a choice. He has distanced himself from those he, ironically, calls ‘nazi’ (in exclamation mark) 
while choosing the non-nationalist line and proclaiming to be the only one with a Norwegian base. […] We must 
warn all good Norwegians against Quisling.17 
 
The statement sums up two important aspects of this National Socialist critique of fascism: first, it 
addressed the problem of leadership by pointing to the thin line between being a Führer and a dictator. 
Second, and as we have seen, while National Socialism was presented as pro-nationalistic, fascism 
was accused, like Christianity, of representing a flattening internationalist idea that undermined 
national particularities. 
 
Against dictatorship 
Beyond the critique of the fascist international agenda, which Jacobsen called ‘the dogma of national 
equality’,18 fascist domestic policies also came under attack. Jacobsen, like other Ragnarok 
contributors, spoke of Christianity’s ‘oriental features’, which was an accusation referring to the 
political methods of dictatorship. In several Ragnarok articles, these features were also presented as 
characteristics of southern European fascism. Unlike the ‘oriental features’ of fascism, 
 
National Socialism is something different from the Roman Caesar cult – it is first and foremost a burning, 
foundational Nordic idea. It is not an oriental dictatorship, although the Fuehrer in hard times will need to lead 
firmly.19 
                                                          
16 Ibid., p. 145. 
17 ‘Nasjonal Samling i oppløsing’, Fronten, 4:6 (15 April 1937), p. 1. 
18 Hans S. Jacobsen, ‘Quisling og fascismen’, Ragnarok, 1:8 (October 1935), p. 195. 
19 Jacobsen, ‘Nasjonalsocialisme og Fascisme’, p. 145. 
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The divide between the National Socialist and fascist state set out here also came to reflect the rhetoric 
against the sozialdominante version of a ‘political religion’ that was discussed in the previous chapter. 
Hans Jacobsen wrote in Ragnarok in 1935 that the fascist system, like traditional Christianity, 
belonged to the past, to the 19th century, while National Socialism represented a new, contemporary 
way of life.20 Fascism was thus an expression of old perceptions of a political ideology, in the same 
way as Christian confessionalism was an outdated model for religious belief. In opposition to 
Mussolini’s personality cult, the conscious construction of dogmas and other signs of religious 
chauvinism, Jacobsen continued his attack on fascism by claiming that 
 
the fascist centralized state is the last chapter of absolutism, not its conqueror. This ‘god’s creation’, the total 
absolutist state might for a moment bring dynamism and vitality to the people […] But it distances the people from 
the state. It is a foreign, southern product of the East.21 
 
While disguised as ‘God’s creation’, the fascist Führer-cult was thus essentially nothing less than an 
absolute dictatorship. One article in Fronten was titled ‘Quisling’s fascist and dictatorial tendencies’ 
where ‘the worst thing that could happen to this country would be having Quisling as its dictator’.22 
Ultimately, the calls for a ‘theological incorrectness’ that had dominated discourses on the Nazi 
‘political religion’ were brought into the context of fascism as a form of ideological incorrectness. 
All those factors that had signified the confessional church, the dominant institutions, the absolutist 
leader and the indoctrinating dogmas identified more clearly how Fronten and Ragnarok described 
the differences not only between Quisling and themselves but more fundamentally the difference 
between fascism and National Socialism: 
 
When Quisling speaks of a ‘sacred fascism’ he is obviously not grasping the nature of fascism. Something that is 
empty and only consists of form can never be sacred. If he continues to lead his followers in a fascist direction he 
will deceive his own followers who seek to establish a solid Nordic state on a biological basis. That can never be 
achieved through fascism. The best of his followers demand a Norwegian National Socialism. Fascism is not 
natural for the Norwegians in any form. It demands the pope in church, state and bureaucracy. Quisling must learn 
the difference between authoritative institutions and the spiritual dominance over a people’s politics.23 
                                                          
20 Ibid., p. 142. 
21 Ibid., p. 145. In accordance with Ragnarok’s emphasis on the importance of presenting divergent opinions in current 
debates, the pamphlet also published a translated version of an article by the editor of the Italian fascist pamphlet Revue 
Fascism, Nino Guglielmi, ‘Rom, fascisme og imperium’, Ragnarok, 2:2 (April 1936), pp. 39–43. 
22 ‘Nasjonal Samling i oppløsing’, p. 1. 
23 ‘Quisling’, Fronten, 3:6 (May 1934), p.1. 
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Indeed, the rhetorical incentive on the part of Ragnarok to claim such a division between their outlook 
and that of Quisling’s NS is clear, but the division also continued to feature in Ragnarok’s theoretical 
writings on National Socialist ideology. The political power struggle with Quisling on the one hand 
and the principal objections towards international fascism in theory on the other provided an 
escalating framework for these intellectuals not only in their continuous critique of fascism, but most 
importantly in their simultaneous formulation of National Socialism’s exceptionality. 
 
In Denmark, Ejnar Vaaben’s colleague in Schalburgkorpset Carl Popp-Madsen delivered one of the 
more interesting and sophisticated critiques of the fascist ‘political religion’ to be found among 
Scandinavian National Socialists. In a speech from December 1942, Popp-Madsen criticised the 
Enlightenment’s ideal of human progress by painting a grim scenario – a scenario that resembles what 
contemporaries saw as the trajectory of the interwar ‘political religions’: 
 
We are facing the breakthrough of individualism and the liberation of personality. [Man] is no longer the obedient 
son of the Church […] but an astonishing Titan who overthrows Popes and ends up seeking the destruction of God 
to satisfy his urge to take the throne […] who rejects all authority, transgresses all boundaries and in blind faith in 
his own strength and abilities demands individual freedom. […] Now we have a freedom that screams rootlessness 
and as an irony of faith, the deepest humiliation for human kind. It is a story of the magician’s disciple who thought 
he could master the genius unleashed.24 
 
Popp-Madsen described how the spirit of the materialist age had sown the seeds for ‘political 
religions’. His analysis resonated clearly with Eric Voegelin’s approach to ‘political religion’ as a 
way analytically to unite Italian Fascism and National Socialism. But while Popp-Madsen suggested 
Voegelin was right in his account of Italian fascism, National Socialism was different: 
 
National Socialism is indeed new, but not new in the sense of an imposed otherworldly system that has fallen from 
the skies: [which is] suitable for angels and machines but not for real people humans made of flesh and blood.25 
 
Popp-Madsen was further convinced that the true difference was that National Socialism had been 
embraced by the people before it came to power, ‘unlike fascism, which seemed to have reached 
power, aided by the king, before reaching its own people’.26 The fascist ‘political religion’ was thus 
                                                          
24 Popp-Madsen, ‘Nationalsocialismen’, p. 5. 
25 Ibid., p. 7. 
26 Ibid., p. 8. 
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presented as Christianity in disguise in the sense that it displayed the same characteristic features of 
dogmatism, foreignness and despotism. 
 
 
III 
Scandinavianism 
 
The emphasis on National Socialist incorrectness vis-à-vis the outdated and non-organic systems of 
Christianity and fascism thus became a way to prove ideological purity. With the same key words of 
‘foreignness’ and ‘dogmatism’, the Danish National Socialist milieu also extended the critique of 
fascism to include opposition to a political movement closer to home, drawing a line between the 
political federalist idea of Scandinavianism and the quest for a National Socialist pan-Germanic order. 
One example of this development is an article by Aage Andersen where he asked the reader to choose 
either ‘Scandinavianism or pan-Germanism’. Scandinavianism was described as ‘empty and 
transparent’ where the ‘implementation of pan-Scandinavianism assumes the abandonment of local 
nationality. One cannot make an omelette without breaking the eggs, and how many of us Danes are 
willing to break that egg that is our Danishness?’27 
 
Scandinavianism developed in the 18th century as a system of ideas related to the establishment of a 
concrete political union of defence between the Scandinavian countries. This idea of forming a 
Scandinavian military alliance had become increasingly attractive in light of the German territorial 
expansion in the 1860s.28 The political outlook of Scandinavianism29 resurfaced in national discourses 
following the Nazi occupation of Denmark and Norway in 1940 and was a topic that also caught the 
attention of the German SS authorities.30 A distinction between the establishment of a Scandinavian 
                                                          
27 ‘Storskandinavisme eller Stor-Germanisme’, Kamptegnet, 2:12 (15 June 1940), p. 1;4. in Rigsarkivet, Straffeakt, nr. 
404 II. 
28 The concrete geopolitical background to Scandinavianist thought was the defence treaty signed by the Nordic 
countries in 1794, where its ideas reappeared during the Napoleonic wars and again re-surfaced in the 1940s due to the 
anxiety over German expansion and the future of Southern Jutland. Kasper Sevaj, Dansk Nationalisme 1776–1848: 
Borgerkrig, Grundtivigianisme og Skandinavisme, unpublished MA thesis (Copenhagen University, 2002). 
29 The emphasis on the political, or pragmatist, outlook of Scandinavianism is an exaggeration that stems from the need 
to distance it from Grundtvigianism, and it is important to emphasise that Scandinavianism during the 1820s to 1850s 
was as much centred upon cultural expressions such as Nordic literature and music as it was on foreign diplomacy. See 
Ibid., pp. 100–104. 
30 A telegram from the advisor of Joachim von Ribbentorp, Auswärtige Amt’s Martin Luther to Werner Best, 25 January 
1943 mentions the article ‘Nordic supremacy’ (Nordens Suveränität). In the article, the notion of the ‘Nordic thought’ 
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federation or the so-called ‘participation in the making of the [pan-Germanic] new Europe’ was made 
in these broader discourses over the fate of the Scandinavian countries in the war,31 and the distinction 
was often translated as a matter of ‘Scandinavianism versus pan-Germanism’. 
 
Both Andersen and Ejnar Vaaben positioned Scandinavianism as a threat to Danish national identity 
and its pan-Germanic roots. The intimate relationship that Vaaben described between the Nordic race 
idea and the essence of Danishness positioned the race idea as a determinant factor when favouring a 
pan-Germanic political order over Scandinavianism. Vaaben stressed that the Nordic race idea cannot 
be 
 
contained within Scandinavian borders, since precisely because of the dynamic between our local heritage and the 
racial Nordic world mission, it strengthens the activist demand of a kind of Nordic community that acknowledges 
its political obligations and acts on the historical possibilities that is revealed. […] The Nordic myth can only be 
realised in conjunction with the Race idea and its leading pioneers, such as Günther […]32 
 
An additional article in Akademisk Aktion described Scandinavianism and Nordic thought thus we 
‘are not against it, but only fighting against its abuse and inauthentic expressions.’33 It was a matter 
of clarifying the meaning of the term Nordic. Kurt Erik Wassman’s article from March 1941 further 
consolidated the role of Akademisk Aktion as a channel where criticism of Scandinavianism was made 
on the basis of a pan-Germanic thinking that implicitly questioned the black-and-white separation 
between Nazi and non-Nazi. Wassman described the proponents of Scandinavianism as struggling to 
 
turn Norden into a museum for outdated political doctrines and isolate it from the new Europe [where the 
Scandinavianists] arrange for ‘Nordic cooperation’ but mean ‘democratic preservation’ and ‘Nordic’ meetings that 
are nothing more than anti-German demonstrations.34 
 
                                                          
and Swedish Scandinavianism is positioned against pan-Germanism, and Luther henceforth demands information on the 
involvement of the SS in these matters. See John T. Lauridsen and Jakob Kyril Meile (eds.), Werner Bests 
korrespondance med Auswärtiges Amt og andre tyske akter vedrørende besættelsen af Danmark 1942–1945 Bind 2 
(Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanums Forlag, 2012), pp. 162-163. 
31 Several articles on the topic in Akademisk Aktion referred to the public lecture given by professor Knud Berlin in 
1943 called ‘Old and New Scandinavianism’ where Berlin made a ‘political analysis of Scandinavianism with its 
conditions and frameworks’ which concluded that old ‘romantic fantasies of a Nordic federal state’ could in the face of 
Nazi power have a devastating impact on Denmark as a nation. In Unknown author, ‘Gammel og ny Skandinavisme’, 
Akademisk Aktion. 9 (1943), pp. 3–4. 
32 Ejnar Vaaben, ‘Ja eller Nej til Norden: Den Nordiske Myte’, På Godt Dansk (July 1943), pp. 9–13. 
33 Jorgen Wernberg, ‘Fellesnordisk antityskland eller?’, Akademisk Aktion (November 1941), p. 4. 
34 Kurt Erik Wassmann, ‘Nordisk Isolation?’, Akademisk Aktion (March 1941), p. 2. 
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These negative assessments of Christianity, fascism and also Scandinavianism served the purpose of 
describing what National Socialism was not. We have seen in publications, mainly from Fronten and 
Ragnarok but also from Vaaben’s circles in Denmark, a fierce attack on these 
Christian/Fascist/Scandinavianist attempts to impose a ‘foreign’ idea or system upon the distinctive 
national culture and character of each Nordic country. 
 
 
IV 
National Particularity 
 
Ragnarok and the circle around Ejnar Vaaben based their anti-liberal critique of Christianity, fascism 
and Scandinavianism alike on their rejection of ‘correctness’. Whether it was religious dogmas, the 
fascist international’s dogma of national equality or Scandinavianism’s tendency to flatten the 
particularities of each Nordic country, in the eyes of these National Socialists, all three ideas were 
based on a striving for homogenisation. The ‘ideological incorrectness’ we find in the case of Ejnar 
Vaaben and Ragnarok defended the idea of national particularities and acknowledged the interaction 
as such between the particularities as an integral part of the holistic National Socialist worldview. 
This ‘ideological incorrectness’, i.e. the ideological practice of claiming incorrectness towards 
politics of homogenisation, figured in these visions as the ideal transnational relations between Nazi 
organisations. 
 
‘There is greatness in being small’ – Nikolaj Grundtvig’s influence on Vaaben 
Vaaben stated in the pamphlet Faedrelandet in September 1944 that ‘those who study the history of 
the Germanic people will soon realise that Denmark is the country best suited for the implementation 
of National Socialism considering something as central and fundamental as its intimate relation to 
Grundtvigianism’.35 Nikolaj Grundtvig’s writings on politics and religion belong to the ‘second 
golden age’ in Danish cultural production, among names such as Soren Kierkegaard and H.C. 
Andersen. Grundtvig’s works influenced Vaaben’s National Socialist identity to the extent that 
Vaaben in his memoirs indeed mentioned the ‘grundtvigianism’ of National Socialism.36 These two 
                                                          
35 Vaaben, ‘Dansk National Socialisme’, published in Faedrelandet 9 September, 1944, and located in Rigsarkivet, nr. 
06540, box 1. 
36 Vaaben, ‘Det var det hele værdt’, p. 17., ibid box 4. 
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–isms were interrelated rather than separate. Vaaben maintained throughout his political career that 
Danish National Socialism could be neither understood nor properly implemented without reference 
to Grundtvig. It was particularly the term ‘Danishness’ that Vaaben found relevant and became 
helpful for him and his colleagues in Schalburgkorpset when negotiating those intellectual obstacles 
that awaited all Danish National Socialists after the Nazi occupation on 9 April 1940, namely the 
need to figure out the relationship between National Socialism and German foreign politics. 
 
When Vaaben used the term ‘Grundtvigianism’, he referred to an intellectual Grundtvigianist 
movement that emerged parallel to that of Scandinavianism. An antagonistic relationship between 
Grundtvigians and Scandinavianists developed in the late 19th century, and Grundtvigianists tended 
to view Scandinavianism as as an expression of the thoughts among the intellectual elite confined to 
the higher layers of Danish society.37 The perceived distance between Grundtvigianism and 
Scandinavianism remained an issue among Vaaben and his contemporaries. One example is C.P.O. 
Christensen, who was a Grundtvigianist and a frequent contributor to the intellectual circles where 
both he and Vaaben operated during the 1930s and 1940s. He described Grundtvig’s organic Nordic 
spirit in contrast to the schematic nature of Scandinavianism: 
 
Whilst the men propagating Scandinavianism spoke of the greater and external power that could be sought through 
a fellow king, army, parliament and justice […] Grundtvig spoke of far greater inner power that is to be found only 
within the Nordic spirit.38 
 
Discourses on the Nordic race idea dominated and Christensen further pointed to similarities between 
Vaaben’s race thinking and Grundtvig’s writings on the Nordic idea. As a fusion between two 
approaches: 
 
Grundtvig has two contributions to the field of Nordic thought: [first] the mythological message that builds upon 
the common Nordic idea and [second] the contemporary need for a spiritual revival within each population in each 
Nordic country – and therefore the Grundtvigian movement stands against the Scandinavianism which brought the 
‘intelligentsia’ and bourgeoisie with it.39 
                                                          
37 Sevaj, Dansk Nationalisme, p. 97. 
38 C.P.O. Christensen, ‘Grundtvig, den nordiske Aand og den nordiske Sandhed af i Dag’, Gads Magasin (1942), p. 13. 
39 Christensen, ‘Grundtvig, den nordiske Aand’, p. 1. Vaaben praised Christensen for describing Scandinavianism in a 
‘deep and truthful way’, but it should be mentioned that Vaaben and Christensen had their disagreements over the 
concrete future of the ‘Nordic’ idea although they had similar perceptions of Grundtvig’s Nordic thinking. Vaaben 
expressed disappointment over how Christensen found ‘the Nordic movement in Denmark to be an essentially German 
movement’. This German labelling was in Vaaben’s view yet another sign of the frequent misunderstandings of Nordic 
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This text describes a separation between the all-encompassing and mythological idea of the Nordic 
and the implementation and adaptations of the Nordic idea within each national context. Christensen 
concludes that Grundtvig managed to bring forward the important insight that ‘there existed different 
spirits in each Nordic population’.40 In Vaaben’s view, these spirits belonged to the wider pan-
Germanic framework, where the dream of a strong and united Nordic community would 
 
not be realised through congresses, but strived for as a reality that reflected our heritage […] Neither Denmark nor 
other Scandinavian countries will maintain their particularities and independences unless in an open-minded way 
a cooperation and a community of fate [Skaebnefaellesskab] is established strong enough for the rest of the world 
to acknowledge.41 
 
Scandinavianism was thus rejected based on what in Nazi circles was perceived as liberal and 
materialistic systems that ruled at the expense of ‘authentic’ Nordic thought. The separation of 
Scandinavianism from Grundtvigianism therefore promoted a pan-Germanic system at the expense 
of Scandinavianist visions of a ‘closed’ federation. 
 
Grundtvig’s ‘Danishness’ and the claims to National Socialist ownership 
The closed nature of Scandinavianism stood in stark contrast to the embrace of pluralism that Vaaben 
found in Grundtvig’s ideas. He not only saw Grundtvig as a ‘pan-Germanic prophet’, but he also 
attached Grundtvigianism to his perception of National Socialism.42 Grundtvig had a vision for a 
people’s community. This vision, which he called ‘Danishness’, was a form of national consciousness 
that would act as a precondition for the spiritual unification of the Danish people.43 One article in the 
pamphlet Dannebroge adds to this picture with the statement that ‘Dannebroge frequently cites 
                                                          
thought. In Vaaben, Den Nordiske Tanke. Vaaben further directed strong objections to Christensen’s ambivalent attitude 
to National Socialism in an article that highlights the revival of the German people through National Socialism, yet 
maintains the National Socialist ideology to be foreign to Danish mentality, in Christensen, ‘“Det tredje Norden” og 
“Det tredje Rige”: Skaebnemodsaetninen mellem Tyskland og Nordens Historie’, Gads Magasin (1937), pp. 337–338. 
40 Christensen, ‘Grundtvig, den nordiske Aand’, p. 2. 
41 Vaaben, ‘Norden’, Vort Vaern: Dansk Tidsskrift for Folkestyre, Udenrigspolitik og Forsvar 17–18 (1–15 September 
1939), p. 389. 
42 Vaaben, ‘Grundtvig – tyskehaderen sett med tyske öjner’, På Godt Dansk (August 1943), pp. 11–12 and Vaaben, 
‘NFS Grundtvig, eine bedeutende Gestalt der dänischen Glaubensgeschichte’, Rass Monatsschrift der nordischen 
Bewegung, 9 (1939), pp. 89–100. 
43 Grundvig’s legacy is connected to his advocacy of an egalitarian educational system, Højskole, which would bring 
about a modern enlightenment through the education of the Danish people from different socio-economic backgrounds. 
It formed the pillar of the Grundtvigian tradition that continued into the 20th century. In the 1930s, the Grundtvigian 
movement, which adhered to Grundtvig’s liberal theology, struggled to distance itself from the Nazi regime namely on 
the basis of the word Folkelighed which is linguistically difficult to separate from the German word Völkisch, and its 
connotations in the Nazi era. Henrik S. Nissen, ‘Folkelighed og Frihed 1933’. pp. 588–89. 
 
 
 
171 
 
Grundtvig […] What Grundtvig strived for was “folkefællesskabet”.’44 When in 1943 Vaaben 
reflected upon his early years as a National Socialist, he remembered that ‘National Socialism from 
the early 1920s appeared for a young Dane as Grundtvigianism with capital letters […] The spiritual 
revival of the people was as essential to the National Socialist movement as the external political 
struggle.’45 In Vaaben’s words from March 1945, ‘much that once appeared elusive in Grundtvig’s 
philosophy is becoming clearer today, not because we have become wiser, but because world events 
have worked to clarify his ideas’.46 
 
The German factor was consistently present in Grundtvig’s thought on Danish identity, as it was for 
Vaaben roughly a century later. ‘There is greatness in being small’ were Grundtvig’s words in 1814 
when he described an intellectually stiff German culture. The definition of ‘Danishness’ was thus 
effectively shaped by Grundtvig’s growing fear of imperialism, which for him came to define the 
‘German’.47 To counter the threat of ‘godless and scientific’ Prussian imperialism, Grundtvig’s notion 
of a ‘Nordic heroic spirit’ came into the limelight in the following decades. Ultimately, the Danish 
defeat in the Schleswig war in 1864 preceding German unification prompted Grundtvig’s call for the 
spiritual revival of the Danish people. In other words, as Grundtvig’s ‘Danishness’ emerged in the 
shadow of German foreign politics, the term was bound simultaneously to define the ‘German’. Yet, 
the phenomenon of ‘Danishness’ was not to be confined to the Danish national context; rather, 
Grundtvig spoke of it as holding a universal principle, where the Danish people would lead a globally 
historical mission of strengthening the bond between the Folk and their common culture, language 
and heritage. As he categorically rejected the term ‘nationalism’ based on his critique of materialistic 
intellectualism,48 Grundtvig further stressed in a proclamation from September 1850 that he 
condemned the ‘Germanisation’ of the Nordic countries as much as he would condemn any Danish 
attempt on cultural imperialism in Germany.49 Any claims to ‘ownership’ of this historical mission 
that he identified in the idea of ‘Danishness’ would thus turn into an ideological oxymoron. 
‘Danishness’ in its particular context meant the safeguarding of the Danish spirit within its national 
borders, but in its wider context it implied the acceptance that beyond the confines of human-made 
borders, the universal principle of ‘Danishness’ was built upon the acknowledgement of its multitude 
                                                          
44 Vaaben, ‘Ejnar Vaaben om den Danske Folkerejsning’, Dannebroge, 5:3 (February 1941), p. 4. 
45 Vaaben, ‘Hans F.K. Günther og den Nordiske bevægelse’, På Godt Dansk, (August 1943), p. 17. 
46 Vaaben, ‘Nogle ord om Grundtvig’, Akademisk Aktion, 5:4 (6 March 1945), p. 6. 
47 Lundgreen-Nielsen, ‘Grundtvig og Danskhed’, p. 19. 
48 Ibid., p. 96. 
49 Ibid., p. 105. 
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of particularities. Consequently, it could not be confined to the notion of ‘nationalism’. In a similar 
manner, and a source of inspiration for Vaaben, Alfred Rosenberg in February 1939 similarily 
stressed in the context of National Socialism that it was ‘not a universal world-view’.50 Instead, 
‘National Socialism meant different things in different countries’51 and Rosenberg thus stressed 
similarily to Grundtvig’s thoughts on Danishness, that any copying of foreign symbols would distort 
the true force of National Socialism. 
 
Vaaben praised how Grundtvig, in the midst of European identity wars, had formulated his notion of 
a particular Danish national identity without losing sight of the universal dimension of ‘national 
consciousness(es)’. It was a dynamic that Vaaben, as well as his Danish colleagues and the Norwegian 
Ragnarok members, found crucial in their understanding of pan-Germanism. The perceived 
‘greatness in being small’ thus structured Vaaben’s and other Danish National Socialists’ thinking 
about the relationship between various national Nazi movements. Vaaben’s party colleague within 
Dansk Enhedsparti, Sven Koefoed, described how this principle of particularist–universalist 
interaction found resonance in the National Socialist Weltanschauung: 
 
The National Socialist ideology encompasses a vast spectrum of ideas which under certain conditions can be 
adapted and used in other countries [...] As the name certainly indicates, National Socialism is not a product of 
German imperialism. It is in fact the opposite of internationalism.52 
 
This clarification is a key to understanding the way Grundtvig’s work was adopted in Danish National 
Socialist propaganda. Grundtvig had effectively formulated a structure of the interplay between a 
supranational principle and its nation-specific expressions, all confined within one distinct 
worldview. With this structure as a foundation for the implementation of National Socialism in 
Denmark, Koefoed argued for pluralism as the only way of affirming the universal principle of a pan-
Germanic order in Europe. Only in this way could National Socialism, despite its German original 
expressions, be understood as Danish and in that sense also Grundtvigian. It places National 
Socialism as a phenomenon above the quests for definitional certainty and as a form of transgression 
beyond the confinements of national borders. One of Vaaben’s articles in På Godt Dansk points to 
                                                          
50 An account of Rosenberg’s speech to diplomats and journalists during a visist in Copenhagen, 1939. ’Tyskland 
ønsker ikke Nazisme og Hagekors brugt i Udlandet’, Nationalsocialisten (8 February 1939 located in Rigsarkivet, nr. 
10192, box 23, ’1932-1944: Diverse Avisudklip’. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Svend Koefoed Jensen, ‘D.N.S.A.P.’s Forhold til Dansk Mentalitet’, Dannebroge, 3 (12 February 1941), p. 4. 
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the all-encompassing universality of these claims for a National Socialist ‘Danishness’; he writes that 
‘the Nordic race idea is not bound to Nordic myths and therefore it transgresses Scandinavian borders 
precisely because of the interaction between our particular heritage and the Nordic race principle as 
a world mission’.53 
 
 
V 
 ‘True’ National Socialism 
 
The idea of National Socialist pluralism and Danish independence was an idealist vision challenged 
ideologically and politically by German expansionism, irrespective of how much it defended the so-
called pan-Germanic union in theory. From the perspective of Scandinavians like Vaaben, they were 
engaged in a balancing act of maintaining the acknowledgement of the Nazi leadership in Berlin while 
simultaneously confirming the Grundtvigian roots of the Danish version of National Socialism. The 
pre-war decade had been a time when Vaaben was occupied not so much by worldly political matters 
but was more ideologically focused on what he called the ‘volkish moment in the National Socialist 
freedom-movement’.54 The ‘volkish moment’ in Vaaben’s memoirs was also described as a 
‘Grundtvigianist’ understanding of national consciousness.55 But in his post-war writings, he clarified 
that ‘in one aspect, I remained politically conscious [during the 1930s] and that was the question of 
the southern Danish borders’.56 
 
While Grundtvig did not hesitate to criticise German power politics (for example, he witnessed with 
despair the Schleswig border crumbling in the face of German expansionism), Vaaben proclaimed in 
1933 what was to become his trademark in Danish National Socialist politics: the ‘Berlin Line’. As 
its name suggests, the ‘Berlin Line’ sought friendly political relations with Nazi headquarters in 
Berlin. To reconcile this political line with his Grundtvigian convictions, Vaaben repeatedly claimed 
the pan-Germanic assumptions in Grundtvig’s thinking by using notions such as ‘the volkish 
                                                          
53 Vaaben, ‘Ja eller nej til Norden’, p. 9. 
54 Vaaben, ‘Det var det hele verdt’, p, 12, Rigsarkivet, nr. 06540, box 1. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
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Grundtvig’57 and notoriously stressing that Danes must soon realise that ‘the German–Danish border 
is both frontier and bridge, in the long run neither party can break these connections or erase these 
borders’.58 
 
On a deeper dimension, however, the Berlin Line was a battle for national freedom. It was a line 
developed in order to undermine German expansion into Danish territory by embracing pan-
Germanic thought as a symbol not of German National Socialism but of National Socialism meaning 
Danish sovereignty. In a piece from 1933, Vaaben writes that the ‘struggle for Germanisation’ had 
since the Great War been the ‘silent goal for those men who through the Nordic movement and 
National Socialism have worked hard and consistently to unite an independent Germany and an 
equally independent Denmark in the destined Germanic union’.59 Vaaben then goes on to illustrate 
the meaning of the Berlin Line as a force transcending national borders and leading ‘the way to a 
lasting friendship between the Germans and the three Scandinavian Folk’.60 That said, Vaaben’s letter 
to E. Christensen, the editor of southern Danish newspaper Flensborg Avis, makes clear that the de 
facto cooperation with the Nazi regime rested upon the precondition that the ‘right’ understanding of 
National Socialism prevailed. National Socialism was not a particularly German phenomenon but had 
values that would primarily safeguard Danish national interests: ‘National Socialism is, apart from 
being true in its own right, the only fruitful way for our nation to resist the German expansion in 
Southern Jutland.’61 
 
Just as we have seen in the case of Ragnarok’s criticism of Quisling’s fascist and internationalist 
tendencies, Vaaben was not impressed with Frits Clausen’s National Socialist politics. Principally, 
he found that the Grundtvigianist unification of universalism and particularism was fatally overlooked 
by Clausen and the DSNAP, and therefore he accused Clausen of claiming ownership over National 
Socialism, as if its universal legacy could be reduced to either Danish or German. For Vaaben, that 
type of ownership thinking was essentially an exercise in ‘wrong’ apprehensions of National 
Socialism since ‘real’ National Socialism does not welcome ‘those people who discuss “a particularly 
                                                          
57 In Vaaben, Ein Däne spricht zu Deutschland. Deutschlands Kampf eine europäische Angelegenheit (Leipzig: S. 
Hesse & Becker Verlag, 1940). 
58 My emphasis, in Vaaben, ‘Norden’, p. 507. 
59 Vaaben, Brodersmålet (1933), p. 1, Rigsarkivet nr. 06540, box 2. 
60 Ibid., p. 2. 
61 Vaaben to E. Christensen dated 1934, p. 2, Rigsarkivet nr. 06540, box 3. 
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Danish form of National Socialism”’.62 Yet, and somewhat paradoxically, Vaaben maintained, ‘they 
are as far from reality (and honesty) as those who like Dr Clausen copy and in a byzantine way praise 
German National Socialism and all its actions’.63 On the one hand then, in order to intellectually 
condemn a Nazi takeover of Denmark, Vaaben maintained that a nation-specific National Socialism 
must prevail within Danish borders, but on the other hand, his immediate geopolitical context of 
German border threats enhanced the necessity for him to simultaneously point to National Socialism 
as a transnational and thus intrinsically cooperative phenomenon. 
 
Vaaben therefore saw ‘the abandonment of the border question and the “Danish–German” 
Volksgemeinschaft humbug’ as a sign of Clausen’s faulty understanding of National Socialism. 
Vaaben’s Grundtvigian understanding emphasised that it was the safeguarding of Danish interests 
rather than an uncritical cooperation with Germany that would pave the way for a true National 
Socialism.64 His colleague in Folkevaernet in the 1940s, Wilfred Petersen, made similar points when 
describing the DNSAP’s failure to take a ‘German line’ in the 1930s: 
 
The movement was soon divided where the majority sought to adopt National Socialism in its German form 
without considering our specific national conditions and Danish mentality, and others who showed a true 
understanding of National Socialism […] in striving to create a politics that reflected our cultural heritage and 
spiritual life.65 
 
The cut-and-paste attitude that for Petersen was evident in DNSAP’s propaganda ultimately led to a 
falsification of the universal legacy of National Socialism that went deeper than the modern construct 
of geopolitical borders. In Koefoed’s view, the political failure of DNSAP was based on this lack of 
national particularity, that ‘the Danish National Socialism, both ideologically and politically is a true 
copy of the German. Not only have one taken the ideas, one has also slavishly adopted the symbol: 
The Swastika.’66 In this vein, it is worth drawing structural parallels back to Grundtvig’s notion of 
Folkelighed as a phenomenon applicable to each national context, such as the fact that there existed 
a Danish Folkelighed as much as a Swedish, or even a German Folkelighed, but its essence was not 
reducible to national ownership. In 1939, Vaaben similarly pointed to the fact that because of 
                                                          
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid., p. 3. 
65 Wilfred Petersen, Rene Folk med Rene Haender: Blade af Frits Clausens Blå Bog (Copenhagen: Dansk Socialistisk 
Forlag, 1941), p. 3. 
66 Sven Koefoed-Jensen, ’D.N.S.A.P’s Forhold til Dansk Mentalitet.’, p. 4. 
 
 
 
176 
 
DNSAP’s ‘German line’, the idea of National Socialism in Denmark had been circumscribed into a 
‘specifically German movement which has systematically falsified the universal principles of 
National Socialism’.67 
 
Vaaben found it particularly alarming that the racial bond between the Germanic countries was often 
neglected in Danish popular perceptions of Nazism, where that ideology was primarily understood as 
an essentially German product. In 1939, he wrote that ‘Danes have begun to separate “Nazis” from 
“non-Nazis”. Anything in between is hardly respected.’68 Two years later, in February 1941, this 
dichotomy was described as a result of the fact that ‘the majority of the [Danish] population was more 
occupied with ideology than Denmark as such. Through their so-called foreign political outlook, they 
divide their fellow nationals into opposing camps and thus ultimately lead them farther away from 
what is important: Denmark.’69 Vaaben stressed that the Nazi/non-Nazi dichotomy was a product of 
the old world, and that the new Europe ‘could not afford thinking in terms of borders’.70 In that sense, 
he also sketched the contours of his idea of National Socialist ideology as transgressive and essentially 
revolutionary because of its incorrectness towards old perceptions of ideological conviction. Thus, a 
pattern emerged where Vaaben increasingly drifted away from the unsettling political realities he 
faced, with the effect that he ignored realpolitik and built his National Socialist ideal on wishful 
thinking. 
 
 
VI 
Grundtvig and the Race Idea 
 
Vaaben’s references to the pan-Germanic and universal mission of National Socialism were 
ultimately arguments about what he called ‘the Nordic idea’. This way of thinking, which marked 
Vaaben’s political activities for 20 years, was indebted to the works of Hans F.K. Günther, the leader 
of Nordische Ring and a pioneering pan-Germanic thinker in both the Nordic and German race-
theoretical context of the late 1920s. In the years preceding 1933, Vaaben’s contact with Günther can 
be described as a decade-long correspondence with one underlying question that was more or less 
                                                          
67 Vaaben, Hagekorset over Danmark (Odense: Dansk Nationalsocialistisk Parti, 1939), pp. 40–41. 
68 Ibid., p. 39. 
69 Vaaben, ‘Ejnar Vaaben om den Danske Folkerejsning’, p. 4. 
70 Vaaben, ‘Det var det hele verdt’, p. 25. 
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expressed in each letter: ‘How did Hitler plan to solve the Danish–German question?’71 In his 
memoirs, Vaaben pointed to Günther’s piece Allnordische Utopie from 1928 as a milestone in what 
Vaaben saw as a ‘turn’ in the NSDAP’s Danish policy, from revisionist aims to a cooperative line in 
the name of a Nordic racial community.72 Nordic race theory thus had an essential impact on Vaaben 
in helping him to formulate the cooperative ‘Berlin Line’. 
 
While Günther’s position within Nazi race theory should not be understated, the questions of whether 
or not Günther had the impact Vaaben estimated, or whether or not NSDAP’s line, from their point 
of view, in reality was cooperative are less relevant. What is of more importance is the fact that 
Vaaben above all distinguished through Günther’s Nordic race idea a clear divide between the idealist 
and political ways of thinking about pan-Germanism. For instance, Vaaben argued that the notion of 
the German Herrenvolk, or a superior people, was mocked by both Günther and another prominent 
race theorist within the NSDAP, Walther Darré. The propaganda of the Herrenvolk was as ‘a form of 
self-contentedness that represents a static mind and thus hardly reflects the hunger and the drive of 
Nordic thought’.73 Similar to his critique of Clausen’s ownership ambitions for National Socialism, 
Vaaben made these references to Günther and Darré to make a similar point. The thought of the 
Nordic spiritual and racial community not only transcended isolated nationalist ambitions, but this 
transcendence was above all a sign of its unbound character and signalled a superiority to which 
geopolitical concerns simply had to accommodate themselves. 
 
In never losing sight of the race principle, Vaaben envisioned a bond between the Germanic countries 
that was superior to both the German revisionist claims and some Nordic protectionist strategies to 
undermine these German claims, such as Scandinavianism. The race principle was thus the foundation 
upon which the idea of pan-Germanism as ‘both frontier and bridge’ was used by Vaaben to explain 
why pan-Germanism did not necessarily imply support for German foreign policies. But it was also 
used to undermine the power in those arguments made by Nazi opponents that pan-Germanism was 
merely an extended arm of Hitler’s imperialistic fantasies. From this perspective, Vaaben and several 
                                                          
71 This expression is cited from Günther’s response to Vaaben in a letter from 5 April 1930. A similar answer is found 
in an earlier letter from December 1929, and the majority of letters, sometimes as frequent as monthly, are concerned 
with the situation within the NSDAP and their attitudes to the Nordic (and thus Danish) question of whether the pan-
Germanic thinking would be translated politically as cooperation or conflict. In Rigsarkivet nr. 06540, box 3. 
72 Vaaben, ‘Det var det hele verdt’, p. 14, Rigsarkivet nr. 06540, box 1. 
73 Ibid., p. 26. 
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Schalburg members were therefore bound to identify not only the ‘real’ meaning of National 
Socialism, but also, and perhaps more fundamentally, the real meaning of the ‘Nordic’. 
 
Grundtvig’s work was free from scientific race theory and it is indeed problematic to draw parallels 
between the German word Volksgemeinschaft and Grundtvig’s notion of a ‘people’s community’. 
The latter translates in Danish as ‘Folkefællesskab’ and does not share the racial and biological 
assumptions of the Nazi term Volksgemeinschaft. This is obvious, considering that ‘scientific’ race 
theory peaked after Grundtvig’s intellectual activities in the mid-1800s. I am not even suggesting that 
the Danish Nazis themselves located the race principle in Grundtvig’s works. The reason, however, 
why one could compare the two terms lies within the Danish perception of the National Socialist 
utopia of Volksgemeinschaft and the meaning they themselves ascribed to it. Vaaben did not merely 
introduce Grundtvig’s notion of Folkelighed as an intellectual predecessor of the National Socialist 
idea; instead, he went a step further to present Folkelighed as the ‘ideal outcome’ of the racial purity 
that a Nordic movement would bring about.74 In Vaaben’s later piece ‘The Swastika over Denmark’ 
from 1939, his introductory chapter on the ‘Nordic idea’ deals specifically with this connection. He 
argued that anyone who embraces Grundtvig’s philosophy and simultaneously rejects the race idea 
effectively turns ‘Grundvig’s thoughts on tribe and heritage into empty poetry and words without 
meaning’.75 
 
In a circulated letter to members of Den Danske Front – one of the small movements that merged 
with Vaaben’s and Madsen’s organisations into Den Nationale Aktion and later Dansk Folkevaern76 
– the author makes an extensive and quite clear definition of the National Socialist Volksgemeinschaft. 
It speaks of a German ‘Folkefaellesskab’, explicitly using the Danish term. The National Socialist 
version was presented as a ‘new’ type of ‘Folkefælleskab’ and the foundation for the entire National 
Socialist idea.77 Its definition did not include references to race theory and described the National 
Socialist goal of ‘providing the people and the nation strength, to revive, to nurture and to gather all 
                                                          
74 Ejnar Vaaben, ‘Den Nordiske Bevægelse’, pp. 470–473, Rigsarkivet nr. 06540, box 2. As a wider basis for the idea of 
‘Danishness’, Grundtvig described the term Folkelighed in 1838 as an expression of the pure Danish, just as the term 
equally applied to other countries in their specific contexts of defining their true characteristics.  
75 Vaaben, Hagekorset over Danmark, p. 35, Rigsarkivet nr. 06540, box 2. 
76 Dansk Folkeværn was the civilian branch of Schalburgkorpset, open for both men and women and focused on 
political/ideological tasks such as propaganda. The organisation is further described in chapter 6. 
77 Gunnar Holm, ‘Danske Betragtninger over det tyske Folkefællesskab’, Information letter, Den Danske Front, 30 
October 1941, p. 1, Rigsarkivet nr. 10192, box 20. ‘1932-1944: Diverse Avisudklip’. 
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strengthening idealist powers and values that is hidden in the people’.78 It is thus evident that the 
German Volksgemeinschaft was ascribed a depth in its meaning through the Danish translation. 
Moreover, it ultimately enabled an understanding of the term which was rich enough to even exclude 
the race principle for a moment. In Vaaben’s usage, the race principle added to Grundtvig’s notion 
of ‘Danishness’ and gave it a contemporary relevance that further enhanced the National Socialist 
claim to universality. But that is not to say that the race principle was ever ascribed to Grundtvig. 
Rather, it was the opposite: Grundtvig’s ‘Folkefaellesskabet’ was another, more spiritual and thus 
complementary side of the National Socialist worldview and part of its universal dimension. 
 
Christian Teisen was a frequent contributor to Akademisk Aktion and the key Danish contact for the 
SS in the early stages of the establishment of Schalburgkorpset. His pan-Germanic siding in this 
debate was thus undeniable. In an article titled ‘Separatism or Cooperation’ from 1941, he argued 
that ‘most of those who speak of the “Nordic” imply its incompatibility with Germany’, but, as Teisen 
continued: 
 
We and our Nordic fellow nationals must without hesitation reach to Germany in the making of the new Europe. 
At the centre of the National Socialist world-view is the Nordic blood […] We shall not confine our expansionist 
need to abstract Scandinavian manifestations that have had their heydays in the past century – but today lack any 
reasonable sense.79 
 
Vaaben’s own definition of the Nordic idea (‘Den Nordiske Tanke’) is taken from the words of the 
Grundtvigianist and politically active Nazi sympathiser Mikkel Ejerslev, a friend of Vaaben 
throughout the 1930s and 1940s, who stressed that 
 
the Nordic idea is not political ideas of the differentiation between blue- and brown-eyed individuals. It is not a 
‘blonde international’ […] It is central to the Nordic idea that people from this race share more than physical 
characteristics, that they have in common what determines their entire fate.80 
 
As it refutes the race principle in its strictly biological sense for the more mythical understanding 
of the Nordic common heritage, this description of the Nordic idea could appear ambivalent. But 
it does perhaps even more so tell a story of the importance Vaaben ascribed to the fusion of 
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mysticism and science. Nordic thinking was not strictly equivalent to pseudoscientific theories on 
race, it also had a more spiritual dimension. Vaaben’s preoccupation with race theory stemmed 
from what he called ‘the volkish moment’ in National Socialism, rather than from the 
Scandinavian racial and biological institutes and their theorists. In 1939, Vaaben modified DNP’s 
party programme from 1930, where the term ‘Danish’ replaced ‘race-scientific’ as the foundation 
for the education of the Danish people.81 That is not to say that Vaaben did not draw parallels 
between these myths of a common heritage and race theory, for he did in fact praise its ‘clarifying’ 
effects on the idea of ‘race’.82 He was, however, convinced that the biologically founded race 
principle ultimately depended upon a mythical core in the racial community that transcended 
clinical and scientific measurements. In an article from 1935, Vaaben stressed that it was Günther’s 
pioneering work, Rassenkunde des deutschen Volkes, from 1922 that had finally articulated the 
relationship between race science and Nordic thought. However, as Vaaben clarified it, ‘Nordic 
thought has in all ages, and among all Nordic people witnessed [Günther’s] predecessors who 
emphasised the Nordic blood and its unbreakable bond with cultural values and characteristics.’83 
For Vaaben, Grundtvig was undoubtedly one of those Nordic prophets who had articulated the 
race principle long before it was even provided with biological or scientific terminology. In 
Vaaben’s words, Grundtvig ‘despised the failed attempts in the 1800s which sought to impose 
foreign systems on people in their natural environments’, and Vaaben ends by claiming that 
‘Nordic thought is thus not an imported product […] “Made in Germany”, but an inner necessity 
for every healthy and strong Nordic people’.84 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
81 Vaaben, Hagekorset over Danmark, pp. 48–49. 
82 Vaaben explicitly mentioned the importance of the ‘Racial-biological perception of history’ as developed in the 
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VII 
Divergent Visions of Pan-Germanism 
 
The Nordic idea had to overcome certain paradoxes concerned with the ‘pro-German’ association 
with pan-Germanism. Just as we have seen a divide between a scientific and a mythical understanding 
of the Nordic idea, the historian Anders Monrad Pedersen has distinguished between two parallel 
understandings of German nationalism in Vaaben’s intellectual work. This, according to Pedersen, is 
the divide between the essentially political and ‘imperialist’ understanding and the more idealist and 
racially oriented view.85 Vaaben’s position as ideological leader of the Schalburg school during the 
war further indicates how an analysis of his work extends beyond his personal profile and indicates 
the ideological outlook of many Danish National Socialists at the time. In fact, we find expressions 
of this divide in approaches to pan-Germanism in the statement by Schalburg member and editor of 
Akademisk Aktion Christian Teisen that there was an ‘inner tension within the occupational machinery 
regarding the relationship with Danish National Socialism and Schalburgkorpset’.86 From the Danes’ 
perspective, Pedersen briefly describes – but does not sufficiently elaborate upon – what he identifies 
as Schalburgkorpset’s ‘attempts to create a Danish National Socialism’ with a foundational 
Grundtvigian philosophy.87 Vaaben identified a fundamental conflict within nationalism between 
Aryan solidarity and imperialist domination. With two such diverse strands of German nationalism, 
both Vaaben and the Norwegian Ragnarok members operated with the perception that two equally 
diverse interpretations of pan-Germanic politics and ideas emerged: either a mythical, less concrete, 
union between the Nordic people or a political alliance that, falsely according to Vaaben, would imply 
recognising the German Herrenvolk ahead of Nordic equality. 
 
It was in this dilemma, of claiming a pan-Germanic identity and at the same time avoiding an 
uncritical acceptance of German foreign policies, where Vaaben saw Grundtvig’s work as a 
remarkable fusion between precisely the idealist and the political. The adoption of Grundtvigianism 
in thinking about National Socialism as a form of transnational dialogue meant that Vaaben 
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considered the safeguarding of Danish particularity integral to a true understanding of National 
Socialism. This way of thinking also served to set boundaries for Nazi Germany’s expansionism in 
the sense that the pan-Germanic order was presented in a dynamic relationship with national freedom. 
Another article in På Godt Dansk from December 1943 states that while ‘the spiritual foundation for 
the pan-Germanic idea is encompassed by the National Socialist principle of preserving the race and 
the Volk as homogenous entities’, pan-Germanism ‘must not turn into a static scheme that overlooks 
the specific national contexts’.88 The Grundtvigian structure thus functioned intellectually to 
safeguard particular Danish interests. 
 
 
Ragnarok: ‘Heretical pan-Germanists’ 
This structural way of thinking, however, also prompted Vaaben and his Norwegian colleagues to 
take a stance against certain versions of National Socialism, at home and abroad, that they saw as 
contradicting its generic principles. Just like Vaaben’s criticism of Clausen, the Ragnarok author 
Imerslund described in an article of 1942 how the ‘traitors within our own ranks’ were to be found in 
Quisling’s movement.89 The frequent use of terms implying a generic meaning to National Socialism, 
like ‘true’ and ‘pure’, among these Scandinavians did not prevent their embrace of pluralism. 
Ragnarok writings on pan-Germanism, in a similar way to their Danish counterparts, opened up the 
idea that pan-Germanic thinking implied a transnational dialogue in order for it to be called ‘pan-
Germanic’ in the first place. Albert Wiesener established this point clearly in his article in Ragnarok, 
stating that ‘without the acknowledgement and the respect for national particularities, an all-
encompassing internationalism is impossible’.90 
 
The respect for national particularities also called for a degree of ‘incorrectness’ towards those 
notions of pan-Germanism where missions of an all-encompassing internationalism dominated. The 
historians Terje Emberland and Matthew Kott argue that from an ideological angle, ‘where race 
theory and pan-Germanism is concerned, Ragnarok remained heretical’.91 Whether Ragnarok’s 
attitudes to pan-Germanic ideology should be regarded as heretical in nature or not depends on 
whether one approaches the issue from a historiographical or a historical viewpoint. First, the 
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heretical label is dependent on a contrasting image of something orthodox which, in a similar way to 
the argument of this chapter, is identified by Emberland as macro-nationalist German expansionism. 
In a more recent piece, however, Emberland and Kott approach the issue from the opposite angle, 
from the SS visions of Norway and their treatment of indigenous Nazi movements like Ragnarok. 
Historical research on SS policies shows a high degree of acceptance regarding national divergences 
and particularities. This tolerance, in turn, tends to be overshadowed by analytical approaches that 
rest on a perception of ‘the German factor’ – i.e. SS ideology – as the cohesive force in transnational 
studies on Nazism.92 Consequently, there is reason to question the ‘orthodox’ label with respect to 
the SS’s pan-Germanic policies as such. 
 
That being said, it is one thing to consider historical research on SS policies but quite another to 
consider the perceptions held by Ragnarok members in a context of occupation and general 
disillusionment with National Socialist ideals. In the latter case, it is clear that regardless of the 
relatively tolerant SS policies, the Ragnarok movement had a self-proclaimed heretical identity. We 
see this in their embrace of ‘theological incorrectness’ in their critique of Christianity, and its 
continuation into the political realms of fascism and various National Socialist movements. 
Ragnarok’s heretical outlook was not isolated to their pan-Germanic ideas, neither was it confined 
to their religious criticism, but it was a principle of incorrectness that they expressed both 
theologically and ideologically. Ragnarok’s publication of the Nazi theologian Herbert Grabert’s 
definition of the ‘Germanic German worldview’ is one indication of their emphasis on the 
transgressive ingredient in the Nazi worldview. Grabert, who served in Alfred Rosenberg’s foreign 
political office for ideological information and had connections with Norwegian theologian 
Schjelderup mentioned in chapter 4, emphasised that: 
 
It is an unfortunate illusion thinking that the beliefs of a young nation will have to appear proper and correct in 
order to face their tasks. What is required is precisely the opposite. […] A world-view without the fighting spirit 
is no belief worth the effort […] The forces of stolidity that continuously undermine the revolt of youth will 
demand facades and dogmas.93 
 
 
This text acquired a particular meaning in the Norwegian context. In a way radically different from 
the clear-cut elitism of the SS, the Scandinavian take on Nazi transgression was infused with an 
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intrinsic sense of being in an ‘underdog’ position. Four months after the occupation of Norway, 
Ragnarok published an article by the Waffen-SS soldier and Norwegian war correspondent Ulf 
Breien, who discussed the judicial implications of Lebensraum. His approach was primarily focused 
on the consequences for pan-Germanic, yet ‘subordinate’, states: 
 
Who should have the authority to decide upon the position of the smaller states? Should their fate rest in the hands 
of the Greater Reich? The unevenness that develops naturally between states is one matter, it is quite another to 
deliberately construct a system of leading states [førerstater] and follower people [følgefolk] […] The dangerous 
implications this will have on international law are clear.94 
 
Lebensraum was, according to Breien, an expression of the ‘supranational concepts that German 
theorists claimed resonated with the demands and universalism (pan-Europe) of the time’.95 While it 
was more common among Ragnarok individuals to emphasise the race principle in order to 
compensate for their lack of national supremacy, Breien’s conclusion was heretical in another sense. 
In a second article from the same publication, Breien rejected the primacy of race by sidelining the 
importance of racial heritage for that of ‘geographical heritage’: 
 
Scandinavia has no state which can claim the absolutist position of being the Greater Reich. This thinking must be 
replaced with the existence of principally equal states and their common ability to actively cooperate. The 
establishment of a greater region [German: Grossraum, Norwegian: Storrum] cannot be a universal process but is 
dependent upon the particularities of the relevant states and its people.96 
 
The position of Norway between German expansionism and a pan-Germanic utopia was a dilemma 
shared by many National Socialists in Norway at the time, regardless of affiliations with the Ragnarok 
circle. In order to configure the expectations from their Norwegian readers with their affiliations with 
the SS, the editorial board of the SS-supported Norwegian pamphlet Germaneren frequently stressed 
the complexity of the pan-Germanic question. Its editor Egil Holst Thorkildsen stated in October 
1942: 
 
It is time to explain what we mean when we speak of a Germanic cooperation. Let us once and for all make it clear 
that this concept is among many people, not only in this country, seen as a cliché with no deeper meaning. When 
we speak of Germanic cooperation we are not speaking of a cooperation between a ruler and its slaves – but a 
                                                          
94 Ulf Breien, ‘Livsrum-begreppet i Folkeretten’, Ragnarok, 6:5 (August 1940), p. 100. On Breien’s National Socialist 
career and war correspondence, see Björn Westlie, Hitlers Norske Budbringere (Oslo: Aschehoug & co, 2013). 
95 Breien, ‘Livsrum-begreppet I Folkeretten’, p. 100. 
96 Ulf Breien, ‘Norden som storrum’, Ragnarok, 6:5 (August 1940), p. 127. 
 
 
 
185 
 
cooperation based on equality […] Many intelligent individuals still believe that the pan-Germanic idea essentially 
undermines our own heritage and character […] Germanske SS is in an inter-Germanic organisation. Only those 
Germanic people who safeguard their particularities deserve a place in the pan-Germanic community and are valid 
members of Germanske SS. It is a misunderstanding to believe that SS is led by a principle of homogenisation 
with for example the Germans as the model. It is also a misunderstanding to believe that due to its superior size, 
the Germans will have the leading role […] we solely believe in quality and race.97 
 
There are different ways to approach this text. Certainly, coming from the propaganda organ of an 
SS organisation, the statement is an argument against the idea that there is a fundamental 
contradiction in combining support for the SS idea and striving for Norwegian independence. But 
beyond SS propaganda, Torkildsen’s statement on the SS should also be analysed for the aggression 
with which he asserts Norwegian independence in relation to Nazi Germany. As much as this article 
was directed to those criticising the entire pan-Germanic idea, it was also a message to those 
Norwegian National Socialists who had begun to see how the idea was taking different forms that in 
turn required different political actions. Indeed, as Breien stated in Ragnarok in 1942, ‘The pan-
Germanic idea is not new to us’ but, as he continued, ‘today, the struggle for the pan-Germanic idea 
has a double meaning for us Norwegians’.98 
 
Germaneren’s defence of the ‘Norwegian’ strand of pan-Germanic thinking was often based on 
arguments that pointed to a connection between the deepening of Norwegian identity and the process 
of pan-Germanic cooperation. For example, one article from 1942 argued that being a true Norwegian 
meant needing to ‘look beyond Norway, to think and act Germanic. That is our best national 
particularity.’99 The author continued his defence of the pan-Germanic idea by pointing to the need 
to transgress old conventions: 
 
Some got lost in the foreign, some got lost in their own particularity. Perhaps it is the struggle between these 
oppositional forces, between those longing to break out and those holding on to the old patriotism, which on a 
deeper level creates the conditions for a particularly Norwegian character. It is a struggle that ultimately results in 
the unification of the two on a higher level. In this struggle, in this unification, and on this higher expression, is 
the Norwegian consciousness developed.100 
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The author first and foremost illustrates a fundamental connection between a particular form of 
Norwegian National Socialism and the principle of transgression. In the Norwegian context, the act 
of looking beyond the conventional frames, including national borders, was thus seen as essential to 
the National Socialist idea. A Norwegian front soldier wrote that ‘National Socialism demands a total 
reconfiguration. Old concepts cease to have meaning, and are thrown overboard.’101 It was in actual 
struggle, both theoretically and physically, that the true National Socialist and simultaneously 
Norwegian character would emerge. Rather than being perceived as incompatible, pan-Germanism 
and Norwegian nationalism were presented as two mutually strengthening components in the process 
of fostering a typically Norwegian National Socialism. It was a National Socialist ideology that 
‘avoided confusing being Germanic with being German’.102 
 
 
VIII 
Ideological Incorrectness  
 
Whether it was Vaaben’s Grundtvigian references in his pan-Germanic thinking or whether it was the 
Norwegians’ discourse on the emergence of ‘Norwegianness’, the act of struggle was seen as pivotal 
to a true National Socialist identity. The tension between the national particularities of each National 
Socialist nation and imperialistic impulses to homogenise these particularities for power-political 
purposes was an issue of pan-Germanic thinking that these Scandinavians were not only well aware 
of, but also guided by in their works on National Socialist ideology. For geopolitical reasons, the 
emphasis on struggle took a different meaning within Scandinavian peripheral movements compared 
to its German centre. Indeed, ‘ideological correctness’ was a way of thinking not confined to these 
small movements. As several scholars today argue, it was actually central to German National 
Socialism both in political practice and in its idealised form. But it gained a more concrete meaning 
in the Scandinavian context through the discourse on pan-Germanism between political reality and 
idealism. So far, we have looked at ‘ideological incorrectness’ from the point of these individuals’ 
thinking about macro-political issues regarding the diverse National Socialist nations’ relations with 
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each other. Being ‘ideologically incorrect’ in this setting thus meant that the National Socialist 
identity of each country depended on the safeguarding of their ‘incorrectness’ vis-à-vis the political 
implementation of National Socialism in other countries. In the next and final section of this chapter, 
‘ideological incorrectness’ will be discussed for its function on an individual level, with a primary 
focus on the Norwegian Ragnarok milieu. The oppositional position that the Ragnarok individuals 
found themselves in was a position of ‘incorrectness’ in relation to other National Socialist agents 
both internationally and nationally, and the argument is that the Ragnarok individuals themselves 
justified this position ideologically. On a personal level too, they saw their individual ‘ideological 
incorrectness’ as a manifestation of a correct National Socialist identity. 
 
 
 
IX 
‘Action Idealists’ 
 
The Danish National Socialist writings on Scandinavianism moved beyond being merely a battle 
between two movements of ideas to include an image of a war between two types of personalities. 
Vaaben sketched an individualised ideal as he glorified ‘the warrior’ where Scandinavianism was 
accused of its ‘passive’ (pacifist) and ‘isolationist’ (neutral) character.103 Christian Teisen described 
how these ‘Scandinavian separatists [separatist in the sense of being anti-Nazi] have a vision of the 
Nordic as the preservation of out-dated and static ideologies that politically avoid the uniting 
framework that exists under the auspices of the German Reich’.104 Thus, Vaaben and Teisen described 
the political idealist who had to battle the passive and corrupt personality that characterised the liberal 
tradition. But it was not only individuals belonging to self-declared oppositional forces against 
National Socialism who displayed this type of passive personality. The Norwegian Egil Holst 
Thorkildsen made it clear that it also included those individuals who called themselves National 
Socialists but in fact subscribed to an incorrect concept of its meaning, for example, ‘those Germans 
who acted unsympathetically as compromised National Socialists’.105 
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The notion of ascribing to someone a ‘wrong’ perception of National Socialism was often coupled 
with an accusation of a lack of idealism. In other words, being an idealist was a clear measurement 
of National Socialist character. The German leader of the Scandinavian office at the NSDAP’s 
Department of Propaganda (Reichspropagandaministerium), Ernst Zuchner, for example, described 
the entire Ragnarok movement as a ‘circle of young Norwegian political idealists, called Ragnarok, 
who moreover referred to themselves as National Socialists’.106 For opportunistic reasons, Zuchner’s 
and the Ragnarok members’ post-war defences all underlined that there indeed existed an orthodox, 
totalitarian version of National Socialism that had gradually departed from the original, idealist 
version. Barth-Heyerdahl recalled a meeting with Zuchner immediately following 9 April 1940, 
where Zuchner had told him that 
 
you Norwegians must learn to think outside the box [um die Ecke denken] […] You need to be clever, to make 
oaths with the sole intention to break them. Use all phrases, but act entirely the opposite. It is perfectly allowed 
against someone like Hitler, who does the same thing.107 
 
In this NSDAP official, Ragnarok had a German ally who shared their opinions on the German 
imperialist methods. Zuchner had a word for this form of imperialism, he called it ‘Nazi 
orthodoxy’.108 ‘They [Ragnarok] were full of criticism against the established political system’ and 
Zuchner saw it as his primary task ‘to make these young Scandinavian idealists aware of the true 
nature of Nazism and Hitler, his obsession with power and its violent methods – which in reality was 
a fundamental contradiction to their ideals’.109 
 
But despite the opportunistic tone of such post-war testimonies, the idealist and reactionary position 
of the majority of Ragnarok members throughout their National Socialist careers points to a 
continuity that cannot be explained by mere opportunism. Testimonies from individuals with no 
obvious reason to understate the Ragnarok members’ National Socialist convictions are consistent in 
their labelling of the Ragnarok circle as a group of National Socialist idealists. For example, 
Quisling’s secretary Rolf J. Fuglesang had the following impression of Hans Jacobsen: 
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He was an idealist, and not afraid to express his divergent opinions and meanings. He was also a person with an 
independent nature, who struggled to subordinate to an organisation, or even to the leadership of others. He did, 
despite his [Nazi] sympathies, take a clearly independent stance when it came to his Norwegian outlook […] He 
took a clearly Norwegian stance, and distanced himself from the imperialist tendencies in for example SS 
policies.110 
 
Jacobsen was described by Quisling’s right-hand man Fuglesang as an idealist to the extent that 
Jacobsen did not hesitate to act incorrectly towards SS authorities. The picture of Jacobsen resonates 
well with the kind of line in political thinking that the Ragnarok member Tor Strand called a ‘third 
way’. Strand was a former NS youth activist who, symptomatically of the Ragnarok movement, had 
left NS in 1936. Strand led the voluntary labour service organisation Frivillig Norsk Arbeidstjeneste 
(later renamed Arbeidsdugnad). After 9 April 1940, Strand was advised by Carl Frølich-Hansen, the 
chief of the labour service which had gone into the hands of NS, and renamed Nasjonal Samlings 
Arbeidstjeneste (AT), to re-enter the party. Fuglesang responded to Strand’s request by stating that 
membership in NS required ‘the unconditional recognition of Quisling’.111 Strand never re-entered 
the party and his work at AT was also threatened by people from NS circles who opposed Strand’s 
‘unpolitical attitude’,112 where the NS leadership had allegedly listed him as an ‘unreliable element, 
not to be accepted as a member of the party’.113 Strand explained his unpolitical outlook as driven by 
the fact that since 1936, he had believed in taking ‘an individualistic third position’ in politics that 
implied a political ‘modernisation of the democratic system’.114 
 
Tor Strand: ‘The synthesis of contradictions that creates totality’ 
Strand explicitly referred to the Danish political party Dansk Samling, which was established in 1936 
by Arne Sørensen with their party pamphlet called Det tredje Standpunkt (‘The Third Way’). Dansk 
Samling advocated a fascist-inspired synthesis of liberal and socialist politics, and this was a political 
outlook that very much resembled Anders Malling’s Dansk Folkefællesskab in its critique of the 
DNSAP’s imitation of the German NSDAP.115 The parallels with Ragnarok’s position in the 
Norwegian context are clear as the formation of Dansk Samling coincided with the establishment of 
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Ragnarok. Moreover, Ragnarok’s exit from NS was based on similar accusations of Quisling’s 
inauthentic National Socialist politics as we find among the Danes in their attitudes to Clausen. It was 
Strand’s belief in the ‘third way’ that had attracted him to AT in the first place, as an organisation 
that symbolised ‘the possibility of a practice beyond dogmas and political parties’.116 The ‘third way’ 
was a call for a political practice based on a principle of ideological incorrectness – an incorrectness 
towards the kind of ideological homogeneity that undermined fruitful exchanges between the 
different political parties. 
 
Strand’s perception of Ragnarok’s role in Norwegian politics cannot be separated from his ‘third 
way’ ideology. His idealisation of the unconventional comes through in his description of the 
published material in Ragnarok as works: ‘You need to read between the lines’ and the entire position 
of Ragnarok as being between the polar opposites on the political spectrum: between the current 
weakness of the democratic system on the one hand and the Nazi dictatorial politics on the other.117 
Strand did not regard this in-between position, however, as a safe and mediocre middle way. Far from 
it: an unpublished paper with the title ‘Reckoning and Outlook’ (Oppgjør og Utsyn), written after the 
German occupation, reflects his reactionary and dynamic understanding of the ‘third way’. Strand 
describes a life without opposition as a life that is ‘sterile, annihilating, [and] a total destruction of 
the freedom that lies in contradictions’.118 The experience of German occupation had forced 
Norwegians to adapt to an environment full of violence, opposition and war. In that way, Strand 
argued, the occupation symbolised an ideal of constantly transgressing all that is perceived as 
contradictions: ‘The contradiction becomes the inspiring accentuation of itself and the contradiction. 
It reflects the versatility of life. It dictates life, renewal and the synthesis of contradictions that creates 
totality.’119 Strand embraced the fighting ingredient of conflict that had become even clearer 
following the Nazi occupation: ‘we had to face conflict and a broadening of the horizon we had to 
acknowledge ourselves, and were forced to live in opposition’.120 
 
Strand developed an equally complex and contradictory attitude towards National Socialist ideology. 
On the one hand, he argued that Nazi dictatorship was the final consequence of the crisis of democracy 
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in Europe – Nazism was in that sense a symbol of failure rather than an authentic ideology.121 On the 
other hand, he clarified that it was a specific ‘materialist direction within Nazism’122 that had caused 
National Socialist ideology to be so intimately associated with dictatorship in the first place.123 The 
latter statement seems to imply that Strand had an idea of a pure, non-corrupt side to National 
Socialism. His fascination with the work of Norwegian economist and intellectual Erling Winsnes 
potentially explains how Strand reconciled his attraction to Nazism with his aversion for actual Nazi 
politics. First of all, Strand was attracted by the völkisch ideas that tied his Norwegian nationalism to 
aspects of Nazi ideology: Strand described the term Folkenorske (‘Norwegianness’) as the nation-
specific foundation on which Norwegian society must be built. He drew explicit parallels between 
Winsnes’s position and that of Grundtvig’s conception of ‘Danishness’ in Denmark when he 
presented Winsnes as the Norwegian equivalent, and an improved version, of the way Grundtvig had 
led his Danish people.124 Similar to the way Vaaben understood the relationship between National 
Socialism and ‘Danishness’, Strand stated that ‘Nationalism is the political realisation of the 
Folkenorske’ and by that he meant that the more political ideologies, technology and religious ideas 
were compatible with these ‘Folkenorske’ foundations, the greater the likelihood that a true and 
authentic Norwegian nation would emerge.125 The völkisch outlook can be seen as the common 
denominator in Strand’s nationalism and National Socialism, but it was his emphasis on Nazi 
pluralism that enabled Strand to hold a strong profile within a National Socialist circle such as 
Ragnarok and still condemn dictatorships. The embrace of plurality was an intellectual preoccupation 
for Strand and it infused all his political activities. In his own publication on Winsnes’s philosophy, 
Strand described Winsnes as ‘undogmatic, and free of systematic constraints’. In fact, Strand’s 
argument that future politics must follow a ‘third individualistic line’ seemed a replication of 
Winsnes’s ‘two wrong lines, and the true third’.126 Like Ejnar Vaaben’s fascination with Grundtvigian 
thinking, Strand held a similar fascination with Winsnes’s contradictory and interactive thinking: 
 
                                                          
121 Strand, ‘Det tyske eliteproblem’, in ibid. 
122 Ibid. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Tor Strand, Vår vei heter Nordveien: En bok om Erling Winsnes (Oslo: Gyldendals Forlag, 1945). p. 101. The close 
relationship between AT, the Folkenorske and Winsnes is described by Strand in the article ‘Norsk arbeidstjeneste’, 
Ragnarok, 2:1 (March 1936), p. 1. 
125 Riksarkivet, L-sak Guldbrandsdalen politikammer nr. 1098. 
126 Strand, Vår vei heter Nordveien. 
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He [Winsnes] wants to make us uneasy, to unravel and destroy the dream, all that in order to help us to break free 
from our familiar patterns, to force us to see things from a new angle. That is why his philosophy is free from 
systems, and provides only a thinly weaved web of allusions, often slippery and self-contradictory.127 
 
Strand described Winsnes’s method of thinking as the ‘contrasting effect’ (kontrastvirkningen). 
Different from the materialist direction within Nazism, Strand had seen ‘promising impulses from 
Nazi Germany’ where National Socialism seemed the ideology fit to realise his dream of the 
Folkenorske.128 For him, Nazism appeared to break with old political structures and modes of 
thinking, and ideally the ideology resonated with Strand’s aversion to conventional politics and 
conventional thinking more generally. But following the occupation, Strand’s activities in AT were 
threatened by a loss of independence because of increased German efforts at interfering. By 25 
September 1940, AT had been subordinated to NS and effectively to the German administration. By 
then, Strand had urged Ragnarok colleague Barth-Heyerdahl to join his efforts in undermining the 
German influence on AT: ‘There was a need for someone willing to disagree with the Germans in 
their demands and plans.’129 It was then that Strand’s National Socialist idealism faced Nazi politics 
for the first time and experienced its constraining effects. Walter Fürst, a colleague in both AT and 
Ragnarok, described Strand as ‘a genuine idealist, entirely captured by AT, and so Norwegian in his 
outlook that he met opposition not only from NS, but also from the Germans’.130 His idealism, 
moreover, was increasingly defined as a particular strand of National Socialism. Against the 
materialist elements of Nazism depicted by Strand, Thorkildsen similarly called for an idealist 
revolution: ‘we need men, not puppets’, he wrote, who do ‘not talk National Socialism but act and 
live National Socialism’.131 
 
To Hitler: A word of warning from a ‘True National Socialist’ 
The Ragnarok member and frequent contributor to the pamphlet Ola Furuseth took Thorkildsen’s 
connection between action and true National Socialist identity one step further. He defined himself 
explicitly as an ‘action idealist’ struggling against the corrupt elite, and he simultaneously defined 
the ideal he found central to National Socialism.132 Against the correctness that Thorkildsen despised 
                                                          
127 Ibid., p. 42. 
128 Strand’s testimony from 20 October 1945, in Riksarkivet Guldbrandsdalen politikammer, nr. 1098. 
129 Riksarkivet L-sak Oslo politikammer, nr. 6331. 
130 Testimony from Walter Fürst dated 29 March 1946, in ibid. 
131 Egil Holst Thorkildsen, ‘De Revolusjonaere’, published in Germaneren in Riksarkivet L-sak Oslo politikammer, nr. 
2483. 
132 The term ‘action idealist’ is defined by Furuseth as ‘the willpower of the Nordic soul’ in Riksarkivet, L-sak 
politikammer, nr. 651. 
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as a ‘puppet mentality’, Furuseth incorporated incorrectness into his definition of the real Nazi man. 
But the corrupt elite to which he referred was not a liberal government, a fascist movement or the 
Church. In fact, he was describing the SS leadership in Berlin. We shall see in the next and final 
chapter more precisely how the political relations between these Norwegian individuals and the SS 
played out. For now, it suffices to pay attention to the image of the SS that comes through in some of 
Furuseth’s writings, and how it contrasted with his ideal of a true National Socialist individual. It is 
clear that these two images developed simultaneously and fed each other. In a private letter from 
1944, he described the SS head office as an endless struggle against Pharisees and bureaucrats.133 He 
had also reflected upon Claus von Stauffenberg’s attempt to assassinate Hitler on 20 July 1944, and 
in a letter from August 1944, he condemned the nature of both Quisling’s and Hitler’s leadership: 
 
Had it not been for all the mini-fuehrers who suppress the voices of the lower ranks of the party, the real idealists, 
the plot would not have been executed. As it is now, both Hitler and Quisling are sitting with their heads in the 
clouds, and a circle of opportunists surrounds them.134 
 
Furuseth’s experience in the SS had proved to be nothing but ‘a stiff and irresponsible bureaucracy, 
where no one had clearly defined responsibilities’ and where his own mission to ‘improve certain 
conditions for the Norwegians within the SS were diminished’.135 He described everyday squabbles 
between Germans and Norwegians at the SS schools, where the ‘Germans called us [the Norwegians] 
opportunistic Germanics whilst we replied that the Germans were nothing but southern-European 
“dagos”’.136 Furuseth expressed through several letters and other written material how the ‘Germans’ 
perpetuated a corrupt kind of National Socialism. Idealists were pushed aside to make way for 
hypocrites. The accusation of Nazi hypocrisy is clearly expressed in a letter written on 5 November 
1944 titled ‘A word of warning form a Norwegian to the German people: In the eleventh hour’: 
 
You must admit that now your friends among the world’s nations are few. You had natural allies but they are 
disappearing one by one. Why? […] Have you kept your promises? Can you lead other nations and races? […] I 
believe I can safely answer no to that question […] There is nothing wrong with setting the goals high, but don’t 
be surprised over other nations’ impulses to defend themselves. You have learned to view other people’s land as 
your ‘Lebensraum’, to view other people as nothing but servants for your own cause. That is precisely how the 
Jews look at people as ‘Gojim’ – people of a second class and people who only live for the purpose of being used 
                                                          
133 Private correspondence dated 5 November 1944, in ibid. 
134 Ibid 
135 Ibid. 
136 Ibid. 
 
 
 
194 
 
[…] Many occupied areas had to have a Reichskommissar and a German mark on them in order to be seen as 
worthy of existing in Europe […] Now, in the eleventh hour you must learn from history, and avoid repeating old 
mistakes. There is no turning back this time, no bridge leading back […] You have a fuehrer looked up to by all 
conscious Germanics across the world, and we are willing to call ourselves ‘national traitors’ to join you in your 
world mission […] One of the greatest tragedies in history will repeat itself and you will destroy the white man’s 
world completely if this will not be your victory. If not, you will go on the path of suffering as the Jews did 2000 
years ago, and history will repeat itself without exception. The exodus, the slavery, the persecutions, the hatred 
from others – you will be a persecuted people without a home.137 
 
His desperate attempts, in his own words, to warn the Nazi leadership of its dominant and 
homogenising politics continued until the very end of the war. Increasingly, this was a project with 
no clear allies. While it had begun with a criticism limited to the Reichskommissariat’s policies in 
Norway, Furuseth’s greater involvement in the SS organisation in 1943 expanded his negative views 
on Quisling’s NS and German power politics to include the SS. This role of being in constant 
opposition is captured in Furuseth’s trial records where Norwegian judicial authorities held the 
impression that 
 
There is a constant sense of opposition in the accused’s (Furuseth’s) description of his activities – an opposition 
to anyone he encountered. The trial has illuminated his opposition to Karl Leib, the chief of the SS head office in 
Norway, where the conflict led to Furuseth being ordered to do front-service. He barely managed to avoid it. This 
oppositional relationship relates to Furuseth’s claim that his education of the front-soldiers was ‘Norwegian’ and 
that this was his way to support them. It was especially the editing of the SS pamphlet which caused tensions 
between Furuseth and the Germans, as Furuseth tried to incorporate distinctive Norwegian material in its 
content.138 
 
Beyond the struggle against Christian universalism, the real threat to the National Socialist order 
came from circles that were far more difficult to detach ideologically. Similarly to how Imerslund 
described ‘traitors in our own ranks’, Vaaben claimed that ‘it is not the obvious enemies that are the 
worst. The most dangerous are those who falsify National Socialism from within.’139 
 
 
 
                                                          
137 Letter written by Furuseth: ‘Ett alvorsord til det tyske folk: 5 minutter for 12. Av en nordmann’, dated 5 November 
1944, in Riksarkivet, L-sak Østerdal politikammer nr. 651. 
138 Ibid. 
139 Vaaben, Hagekorset over Danmark, p. 37. 
 
 
 
195 
 
X 
Chapter Conclusion 
 
The struggle against cultural imperialism that united Ragnarok with Ejnar Vaaben and Aage 
Andersen in Denmark thus did not end with their battle against Christianity. The previous chapter on 
the concept of ‘political religion’ focused on how ‘theological incorrectness’ played into the 
relationship between the Scandinavian Nazis’ own definitions of National Socialism and their 
rejection of Christian religion. This chapter has shown that it was not only theological but also 
‘ideological incorrectness’ that informed Ragnarok members and their Danish colleagues when 
facing what they perceived as the new dogmas of Quisling’s and Clausen’s politics and Nazi foreign 
policy. There were similarities between the criticism of Christianity identified as a principle of 
‘theological incorrectness’ and the later critique we find among these Scandinavian intellectuals that 
was directed against the policies of Nazi occupation. While this opposition was formulated as a 
struggle between divergent notions of a correct National Socialism, this chapter has found that 
embracing the idea of ‘ideological incorrectness’ represented a claim to ideological purity in its own 
right. 
 
This chapter has sought to make two interrelated points about National Socialism and ‘ideological 
incorrectness’: first, ‘ideological incorrectness’ identifies the logic of differentiation that 
Scandinavian Nazis used when setting their own rules for the relationship between National Socialist 
movements in the Nordic peripheries and the Third Reich. This logic underpins the way we can 
understand the transnational relations that existed between various Scandinavian National Socialist 
movements at the time. It also illuminates the actual discourse among these individuals about this 
transnational relationship. Second, that dimension of ‘incorrectness’ could only function as a guiding 
principle if it resonated – i.e. was justified theoretically – with a more universal perception of what 
National Socialist ideology entailed. ‘Ideological incorrectness’ was indeed a historical reality 
considering the heterogeneity among Nazi movements as well as being a reality that these movements 
were aware of. But above all, this ‘ideological incorrectness’ was an affirmation of the kind of 
uncompromising and transgressive character that scholars today describe as generic features of 
National Socialist ideology.
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Chapter 6: ‘Fed Up with Weltanschauung’ 
  
Years of Radicalisation and Disillusion, 1940–1945 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The psychiatrist François Bayle’s post-war analysis of the leader of Einsatzgruppe D, Otto Ohlendorf, 
likened Robert Stevenson’s figure ‘Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde’ to Ohlendorf’s conflicted personality. 
Bayle described Ohlendorf as ‘brilliant, but with a limited analytical and intellectual capacity that 
was subordinated to a kind of idealism not freed from fanaticism’.1 The Nazi dream of a society where 
the Volksgemeinschaft replaced ‘confession’ was, in Bayle’s analysis, a manifestation of this fanatic 
idealism.2 A copy of Bayle’s observations is located in Copenhagen, among the psychological 
investigations made in the post-war trials of Danish National Socialists, and they probably functioned 
as guidelines for Danish investigators in the cases against their own ‘national traitors’. Fanaticism 
and radicalism were not absent among Danish Nazis, where Aage Andersen, for example, was 
described as the Danish ‘Julius Streicher’ for his rabid anti-Semitism and Ejnar Vaaben’s racially 
infused pan-Germanism was regarded as a trait of a ‘political fanatic’.3 But as it turned out, 
Andersen’s organised anti-Semitic activities were put to an end in the mid-1940s: Werner Best and 
the German authorities realised the complicating consequences that Andersen’s radicalism might 
have for the politics of occupation and German financial support was consequently withdrawn.4 And 
Ejnar Vaaben, as we shall see, ended his career as a disillusioned Nazi collaborator.  
 
A similar fate met Andersen’s and Vaaben’s Scandinavian colleagues, and the final years of their 
careers will be the focus of this last chapter. While the previous chapter focused on the ideological 
dilemmas that awaited these Scandinavian intellectuals as Nazi Germany occupied their home 
                                                          
1 Copy of François Bayle, Psychologie et Etique du National-Socialisme, in Rigsarkivet, nr. 1355 Justitsieministeriets 
Psykiatriske Undersøgelseklinik, ‘1935–51 Diverse sager vedrörende Besettelsestiden’, box F14 ‘DNSAP’. 
2 Ibid. 
3 On Vaaben’s image as a pioneering Nazi, see John T. Lauridsen, ‘Den Förste Graenseredder’, pp. 411–419. Andersen 
was described as ‘Denmark’s Julius Streicher’ in various milieus including the first Danish historical account of the 
time of occupation in Børge Outze, ‘Vore hjemlige nazister’, in Wilhelm LaCour (ed.), Danmark under besættelsen vol. 
II (Copenhagen: Westermann, 1946), pp. 449–478. 
4 Werner Best to Auswärtige Amt, 15 April 1943 in Lauridsen (ed.), Werner Best’s Korrespondance, p. 493. 
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countries, this chapter will give a more detailed account of the organisational and political 
mechanisms that underpinned these dilemmas. Ejnar Vaaben, in Schalburgkorpset and the Norwegian 
Ragnarok circle, continued to have access to the inner circles of the NSDAP’s decision-making 
regarding Denmark and Norway – only to realise their political impotence rather than importance. 
While Ohlendorf’s National Socialist fanaticism turned him into a mass murderer on an 
unprecedented scale, these Scandinavian Nazi intellectuals are more difficult to position on the 
spectrum ‘between idealist humanism and murderous fanaticism’ that Bayle had identified in the Nazi 
worldview.5 There is an obvious difference between Ohlendorf and these Scandinavians, a structural 
difference which will also function as the framework of this chapter: while all of them praised the 
violence of the National Socialist kämpferische Weltanschauung, geopolitical borders and 
institutional boundaries lent the Scandinavians’ understanding of it a different meaning. Their version 
of the Nazi ‘fighting worldview’ not only engaged in idealist battles against liberalism, the 
confessional church and fascism, but also against the imperialism and ‘fanaticism’ of the Third Reich 
as it occupied Denmark and Norway on 9 April 1940. In Vaaben’s own words, the idea ‘that swastika 
cannot stand against swastika is merely a phrase – of course it can, and it does’.6 The emphasis that 
Vaaben and his colleagues put on the pivotal position of pluralism in National Socialist ideology has 
been discussed above and this final chapter will explain how this embrace of pluralism became for 
them a political necessity. 
 
This final chapter focuses on the situation following the German occupation where ‘ideological 
incorrectness’ took its most political and tangible form. It presents the histories of the Scandinavian 
SS organisations Schalburgkorpset and Germanske SS Norge as Vaaben and the profiled Ragnarok 
members figured in them during the occupation years. The chapter is structured into two main parts: 
firstly, the Norwegian case study of Ragnarok’s involvement in Germanske SS Norge (GSSN) and 
secondly, the Danish Schalburgkorpset with Vaaben as the ideological leader of the corps’ 
educational branch. Despite this division, both national case studies reveal striking similarities when 
it comes to how the ‘war’ unfolded between various Scandinavian and German visions of the purpose 
of these organisations. More extensive accounts of the mechanisms behind the establishment of 
GSSN are available, and research already shows how the organisation comprised divergent pan-
                                                          
5 François Bayle, Psychologie et Etique, Rigsarkivet, nr 1355, box 14. 
6 A quotation of Vaaben made by the nationalist conservative historian Wilhelm LaCour in an article published in 
Graensevagten, September 1934. In Rigsarkivet, nr. 06540, box 3.  
 
 
 
198 
 
Germanic ideologies.7 The power struggles that were characteristic of both organisations, however, 
are important to cover here in order to be clear about the kind of organisational and political contexts 
within which these Scandinavian intellectuals operated. With these contexts established, the 
particular form of transnational pan-Germanism that was discussed in chapter 3 will be further 
analysed as these idealist visions finally faced the possibilities of political concretisation following 9 
April 1940. With these possibilities came expectations and this chapter will describe a period that the 
main subjects of this thesis recalled as the ‘dark years’. The geopolitical realities that had been lurking 
in the background in the interwar years were now all the more obvious and the rules and practices of 
political occupation had once and for all illuminated the paradoxes of the Nazi anti-confessionalist 
gospel. In response, the ‘fighting worldview’ became the ideological weapon for these Scandinavians 
in claiming a National Socialist identity freed from the domination of Nazi Germany and which 
ultimately emphasised pluralism at the centre of its ideology. 
 
 
I 
Norway under Occupation 
 
‘Three wars went on in Norway during the occupation: Germans against Norwegians, Germans 
against Germans and Norwegians against Norwegians.’8 In his post-war trial, the Ragnarok editor 
Hans S. Jacobsen described the five years of the German occupation of Norway and his own role as 
a ‘Nazi collaborator’. There should be no doubt that emphasising grey zones and complexities within 
the Nazi milieu was an integral part of Jacobsen’s defence strategy. Indeed, he had obvious reasons 
to stress that the National Socialist milieu in Norway was more heterogeneous than one might have 
believed at the time. As the editor of GSSN’s propaganda organ Germaneren between June 1942 and 
January 1943, Jacobsen contributed actively to its ideological outlook in a formative period for the 
GSSN organisation. In fact, many of Jacobsen’s colleagues in GSSN and Ragnarok would similarly 
outline their post-war defences with the main explanation that they had entered GSSN to undermine 
the organisation and the entire German occupation system. At the same time, when we look into their 
intellectual production, their critique of Nazi policies – expressed both intellectually and politically 
                                                          
7 For more recent research, see Emberland and Kott, Himmlers Norge and Olav Bogen, Fremst i fylkingen: 
Germanske SS Norge. Organisasjonens historie, skoleringsvirksomhet og ideologi (Oslo: University of Oslo, 2008). 
8 Riksarkivet, L-sak Moss politikammer nr. 488, box 3. 
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– were often accompanied by fierce National Socialist propaganda. Rather than being signs of 
declining Nazi convictions, their actions instead appear as desperate attempts to safeguard the ‘pure’ 
core of National Socialism from what was perceived as the corrupt and ‘false’ forces led by Quisling 
and Terboven. 
 
These ‘three wars’ all have in common the fact that they fought over the ‘right’ implementation of 
ideology in politics. Regardless of whether we look into the Norwegian Nazis’ opposition to German 
‘imperialism’, German internal conflicts between the SS policies and the German Foreign Ministry 
(Auswärtiges Amt), or Ragnarok’s criticism of Quisling’s Nasjonal Samling (NS), a self-proclaimed 
National Socialist identity did not necessarily contradict an opposition to aspects of Nazi policies. 
 
Germanske SS Norge between nationalism and pan-Germanism 
The proclamation of the establishment of Germanske SS Norge on 21 July 1942 stressed that 
‘Germanske SS Norge is a National Socialist formation of soldiers with Nordic heritage who adhere 
to a Nordic world-view. It is an independent sub-division of NS, directly subordinated to the NS 
leader.’9 Yet, conflict within GSSN throughout its existence was caused by diverging visions of the 
organisation’s purpose. Some members had envisioned it as a military organisation with Waffen-SS 
recruitment as its main task, while others saw GSSN as primarily a cultural and ideological formation. 
The majority of Ragnarok members belonged to the latter group.10 What united these camps, 
however, was the common perception – which was implied in the official proclamation cited above 
– that GSSN represented a Norwegian, rather than German-led, elite formation of exceptional 
National Socialists. 
 
Gradually a more cynical view of the organisation emerged among the Norwegians. The NS party 
secretary, Rolf Jørgen Fuglesang, described tensions emerging even during the establishment of 
Germanske SS, the pre-runner of Germanske SS Norge, and was not just evident with the later GSSN. 
The idea of Germanske SS was delivered to the NS leadership during a meeting with Himmler in the 
summer of 1941, where ‘the attempt seemed to have come as somewhat of a surprise for Quisling, 
and that he [Quisling] in reality was not that persuaded by the thought, but agreed due to strategic 
                                                          
9 ‘Partiforordning om “Germanske SS Norge”’, Germaneren (July 1942), p. 1. 
10 Riksarkivet, L-sak Oslo politikammer, nr. 3003. 
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concerns’.11 The later establishment of GSSN was envisioned by high-ranking NS members like 
Fuglesang as just another way for the Germans to gain control over the organisation. Despite promises 
of cooperation, GSSN was looked upon as an extended arm of the SS which, as Fuglesang expressed 
it, ran ‘contrary to Norwegian national interests’.12 
 
GSSN was marked by SS elitism and was never intended to become a mass movement; it comprised 
1,200 men at the end of 1943, including 400–500 policemen and 400 front soldiers.13 Its propaganda 
organ Germaneren was established on 1 July 1942, with new editions published every second week 
until January 1943 when production became weekly. With a head office in Oslo, the organisational 
reach of GSSN was structured through geographical zones that followed the 15 Norwegian counties, 
with one leader, Stormfører, in each county. These leaders were generally unpaid, although there 
were exceptions, and the entire enterprise of GSSN was largely based on voluntary work.14 In addition 
to being a Norwegian male aged between 17 and 40 with a minimum height of 1.70 m., an aspiring 
member of GSSN would have to meet three fundamental requirements upon entering the organisation. 
First, one had to have held the status of aspiring member for one year. The following conditions dealt 
with racial matters, where the aspirant had to have genealogical documentation that confirmed his 
‘Nordic’ heritage, as well as having his ‘hereditary and racial measurements confirmed positive’.15 
In terms of political affiliation, the aspiring member had to either be a member of NS or have served 
the Waffen-SS or Den Norske Legion (a sub-division of the Waffen-SS comprised only of Norwegian 
soldiers). If none of these criteria were met an application could only be accepted directly by the NS 
secretariat. 
 
From an SS point of view, the plans to establish GSSN were a result of the growing concern within 
the Waffen-SS leadership regarding the ideological motivations among Norwegian front soldiers.16 
In the first half of 1942, with Himmler’s permission, negotiations took place between Gottlob Berger 
(the Waffen-SS leader), Terboven (the Reichskommissariat) and Quisling to form an Allgemeine SS 
organisation in Norway. While the NS representatives were involved in the process, the establishment 
                                                          
11 Report from 21 January 1941 on Fuglesang’s account of the establishment of SS Norge, in Riksarkivet, L-sak Oslo 
politikammer, nr. 2125. 
12 Ibid. 
13 The numbers refer to those provided by Emberland and Kott in Himmler’s Norge, p. 246. 
14 Karl Leib witness testimony in Riksarkivet, L-sak Moss politikammer, nr. 488. 
15 From the pamphlet ‘Germanske SS’ by Asbjørn Hansen, 1943 in Riksarkivet, L-sak Oslo politikammer, nr. 3003. 
16 Emberland and Kott, Himmler’s Norge, p. 341. 
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of GSSN was also a symbol of a more interventionist German line regarding the recruitment of 
Waffen-SS soldiers in Norway. This intervention effectively implied a compromise in Quisling’s role 
in the recruitment process. At one of the meetings regarding the establishment of the GSSN, 
Reichsjugendführer (‘Reich Youth Leader’) Artur Axmann had, according to a Norwegian GSSN 
member, described the NS as ‘useless’ and ridiculed Quisling.17 
 
GSSN received financial backing from the NSDAP in Munich from where funding was channelled 
through the SS office Germanische Leitstelle in Norway. The whole enterprise was part of a wider 
geopolitical experiment of establishing an inter-Germanic order in all Nazi-occupied ‘Germanic’ 
countries and simultaneously expanding the SS. Subordinated to the SS Main Office in Berlin, a 
Germanische Leitstelle was first established in each country, where Germanske SS (in Norway, 
Denmark, Belgium and the Netherlands) functioned as the first offices with non-German leaders. The 
leader of the Germanische Leitstelle in Norway from June 1942 was Karl Leib who in turn was 
directly subordinated to Gottlob Berger, a Waffen-SS general and chief of the SS Main Office who 
also happened to be Leib’s father-in-law. Leib described the German purposes of GSSN as a wider 
and more ideologically informed aim to ‘create a basis for communication between the Germanic 
people and the Germans, and raise understanding for the German struggle in the east’.18 
 
Internal organisational divisions 
GSSN was part of a web of military and political National Socialist organisations in Norway that had 
emerged by the second half of 1942. The SS stronghold in Norway had begun through organisational 
measures taken in 1940 with the establishment of the Dienststelle der Höheren SS- und Polizeiführer 
(HSSPF). This institution provided the SS with control over the Norwegian police, at the expense of 
the Reichskommissariat, and first and foremost represented a divide in the Nazi occupational policies 
in Norway between the SS and Terboven’s Reichskommissariat.19 Although the differences between 
the two Nazi institutions should not be exaggerated, it set the scene for the clear and more outspoken 
conflict between Quisling’s Hirden and the GSSN that developed a couple of years later. In January 
1941, Jonas Lie, the Norwegian chief of police, had already established Norges SS (NSS) as the 
predecessor to GSSN. NSS was, just as its successor GSSN, entirely separate from NS’s military 
group Hirden as the latter organisation was subordinated to Terboven’s Einsatzstab. The Einsatzstab 
                                                          
17 Riksarkivet, L-sak Oslo politikammer, nr. 2125. 
18 Witness testimony by Karl Leib in ibid. 
19 Hans-Dietrich Look, Quisling, Rosenberg og Terboven (Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1972), pp. 255–278. 
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was comprised of NSDAP members recruited by Terboven and placed as representatives of the 
Reichskommissariat in the various Norwegian counties. The short history of NSS reflects aspects of 
the later GSSN’s position, as NSS was a project undermined primarily by diverging German forces 
and power politics. While the men within the Einsatzstab tried to strengthen Hirden, doing so 
effectively reduced recruitment to NSS. 
 
As preparations for a new SS organisation took place in spring 1942, Leib was sent to Norway to 
undertake a thorough intervention in an already chaotic – and from the SS point of view – 
unsatisfactory Norwegian National Socialist milieu. At the time of the establishment of GSSN, the 
structures for potential conflict were thus already set. Fuglesang described a growing struggle 
between NS and GSSN in the years after 1942, with constant German attempts to isolate the 
organisation from NS influence.20 As Leib initially sought to release GSSN from the control of NS 
in order to broaden the recruitment basis, tensions quickly emerged between Leib, as a representative 
of SS, and Quisling.21 The Norwegian Leif Schjøren, who led GSSN from April 1943 to February 
1945, confirmed this situation. Schjøren stated in his post-war trial that ‘according to official 
declarations, GSSN was intended as an independent sub-division of NS’, but that, as he continued, 
‘GSSN was entirely independent of NS, and many of its members were not members of the NS […] 
It is safe to say that there were tensions between GSSN and NS.’22 Schjøren further claimed that 
Fuglesang had spoken of GSSN as ‘the common ground for all NS opponents and those unwilling to 
subordinate to the party discipline’.23 Fuglesang himself mentioned the conflict with Leib, where 
Fuglesang described GSSN as ‘a German attempt to expand its military position in Norway in the 
event of German victory. Indeed the Germans had purely imperialist ambitions in their so-called 
Germanic cooperation.’24 This situation, according to a former Waffen-SS soldier, was considered 
serious enough to prompt a German order to assassinate Fuglesang based on his opposition to 
GSSN.25 
 
The conflict that had originated in diverging political constellations thus soon developed into the 
perceptions of two equally National Socialist yet contradictory ideological camps. It was a 
                                                          
20 Witness testimony of Rolf Jörgen Fuglesang, ibid. 
21 Witness testimony of Karl Leib, ibid. 
22 Riksarkivet, L-sak Oslo politikammer, nr. 3003. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Witness testimony of Rolf Jörgen Fuglesang, ibid. 
25 Riksarkivet, L-sak Oslo politikammer, nr. 1099, box 1. 
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widespread perception at the time that the NS represented a particular ‘national line’ compared to the 
‘German-friendly’ GSSN. The GSSN organisation, in turn, was perceived among these ‘nationalists’ 
to be ‘dictated by Leib and entirely in the hands of the Germans’.26 One of the clearest expressions 
of this Norwegian–German National Socialist divide is the conflict that developed between Hirden 
and GSSN regarding the control of Norwegian front soldiers. Joint membership of Hirden and GSSN 
was not allowed, and this led to constant struggle regarding membership numbers.27 The fundamental 
difference in outlook between the two groups was clearly drawn up in the propaganda organ Skuggsjå, 
associated with the NS’s youth organisation NS Ungdomsfylking (NSUF). One article in the pamphlet 
separated the National Socialist tasks for GSSN and Hirden according to a pan-Germanic and 
Norwegian divide: 
 
Our comrades in Germanske SS Norge have as their main task to build a bridge between Norwegians and other 
Germanic people. The mission of Hirden is to bring out the faith in our own strength and destiny, which eventually 
will lead to national resurrection and the common goal for all sub-organisations: a National Socialist Norway. In 
a strong and unbreakable community between all Germanic people.28 
 
In a confidential report titled ‘The relationship between Germanske SS and Hirden’, the Hirden leader 
Oliver Møystad stated in November 1942 that ‘Germanske SS is expanding at the expense of Hirden. 
Recruitment to Germanske SS must be halted.’29 Møystad’s colleague describes German attempts, 
especially from Leib, to remove Møystad in response to his attempts to undermine the expansion of 
the SS in general and Germanske SS in particular. In Møystad’s view, ‘GSSN was Leib’s “playhouse” 
where Leib was preoccupied with turning Hird men into GSSN members.’30 From the viewpoint of 
GSSN, the relationship between the two organisations was given much attention through the monthly 
reports submitted by GSSN leader Leif Schjøren to the Norwegian head of SS and Chief of Police, 
Jonas Lie. One report from August 1943 concludes that Hirden’s attitudes towards GSSN had become 
increasingly hostile.31 A Hirden county leader further stated that there were rumours within NS that 
there were Germans in certain circles who ‘sought to remove individuals with this nationalist outlook, 
                                                          
26 Report conducted 16 April 1944 and presented 21 September 1945 in Riksarkivet, L-sak Oslo politikammer, nr. 3003. 
27 A later agreement between Hirden and GSSN dated 4 January 1944 declared that an aspiring GSSN or Hirden 
member would have to choose between membership in one of the organisations. Only in leadership positions was 
simultaneous membership in NSUF/Hirden and GSSN allowed. See ‘Personalavdelingen’ and ‘Betingelsene for 
opptsgelse I Germanske SS Norge’, in SS-Meddelelser, 1:1 (August 1944), pp. 16–17. 
28 Trond Rønning, ‘Ideologisk Skolering’, Skuggsjå, 2 (December 1943), p. 477, (original emphasis). 
29 Riksarkivet, L-sak Østerdal politikammer, nr. 3550. 
30 Witness testimony, Arthur Qvist, March 1946 in ibid. 
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and replace them with leading positions representing a pan-Germanic outlook, first and foremost 
GSSN’.32 
 
These dual structures between GSSN and Hirden also represented deeper issues of diverging German 
lines in Nazi occupation politics. The tensions between Reichskommissar Terboven and the SS were, 
in Jacobsen’s words, indeed a war of ‘Germans against Germans’ which directly sowed the seeds for 
a ‘Norwegians against Norwegians’ conflict in the relationship between Hirden and GSSN. It is 
against the backdrop of these dual wars that we can also see another ‘Norwegian against Norwegian’ 
war: the relationship between the two parallel military groups (Hirden and GSSN) was effectively 
translated into a conflict between NS men and NS opponents. In this vein, the mapping of these 
organisational identities confirms the Norwegian nationalist versus the German pan-Germanic divide, 
where NS and Hirden is positioned against the SS and the GSSN, with Terboven and the 
Reichskommissariat as the balancing agent. What this image leaves out, however, is a more in-depth 
look at the rationale behind Norwegian nationalists entering the GSSN. Several GSSN members 
would later claim that a third type of conflict, ‘Norwegians against Germans’, actually took place 
within this SS organisation, thus confirming divergent understandings of pan-Germanism. 
 
With regards to the use of the term ‘pan-Germanism’, it might appear paradoxical to identify a pan-
Germanic thinking on behalf of Ragnarok and certain GSSN members who clearly opposed certain 
pan-Germanic policies of the Third Reich. However, drawing from chapter 3 of this thesis, ‘pan-
Germanism’ was as integral to German expansionism as it was to Norwegian National Socialists, and 
from there conflicting conceptions emerged. As Emberland states, ‘it is easy to assume that Ragnarok 
saw German expansionism as the realisation of pan-Germanism, but that was certainly not the case’.33 
 
The GSSN leadership: A pan-Germanic Norwegian nationalism 
There were Norwegians, including Ragnarok members and others, who were not content to call 
themselves mere nationalists. They would rather speak of themselves as nationalist advocates of a 
pan-Germanic order with characteristic opposition to Quisling’s NS. While the nationality factor 
indeed created natural divisions, the tensions within the pan-Germanic organisation GSSN were 
ultimately brought about by competing perceptions of pan-Germanism as such. Those Ragnarok 
                                                          
32 Witness testimony from Fylkesfører Per Gjerstad, in ibid. 
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members who entered GSSN in 1942 were accompanied by other Norwegians who shared their pan-
Germanic ideas. One of them was Leif Schjøren, who functioned as the GSSN Chief of Staff for 
almost two years. In an article published after the liberation, a Norwegian Social Democratic 
pamphlet framed Schjøren and Egil Holst Thorkildsen, editor of GSSN’s pamphlet Germaneren, as 
a group of ‘Quislings in a war against Quisling’.34A former NS member would claim that Schjøren 
had seen possibilities for GSSN to ‘concentrate all Norwegian forces willing to undermine German 
assaults in Norway, as well as unfortunate developments within NS’.35 Schjøren was an NS member 
determined to overthrow Quisling from his leadership position and replace him with more pro-
German forces. Schjøren stressed his initial fascination with the National Socialist achievements he 
had witnessed on his travels to Nazi Germany in 1938, and further pointed to the attraction he felt for 
the elitist image of the GSSN as a ‘Norwegian, purely cultural formation on National Socialist 
grounds’ and a ‘formation with the highest possible demands on moral and ethical standards’.36 In 
his post-war trial, he maintained that his membership in NS had never been opportunistic but was 
based on a fundamental idealism, an idealism which had ultimately alienated him from the party. This 
image of the GSSN leader is confirmed in several witness testimonies where Schjøren’s idealism was 
often mentioned explicitly in relation to his outspoken opposition to Quisling and other leading NS 
figures such as Fuglesang.37  
 
Schjøren’s position was thus understood through the lens of the Norwegian nationalist versus German 
pan-Germanic division, and he was portrayed as one of ‘the Germans’ henchmen’ aiming to transform 
the GSSN from being Quisling’s personal lifeguards into a purely German organisation.38 This 
conflict eventually led to Schjøren’s dismissal from his leadership post as he was called in to 
Quisling’s office in December 1944 with accusations of ‘undermining the movement’. He was also 
ordered to do front service in the Waffen-SS and thus immediately leave GSSN.39 It is therefore clear 
that despite pan-Germanic idealist intentions that resonated ideologically with the SS’s visions, a 
conflict with Quisling did in many instances lead to German repercussions. 
 
                                                          
34 ‘Quislingenes krig mot Quisling’ published in Arbeiderbladet for Social-Demokraten Hovedorgan for Det norske 
Arbeiderparti on 19 May 1945, and located in Riksarkivet, L-sak Oslo politikammer, nr. 3003. 
35 Witness testimony by Axel Buhs, 10 November 1945, in Riksarkivet, L-sak Oslo politikammer, nr. 3003. 
36 Statement by Schjøren in ibid. 
37 Witness statement by a former GSSN member, 7 February 1946, in ibid. 
38 ‘Quislingenes krig mot Quisling’, Arbeiderbladet. 
39 Statement by Schjøren in Riksarkivet, L-sak Oslo politikammer, nr. 3003. 
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Schjøren’s colleague Erik Thorkildsen, also an NS member, became an ally in Schjøren’s work to 
undermine Quisling’s position. Thorkildsen was offered the role as editor of Germaneren and viewed 
the pamphlet as a potentially fruitful portal for criticising ‘unhealthy developments within NS’.40 He 
explained his motivation for joining GSSN as primarily based on its role as a National Socialist 
alternative to NS: 
 
Those National Socialists in opposition to NS were thrilled by the line taken by Germaneren and seized every 
opportunity to express opinions there which they were banned from publishing elsewhere. This ‘negative line’ 
adopted by GSSN met with complaints both from German and Norwegian [National Socialist] authorities.41 
 
Thorkildsen justified his collaborative role in serving an organisation, which at least formally was 
subordinated to NS, by pointing to several NS members’ misunderstanding of National Socialist 
ideology: ‘an important factor to consider is that the majority of the NS leadership was, in my opinion, 
not National Socialist’.42 One of his weekly editorial columns was titled ‘The opportunists’ (korkene) 
where Thorkildsen outspokenly stated that 
 
within NS, it is not easy to separate the fools from the good ones. The events since 1940 should indeed have 
convinced the Norwegian people that their future is in the name of National Socialism, in friendly cooperation and 
absolute equal relations to Germany. NS has gained so many new members that it is now difficult to keep track of 
[the ideological authenticity of] each individual […] Those who call themselves National Socialists must live as 
National Socialists.43 
 
It was not only members of the NS who in Thorkildsen’s opinion perpetuated a wrong conception of 
National Socialism. He added that he viewed ‘those Germans who acted unsympathetically as 
compromised National Socialists’.44 In his definition of ‘unsympathetic’ actions, Thorkildsen most 
probably included the joint measures taken by the Reichskommissariat and Quisling against him by 
the second half of 1944. During the following six months, Thorkildsen was repeatedly called into the 
Reichskommissariat’s press office where he was threatened with being sacked from his editorial 
position as a result of Germaneren’s ‘negative line’. By March 1945, and despite complaining about 
these threats directly to Terboven, Thorkildsen was forced to leave Germaneren and was sent to 
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Germany.45 Just like Schjøren, Thorkildsen’s writings show his idealist outlook where he portrayed 
himself as a ‘true’ National Socialist with a mission to purify GSSN and the Norwegian National 
Socialist milieu from false and compromised followers. 
 
While the attempts to undermine NS also caused strained relations with the German authorities, both 
Thorkildsen and Schjøren were nevertheless seen by their National Socialist colleagues as followers 
of a German line. Several witness testimonies would describe Schjøren as ‘German-friendly’. 
Although this was obvious, considering his position within GSSN, Fuglesang’s statement confirms 
Schjøren’s relatively high support for the German authorities within the GSSN: ‘Although Schjøren 
held sincere nationalist sentiments, I also had the impression he was not aware of the dangerous 
implications of a formation like GSSN in Norway.’46 In addition to his work in Germaneren, 
Thorkildsen’s career during the German occupation makes him appear as a distinguished Norwegian 
collaborator; in the summer of 1940, he volunteered for a position as translator for the 
Reichskommissariat as well as serving as an interpreter for the German security department SD 
(Sicherheitsdienst) from 25 August 1940 to 5 June 1942.47 As two of eight men, Thorkildsen and 
Schjøren were distinguished for their worthy efforts within GSSN in January 1945.48 Taking this 
close cooperation with German institutions into account, it was stated in the final verdict of his post-
war trial that Thorkildsen ‘sought to undermine the [NS] party leadership for its failed capacity to 
establish National Socialist ideas in cooperation with Germany’.49 In this view, Thorkildsen’s 
opposition to NS was motivated by his National Socialist radicalism and willingness to collaborate 
with the Nazi regime, where NS was simply not radical enough. 
 
The histories of Schjøren and Thorkildsen broaden the framework of National Socialist idealist 
opposition within GSSN. Since opposition extended well beyond the Ragnarok circle, Fuglesang 
pointedly described the GSSN as ‘a composition of oppositional elements to the NS’.50 At the same 
time, Schjøren and Thorkildsen were opponents of sorts; they were being decorated for outstanding 
SS service and, thanks to their NS opposition, they acted in ways that were regarded as purely 
‘German-friendly’. This rather clear-cut siding with the SS at the expense of Quisling ran contrary to 
                                                          
45 Ibid. 
46 Witness testimony Rolf Jørgen Fuglesang in Riksarkivet, L-sak Oslo politikammer, nr. 3003. 
47 Riksarkivet, L-sak Oslo politikammer, nr. 2483. 
48 In SS-Meddelelser, 1:3 (October 1944), p. 4. 
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50 Witness testimony Rolf Jørgen Fuglesang in Riksarkivet, L-sak Oslo politikammer, nr. 3003. 
 
 
 
208 
 
the rather more ambivalent activities of other members within GSSN. The rest of this chapter draws 
from these insights into the extent and breadth of GSSN’s oppositional identity to focus more 
narrowly on the activities of the Ragnarok members. 
 
 
II 
Ragnarok Activities in GSSN 
 
Several leading Ragnarok men shaped both the ideological propaganda organs of GSSN and the 
practices of ideological education within the organisation. When the first edition of Germaneren was 
released on 25 July 1942, it was not Thorkildsen who held the editorial position but the Ragnarok 
editor Jacobsen. Jacobsen was offered the position in June 1942 by Lie, who ignored Quisling’s 
refusal to accept Jacobsen as the editor of Germaneren.51 In the initial phase of GSSN’s 
establishment, the aim had been simply to incorporate Ragnarok into the organisation and use it as 
the propaganda organ of GSSN.52 While Jacobsen rejected the proposal, these plans indicate that the 
men who outlined the future of GSSN envisioned an ideological profile closer to that of Ragnarok. 
 
Ola Furuseth was another Ragnarok member who shaped the ideological outlook of GSSN as he 
joined the organisation in July 1942. Until May 1943, Furuseth functioned as the ideological leader 
of the indoctrination courses, established by the Germanische Leitstelle and executed through GSSN, 
for aspiring SS men in Norway.53 Since GSSN was responsible for the production of material used in 
ideological teaching, the so-called ‘SS pamphlets’ (SS-skolehæften), the Norwegians Holst 
Thorkildsen and Furuseth’s successor as ideological leader, Rolf Wessel Karlsen, were the main 
contributors to this essential ideological curriculum for the SS schools. A second important SS 
publication in Norway was Germansk Månedshæfte (later renamed Germansk Budstikke). This 
pamphlet was published through Jacobsen’s own publishing house Kamban Forlag which also 
published the Ragnarok pamphlet. 
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Despite Norwegian contributors and publicists, there were limitations to the Norwegian influence on 
this material. Both the SS pamphlet and Germansk Budstikke were dominated by German SS 
propaganda, and hardly contained the kind of critical commentary that could be found in both 
Germaneren and Ragnarok at the time. Moreover, the attempt to influence the propaganda material 
among the Norwegian ideological leaders of GSSN is a clear sign of deeper tensions between 
Norwegian and German visions of the organisation. Similar to the criticism Thorkildsen faced as 
editor of Germaneren, Wessel Karlsen’s time as ideological leader ended in conflict with Leib over 
how Wessel Karlsen had conducted his ideological teaching. The German authorities were unsatisfied 
with the way the Norwegian leader had emphasised that, rather than ideological homogenisation, ‘true 
pan-Germanic unity fundamentally rested upon the consideration of national particularity’.54 
 
Ola Furuseth’s period as ideological leader had a similar outcome. He described his decision to join 
GSSN as a result of his opposition to NS, which left GSSN as the only National Socialist alternative 
at the time. Yet, the high expectations that Furuseth had of the SS in the beginning were soon 
compromised by his experience of the German SS guidelines for ideological teaching: 
 
I opposed the Germans’ attempts to impose a German ideology on school teaching, and for that I stood in opposition 
to the school board and the Germans [...] I wrote a letter to ‘Hitler’ at the beginning of January 1945 to share my 
opinions on the way the school was being run as it had caused hostility towards Germany among the [Norwegian] 
volunteers [...] The letter prompted my dismissal from the position, and I was sent to the front.55 
 
By then, Furuseth had experienced the SS directives on ideological education not only in Norway, 
but also at the SS school in Berlin. Furuseth was only one of several Ragnarok members who 
expressed clear concerns, and often hostility, towards the German policies within GSSN. A few 
editions of Ragnarok were banned by German authorities for the criticism directed not only against 
Quisling’s NS but also against so-called ‘German imperialism’. For example, the April/May edition 
from 1941 was withdrawn due to Ragnarok’s criticism of those circles within NS who merely sought 
to ‘copy the Germans’.56 A copy-paste National Socialism with the NSDAP as the model was thus 
seen as a false and inauthentic National Socialism. 
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Furuseth was forced to leave his position in GSSN and the corrupt elite he was referring to was the 
SS leadership in Berlin. After being a witness in a case against a more senior NS man, Furuseth was 
sent to Berlin and given a position as consultant for the ‘ideological schooling’ of Norwegian Waffen-
SS soldiers, with the additional task of editing SS pamphlets.57 At this point, the SS school that had 
been located in Berlin was moved to Kulmbach. Furuseth regarded his position as unnecessary and 
mere bureaucracy. This situation prompted the above-mentioned letter from Furuseth to Hitler, where 
the letter was written in the school secretary’s name. According to Furuseth, he was informed that the 
letter had been received at the Reichskanzlei, and he interpreted his dismissal to the front as a sign 
that his complaints had been read, if not by Hitler then at least by individuals within the NSDAP 
leadership.58 The SS experience had disappointingly proved to be nothing but ‘a dry and irresponsible 
bureaucracy, where no one had clearly defined responsibilities’ and where his own mission to 
‘improve certain conditions for the Norwegians within the SS were diminished’.59 In letters and other 
written material, Furuseth expressed his views that the ‘Germans’ perpetuated a corrupt kind of 
National Socialism where idealists were pushed aside on behalf of hypocrites. At these grass-roots 
levels, National Socialism was seen as a pure idea and thus very different from the corruption 
associated with the imperialist ambitions that had separated the Nazi regime from the pan-Germanic 
ideals. 
 
 
III 
Contacts in Nazi Germany 
 
The idealisation of the front soldier, the grass-roots dimension of National Socialism and essentially 
the underdog position were all aspects of the Ragnarok intellectual enterprise that went hand in hand 
with the unfolding of political events in Norway. Historians Emberland and Kott describe that the 
longer the war went on, the more there ‘was a growing divide between Himmler’s pan-Germanic 
visions and Ragnarok’s own project’.60 While the German occupation of Norway must be regarded 
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as the primary cause of tension for the divergent visions of a pan-Germanic political order, Ragnarok 
also got inspiration from voices within Nazi Germany. Like Furuseth, Jacobsen’s links to GSSN were 
significantly loosened after 1943. By then, Jacobsen had spent several years using his German 
contacts in diplomatic attempts to influence Nazi policies in Norway. He met Himmler for the first 
time in 1937, at a summer meeting arranged by the Nordische Gesellschaft in Munich.61 In the late 
summer of 1940, Jacobsen saw it as an absolute necessity to keep Quisling as passive as possible 
during the ongoing negotiations over the nature of the occupation.62 There was no doubt in the minds 
of Jacobsen and his Ragnarok circle that the man they needed to turn to was Himmler. Himmler’s 
personal interest in Nordic race theory and heritage had given them hope of Nordic cooperation. 
Jacobsen met with Himmler for one hour on 16 August 1940, but he was quickly informed that the 
Nazi plans to support Quisling’s NS were well underway. For pragmatic reasons, Jacobsen thus re-
entered NS on 28 September 1940. As one last attempt, he wrote a letter to Himmler right after the 
meeting and received a reply six months later (by which point NS had consolidated its position) on 
30 January 1941. In the letter, Himmler urged Jacobsen and his circle to support recruitment to the 
Waffen-SS, and above all to acknowledge the leading position of the NS.63 Three years later, Jacobsen 
once again attempted to contact Himmler, now following the request of the Ragnarok contributor 
Herman Harris Aall, an NS member with a specialism in judicial matters who remained sceptical of 
Quisling’s leadership.64 Aall pointed to unacceptable actions taken by the Reichskommissariat, and 
had evaluated the Norwegian position and the German occupation in the context of international law. 
This time, however, Jacobsen was unsuccessful in his attempt to arrange a personal meeting with 
Himmler.65 
 
Besides overthrowing Quisling, Jacobsen had additional agendas in Germany. Ejnar Vaaben recalled 
a meeting with Jacobsen in 1943 where they had discussed the failure of Scandinavian National 
Socialism under Clausen and Quisling. Jacobsen himself described Terboven as an ‘extremely 
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dangerous person’ for Norway and he attempted to take matters into his own hands when he heard 
rumours of Terboven’s supposed resignation. Jacobsen already had a replacement in mind, the 
Gauleiter and Reichsstatthalter of Thuringia, Frits Sauckel. As a leading propagandist and NSDAP 
member since 1921, Sauckel came to work directly under Göring through the Office of the Four-Year 
Plan as Plenipotentiary General for the Utilisation of Labour, and in these matters received complete 
authority from Hitler on 21 March 1942. Jacobsen had met Sauckel at an event arranged by the 
Nordische Gesellschaft in the summer of 1938, at which Sauckel had personally invited Jacobsen to 
visit Thuringia to discuss their common interest in social economy.66 In December 1940, when 
Jacobsen then heard the rumours about Terboven, he wrote a letter to Sauckel on 11 December in an 
attempt to persuade him to consider the position as Reichskommissar in Norway.67 Jacobsen was 
convinced that once Sauckel ‘had got to grips with the conditions in Norway he and the other Germans 
would finally understand the necessity of dissolving the Reichskommissariat’.68 
 
It was Jacobsen’s and Vaaben’s common acquaintance Dr Ohling who had given Jacobsen the 
information about Terboven’s supposed resignation. Although Terboven remained in his position, it 
was not the final attempt made by Jacobsen to influence German policies. Ohling, a German lawyer 
and a student in Lund, Sweden, had had several functions within the German propaganda ministry 
since 1933; he was representative of the official German news agency Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro 
(DNB), which was controlled directly by Goebbels’ propaganda ministry and the organisation for 
German academic exchange, Deutsche Akademischer Austauschdienst. Ohling also took part in 
Nordischer Gesellschaft, an organisation with the aim of strengthening German–Nordic cultural and 
political cooperation. These activities combined made him the face of the German propaganda 
ministry in Sweden, and he took orders directly from Alfred Rosenberg regarding propaganda 
activities.69 In this context, Ohling invited Jacobsen to attend a European congress in Munich at the 
end of November 1940. The congress (whose ‘European’ outlook was in reality limited to Norwegian, 
Dutch, Belgian, Finnish and possibly Swedish attendants) was organised by VDA, a Nazi propaganda 
organisation directed towards people of German origin (Volksbund für das Deutschtum im Ausland), 
and Jacobsen brought the Ragnarok men Per Imerslund and Geir Tveit with him on the trip.70 
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Jacobsen described the event in his testimony as an event that gave him the chance to speak up against 
the practices of the Nazi occupation authorities in Norway; Jacobsen held a short speech where he 
particularly criticised the involvement of the Reichskommissariat in Norwegian internal political 
matters. Jacobsen also had the chance to address the issue with Rudolf Hess, who ‘promised to look 
into it further’, although Jacobsen never heard back from him.71 Jacobsen’s initiative in Munich is 
telling of his general outspokenness regarding Nazi policies in Norway after April 1940. Herbert Noot 
described Jacobsen as ‘bold and very outspoken within German circles’.72 Since April 1941, Noot 
had led Department III of the SD (Sicherheitsdienst) and administrated the monitoring of Norwegian 
sentiments towards Nazi Germany during the occupation. Noot recalled Jacobsen’s constant 
disagreements with Terboven’s policies, and stated that Jacobsen had claimed on several occasions 
that ‘the biggest mistake Quisling had ever made was his passivity towards Terboven’.73 
 
Ernst Zuchner, introduced earlier in this thesis as the Ragnarok contact at the NSDAP 
Reichspropagandaministerium, had given Barth-Heyerdahl the advice to join NS and to maintain 
close ties to Zuchner so that no one could suspect Barth-Heyerdahl’s anti-German sentiments.74 On 
15 December 1940, Barth-Heyerdahl joined NS, and from the same date until the end of the war, he 
served the NS foreign office in Berlin. In Germany, he also worked for the Fremdsprachendienst, a 
sub-department of the Ministry of Propaganda providing foreign language services with the main task 
of adapting Norwegian material for German newspapers.75 
 
Barth-Heyerdahl was not the only Ragnarok member to make this decision out of strategic concerns. 
At the end of June 1942, Barth-Heyerdahl wrote a letter from Berlin to the Ragnarok editor Hans S. 
Jacobsen, who earlier in 1940 had decided to join the NS formally. That NS membership was at odds 
with the Ragnarok collective identity is clear in Barth-Heyerdahl’s message: 
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71 Ibid. 
72 Statement by Herbert Noot in ibid. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid. 
 
 
 
214 
 
My conclusion is this: your influence and power still rests on Ragnarok and the pamphlet must continue to be 
published. It must also avoid having any other editor than you. That you are independent, and that you are a 
member of NS is good I suppose, but your influence and reputation is bound to Ragnarok.76 
 
Jacobsen’s friend Ohling played an influential part in convincing Jacobsen to re-enter the NS after 
April 1940. Ohling had also been a connecting link between Jacobsen and Ejnar Vaaben since the 
mid-1930s, and had encouraged closer relations between the two by introducing Vaaben to the 
Ragnarok pamphlets.77 In Norway, Ohling had advised Jacobsen to ‘associate yourself with those 
with power, so that you can use them [...] but never get in the position where the SS can give you any 
orders’.78 Jacobsen quickly came to balance his German contacts with the insight that a similar 
strategic move had to be made towards Quisling. Quisling stated in post-war hearings that he was 
well aware of Jacobsen’s close relations with Ohling, as well as men within the SD, but that ‘Jacobsen 
was not as reactionary and rebellious as others within his circle [Ragnarok]’ but that he was ‘a little 
too German [in his outlook], and too little Norwegian’.79 But when Jacobsen entered the NS autumn 
1940, he was torn between not only different versions of Norwegian nationalism, but also by a 
growing sense that there was a gap between National Socialist ideology and Nazi policies. When he 
met with a friend the same autumn, Jacobsen revealed that  
 
today I have made a decision that my heart cannot accept, but one which I had to take out of practical concerns. 
From now on, I will try to overcome my disagreements with Quisling’s line, in order to prevent as effectively as 
possible the Norwegian administration from falling into German hands.80  
 
The divergent perceptions between Fuglesang and Quisling on Jacobsen’s nationalist outlook perhaps 
tell the most accurate story of Jacobsen’s activities during the war. On the one hand, the bidirectional 
pragmatism that developed the relations with the SS administration and Quisling had been encouraged 
by Jacobsen’s German National Socialist contacts. But these actions would ultimately conceal the 
fact that Jacobsen’s and the entire Ragnarok circle’s main intention was to go an entirely independent 
route, when the circumstances called for it. On the other hand, Jacobsen’s fundamental unwillingness 
to align with either the SS or the NS structures was becoming increasingly clear. As a witness 
described Jacobsen in his post-war trial, ‘he [Jacobsen] was undoubtedly an idealist who never would 
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compromise on the question of national independence, equally so he held positive attitudes towards 
the Germans, and remained subordinate to the “pan-Germanic idea”’.81 
 
During the course of the war, Jacobsen volunteered twice for the Waffen-SS, at the end of June 1941 
and in March 1943; both applications were dismissed. Jacobsen recalled in 1941 having had 
conversations with SD’s Herbert Noot regarding the military group Den Norske Legion, which 
Jacobsen had been told would be a purely Norwegian organisation with Norwegian commanders.82 
Despite his failed attempts to volunteer, Jacobsen was recommended for a position at the unit’s 
information department, where Walter Fürst, another Ragnarok contributor, served as propaganda 
leader. On behalf of the Norwegian Legion, Jacobsen travelled to Berlin on 9 October 1940 to attend 
an SS meeting regarding cooperation between the Germanic countries. At the time, it was important 
to Den Norske Legion to gain more information about SS views on the Norwegian character of the 
organisation, since tensions had developed between Norwegian leaders and the German educational 
authorities responsible for the legion.83 
 
Despite the members’ initial fascination with SS elitism, Ragnarok’s ideological outlook gradually 
took the role of being the protector of those National Socialists who for various reasons were treated 
as if they were less worthy than the SS elite. With Ragnarok’s intellectual profile, the pamphlet came 
to serve as a portal for defending and reclaiming the status of those Norwegian National Socialists 
who experienced mistreatment because of their nationality. In October 1941, Jacobsen sent a report 
to Quisling regarding ‘The German SS and their attitudes towards Norway and the Legion [Den 
Norske Legion]’ with references to a meeting ordered by Himmler’s subordinate, Berger. Present to 
discuss the publication of the pamphlet Germanische Leithefte were 20 Höhere SS- und Polizeiführer 
(HSSPF) members and the VDA was represented by Ohling among others. Germanische Leithefte 
was aimed particularly at Germanic front soldiers,84 and Jacobsen had noted that Berger was clear on 
the message that ‘there were talks about a “Germanisation” [Verdeutschung] of their Germanic 
brothers, and that this principle was an absolute order from the Reichsführer [Himmler]’.85 Jacobsen 
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also had the impression that ‘the Norwegian volunteers are exposed to a great deal of attention from 
the Germans […] but they [the Germans] apparently experience difficulties dealing with them’.86 
Among the front soldiers themselves, the experience of front service and German command had 
created a wide gulf between perceptions of what was ‘National Socialist’ and what was ‘German’. 
Ragnarok was widely read among front soldiers and it fostered a specific pan-Germanic rhetoric 
shared by Ragnarok and the front soldiers. The growing divide between German directives and 
Norwegian ambitions was also a shared experience. In autumn 1943, ‘the German aim to dominate 
and abuse GSSN contrary to his initial impression that it was an organisation built upon Norwegian 
culture and National Socialist ideology’ forced Jacobsen to distance himself from the organisation 
and he was removed from his position as editor at Germaneren.87 
 
 
IV 
Autumn 1943: Active Opposition  
 
The Ragnarok members Barth-Heyerdahl, Furuseth, Jacobsen and Strand were all heavily influenced 
by the main Ragnarok ideologue, Per Imerslund. Quisling regarded Imerslund as a particularly 
‘dangerous NS opponent’,88 and it is clear from his correspondence to Jacobsen in December 1937 
that Imerslund had at that point already begun to see a different, less idealist side to the politics of the 
Third Reich. That did not take away from the fact that he was regarded in the Ragnarok circle as the 
epitome of the movement, or as Imerslund is described in later historical works, an ‘Aryan idol’.89 
Imerslund had written to Jacobsen to inform him that their NSDAP friend Zuchner was ‘on the verge 
of being overthrown’ by ‘the psychopathic criminal’ Günther Kern, as Imerslund called him. 
Imerslund concluded that ‘it is hard staying positive over the thought of cooperating with Germany, 
when it is represented by such men’.90 In his view, 
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a message must be sent to the right place in Germany […] it is important. It affects the entire German policy in the 
Nordic countries. If they are allowed to continue having large and small versions of Kern running around in all the 
Scandinavian countries, then all our work will be for nothing.91 
 
Imerslund had left NS in 1936, and despite attempts made by Barth-Heyerdahl to convince Imerslund 
to re-enter,92 he remained vehemently opposed to NS. In January 1941, Imerslund joined the early 
recruitment groups of Waffen-SS volunteers in Norway and was sent to Kiev in the summer of 1941 
in the midst of the Nazi war of annihilation.93 He later worked as a war correspondent in Karelia, 
before a war injury prompted his return to Oslo in May 1942. In the following year, which coincided 
with the founding of GSSN, Imerslund published several articles in Germaneren that were highly 
critical of NS. The previously mentioned piece on the ‘traitors within our own ranks’94 was given 
significant attention within the SD, who had their eyes on Imerslund. Already in May 1942, the SD 
in Norway had reported back to Berlin about ‘distancing tendencies’ (Distanzierungstendenzen) 
within Quisling’s NS vis-à-vis German authorities, where the growing tensions were explained by 
reference to Norwegian opposition to ‘German imperialism’.95 When Imerslund’s article appeared in 
August the same year, the SD reports noted that the hostile elements in GSSN towards NS were 
exemplified by ‘the SS volunteer Per Imerslund’. The report described how Imerslund claimed that 
NS was comprised of freemasons who ultimately undermined National Socialism. It further reports 
that Imerslund’s articles was ‘embraced by young front-soldiers, whilst other circles looked on with 
disapproval’.96 Upon his arrival in Norway, Imerslund had quickly begun to build a network of 
Norwegian front soldiers around him who not only agreed with his criticism of NS, but most of all 
the experience of so-called German imperialism. From the point of view of front soldiers like 
Imerslund, the idea of German imperialism at the expense of ‘true’ pan-Germanism was more than 
abstract intellectualism. 
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Furuseth’s account of his time at the SS school echoes the testimonies among front soldiers about 
Norwegians being mistreated by German authorities because of their non-German heritage. 
Emberland writes how ‘the political realities of German occupation increasingly diverged from 
Imerslund’s maximalist National Socialist utopia’.97 Driven by frustration over this development, and 
backed up by his Waffen-SS network of young Norwegian volunteers, Imerslund was the mastermind 
behind the plans to assassinate both Quisling and Terboven. In his post-war trial, Jacobsen recalled 
taking part in a meeting in September/October 1943 ‘to discuss actions to be taken against the 
Germans and others who seemed to use GSSN against Norwegian interests’.98 The concrete plans 
were first to remove the Norwegian Waffen-SS soldiers from German service and second to establish 
a Norwegian military group independent of the German authorities. Quisling was to be kidnapped 
and tried by a people’s tribunal, and sabotage groups would be formed under the command of Tor 
Strand.99 More than a front soldier phenomenon, these plans were the culmination of Ragnarok’s 
oppositional outlook that had been a factor in the Norwegian National Socialist milieu for almost a 
decade. While Furuseth remained a distant supporter from Berlin, Barth-Heyerdahl, Jacobsen and 
Strand were just a few of the Ragnarok members who were actively taking part in this attempt to 
form a stable underground movement. The activities came to mark the final stage of several leading 
Ragnarok members’ National Socialist careers. The plans ended abruptly as three of Imerslund’s men 
were caught by the Germans while shooting at images of Hitler and were sent to the front.100 The 
main event that finally ended these plans, however, was the death of the underground leader himself. 
Imerslund died suddenly after slipping on ice in early December 1943. Members of Ragnarok and 
good friends of Imerslund would express how the collective fighting spirit died with Imerslund,101 
while others saw it as a sign to increase the resistance against German politics.102 When Furuseth 
wrote his ‘word of warning’ letter mentioned above in November 1944, he attached a note stating 
that ‘I will attempt to spread the word as much as possible, in case I drop dead just like Per, which 
many would probably find very convenient’.103 That being said, the collective organisational efforts 
to sabotage the German stronghold, including the SS, in Norway were dissolved with Imerslund’s 
death. 
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As we turn our focus away from the Norwegian case study to the events taking place in Denmark 
during the same period, there will be striking similarities. First, the position of both of the 
Scandinavian SS organisations between German expansionism and a pan-Germanic utopia was a 
dilemma shared by many National Socialists in Norway and Denmark at the time, regardless of their 
affiliations with the Ejnar Vaaben or the Ragnarok circle. Second, the formation of new political and 
military units in Schalburgkorpset and GSSN of dedicated national Nazis in the occupied 
Scandinavian countries was accompanied by a growing German discontent over Quisling’s (or in the 
Danish case, Clausen’s) failure to lead Scandinavian National Socialism in the desired direction. 
Third, the opposition to the homogenising impulse in the ‘political religion’ of Nazi imperialism is 
clear in both national cases, where the calls for acknowledging divergent perceptions of pan-
Germanism resemble the National Socialist critique of Christian orthodoxy prevalent during the 
1930s that was discussed in chapter 4. 
 
 
V 
Schalburgkorpset 
 
On 1 April 1943, Knud Børge Martinsen, SS Obersturmbannführer and Danish officer of the Waffen-
SS battalion Frikorps Danmark, announced the establishment of Schalburgkorpset in Denmark.104 It 
was an armed corps ‘with the aim to strengthen our bonds to the battle at the Eastern front and to 
strive for the expansion of National Socialist ideas’.105 From mid-1943 to the beginning of 1945, 
Schalburgkorpset had a maximum of 500–600 members in addition to approximately one thousand 
Danes who were educated at the Schalburg school.106 At the school, which was led by Ejnar Vaaben 
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as the chief of ideological education, the goal was to provide young Danes with ‘a world-view and 
not a system […] this belief is Nordic idealism versus foreign materialism’.107 
 
The establishment of the corps was ordered by the SS department under Gottlob Berger and Himmler 
in Berlin in late 1942 and adopted by Reichsbevollmächtigter (Plenipotentiary) Werner Best in mid-
1943; Best sought to use the corps in his personal power struggle against both the SS and the Foreign 
Office. In order to attract Danes, who in the long term would ideally serve the Waffen-SS, the corps 
was profiled as a Danish alternative to political support for Frits Clausen’s DNSAP, a channel for 
peripheral National Socialist movements to unite both militarily and politically. In Best’s own words, 
it was intended as ‘a special department for those established National Socialists who were detached 
[abgesplittert] from the DNSAP’.108 Furthermore, Best acknowledged the three overreaching aims 
from the perspective of Himmler and the leader of the Danish Germanische Leitstelle, Bruno Boysen, 
regarding the establishment of the corps. It was firstly to recruit Waffen-SS volunteers; secondly it 
aimed to function as a local, Danish propaganda organ in the common struggle against Bolshevism; 
and thirdly and finally, the corps represented the consolidation of a National Socialist movement for 
those Danes not active within the DNSAP.109 None of these goals was achieved according to Best’s 
own verdict, and the reason for that failure was precisely the divide created within Danish National 
Socialism. Regarding the activities of the corps, the Danes would spend the majority of the time 
‘focusing on their rivalry with DNSAP’. Therefore, the experience with Schalburgkorpset did 
ultimately put an end to ‘German attempts at political experimentation with Danish National 
Socialism’.110 The distance between Schalburgkorpset and DNSAP was formulated in a German 
document from September 1943 stating that ‘it must be stressed that Schalburgkorpset represents the 
only solution left in the aim of creating a Danish National Socialist movement that is willing to 
cooperate openly with Germany’.111 
 
                                                          
107 T.I.P.O. Madsen, ‘Baggrunden for Schalburg-Korpsets Arbejde’, p. 7. Rigsarkivet, nr. 10192, box 7. ‘1935-1944: 
Manuskribter til artikler, taler m.m.’. 
108 Best testimony regarding Schalburgkorpset in Rigsarkivet, Straffeakt, nr. 313, box 1. The ‘power struggle’ was 
explained by Best as one where Best feared that the Germanische Leitstelle was not loyal to Best’s position as 
Reichsbevollmächtigter. In this vein, Best’s decision to support Boysen was made after considering himself to be the 
sole possibility to maintain influence within the SS and its Danish interests. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Ibid. 
 
 
 
221 
 
Frits Clausen’s Danish DNSAP announced confidentially to its members on 19 April 1943 that ‘any 
membership of a “Germanic corps” would automatically disqualify one from a leading position within 
DNSAP’.112 This antagonism was a result of a year-long power struggle between the DNSAP and the 
SS, which had been concretised with the establishment of an SS school in October 1942. Clausen 
stressed that the DNSAP had nothing to do with the initial establishment of the school, which would 
take the name Schalburg-skolen, but made an active effort to undermine recruitment, as Clausen et al 
had realised that ‘the school was a German rather than Danish product’.113 One telling example was 
the German and Danish disagreements over whose photo would be placed in the entrance hall of the 
school, where a portrait of Himmler is claimed to have disappeared one night to be replaced by one 
of Clausen.114 The history of this rivalry had yet another peak in February 1943, when Clausen and 
Best had met and discussed the early plans of the establishment of a Danish–Germanic SS, later 
renamed Schalburgkorpset. Clausen had sought, unsuccessfully, for Hitler’s personal guarantees to 
secure Clausen’s position as the sole leader of a Danish National Socialist movement.115 
 
The organisational structure of Schalburgkorpset took shape in the wake of Werner Best’s arrival in 
Copenhagen as Reichsbevollmächtigter. Best’s correspondence with the Foreign Office on 7 
December 1942 gives a fairly coherent image of the German leadership’s aims. Against the backdrop 
of the SS and Gottlob Berger’s offensive in the occupied Germanic countries, Himmler had ordered 
the establishment of Schalburgkorpset, which ‘in informal circles must be understood as Germanic 
SS in Denmark’ where ‘the corps is constructed by the SS in full independence of DNSAP’.116 On 
Best’s orders in autumn 1943, the movement Dansk Folkevaern (‘Danish People’s Defence’), 
comprising former DNSAP members and radical National Socialists from the 1930s, was 
incorporated in Schalburgkorpset as the ideological department of the corps. Ejnar Vaaben was one 
of them, and until autumn 1944 his role in Schalburgkorpset was to lead the department of ideological 
education (Afdeling for skoling og verdensanskuelse), the one department of Dansk Folkevaern (later 
renamed Folkevaernet) that had direct cooperation with the military branch of the corps. Vaaben 
                                                          
112 Elly Mogensen, ‘DNSAPs forhold til Schalburgkorpset, Folkevernet, Landsstormen og Germansk korps 
(Redegörelser fra Bovrup-arkivet)’, ibid. 
113 Frits Clausen’s testimony in Rigsarkivet, nr. 1355, Justitsieministeriets Psykiatriske Undersøgelseklinik, 
‘1935–1951 Diverse Sager vedr. Besettelsestiden’, box 15, ‘DNSAP’. 
114 Ibid. 
115 ‘Dr Best’s redegorelse for forholdet til DNSAP’ in ibid. According to Renthe-Fink’s testimony in ibid., Clausen 
clearly separated the interests of the SS and the German Foreign Ministry, where he placed the future of the DNSAP 
within the support of the latter German institution. As he replaced Renthe-Fink, Werner Best put an end to the previous 
support given to Clausen, and it is in this breaking-point that we can find the symbolic position of Schalburgkorpset. 
116 Cited in Lauridsen and Meile (eds.), Werner Bests korrespondance Bind 2, p.p 27-28. 
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personally described Dansk Folkevaern as an organisation ‘established with the aim of replacing 
DNSAP, where the incorporation in Schalburgkorpset was accepted with the assumption that the 
Germans had “sincere” intentions with its establishment’.117 
 
In the years preceding Schalburgkorpset’s establishment, Vaaben had reappeared in Danish National 
Socialist politics, where more effort was put into his projects. In 1941, when Vaaben established 
Enhedspartiet, it was proclaimed that 
 
Now we witness the birth of a movement with the vision of a third way; not the politics of cooperation with its 
political skeleton, and not an imported ideology, but a Danish movement that provides Danish content to the new 
ideas of Europe.
118 
 
It did not take long, however, until Vaaben yet again realised that his political projects were deemed 
to fail as long as they remained at the periphery. The future leader of Schalburgkorpset, T.I.P.O. 
Madsen, who led the Nationale Blok in the same years that witnessed Vaaben’s activities in the 
Enhedspartiet, had also gradually realised the strategic importance of merging these small movements 
into one powerful opponent to the DNSAP. On 27 July 1942 came the proclamation that both 
Vaaben’s and Madsen’s organisations would dissolve and that members were encouraged to join the 
newly established Den Nationale Aktion, in which both Vaaben and Madsen held leadership 
positions.119 From these Danish initiatives of a DNSAP-opposing coalition, the Germans soon faced 
the problem of whether or not to actively support these tendencies. Within the SS and especially 
considering Hitler’s recent order from February 1943 that all relations to Germanic völkisch 
movements in the German-occupied countries would be handled by Himmler, it was decided that 
some control over the events in Danish National Socialist politics remained desirable. Therefore, on 
20 February 1943, a letter to the supervisor of Generalplan Ost, Gottlob Berger, from Rudolf Brant 
read that on the on the basis of the Germanische Leitstelle’s reports on Danish National Socialist 
splinter movements, Himmler had decided to encourage cooperation that would go directly via 
Werner Best.120 This report was based on the decision made in conjunction with earlier contacts with 
Den Nationale Aktion and referred to their reports that were given directly to Himmler in November 
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the previous year. The meetings between the leadership of the Danish movement and Gotlob Berger 
prompted the decision to provide financial support to Den Nationale Aktion in order to counter the 
accusations that the SS were tied to the failed politics of the DNSAP.121 
 
 
VI 
‘Swastika against Swastika’ 
 
To sum up this eventful year between 1942 and 1943, one first has to point to the broader context of 
the dismantling of the ‘cooperation policy’ between the German occupation regime and the Danish 
government. More narrowly, the Germans envisioned more widespread support for Nazism among 
Danes than was to be found in the DNSAP. It thus became increasingly clear that the SS support for 
Danish National Socialism was to be distributed outside the DNSAP with the backing of Best and his 
pivotal position as civilian administrator. This process developed in two stages. The first stage, from 
mid-1942 to the end of the same year, was a ‘Danish’ stage in the sense that it was less concrete in 
terms of financial and formal organisation. Ex-members or long-term Nazi opponents of the DNSAP 
had, independently of German instructions, begun to realise the need to create a united front against 
the DNSAP. Entering 1943, the second stage had a clearer German vision, with the involvement of 
the SS and the establishment of Schalburgkorpset as a symbolic expression of so-called Danish–
German cooperation. In the context of the second stage, Dansk Folkevaern was established in April 
1943 and led by the triumvirate that was comprised of the two future leaders of Schalburgkorpset 
Knud B. Martinsen and Carl Frants Popp-Madsen together with the recently exited DNSAP member 
Poul C. Rasmussen.122 For the Danes, little had changed since 1942, however, and the ambition 
remained to establish a movement independent of German authorities. The independence, however, 
needed to appear friendly and cooperative in the eyes of the Germans. 
 
In fact, the incorporation of Dansk Folkevaern into the organisation of Schalburgkorpset did not take 
place until autumn 1943. It was far from clear that a united Danish National Socialist movement 
would necessarily form around a German-sponsored project. In September 1943, and in the midst of 
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organising Schalburgkorpset, Martinsen was contacted by Vaaben, Kamptegnet’s Arent Lemwigh-
Muller and Carl Frants Popp-Madsen with the aim of positioning Dansk Folkevaern as the ideological 
department of Schalburgkorpset.123 Martinsen, together with Poul Sommer, had opposed Vaaben’s 
original plans to establish a movement outside of Schalburgkorpset.124 The reluctance among some 
notable Nazis within the Danish milieu can be explained by their contacts with Best and the SS 
administration, where at a meeting on 29 August 1943, Best had given them a clear message that 
attempts to form a movement outside of Schalburgkorpset were both unwanted (‘unerwünscht’) and 
purposeless (‘unzweckmässig’).125 
 
Thus, fairly soon a mutual understanding evolved between the German authorities on the one hand 
and the DNSAP on the other that Schalburgkorpset was an organisation whose purpose was to disturb 
the landscape of an ‘uncooperative’ Danish National Socialism. From the perspective of the DNSAP, 
it meant a National Socialist ‘middle way’ which seriously undermined their aims of national 
ownership over National Socialist politics. In the eyes of the SS, this divide-and-rule tactic would 
ultimately lead to a questioning of whether such a thing as Danish National Socialism could exist 
without the aid of the SS. Within Schalburgkorpset, however, this ‘disturbing’ role was welcomed at 
first, since it corresponded with the general ideological outlook of these men: at the outset, it was a 
Danish National Socialist movement, freed from its association with the DNSAP, and with an active 
role as recruiter and warrior in the pan-Germanic and SS-led crusade against Bolshevism in the east. 
But the vision so prevalent among Vaaben and his Danish colleagues of an independent Danish 
military corps – a replacement of the Danish army126 – was not shared by the SS authorities. In the 
early stages, the attitude among the Danish Schalburg men was one of cooperation and patience. In 
Popp-Madsen’s words, ‘we Danish National Socialists are the jolly boat trailing behind, just waiting 
                                                          
123 Rigsarkivet, P-journaler, nr. 8624. Witness testimony of Poul C. Rasmussen. 
124 Witness testimony of Knud Nordentoft, Rigsarkivet, Straffeakt, nr. 20. 
125 Rigsarkivet, straffeakt nr. 313. During the summer months of 1943, Best had initially envisioned the SS man and 
Luftwaffe soldier Poul Sommer as the leader of Schalburgkorpset. These plans remained throughout October when 
meetings were held regarding the corps following the German actions taken against Danish Jews. In November, 
however, Best had lost his faith in Sommer and decided to give the leadership position to the more authoritative and 
militarily experienced Martinsen. Rigsarkivet, Straffeakt, nr. 404, box 1. 
126 Werner Best’s statement in the trial regarding Schalburgkorpset’s Danish leadership: ‘Martinsen would take the 
advantage of all German support possible, but strive to avoid any German influence on the future of the corps. […] 
Martinsen declared to me [Best] that Schalburgkorpset was a pure Danish project, independent of German plans. I had 
the impression that Martinsen in the presence of German authorities did not express his real intentions.’ Best’s 
statement is in accordance with those of Martinsen, Vaaben and the majority of the corps’ members. Eberhard Loew, 
chief of dep. RSHA D3 in Berlin underscored this fact as he described Martinsen’s reputation among the Germans as 
being outspokenly against Germanische Leitstelle’s imperialistic plans for Denmark. Rigsarkivet, Straffeakt nr. 313. 
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for the right moment to deviate’.127 Gradually, however, the structural framework crafted by German 
visions of the corps became increasingly obvious and equally constraining. To many of the Danish 
members, it became a starting point for the realisation that indeed, as Vaaben had expressed it, 
swastika could stand against swastika. 
 
 
VII 
Disillusion 
 
Vaaben’s and Schalburgkorpset’s idealist and pan-Germanic battle against liberal materialism was 
fought on all fronts – against Scandinavianism, fascism, the church and even Danish National 
Socialist parties. Indeed, the first three years of occupation had carved out the natural targets for these 
Danish pan-Germanists: for them, the failure of Danish National Socialism lay not primarily in the 
hands of the Germans, but was a result of the hypocritical Danish cooperation policy and Frits 
Clausen’s missed opportunity to get rid of the corrupt elements within the DNSAP. But this intimate 
connection between pan-Germanic thinking on the one hand and a pro-German policy on the other 
was increasingly threatened by a series of events in the latter half of 1943. Vaaben described the year 
from July 1943 to July 1944 as ‘a surreal nightmare’ where his political strivings ‘were dissolved into 
nothingness’.128 
 
Schalburgkorpset proved to be a short-lived transnational National Socialist experiment. In early July 
1944, Ludwig Pancke ordered the removal of the military branch of the corps and by 1 August, the 
SS Ausbildung Battalion Schalburg was established on purely German conditions. Debates over the 
Danish or German origin of this military corps were no longer necessary, and the true nature of 
Schalburgkorpset had been crystallised within the radicalising framework of the SS’s actions in 
Denmark. At this point, the Danish police was dissolved and nearly 2,000 Danish policemen were 
sent to concentration camps. On 19 September 1944, Schalburgkorpset’s Popp-Madsen personally 
received an offer from Pancke to lead the reorganisation of the police resources and contribute to its 
subordination under the SS.129 Popp-Madsen declined the offer and instead offered his services to the 
                                                          
127 Witness testimony in Rigsarkivet, P-Journal, nr. 9807. 
128 Vaaben, ‘Det var det hele vaerdt’, part ‘For Seint’, p. 1, Rigsarkivet, nr. 05640. 
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foreign ministry in case the action against the police was to be halted. In Best’s post-war testimonies, 
Popp-Madsen is described similarly to Schalburgkorpset’s leader Martinsen as someone who ‘strived 
for a pure Danish character of the corps and rejected any German involvement’.130 Furthermore, Best 
described how it was obvious that Martinsen must have ‘regretted the fact that he early on stuck to 
the German line and when he no longer found support from the other side (he would have made an 
excellent saboteur!) sought alternative roads for an activity with no concrete political aims’.131 The 
‘nightmare’ of the political activities of the year from July 1943 to July 1944 – as described by Vaaben 
– was in several ways a collective experience of a large number of Schalburg members. Not only 
Vaaben but larger parts of the Danish leadership including Martinsen and Popp-Madsen all faced the 
realisation of their fears and brutal confirmation of the validity in their early hesitance towards the 
German ambitions of the establishment of the corps. 
 
Knud Nordentoft, a lawyer and writer, joined Schalburgkorpset in 1941 and functioned as an 
intelligence agent for the corps. His subsequent diary entries not only document his own experience 
but also provide a useful source regarding the collective experiences of Danish Schalburg men in the 
face of the growing dominance of the SS. Nordentoft’s diary tells the story of Danish disappointment, 
where the leader Popp-Madsen had allegedly, and fairly early on on 22 June 1943, made up his mind 
about the corrupt character of ‘the Germans’: ‘it is as if they are a defeated nation. They are willing 
to be bribed into anything. This is the politics of Dr Best!’132 Nordentoft himself connected this 
corrupt element in the German leadership to the establishment of Schalburgkorpset and stressed that 
‘this constellation raises serious concerns from a Danish point of view, but is indeed unavoidable’133 
and if the war is to be won, Nordentoft continued, 
 
The SS will form a European, but particularly German, elite – great ambition, great dangers. The genius and 
spiritual prophets are increasingly excluded in favour of the glorification of the secondary’s […] Adolf Hitler 
would never have passed an SS entry test! Can we find ways of fighting these structures? If not, the revolt is just 
around the corner.134 
 
                                                          
130 Werner Best’s testimony in ibid. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Entry in Knud Nordentoft’s diary, 22 June 1943, ibid. 
133 Entry 7 September 1943, ibid. 
134 Ibid. 
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In other words, in accordance with the idea of several Ragnarok members described in this thesis, 
Nordentoft distinguished between real and false National Socialists. The glorification of ‘the 
secondaries’ meant for Nordentoft a tendency he identified within the SS to let the mediocre 
bureaucrats rise up the ranks at the expense of the ‘real’ National Socialists – the idealists. Despite 
Nordentoft’s cynical view of the tendencies within the SS and the occupation regime, he nevertheless 
hoped that Vaaben had the ability to reconcile his role as a spiritual prophet on the Danish National 
Socialist scene. Nordentoft envisioned Vaaben as a leading mediator between the Danish factions of 
the corps and the SS. Nordentoft wrote that ‘Popp [-Madsen] continues to recommend Vaaben. He 
[Vaaben] has the network, he has admission, it means something. Let us hope so.’135 
 
When the cooperation policy between the Danish government and the German authorities broke down 
after 29 August 1943, Popp-Madsen argued that for Best, Schalburgkorpset meant a kind of 
compensation and the achievement he could use to regain trust from Berlin. Moreover, it required 
that Schalburgkorpset was framed as Best’s personal project.136 But he also had to accommodate 
himself to the directives of Germanische Leitstelle, where Boysen in dialogue with Popp-Madsen and 
Martinsen had outlined a protocol that would establish Danish independence from German authorities 
in the Schalburg organisation. The protocol contained three important points regarding the conditions 
for this independence: first, the Germans had to agree that the corps would not be dissolved without 
the approval of Martinsen; second, Schalburgkorpset was independent of any German involvement; 
and third, Martinsen would have the possibility to turn to the Germanische Leitstelle for financial 
support.137 These points laid the foundation for the so-called ‘Protocol Negotiations’ in autumn 1943. 
It was a formal yet insignificant negotiation that more than anything illustrates the ideological divide 
that was growing between Danish Schalburg members and the SS ambitions with the corps. Best 
balanced the agendas of both the SS and Foreign Office and certainly also his own personal position 
as he declared that the second point in the protocol could not be accepted – that German involvement 
was a precondition for the establishment of the corps – and in Danish circles this move was 
disappointing but not surprising. Nordentoft concluded in his diary from 26 September 1943 that 
                                                          
135 Entry 20 September 1943 (original emphasis), Knud Nordentoft’s diary, ibid. 
136 Popp-Madsen’s testimony, ibid. Best’s independence in the affairs of Schalburgkorpset was established through the 
agreement between Joachim von Ribbentorp and the SS, where Ribbentorp had accepted the corps’ existence and the 
fact that Best would cooperate with Himmler in all Germanic Voelkisch matters. The acceptance implied the silent 
permission for Best to work more closely with Boysen and Germanische Leitstelle. See letter from Horst Wagner to 
Werner Best, 31 July 1943 in Lauridsen (ed.), Werner Best’s Korrespondance, Bind 3, pp. 313-314. 
137 Ibid. 
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‘undoubtedly, it is an old SS ambition to incorporate Danish National Socialists and bring them under 
SS command’.138 
 
The German action against the Danish police on 19 September 1944 was for Martinsen the beginning 
of the end for his involvement in the corps’ leadership. Moreover, the fate of Martinsen’s role in the 
corps is both a personal story and a wider reflection of the general Danish involvement in this 
organisation. Gradually after mid-1943, Danish attitudes within the corps – primarily a growing sense 
of hostility towards any ‘German’ measures – were influenced by German military hardships and 
subsequently the SS’s radically more suppressive actions in the occupied countries, including 
Denmark. Martinsen viewed the German actions against the police as de facto violations of the now 
one-year-old Protocol Negotiations, and he consequently refused to give orders on 
Schalburgkorpset’s actions against Danish police stations. As a result, he was arrested by German 
authorities at the beginning of October, accused of uncooperative behaviour and anti-German 
propaganda. He was sentenced to imprisonment in and managed to escape from Fürstenberg, 
Germany as late as March 1945.139 
 
At this point, Vaaben faced German directives that were less punitive but just as coercive; Vaaben 
volunteered for Waffen-SS service in July 1944 and was enrolled in October the same year. After 
months of schooling and preparation in the SS school in Sennheim (Alsace), he received German 
orders to return to Berlin where a post as Kriegsberichter [War Correspondent] awaited him.140 
Vaaben realised he could do nothing but accept that his role as warrior for the pan-Germanic cause 
would become, in his own words, a ‘paper soldier’ and an ‘absolutely pointless’ bureaucrat.141 By 
then, Vaaben had already got used to dealing with the German authorities. In 1943, the radicalisation 
of German occupation policies had prompted Vaaben to propose the establishment of radio broadcasts 
which through illegal channels would allow the circulation of justified criticism of German policies 
in Denmark.142 In this period, the bonds with other Nordic pan-Germanic movements were 
strengthened through their gradually growing aim to isolate themselves from German involvement. 
In July 1943, during the meeting between Vaaben and Jacobsen, they had – besides their discussion 
                                                          
138 Entry 26 September 1943, Knud Nordentoft’s diary, ibid. 
139 Rigsarkivet, P-journaler, nr. 22198. For a more comprehensive reading on Martinsen and his National Socialist 
career, see Knud Bøgh, K.B. Martinsen, Officer og Landsforraeder (Hellerup: Forlaget Documentas, 2005). 
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about Terboven’s position in Norway – also agreed that the DNSAP in Denmark had failed, and that 
consequently, ‘Danish National Socialism had rotted under German authority and financing’.143 
Vaaben remembered this moment of Scandinavian unity as a time where he ‘believed that something 
could be done’, but one year later, by the summer of 1944, he had ‘given up all hopes for change’.144 
 
In April 1944, Vaaben made a last attempt to affect the internal affairs of the Nazi occupation office 
in Denmark by leading a group of dissatisfied Schalburg men to propose Karl Hubertus von 
Schimmelmann as Boysen’s successor as leader of the Germanische Leitstelle. Schimmelmann was 
preliminarily appointed, an announcement which allegedly took place behind Best’s back. Both 
higher SS leaders Pancke and Best sent protests against this appointment directly to Himmler and the 
appointment was subsequently annulled. Vaaben interpreted Best’s disapproval as stemming from his 
dislike of Vaaben’s connections with Berlin,145 but John T. Lauridsen mainly explains the situation 
as another example of the idealist dreamer and the ‘politically impotent’ Ejnar Vaaben. In considering 
that Schimmelmann’s aspiration to the leadership position of the Germanische Leitstelle was finally 
turned down, Lauridsen claims that because Vaaben avoided mentioning the fact that his 
missionfailed, his impotence is shown not merely in his limited political influence but perhaps most 
importantly through his idealistic visions that were fundamentally detached from political reality.146 
Indeed, Vaaben never elaborated or even commented upon this particular failure of negotiation. But 
it is debatable whether this avoidance of admitting failure indicates that Vaaben was a political 
dreamer with no apprehension of the structural constraints surrounding his pan-Germanic ideas. 
When examined more closely, the events of April 1944 seem to be parts of that particular year that 
were described earlier in this chapter as Vaaben’s ‘surreal nightmare where all his efforts dissolved 
into nothingness’. There is nothing to indicate that Vaaben did not include the Schimmelmann affair 
in this ‘nothingness’, as another failed attempt to stir German occupational politics in the right – 
Danish – direction. On the contrary, Vaaben realised his limits enough to place the Schimmelmann 
affair in the context of one year of political impotence and broken National Socialist dreams, not as 
an isolated mistake. Because in the end, the year of this surreal nightmare was not defined merely 
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politically but rather as yet another sign of what was really going on: the perceived German imperialist 
corruption of National Socialism. To a colleague at the SS school in Sennheim, in late autumn 1944, 
Vaaben declared: ‘I am sick and tired of being a Kulturpriester, and I am fed up with 
Weltanschauung.’147 
 
 
VIII 
Chapter Conclusion 
 
In 1944, Denmark’s first National Socialist no longer strived to be a prophet for a belief system that 
he believed had betrayed him. Ejnar Vaaben’s idealism and his ‘fighting worldview’ had met its 
opponents in Christian orthodoxy and fascist inauthenticity among rival Danish Nazi movements, and 
finally among leaders of the Third Reich. This chapter concludes the journey from the idealism of the 
1930s to wartime disillusionment that we have seen primarily in the histories of Vaaben and Ragnarok 
throughout this thesis. Testimonies from the individuals discussed in this thesis describe an 
increasingly claustrophobic experience where their visions of a transnational Aryan 
Volksgemeinschaft ran up against the Third Reich’s imperialistic state machinery. But does that mean 
that either of these two camps, the idealist dream of Volksgemeinschaft or the genocidal Nazi 
machinery (as it appeared in the eyes of the Scandinavians), was less Nazi than the other? Bayle’s 
comments on Ohlendorf’s personality that introduced this chapter would reject that binary reasoning. 
Rather, in criticising the supposed dichotomy between idealism and the murderous consequences of 
fanaticism, Bayle stressed that ‘these two aspects are not conflicting, as a confessional audience 
would be inclined to believe. Instead, they fuel one another.’148 
 
This point is important for the discussion of the National Socialist ‘ideological incorrectness’. For the 
Nazis, the actual contrasts and the dynamic that was created by virtue of their incompatibility was 
thus the ‘fighting’ ingredient that separated National Socialism from those confessional worldviews 
of doctrinal readings and schematic orders. We find the same pattern in the landscape of Nazi 
collaboration across Europe, and in a particularly illuminating form in the case studies from 
Scandinavia. The ‘ideological incorrectness’ that has been discussed throughout this thesis was not 
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expressed in antagonism towards the National Socialist ideology; rather, the incorrectness was an 
ideological feature of National Socialism in its own right. In this final chapter, we have seen that 
against a constraining Nazi policy of occupation and ideological homogenisation, a parallel and 
increasingly idealist view of National Socialism emerged in response. Ultimately, Ragnarok’s 
ambivalence about their German contacts was not a sign of declining Nazi convictions or increased 
disillusionment, nor should Vaaben’s attack on Weltanschauung be written off as words from a 
former Nazi. That kind of conclusion is an exercise in essentialism. Instead, these were ambivalent 
and ‘ideologically incorrect’ attitudes to the German authorities because their National Socialist 
identity and its essentially ‘fighting worldview’ not only allowed but also encouraged them. 
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 Thesis Conclusion 
 
The problem with ‘political religion’-theory today is that it is theorised based on an out-dated 
historiography that ascribes a dogmatic essence to Nazism. This study has thus set out to show how 
the ‘ideological incorrectness’ that was central to the way in which National Socialism was 
understood by its contemporaries emphasises the Nazis’ battle against dogmatism in a way which 
conflicts with ‘political religion’-theory today. The case study of Scandinavian National Socialism 
represented Nazi pluralism and its heretical nature – precisely those dimensions of National Socialism 
that ‘political religion’-theory overlooks today. As the thesis has shown, the contemporary use of 
‘political religion’ as applied to Nazism ascribes a far too static and conventional nature to Nazi 
ideology, when in fact the Nazis themselves sought to break the conventional framework with an 
unbound and revolutionary ideology. The dogmatism lies in the historiography and subsequently its 
demonisation of Nazism. The Scandinavian National Socialists in this study did indeed discuss the 
Nazi state as a system of policies bearing similarities to a ‘political religion’, but this ‘political 
religion’ was for them a sign of a ‘corrupted’ Nazism rather than an expression of true National 
Socialist faith.  
Indeed, scholars generally regard the demonisation of Nazism as a phenomenon of early postwar 
historiography. Chapter 1 and 2 in this thesis set out to explain that the issues that scholars now depict 
in ‘political religion’-theory result from a persisting demonisation of National Socialist ideology. 
Chapter 1 found that ‘political religion’-theory has polarised into ‘sacred’ and ‘profane’ approaches 
– assuming that Nazism’s religious nature could be found in either its sacred, inner experience of the 
individual perpetrators who took part in the Nazi genocide, or in the rituals, ceremonies and pseudo-
religious nature of the Nazi totalitarian state. Since the focus on ideology-centred explanations to the 
Holocaust in combination with a focus on individual agency of the perpetrators has dominated since 
the 1990s, research has tended to favour the first ‘sacred’ approach. Yet, the thesis has shown that the 
‘sacred’– also called phenomenological – approach often bases its analysis on a rigid notion of Nazi 
ideology that, despite aiming to address agency and diversity, fails to take on board new research on 
Nazism’s transgressive side. The ‘profane’ – or functionalist – approach, in turn, receives less 
attention in studies confined to Nazi Germany, and is used primarily as a comparative tool in 
transnational research on fascist ideologies in Europe.  
 
 
 
233 
 
As the first analytical chapter established that the phenomenological school of ‘political religion’-
theory is the one most commonly applied on Nazism, chapter 2 examines this approach further. The 
rigid notion of Nazi ideology that tends to accompany these phenomenological analyses has thus 
caused scholars to see ‘political religion’ as a distorting and reductionist concept rather than as an 
illuminating one. Chapter 2 reveals that this conclusion on the limitations of the phenomenologist’s 
‘political religion’ is not an insight from contemporary research. In fact, it was Eric Voegelin – often 
mentioned by scholars as the founding father of the phenomenologist ‘political religion’ theory – who 
much earlier, in the late 1970s, rejected the analytical value of his own concept. He found the concept 
to be both dogmatic and sacralising, to the extent that it became ahistorical. But the issues with 
Voegelin’s phenomenological ‘political religion’ gave rise to criticism much earlier than the late 
1970s. It is well known that Hannah Arendt fundamentally objected to Voegelin’s ‘political religion’ 
as a plausible concept for explaining National Socialism. This thesis has argued that the disagreement 
between the two thinkers has been exaggerated. Voegelin and Arendt have come to represent two 
polarised schools of thought regarding not only Nazism as a ‘political religion’ but more generally 
also Nazism and the Holocaust. The gulf that once existed between Voegelin’s and Arendt’s views 
on National Socialism laid the foundation for the polarised Holocaust historiography that developed 
in the postwar years. Despite new information about Voegelin’s hesitations about his own concept, 
the polarisation between his and Arendt’s ideas was vital to the ‘order’ of the scholarly field. The 
present thesis has shown that Voegelin and Arendt in fact were much closer intellectually regarding 
their thoughts on Nazism than has been portrayed in the historiography. They shared the insight that 
the Nazi world-view would challenge any conventional notions of a political ideology – that National 
Socialism was ‘incorrect’ in the face of old concepts. It is thus an irony that the polarisation between 
these two thinkers has worked to conceal the fact that both Voegelin and Arendt raised thoughts about 
this ‘incorrectness’ of National Socialist ideology that has now become established in historiography. 
The Scandinavian intellectuals were singled out for this thesis because of their connections with Nazi 
Germany and their self-acclaimed radicalism. The thesis has discussed their political trajectories in 
the Scandinavian milieu in the light of Michael Wildt’s notion of the Nazi ‘uncompromising 
generation.’ We cannot speak of these Scandinavians coming anywhere near an ideal-type of Nazi – 
like the way that scholars often portray men like Otto Ohlendorf as representative of his generation. 
Considering their national contexts and the lack of an institutional Nazi framework, however, their 
ideas and beliefs nevertheless share such similarities to those of men like Ohlendorf that this thesis 
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finds it fruitful to expand on Wildt’s focus on the National Socialist mentality in order to analyse 
Nazism also outside of Nazi Germany. 
The analytical chapters identified two main points on ‘political religion’ and these points were further 
discussed in the light of empirical case studies on National Socialist movements in Scandinavia. The 
thesis firstly compared the two schools of ‘political religion’-theory with the ways these 
Scandinavians discussed the relationship between religion and National Socialism. Secondly, the 
thesis has made a comparison of Voegelin’s and Arendt’s thoughts that Nazi ideology, with the ideas 
among Scandinavian National Socialists regarding their Nazi world-view before and during the 
German occupation of Denmark and Norway. The comparison shows that both approaches were 
‘incorrect’ towards a too rigid notion of National Socialism, These are not two parallel arguments. 
Instead, through an examination of these National Socialists’ attitudes towards Nazi Germany and 
religion, this ‘ideological incorrectness’ becomes even clearer. The Scandinavian movement and 
individuals in this study raised heavy critique of the despotic tendencies of the Christian religious 
system, in a similar manner to that of liberal theologians at the time. A sense of ‘theological 
incorrectness’ (a concept taken from the field of cognitive studies on religion) informed these Nazi 
writers and liberal theologians alike in their attitudes to Nazism. They displayed varying degrees of 
sympathy for Nazism, as they saw this world-view as a first revolt against the dogmas of religious 
systems. For the Nazi intellectuals, the idea of creating a Nazi ‘political religion’ was a process that 
too much resembled the evils of old Christian confessionalism. Regarding the discussion on 
functionalist and phenomenologist approaches to ‘political religion’, the thesis clarified that the 
intellectual output among these Scandinavians described an ideal-type religion much closer to a 
phenomenologist approach to the concept.  
Yet, the existing theories on phenomenologist approaches to ‘political religion’ assume a National 
Socialist ideology much more rigid than was actually the case among the Scandinavians in this study. 
For them, National Socialism was indeed universal and generic. But it was an generic core to Nazism 
that had emerged as a result of a transnational pattern of divergent National Socialist ideas and 
practices. This transnational logic behind National Socialism created a legitimate space in Nazi theory 
as the Scandinavians faced German occupation. There were similarities between the criticism of 
Christianity identified as a principle of ‘theological incorrectness’ and the later critique we find 
among these Scandinavian intellectuals that they directed against the policies of Nazi occupation. The 
‘theological incorrectness’ among the Scandinavian National Socialists’ critique of Christianity was 
the root of the ‘ideological incorrectness’ that had attracted them to Nazism. Moreover, the 
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ideological incorrectness developed as both an ideal and political practice among the Scandinavian 
National Socialists, as the gulf between them and the Nazi occupation authorities grew wider. The 
ideological incorrectness that characterises their writings on National Socialism further resonates 
with the transgressive mind-set that scholars today who are working on Nazi Germany characterise 
as distinctively National Socialist.  
The Scandinavian National Socialist critique of the ‘dogmatic’ Nazi political religion that, for them, 
represented the imperialistic Nazi rule of occupation was a critique of dogmas, homogenisation and 
corruption. In their view, the Nazi ‘political religion’ corrupted their idea of what true National 
Socialism was. This thesis has shown that the Scandinavians’ ideas about Nazi imperialism were 
strikingly similar to the image of Nazism that persists in historiography. In ‘political religion’-theory, 
Nazism is too closely tied to ideas of the hegemony of Nazi dogmas. Their idea of a true National 
Socialism, however, was one that broke the boundaries of the old world. The transgressive mentality 
that they shared with men like Otto Ohlendorf was the aspect of Nazism that also caused Hannah 
Arendt, and eventually Eric Voegelin, to reject the notion of ‘political religion’ as a fruitful analytical 
tool. This study has sought to theorise ‘political religion’ with a broader image of Nazi ideology in 
mind. Rather than assuming that the striving for homogenisation that characterises the crimes of the 
Holocaust were replicated in Nazi perceptions of their ideology, this Scandinavian case study has 
described another side of Nazism: its ‘ideological incorrectness’. To many, it appears as a less 
totalitarian side of Nazism. Yet, its ‘ideological incorrectness’ is a side of Nazism that more than 
anything can help to explain its continent-wide support – and eventually its deadly consequences. 
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